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a journal of East & West studies

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Soviet Foreign Policy
Active Measures & Political Strategy

The Plot to Kill the Pope
Paul B. Henze

The United Nations: Shattered Illusions
Juliana G. Pilon

The USSR & Central America
Sol Sanders Jiri Valenta

Sino-Soviet Relations
Harry Gelman Leif Rosenberger
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IMPORTANT NOTICE

To Our Readers

This issue of SURVEY is a double number (118/119). It is dated Autumn-Winter 1983 and constitutes the entire Volume 27. It leaves out two issues—for Spring and Summer 1983—in order to enable us to publish SURVEY on a timely basis, so that in future its content corresponds to the actual cover date.

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JAPAN'S ECONOMY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Edited by
GIANNI FODELLA

This is an attempt at comparison between the Japanese and Italian economic systems, or rather it is a study on the Japanese economic system seen, whenever possible, in a mirror provided by the working of the Italian economy.

The most important aspects of the two economies are nearly all considered here. *Andrea Boltho* points out the main similarities and differences of the two economic systems starting from the reconstruction period; *Paolo Sylos Labini* provides a thorough analysis of the manufacturing industry; *Mario Monti* outlines the financial structure; *Fabrizio Onida* focuses on the changing role of the two economies in the international division of labour; *Tadao Takagi* examines the crucial knot represented by the labour force and its use; *Toshiaki Furuki* describes regional imbalances in both countries; *Antonio Lombardo* shows that not only are there similarities in the economic field but also in the way politics are run in Japan and Italy. Although not comparative in a strict sense the essays by *Jon Halliday, Soichiro Ariki* and *Kiyoshi Kojima* help a great deal to make the overall picture clearer.

The introductory article tries to consider in a comprehensive prospect the problem of comparing the economies of two countries that have followed a similar path towards development and growth, although with different results in the last two decades. One particular aspect dealt with, which needs further study, concerns the effects of the diffusion of technology on the economic growth process, considering especially the case of Japan.

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From Azeff to Agca

THE tenebrous world of Dostoevsky's The Devils *and Conrad's* Under Western Eyes *has never been particularly well understood in the West, even though glimpses of it have been imaginatively absorbed by some Western readers. The world of* provokatsiya *was typified by the Okhrana* agent provocateur *Azeff who infiltrated the ranks of the Social Revolutionaries and organized a number of terrorist acts in Russia. Other* agents provocateurs *in the Okhrana had more limited aims: for instance, they infiltrated the* milieux *of Polish exiles abroad. They often produced writings and pamphlets which served the same purpose as disinformation does more generally today, thus providing the early prototypes for this technique. But the focus of Western interest was always the internal significance and general ethical implications of the revolutionaries' struggles with their alter egos in the tsarist security police, the Okhrana. Historical continuity between the Okhrana and the KGB has also always been perceived in terms of internal repression. However, such continuity is relevant not only to internal developments in the Soviet Union, but also to the murky activities of the Soviet secret police abroad. Neither a knowledge of these, nor an understanding of their origins is very widespread. Moreover, it is not simply a question of continuity—the KGB is not only bigger and more efficient than the Okhrana—it is a problem of the new scope of its activities as a result of the change in the nature of the Russian state; it is a problem of the international implications of its transformation into a totalitarian Soviet state.*

A general reluctance in the West to face these implications, as exemplified in the attempt on the Pope's life, has induced us to devote a special section of this issue of SURVEY to an analysis of the affair, particularly in respect of the general background to the historical record of terrorist acts abroad and the attempts to cover them up by disinformation techniques. The matter is now in the hands of an Italian magistrate. But it is not always recognized that legal decisions require standards of proof that are different from those necessary for holding reasonable beliefs about historical crimes (organized with the full support of the machinery of state). After all, even today we have no legal proof of who organized the murder of Trotsky, but although the murderer, Ramon Mercader, unlike Ali Agca, never indicated who stood behind him, there is very little doubt about the identity of the instigator.

In the 1930s, many people were ready to believe Bukharin's confession about crimes he had not committed; today there are many who are inclined to disbelieve the confession of Ali Agca about a crime they know that he has committed.

L.L.

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Misinformation and Disinformation

The Plot to Kill the Pope*

Paul B. Henze

Mendacity is the immortal soul of communism. They cannot get rid of it. The gap between the reality and the façade is so enormous that the lie has become a normal and natural way of life.

Leszek Kolakowski

THE attempt to kill the Polish Pope, John Paul II, on 13 May 1981 was not a casual intrigue undertaken for the amusement of the plotters. It was not the work of smugglers creating a diversion or of criminals looking for notoriety. Mehmet Ali Agca, who came within inches of killing the Pontiff in St Peter's Square, was not a crank or a demented loner. Demented loners can become assassins, as the attack on President Reagan by John W. Hinckley on 30 March 1981 demonstrated. But Agca was no Hinckley. He was not mentally deranged. If he had been, he would not have been selected for the key role in what Zbigniew Brzezinski has called " the most ambitious and complex plot of the century." He was no loner either, though he was told to claim that he was and he occasionally appeared to be. It nevertheless became apparent early on in his interrogation in Rome that he was carrying out a plot to kill the Pope. That is beyond debate. Even the Russians admit it and did so from the start. But they maintained that the American government was behind it.

Conspiracy requires motives. Agca is a Turk but there are no credible Turkish grounds for killing a Polish Pope. Moscow's frantic efforts to put the blame on the CIA began almost as soon as the shooting had taken place, well before substantial suspicion began to be directed towards the Kremlin. They have continued ever since. Shrill Russian denials, slander against Italian judges, allegations of US government complicity and a steady flow of disinformation from Eastern Europe all heighten the impression of Soviet guilt. So do the abusive attacks on the Pope which appeared in the Soviet provincial press long before the shooting took place in Rome. The Soviet Union stands alone among concerned governments in never having encouraged any objective investigation or independent assessment of the plot.

* Two and a half years after the attack on the Polish Pope in St Peter's Square, the first scholarly study of the episode and its background, *The Plot to Kill the Pope* by Paul B. Henze, has been published in Britain and the United States by Croom Helm Ltd., London, and Charles Scribner & Sons, New York. The article which follows is adapted from this book. It includes additional material which came to the attention of the author after the book was completed.

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THE strong condemnation of " international " terrorism by officials of the new Reagan Administration during the early months of 1981 and their frequent allegations of Soviet support for it put Moscow on the defensive. During this period there was a marked increase in Soviet propaganda aimed at proving that the United States created and supported terrorist groups. There was little that was new in all this material except for details. The basic line can be traced back to forged " documents " which surfaced in Turkey in the 1960s through the efforts of a pro-Soviet Turkish senator, Haydar Tunçkanat.[1] It was developed more ambitiously in the forged US Army Field Manual 30–31B which was first publicized in the Ankara leftist newspaper *Barış* (Peace) in March 1975. The fake field manual subsequently appeared in more than 20 other countries.[2]

Detailed examination of Soviet media output in the period *immediately before* the attack on the Pope provides evidence that a conscious effort to blame the United States, and specifically the CIA, for the assassination may have been made in advance. A long article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* of 5 May 1981 by veteran KGB propagandist Ernst Genri is especially revealing. Called " Terrorism without a mask: using other people's hands," the article discusses a long series of assassinations allegedly instigated or attempted by the CIA since the 1950s. " There are threads stretching from the CIA both to neo-fascist and to left extremist terrorists," the author maintains, and what is more:

> By and large . . . the strictest secrecy is observed and everything is done through a *podstavnoi apparat* (" dummy structure "). CIA operations thus represent a kind of *agent* terrorism which makes no declarations, parades no ideology . . .

Turkey is prominent among the countries where Genri describes alleged CIA operational techniques specifically:

> CIA operations in Turkey in the 1970s were carried out chiefly at the hands of the fascist Grey Wolves Organization. The number of their victims reached 2,500 by 1980. The instructions drawn up for them at the CIA pointed out: " It is necessary to carry out acts which give the public the impression that revolutionaries committed them. Here you should not stop even at killings."[3]

If we substitute KGB for CIA in this Genri article, we have an accurate description of the Soviet *modus operandi* in Turkey during the second

[1] George Harris, *Troubled Alliance* (AEI/Hoover, Washington/Stanford, 1972), p. 138. Tunçkanat lent himself a second time to Soviet purposes in 1969 when he published a book entitled *The Inside Story of the Bilateral Agreements* filled with allegations of American highhandedness and bad intentions in dealing with Turkey. See Paul B. Henze, *Goal: Destabilization* (European American Institute for Security Research, Marina del Rey, California, Dec. 1981), pp. 40–41.

[2] The forged field manual is described and reproduced in part in *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 6, 19 Feb. 1980, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1980).

[3] The translations are from FBIS LD080943, 8 May 1981: Moscow *Sovetskaya Rossiya* in Russian, 5 May 1981, p. 5.

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great wave of terrorism in the period 1975–80.[4] There is a remarkable similarity between this line and the " explanation " of Agca's crime and background which Soviet sources immediately provided after the shooting and which have been embroidered and extended by Soviet propaganda ever since.

Parallel to the mounting effort in the Soviet media to attribute " international " terrorism to the United States, there was a crescendo of argumentation that what was happening in Poland was basically the work of the CIA. The aim was to destabilize Poland and overthrow its government. German " revanchist " organizations were " reported " to be planning to " free " Silesia and East Prussia. *Pravda* of 15 April condemned a ceremony in a Warsaw cemetery commemorating the victims of the Katyn Forest massacre as a Nazi-inspired action.[5] Senior Politburo ideologist Mikhail Suslov led a CPSU delegation to Poland at the end of the third week of April for a " friendly visit " with Polish party colleagues. Cardinal Wyszynski's health was declining rapidly at this time, but Suslov could not have returned happy with what he had found. The Polish Church was not going to be severely affected by the Cardinal's passing. The presence of John Paul II in the Vatican gave it strength. Solidarity and the Church together were assuming real political power in the country. It is possible that Suslov might have been among the small Kremlin group involved in planning the elimination of the Pope. His advice, when he returned to Moscow on 24 April, might well have played a role in confirming the plan for quick action by Mehmet Ali Agca, who departed from Milan on 25 April for Majorca with an Italian tour group and telephoned Musa Serdar Çelebi in Frankfurt a few days later to say that he had received the promised money and would now go to Rome and " finish the job."

Soviet propagandists were gripped by the hysteria that they accused the United States of fomenting. " Whence the threat to Poland? " *Literaturnaya gazeta* asked on 29 April. Not from Soviet intervention, the paper maintained, but from the United States, which was trying to intimidate West Europeans into accepting NATO " missile rearmament."[6] The same paper on 6 May called developments in Poland the work of " concealed foreign masters " who had formulated " a very real plot against socialist Poland, a plot that was deeply entrenched."[7] The CIA, naturally, was seen as the prime culprit—it had been mustering anti-socialist forces to prepare " the current Polish crisis throughout the second half of the 1970s ":

> . . . those forces of international reaction which for a long time—but particularly since the arrival in the upper echelons of US power of

[4] Paul B. Henze, " Turkey on the Rebound," in the *Wilson Quarterly*, Special Issue, 1982, pp. 123–25.

[5] FBIS reports as follows: LD072318, Moscow in Polish to Poland, 7 Apr. 1981; LD141830, Moscow in Polish to Poland, 14 Apr. 1981; LD272237, Moscow in Polish to Poland, 27 Apr. 1981; LD142102, Moscow TASS in English, 14 Apr. 1981.

[6] FBIS LD071307, Moscow *Literaturnaya gazeta* in Russian, 29 Apr. 1981, p. 9.

[7] FBIS LD111525, Moscow *Literaturnaya gazeta* in Russian, 6 May 1981, p. 14.

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> the rabid anti-communist Brzezinski—have chosen Poland as the main " link of subversion in the socialist system."[8]

This theme has been repeatedly embroidered in disinformation that has appeared over more than two years and figures prominently in the Yona Andronov series " On the Wolf's Track," the most extensive compilation of disinformation on the plot against the Pope which has appeared to date. (See further discussion below.)

THE Pope was shot at 17:21 hours on 13 May 1981. Warsaw TV interrupted its programme an hour later to announce the attack, followed by Warsaw Radio soon after. It took Moscow Radio another half an hour to broadcast a brief report on the shooting. While Warsaw media coverage during the days which followed was voluminous, Soviet media were at first very cautious. There was no special TV coverage. TASS issued a brief bulletin on the evening of the shooting:

> An assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II was made today in the square in front of St Peter's. An unidentified gunman made several shots at him. According to ANSA agency, the Pope was wounded and taken away by an ambulance.[9]

Pravda carried a 15-line dispatch on the shooting the next morning. Leonid Brezhnev sent a message of condolence to the Pope which was printed in *Pravda* on 15 May. It was of remarkable brevity:

> I am deeply upset by the criminal attack carried out against you. I wish you a rapid and complete recovery.

From 15 May onwards Soviet media gave the story a good deal of attention—spurred no doubt by the realization that Soviet citizens (especially those in the Catholic areas in the western part of the country) would be listening to Western broadcasts as well as broadcasts from Poland. While the basic tone of Soviet reporting was formally sympathetic towards the Pope and the attack on him was outrightly condemned, treatment of Agca was clearly tendentious. He was characterized as an " ultra-rightist terrorist " (Moscow Radio, 15 May), as " having close links with extreme rightist terrorist organizations " (TASS, 16 May) and as " a member of a banned pro-fascist party " (*Izvestia*, 15 May).

Guidance had apparently been issued quickly. Only 24 hours after the shooting Moscow Radio had broadcast a comprehensive reflection of this guidance in its " International Diary " programme. Following an account of the Pope's condition, the broadcast proceeded to blame the attack on Nazis and Fascists:

> . . . the man who made the attempt on the Pope's life . . . is a 23-year-old Turkish citizen Mehmet Ali Agca. It has been established that he is a member of the National Action Party—this is how Turkish neo-fascists call themselves. This party is responsible for the death of a number of people in Turkey itself. Its leader,

[8] FBIS LD061315, Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 6 May 1981.
[9] FBIS LD131616, Moscow TASS in English, 1613 GMT, 13 May 1981.

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> Türkeş, who is presently in jail, has tried to launch a large-scale terrorist campaign in the country in order to seize power. Turkish nationalists have followed methods used by Hitler. It should be added that their links with the German Nazis and neo-Nazis are not only ideological but also practical: during the Second World War Türkeş closely collaborated with the Hitlerites, and currently—as pointed out in the charges levelled against him—with neo-Nazi groups in Western countries.

Themes which soon became prominent were obvious here and the notion that Agca as a Turkish fascist would want to shoot the Pope, was implied as natural. The United States was not implicated at this stage (an omission which would soon be remedied), but the recent attempt on President Reagan's life by John W. Hinckley was linked with Nazis! This same broadcast concluded:

> Terror is the main means used by Nazis in their attempts to achieve their objectives. Quite recently, on 30 March, an attempt was made on the life of US President Reagan. He also was shot by a Nazi. There exists incontrovertible evidence that John Hinckley, who made the attempt on the life of the President, was a member of the American National Socialist Party . . .[10]

On 17 May TASS reported from Rome and many organs of the Italian press had concluded that the Pope was a victim of " a broad international neo-fascist plot " and went on to claim that it had been established that during his time in Italy Agca had met with representatives of local rightist terrorist organizations.[11] Though investigation of the plot against John Paul II was continuing, TASS concluded, it was already possible to reach a basic conclusion: the attack had been a provocation of neo-fascists on the international plane.

None of the information about Agca's background and travels that preoccupied the Western press during this period was reported in Moscow. The fact that he had spent time in Bulgaria went unmentioned. " Just who is Mehmet Ali Agca? " asked the Moscow weekly *Nedelya* on 17 May. " He is 23, born in Turkey, joined the rightist pro-fascist party which had as its aim the establishment of a fascist dictatorship in the

[10] FBIS LD142250 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1645 GMT, 14 May 1981.

[11] As far as investigations have been able to determine to date, Agca had no contact with Red Brigades or other terrorist groups or supporters in Italy during the six months he travelled in and out of the country before he attempted to kill the Pope. We still do not have a complete picture of how Agca spent all his time during this period and unexpected information may come to light. As matters stand, it appears that Agca was deliberately kept separate from the Italian terrorist scene. Many other intriguing questions arise as we contemplate the devious processes which must have led to the assassination attempt in the form in which it eventually was made. Why, for example, with a proven terrorist organization like the Red Brigades (as well as Italian rightist groups) available, was a Turk used at all? The Soviets may well have concluded that no Italian could be trusted to attack the Pope even though this particular Pope was Polish, not Italian. Soon after the attack, Soviet and some East European publications speculated that the attack might have been planned by conservative Church elements opposed to the Pope as a Pole and as a modernist, but this was not an easy line to develop for disinformation purposes and the theme has never become a major feature of Soviet disinformation or defensive propaganda. No evidence has ever appeared to support it.

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country . . ."[12] This account concluded by calling attention to Agca's 1979 letter threatening the Pope at the time of his visit to Turkey.

For Moscow it was all cut and dried very early on, much more so than for even those Western reporters who were inclined to accept an explanation not very different from that which the Soviet leadership wanted their people—and the world—to believe. General allegations of an international neo-fascist plot were not enough, however. The bare bones needed some flesh. The journal *Nauka i religiya* featured an article by Yuli Grigulevich, a writer who had long preoccupied himself with papal affairs, in which he postulated a conspiracy to " denigrate all leftist forces," possibly involving the secret Italian Masonic lodge, " P-2, working hand in hand with the CIA." The murder of the Pope, he claimed, " would fully meet with the aspirations of ultra-conservative clerical circles in Italy."[13]

Soon Soviet propagandists were laying responsibility for the attack on the United States. The claim that Hinckley was a Nazi who attacked President Reagan was conveniently forgotten. *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and *Komsomolskaya Pravda* featured articles on 31 May which drew on a rich mixture of themes that went back to the fake US Army Field Manual:

> The American secret service supplied the Turkish terrorists not only with training, but with weapons. On the majority of the pistols, bombs and explosive devices which have been confiscated it is not difficult to make out the familiar stamp: " Made in USA."[14]

But the United States is not alone—there are " local Maoists " too:

> They also rob banks, wreak vengeance on genuine patriots and democrats. The only difference lies in the fact that their masters are on the other side of the ocean—Peking.

Meanwhile Novosti had been experiencing a burst of creativity. It set one of its most imaginative writers, Vladimir Katin, to work on a dispatch which first went out over its foreign wire on 27 May. The fundamental purpose was identical to that of the *Sovetskaya Rossiya* article, but the argumentation was more specific. The two probably reflected the same basic propaganda guidance. Called " The Attack on the Pope—not the action of a loner but a ploy by extreme rightist neo-fascist forces," this story implied, without ever quite saying so directly, that the attack had been launched because the American Ambassador to the Vatican, William Wilson, had had an unsatisfactory meeting with the Pope on 13

[12] No evidence has ever appeared that Agca was in fact a member of the Türkeş—i.e. National Movement Party—in Turkey or of any of its subsidiary organizations. Nor did he have any links with religious fundamentalists or the National Salvation Party.

[13] The article appeared in *Nauka i religiya* (No. 9, 1981), pp. 57–58.

[14] The notion that the United States and other NATO countries were actually behind Bulgarian support for terrorism in Turkey was subsequently propagated in that country by Ugur Mumcu in a book called *Silah Kaçakçiligi ve Terör* (Arms Smuggling and Terror) (Tekin Yayinevi, Istanbul, 1982). Mumcu, a leftist publicist who now writes for the leftist Istanbul daily *Cumhuriyet*, is well known as a purveyor of Soviet disinformation in Turkey. The fact of Bulgarian support for terrorism in Turkey and Bulgarian tolerance of major Turkish arms and narcotics smugglers was so well known in that country that Mumcu had to contrive a theory that might at least have some chance of being believable to Turkish leftists or anti-Western elements. The theory has not won wide acceptance anywhere.

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March when Palestinian issues were discussed. " The Pope emphasized the fact that . . . peace cannot be guaranteed with the help of arms but only through negotiations," Katin wrote; and he continued:

> this opinion . . . is diametrically opposed to the political stand taken by the White House. Moreover, John Paul II added that the situation in El Salvador should be resolved in a peaceful manner—i.e. through special negotiations—but in fact Washington is against this theory.

Katin went on to claim that Washington had been irritated by the meeting the same day between Cardinal Casaroli and PLO " foreign minister " Khaddoumi, as well as a visit to the Vatican by a leftist Salvadoran leader. He concluded by declaring:

> All these things put together represent the unmistakable political background against which the episode of the assassination attempt on the head of the Catholic Church stands out.

This Novosti piece attracted little attention at the time, but it was soon used in Italian translation in the June issue of the monthly magazine distributed by the Soviet Embassy in Rome, *URSS Oggi*. This eventually led to protests by both the American and Italian governments and a disclaimer by the Soviet press attaché in Rome who maintained that it did not represent the official view of the Soviet government.[15]

Thus, less than three weeks after Agca's attack on the Pope, at a time when no Western leader or government had even voiced tentative suspicion of Kremlin involvement (and the US government had been particularly cautious), and at a time too when the Western press, by and large, was still inclined to regard the attack as the work of Turkish rightists in league perhaps with mysterious fundamentalist Islamic forces, leading Soviet media outlets had begun heaping blame on the United States.

The line has never changed. There was no mystery about the plot for Kremlin propagandists, no additional facts to be gathered, no background to be examined. Agca's personality and political links did not interest them. They knew: the CIA was behind it. When disinformation began to circulate, it merely embroidered these same themes.[16] Did not this insistence on a crude, rigid explanation of the plot betray a guilty conscience from the very beginning? Was it merely accidental that El Salvador kept coming up in Soviet commentaries—just as Agca had talked of it in the note he left behind in the Pensione Isa the day he went to shoot the Pope?[17]

[15] " US Protests Soviet Innuendo on Shooting of Pope," in the *New York Times*, 27 Aug. 1981.

[16] For example, Ernst Genri, *Protiv Terrorizma* (Against Terrorism), (Novosti, Moscow), approved for printing 23 Oct. 1981. This book is an elaboration of the article that appeared in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on 5 May 1981. Its appearance may have been directly related to the Soviet effort to deflect suspicion in the papal plot.

[17] Leonid Zamyatin, Chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Information Department had woven El Salvador into an early discussion of terrorism on 28 March 1981 (FBIS LD071050, Moscow Domestic Television in Russian). It was a major preoccupation of the Soviets during this period. Note the emphasis on El Salvador in Katin's Novosti dispatch implicating the US in the attack on the Pope. Most curious is Agca's mention of " freedom in Afghanistan and El Salvador " as justification for his attack on the Pope. No Turk except a leftist loyal to the Soviet Union would understand freedom in

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AT the time of the shooting Bulgaria gave the news routine treatment in its media. Already on the day of the attack Todor Zhivkov sent a message to the Pope expressing his indignation at the " act of terror " carried out against him, and sincere wishes for a speedy recovery. It was almost identical to Brezhnev's message which came later. Early evidence that came out of Rome of a " Bulgarian connection " was resolutely ignored in Bulgaria itself.

The Pope himself was never attacked in the central Soviet press either before or after the shooting in St Peter's Square. Unknown to all but a few specialists in the West at the time, however, there had been a massive campaign of vilification of him in the Soviet provincial press in the early months of 1981. The Byelorussian journal *Polymya* termed him a " malicious, lowly, perfidious and backward toady of the American militarists " in March 1981 and *Radyanska Ukraina* was almost as vitriolic.[18] There were similar outbursts of invective in Lithuania. But none of this material was repeated or reflected in the central media. This policy was maintained, as we shall see, until after the exposure of the Bulgarian connection in Rome at the end of 1982.

EVEN if Agca had been killed on the spot,[19] some suspicion of Soviet complicity might have arisen. His rightist cover was probably developed in expectation that he would be killed immediately—or later, if he escaped. He would have been much more convincing as a dead Grey Wolf than he was alive. Even if he had been killed, Poles would have almost certainly suspected the Kremlin. Until an informed defector appears who can tell us about it, we are unlikely to learn exactly what Kremlin pre-emptive planning entailed. Disappointment in Moscow must have been intense when Judge Santiapichi announced his verdict on Agca's trial on 25 September 1981. The case would not be closed. Investigation would continue. During the year that followed, the central Soviet media continued to follow the established line: the US did it. In the Soviet provincial press, attacks against both the Vatican and the Pope increased—still unnoticed in the West. But there were long periods when Moscow kept silent. Encouraged as the Kremlin must have been by the passivity and occasional gullibility of sections of the Western press, Soviet propagandists could not relax. Some media organizations were going to pursue it. The story would not die.

Afghanistan as having any link with killing a Polish Pope. Turks had no interest in El Salvador during this period. Agca's use of the theme was most likely at the urging or direction of his Bulgarian " friends " in Rome.

[18] Cf. Alex Alexiev, " The Kremlin and the Pope," Rand Paper No. P-6855 (Santa Monica, California, Apr. 1983). A condensed version of this study appeared in the *Wall Street Journal*, 30 Mar. 1983.

[19] Agca did not expect to be killed and had made careful preparations to escape. We can infer from what we now know of Bulgarian behaviour that one or both of the Bulgarians who went to St Peter's Square with him planned to kill him. This plan could not be executed because the crowd surged in around Agca and the Pope immediately after the shooting and the Bulgarians gave priority to their own escape. Expectation that Agca would be killed apparently caused inattention to the details of his cover story. Thus his initial explanations for his motives and mission in the first days of his interrogation immediately raised doubts because of the muddle and inconsistencies in his cover story which did not provide a coherent explanation of his actions.

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When the September 1982 *Reader's Digest* appeared, Moscow launched a campaign of vilification against Claire Sterling, the author of the article on the plot. When NBC's " White Paper " was aired on 21 September 1982, TASS termed it a " foul, anti-Soviet sensation invented by the CIA." When NBC broadcast an updated version of the same programme with important new information in January 1983, Moscow threatened reprisals (but took none).

There was little inventiveness in Soviet counter-thrusts. Times were difficult. Brezhnev was dying. Andropov was manoeuvring to improve his chances for the succession. General Jaruzelski's " *coup* " in Warsaw on 13 December 1981 exposed the ideological bankruptcy of the Soviet position there and confirmed the disintegration of the Polish party. The effort the Kremlin was putting into encouraging the " peace movements " and intimidating Western Europe produced only meagre results. When the arrest of Sergei Antonov on 25 November 1982 exposed a Bulgarian connection that had already been visible earlier—but for the most part not seen—the KGB must have been temporarily thrown into consternation. Why had the Bulgarians not taken the elementary precaution of rotating their intelligence team in Rome? What kind of advice had Ambassador Nikolai Tolubeev been giving to Zhivkov? Why were not the KGB officers overseeing the Bulgarian KDS alert to the danger?

Ayvazov had to leave Italy in unseemly haste, invoking diplomatic immunity. Sparse Soviet media comment in early December treated Antonov's arrest as a Bulgarian problem. Moscow fumbled for a couple of weeks. There must have been hope that the Antonov case could be ignored. Surely a bargain of some sort could be struck with the Italians. Somebody could be bribed or frightened, or both . . . It was a futile hope. The widespread tuning in to Western radio in the USSR in recent years had made it far more difficult than it used to be for Soviet media to avoid giving at least minimal attention to important news. By mid-December the Kremlin had decided that bluffing it out would not work. Soviet citizens could not be permitted to form their own ideas on the basis of Western broadcasts. So the word went out to strike back. There was, however, nothing new to strike back with. So the response was the same as in the summer of 1981—with accusations multiplied, rhetoric intensified, language more shrill. The titles of articles from late 1982 into the first months of 1983 demonstrate the frenzy which gripped Soviet propagandists. Here is a random selection of some that appeared in the central press between 14 December 1982 and 1 April 1983; there were dozens of others:

" Absurd Affirmations," *Pravda*, 14 December 1982.

" The Tracks Lead to Washington," *Izvestia*, 26 December 1982.

" The ' Antonov Affair,' or the Attempt to Prove the Impossible," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 29 December 1982.

" Slander Record," *Izvestia*, 30 December 1982.

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" Who's Behind It?—The Origin of a Falsification," *Pravda*, 30 December 1982.

" The Tracks Lead to Langley—the Role of the American Intelligence Services in the Slanderous Campaign against the Bulgarian People's Republic and the USSR," *Pravda*, 5 January 1983.

" Portrait of a Terrorist—How Agca was made a Leftist," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 19 January 1983.

" The Grey Wolf, the Red Hat and Henry Kissinger's Earmuffs," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 26 January 1983.

" The Slanderers are not Quietening Down," *Izvestia*, 18 March 1983.

" A Red Cap for the Grey Wolf," *Izvestia*, 25 March 1983.

These articles and others like them were variations on the same themes: the hullabaloo about the Bulgarian connection was a Western tactic to divert attention from plans for aggression against Eastern Europe. Everyone knows that the CIA masterminds international terrorism—it is hopeless to try to put the blame on the USSR. The suggestion that anyone in a socialist society could have anything to do with terrorism runs counter to Soviet policy and ideology. The allegation was made over and over again that Agca was trained by Americans in Turkey who supported Türkeş's Grey Wolves. Soviet propaganda claimed that Agca invented the Bulgarian connection when he was visited and propositioned by Italian intelligence agents after his conviction.

Nowhere in these accusatory, self-righteous outpourings was there admission of the fact that Agca had spent a long time in Bulgaria in the summer of 1981, no reference to Palestinian training, no reference to the mystery of where Agca went after he escaped to Iran.[20] These are very sensitive topics for the Russians.

Many of the biggest names in the Soviet propaganda hierarchy were drawn into the effort. They did not distinguish themselves. Leonid Zamyatin described revelations of the Bulgarian connection as " an evil-minded campaign that has not a grain nor an iota of truth." It was all a scheme, he maintained, to discredit Bulgaria and the USSR among Catholics. Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences, could only claim that " the US had invented the Bulgarian connection as an explanation for the attempted assassination of the Pope " because " the Reagan Administration was frustrated at the speedy, smooth change of leadership in Moscow after the death of Brezhnev and wanted to cause the Soviet Union difficulty." Pretty thin gruel from a Soviet figure who is supposed to understand so well how America works.

Meanwhile Kremlin frustration resulted in a major press attack on the

[20] Soviet silence about Agca's escape from Turkey into Iran on 1 Feb. 1980 has persisted and heightens suspicion that he may either have gone to the Soviet Union from Iran or to Syria or Libya for training. The fact that the topic has never been dealt with in disinformation output demonstrates Moscow's desire to avoid it altogether. One purpose of his going to Iran may have been simply to build cover as a religious fanatic. This and other explanations are discussed in *The Plot to Kill the Pope*, pp. 159–63.

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Pope himself. On 30 December 1982, TASS publicized a CPSU declaration which called the Pope a rigid anti-communist whose Church was carrying on subversion in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe:

> Unlike his predecessors, the present head of the Catholic Church . . . has taken a much more conservative position vis-à-vis the socialist world . . . The notorious Solidarity, which came to symbolize the crisis provoked by the anti-socialist forces on instructions from overseas, was born not in the wave of disorders that swept the country in the summer of 1980, but in the Catholic Church. Poland is not only the object of the Vatican's subversive activity. It sends " specialists " in Catholic propaganda to other socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

Calling the Pope the " former Archbishop of Krakow," the CPSU accused him of using " the language of Christian prayers " to disguise his political aims. The attack could be seen as a veiled suggestion that the Pope himself had invited assassination. It stood in sharp contradiction to the main propaganda line sustained for more than 18 months: that the US had mounted the assassination attempt.

The Pope had done nothing to provoke this CPSU assault. The Vatican was silent during the arrest of Antonov and the exposure of the Bulgarian connection. The Vatican press office now issued a terse response, pointing out that the Soviet attack:

> . . . contrasts with the reality of the facts and the situation that are well known to all, on which world public opinion has pronounced a judgment that can hardly be contradicted. It contradicts also the evaluation made by Soviet sources, including Soviet officials, who have recognized on various occasions the high skill and untiring work of Pope John Paul II for peace and a just solution of the grave problems that threaten humanity.

The Vatican had clearly the better argument. It was even supported by the Italian Communist Party paper *Unita* on 31 December 1982. This direct, unprovoked attack on the Pope in language hitherto reserved for the Soviet provincial press added to the growing impression even among charitable sceptics in the West that the Kremlin leadership was behind the plot.[21] The new Soviet line has not, however, been sustained. Even during the Pope's visit to Poland in June 1983, Moscow for the most part adhered to a policy of sullen silence rather than vitriolic frontal assault.

BULGARIA'S media paid less attention to the plot against the Pope than those of any other East European country, until Sergei Antonov's arrest. Then they had to become engaged. Bulgarian counteractions ony heightened the impression of culpability. Ayvazov fled Rome and Bekir Çelenk, the notorious Turkish smuggler who was in

[21] But the *New York Times* reporter Henry Kamm was in error when he stated in a dispatch datelined Rome, 30 Dec. 1982, that " the Soviet Union has not in many years directed strong public criticism against a pope." Vilification in the provincial press, which had been going on for a long time, was as official—and probably more indicative of basic Soviet positions—as statements issued by TASS out of Moscow for international consumption.

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London when Antonov was arrested, rushed back to be " taken into custody " in Sofia and ostentatiously imprisoned on 9 December 1982. The Bulgarians arrested two Italian tourists in a transparent move to secure hostages for trading. Ambassador Tolubeev and his Bulgarian charges must have spent a few sleepless nights before the unprecedented press conference which was held in Sofia on 17 December 1982, featuring Ayvazov and Kolev, Antonov's wife and Bekir Çelenk. The press was not permitted to talk to the suspects privately.

The Bulgarian defence effort contained three main features:

1) Repeated protests of innocence coupled with loud accusations of a frame-up—always, in the last analysis, by the United States.
2) Elaborate argumentation on fine points designed in part to obscure the fact that most of the information Agca has provided the Italians fits together logically and information supplied by Scricciolo[22] has confirmed Agca's identification of his Bulgarian handlers and their pattern of operation.
3) Attempts to turn known and hard-to-deny facts in the opposite direction. For example, the Bulgarians could not deny Agca's stay in Bulgaria, although they could obscure its length. They maintained they could not be expected to identify him among the hundreds of thousands of Turks who cross Bulgaria every year. They ignore the fact that few of these Turks stay in Sofia's deluxe hotels and that Bulgarian security keeps track of those who do. The Bulgarians claimed Scricciolo was in fact a Western agent since he contacted known Polish dissidents on visits to Poland, passed money from Western labour unions and attended a meeting at the US Embassy in Rome. One of the most contrived of these arguments is the claim that Agca had to have been abetted by NATO because he travelled through seven NATO countries before the shooting in St Peter's Square![23]

The flood of material which the Bulgarian News Agency began putting out in December 1982 and which has never really ceased, is an indication of great confusion in Sofia which is only mitigated by a policy of brazening it out. Some Bulgarians participating in denial efforts may even be sincere in their efforts, since only an extremely limited circle in Bulgaria would have had knowledge of an operation as sensitive as the killing of the Pope.

The official press in Poland has repeated much of the Soviet and Bulgarian invective on the shooting of the Pope. One gets the impression that this is for the most part done with tongue in cheek. The Polish

[22] Luigi Scricciolo was head of the foreign department of the Italian socialist labour federation, UIL, in which capacity he was one of the principal Western labour leaders in direct contact with Lech Walesa, leader of Solidarity, and Walesa's host in Rome when he came to visit the Pope in Jan. 1981. Arrested in the wake of the Dozier kidnapping in early 1982, Scricciolo confessed a few months later that he had been a Bulgarian agent since 1976. Everything he revealed to the Italian authorities about his activities for the Bulgarians, including his possible involvement in the aborted plan to have Agca kill Lech Walesa when he came to Rome, has not yet been made public.

[23] The only NATO countries through which Agca is known to have travelled, in addition to Turkey, where he started out, are Germany and Italy. Spain, at the time when Agca was in Majorca, had not yet joined NATO.

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population, well informed by Western radio broadcasts, has plenty of information to bolster its already strong inclination to regard the Russians as guilty. Poles have doubtlessly enjoyed the discomfort Moscow's and Sofia's vituperation reveals.[24]

IT is impossible to draw a clear boundary between *mis*information and *dis*information. The two categories are part of a continuum which in Soviet practice extends from distortion to total falsification, misrepresentation and forgery. All parts of this spectrum are interconnected and consciously manipulated to achieve desired results. Thus false information planted abroad and seemingly originating from sources that have no connection with the USSR or Eastern Europe is fed back into the Soviet propaganda system, cited in the Soviet press as authoritative confirmation of views which the CPSU propagandists want to spread, and then it is disgorged by TASS and Novosti in their international services. Thus spewed out again into international information channels, it becomes self-confirming. Sometimes the process goes through several cycles. Not only current news, but even scholarly research and intelligence are influenced.

To those familiar with Soviet techniques and objectives, such operations are relatively easy to identify, but often difficult to prove. To accomplish their purposes, Soviet propagandists and KGB operatives do not rely only on the credulity and predisposition to believe of Western and Third World journalists, writers and intellectuals. They exploit the readiness of reporters to accept cash or other favours in return for doing their bidding. In Soviet usage, *dezinformatsiya* means deliberately concocted, falsely attributed or distorted information brought to the surface through ostensibly non-Soviet channels or outlets. Of course, the more legitimate (and unwitting) these are, the better.

Disinformation on the papal plot began to appear in the autumn of 1981. The manner in which it appeared reflected familiar KGB techniques. The purpose was to reinforce the Soviet case, now in need of it, that Agca was a committed rightist fanatic who had shot the Pope out of a combination of religious and "fascist" motivation and that he was backed by the United States.

In late October 1981 the Munich tabloid *Bildzeitung* featured a story claiming that German police had discovered that Agca had stayed for six months in a hotel in Ottobrunn, near Munich, while being trained by a German neo-Nazi group. When? Not specified. No dates. No real facts. No German police official could be found to verify it. Though *Milliyet* in Istanbul gave the story headline coverage on 24 October, it quickly evaporated. Too many specific facts about Agca's travels and connections had already been established by that time to give the tale a semblance of seriousness.

[24] According to a poll taken among Poles in Poland recently and reported in *Paris Match*, 18 June 1983, at least three out of five Poles believe Moscow instigated the assassination attempt against John Paul II. Only a tiny fraction professed to believe that the US was involved. Thirty-seven per cent safely claimed that they had no opinion.

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Another item of disinformation that appeared in the same month has had a longer life. It is a letter allegedly written from Agca to Alparslan Türkeş, from Munich. It has no date. No original of the letter has ever appeared. Photocopies of it " were sent by unknown persons to certain individuals and organizations " even its most enthusiastic publicizer has admitted.[25] This is a common Soviet technique. Absence of a date is understandable for a forgery, much less likely with a genuine letter. Genuine Agca letters have invariably been dated. The forgers did not want the authenticity of their work to be called further into doubt by a date that might later prove untenable. However, the content of the letter is the most dubious feature. It consists merely of a string of National Action Party slogans, in language that is not characteristic of Agca. Türkeş has denied all knowledge of it. No other evidence substantiating an Agca-Türkeş correspondence or link has come to light in Germany or Turkey.

Unconvincing as the Agca letter to Türkeş looks, not much would be proved if it were genuine. By the time it appeared, evidence was already accumulating that Agca had been sheltered in a network that was camouflaged to look rightist although ultimately it served Soviet purposes. Proof of the nature of this network materialized when Musa Serdar Çelebi's key role became evident in the autumn of 1982.[26]

DURING the winter of 1981–82 when new facts about the plot against the Pope were slowly coming out, misinformation and disinformation spread. Some was designed to prove that Agca had, after all, acted out of deeply anti-Christian motivation. His home town, Malatya, so a widely circulated story went, suffered severely at the time of the Crusades and intense anti-Christian sentiment had survived there ever since. So it was natural for Agca to attack the Pope . . . If one bothers to read half a page of Malatya's history in a tourist guidebook, this tale is seen to be fantasy. So many armies have fought in what is today south-east Turkey since the time of the Crusades that memory of alleged Crusader atrocities would long since have been obliterated. Modern Malatya came into existence only in the mid-nineteenth century when the old city, several miles to the

[25] Ugur Mumcu, *Agca Dosyasi* (Tekin Yayinevi, Istanbul, 1983), p. 107. The letter would have been forgotten except for the continued publicity Mumcu has given it. A series of columns Mumcu published in *Cumhuriyet* during Dec. and Jan. 1982/83 (and which subsequently formed the basis for the book cited above) included a great deal of information which has served Soviet disinformation purposes. This is not surprising in view of Mumcu's established record as a purveyor of Soviet-originated disinformation in Turkey. In another recently published book, *Suçlular ve Güçlüler*, (Tekin Yayinevi, Istanbul, 1982), he repeats much of the analysis he wrote during the 1970s based on Soviet forgeries, without any reference to the fact that the documents have since been exposed as fabrications.

[26] Çelebi headed the Turkish Federation in Germany, an ostensibly non-political cultural and welfare service organization which was widely known to be closely associated with Türkeş-oriented individuals. Çelebi himself, born in 1951 of a reputable family from Dörtyol, near Iskenderun, graduated from Istanbul Technical University as an engineer and then went to work in the Turkish Customs Ministry. Here, it seems, he became associated with smugglers involved in arms and narcotics trafficking and was probably recruited into serving Soviet purposes. He was a key link in contacts with Agca that led to the activation of the plot against the Pope. He was arrested in Germany in the autumn of 1982 and extradited to Italy in Jan. 1983. When and if he is eventually tried, he may have even more to reveal than the Bulgarian Antonov about how the plot against the Pope was orchestrated.

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west, was wrecked in fighting between Ottoman armies and the rebellious Egyptian leader, Mehmet Ali. There are other incongruities in the story too. The Agca family ancestors came from a region well to the north of Malatya, and its roots extended up to Kayseri. Agca's mother and father only moved to Malatya in 1965. As newcomers living in a *gecekondu* on the edge of the city, they would not necessarily be steeped in Malatya traditions, even if these were anti-Christian. As I have demonstrated in a recent article in *Encounter*, they are not.[27]

This kind of disinformation liberally larded with lurid tales of Agca's alleged adventures in sex (both hetero- and homosexual), narcotics and violence formed the basis of two long articles which appeared in the Dublin *Sunday Press* on 14 and 21 February 1982. Their authors, Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan-Witts, expanded these articles and combined them with accounts of papal politics and Vatican intrigue to make up a lengthy book, *Pontiff*, which was published in New York in the summer of 1983. If the book were honestly advertised as fiction, it would merit attention only as a moderately entertaining effort at commercial exploitation of the Agca story and the attack on the Pope. It purports, however, to be the result of research and concludes with a section on sources which aims to give the impression that serious investigation was carried out in many countries and information supplied to the authors by many intelligence services. The discussion of Agca's background and activities in Turkey is nevertheless replete with elementary errors.

If the authors of *Pontiff* did not consciously use disinformation, they exploited it indiscriminately to add to what they had already embroidered. The end result serves Soviet purposes by confusing the story of the plot to kill the Pope. It leaves the perplexed reader with the impression that the story is perhaps too complex and sordid for anyone ever to get to the bottom of it. *Pontiff* repeatedly alleges KGB involvement in the plot and it has been attacked by two Soviet apologists in the US who have branded the effort to demonstrate KGB complicity—"Free World Disinformation."[28]

Among the confusing currents of misinformation and disinformation which *Pontiff* dramatizes and the Soviets now openly spread, is the assertion that renegade erstwhile CIA agent Frank Terpil served as Agca's trainer. This story has been repeated over and over again in many variations and even, occasionally, taken up by serious media outlets in the US and Europe. The story can be utilized to demonstrate a CIA link only by ignoring the vigorous prosecution by the American authorities of the entire group of men with former intelligence connections who served Qaddafy. This is undoubtedly why Yona Andronov in his *Literaturnaya*

[27] Paul Henze, "Quest for an Assassin: Mehmet Ali Agca, Report from Malatya," in *Encounter*, May 1983, pp. 9–18.

[28] Frank Brodhead and Edward S. Herman in "The Press, the KGB and the Pope," *The Nation*, 2 July 1983. These authors had previously published "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Case Study in Free World Disinformation" in the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, No. 19, Spring-Summer 1983. Their objections to *Pontiff* notwithstanding, their basic arguments are remarkably similar to Soviet and Bulgarian protestations of innocence.

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gazeta series of June and July 1983 (see below) avoids mention of any Terpil connection with Libya and instead has him training Grey Wolves in the Middle East, but also without mention of the PLO. Agca clearly had Palestinian connections. He may have had a Libyan connection also, but nothing has yet come to light to substantiate it. In either case, the connection is much more likely to have been with trusted Soviet surrogates rather than with Frank Terpil.

Soviet disinformation specialists have not had an easy time fabricating material that would divert attention from mounting evidence of communist instigation of the plot against the Pope, but they have not stopped trying. An example of a variation on familiar themes came to light in the spring of 1983. It seems first to have appeared in the Madrid weekly *El Tiempo* in early March. It was a forgery of an alleged 1978 " top secret " memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter purporting to outline a plan for destabilizing Poland. Curiously, the Warsaw paper *Zycie Warszawy* reprinted the forgery on 13 March 1983 under a Washington dateline. The " memorandum " implies that the election of Cardinal Wojtyla as Pope was an intrinsic part of the destabilization scheme. The forgery may reflect an authentic KGB analysis from late 1978 attributing the Polish Pope's election to a successful conspiracy Brzezinski allegedly mounted through Cardinal Krol of Philadelphia and West German Catholic leaders. This forgery seems to have been designed more for effect inside the Soviet empire than in the West. Among other things, it may have been seen as potentially useful in prosecuting Solidarity leaders in Poland.[29]

Disinformation continued to appear during the summer of 1983. In early July, two forged cables allegedly sent from the US Embassy in Rome to Washington in August and December 1982 suddenly appeared in left-wing publications in Europe and attracted brief attention in other media throughout the world, when they were immediately exposed by the US State Department. The purpose of the memos was to demonstrate that the Bulgarian connection was consciously fabricated by the US and implemented by cooperative Italians. TASS's handling of these " documents " demonstrates Soviet disinformation techniques in their most crass and simple form. A TASS dispatch datelined Rome released on 14 July (a day before the Washington denial) dramatized the forgeries as documents that had simply come to light in Italy, stating, *inter alia*:

> The outcry in the West over the alleged complicity of Bulgaria and other socialist countries in Turkish terrorist Ali Agca's attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II has been inspired directly by Washington, it follows from a report released by the news agency ANSA. The agency refers to photocopies of two secret documents drawn up by US Ambassador to Italy Maxwell Rabb and obtained by the Italian magazine *Pace e Guerra* . . . The first document, dating back to August 1982, speaks bluntly about organizing a campaign in Italy to

[29] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, " With a Forged Memo, the Soviets Counterattack," the *Washington Post*, 30 Mar. 1983.

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> influence public opinion with a view to convincing it of Bulgaria's involvement in the act of terrorism . . . The second document, composed in December 1982, speaks already about the " success " of the operation . . . Every effort is still being made to amplify the propaganda ballyhoo in Italy over the assassination attempt . . . Recently official authorities arranged a meeting between Ali Agca . . . and a group of Italian and foreign journalists . . . The right-wing terrorist did not disappoint their hopes and used the granted opportunity to issue a blatantly slanderous statement in relation to Bulgaria and the USSR.

The " blatantly slanderous statement " was too embarrassing for TASS to repeat. It was made in connection with an investigation into the kidnapping of Emanuela Orlandi, the 15-year-old daughter of a Vatican official, on 22 June 1983. At first appearing to be the work of sensation-seekers, this mysterious kidnapping, not yet solved at the time of this writing, has increasingly come to look like yet another Soviet-Bulgarian instigated attempt to depict Agca as backed by Islamic fundamentalists. The abduction was carried out by unknown persons claiming to be Turks and " identified " in early August as the " Anti-Christian Turkish Liberation Army " allegedly seeking Agca's release. No organization of this name has ever come to light in Turkey. The characterization is implausible. Fundamentalist Muslims in Turkey have never identified themselves in terms of anti-Christian sentiment. Nor have such people ever shown an interest in Agca, who was not religious. Agca was brought to Rome for interrogation, he claimed no connection with or knowledge of such a group and, taking advantage of the presence of a large gathering of journalists outside the building where he was questioned, declared that he knew he was working for the KGB and had been trained in Syria and elsewhere by Soviet agents. There is no reason to believe he was not telling the truth.

THE kidnapping of Emanuela Orlandi and the surfacing of the forged US Embassy Rome cables may have been timed to lend weight to the most extensive compilation of misinformation, disinformation and distortion on the plot to kill the Pope yet produced in Moscow: three full-page articles by Yona Andronov which appeared in *Literaturnaya gazeta* on 16 and 29 June and 6 July 1983. They were reprinted immediately in Sofia and publicized by the Bulgarian Press Agency in its European services in mid-July. They were subsequently issued in English as a booklet by the Sofia Press Agency. We see here a good example of how the Soviet and Bulgarian disinformation efforts have been enmeshed. Because of their length these articles have so far attracted very little attention in the West, but they deserve detailed study both by those interested in the papal plot and by students of Soviet disinformation techniques.

Andronov, who identifies himself as a former *Literaturnaya gazeta* correspondent in New York, repeatedly reminds his readers that he did his " research " as a journalist (" *po-zhurnalisticheski* ") and tries to

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create the impression that what he has to say has merely been gathered in the course of personal investigations in Turkey, Bulgaria and Germany—travels which he indeed appears to have made. He was refused a visa for Italy, but succeeded in making a visit to Italy later in the summer of 1983.[30] His series conveys the impression of being a comprehensive and imaginative rewriting of practically the entire contents of the KGB's disinformation file on the papal plot.

Andronov has been authorized to use information which has not hitherto been highlighted in the Soviet press: e.g. the mysterious flow of money into Agca's bank accounts in Turkey during 1978 and the role of Çelebi as Agca's prime mover in the final months before the shooting in Rome. Andronov's techniques include interviewing people and then interpolating the interviews and summing them up to create the impression that the persons interviewed have substantiated and agree with Soviet disinformation themes.

Andronov's basic thesis is the familiar one that the United States was behind the plot and the main instrument for its execution was the CIA. It is set against a patchwork of alleged US-supported terrorist activity which goes back to the 1960s. The author of the present article is singled out as a key personality, allegedly organizing Turkish fascists in the late 1950s, recruiting Agca to assassinate the prominent Turkish editor of *Milliyet*, Abdi Ipekçi, in early 1979, while serving, as a National Security Council Staff Member under Zbigniew Brzezinski, as head of the "Black International," a US-supported coordinating body for Nazis and Fascists all over the world. I am supposed to have overseen the former CIA agent Frank Terpil's alleged training of Agca and—last but not least—to have organized the attack on the Pope![31]

[30] He published an article alleging that all Italian terrorism was organized by the US. Andronov alleges that Claire Sterling played a prominent role in it. (Cf. "For Whom Terrorists in Rome are Useful," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 19 Oct. 1983.) Claire Sterling is the author of *The Terror Network* (1981) and *Time of the Assassins* (1983) on the papal plot.

[31] A subsequent article, "Again on the Tracks of Agca," signed not by Andronov but impersonally by the "International Section of *Litgazeta*" (*Literaturnaya gazeta*, 27 July 1983), developed the theme further:

> It has long been observed: often a criminal, having succeeded in avoiding exposure and the punishment he deserves, experiences an insurmountable urge to return to the place where he carried out his crime. In this way, days ago the long-time CIA veteran of general's rank, Paul Henze, arrived from the United States in Turkey . . .
>
> However, this time not only purely personal reasons prompted him to visit this country all of a sudden. Let our readers be reminded that "*Litgazeta*" published a short time ago the reportage of Yona Andronov "On the Wolf's Track," recounting how the Turkish terrorist from the fascist organization "The Grey Wolves," Mehmet Ali Agca, carried out two years ago an attack on the Pope in Rome at the instigation of the CIA and with the help of three agents of American intelligence: Paul Henze, Rusi Nazar, Enver Altayli. Among other things, Paul Henze, at the direction of the White House, for more than a year already, has been directing behind-the-scenes anti-Soviet slander in the Western press in connection with the Rome attack. He came rushing to the Turks because their information agency THA [i.e. the Turkish News Agency] on 17 July publicized the exposé of "*Litgazeta*." Henze was especially upset because we identified him as being personally involved in Agca's first political murder—when he shot the progressive Turkish journalist Abdi Ipekçi in Istanbul. That took place in February 1979. And on 18 July 1983, the CIA General declared in the ultra-reactionary Turkish newspaper *Tercüman*, which opened its pages to him, that it was not he who had done in Ipekçi but certain mysterious "Soviet agents." But why has Henze hidden this nightmarish secret for four whole years? It would follow that he is also a "Soviet agent"! In general, Mr. Henze is talking through his hat.

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The Andronov series is the most striking demonstration we have seen to date of the spectacular capacity of the Soviets to lie—with little lies begetting bigger and more elaborate ones—which was exposed in the aftermath of the shooting down of the Korean Airlines' 747 in September 1983.[32] But it also demonstrates the poverty of lying as a means of dealing with a problem as intractable as explaining the plot to kill the Polish Pope. In two and a half years of trying, the Kremlin's propagandists have been unable to devise an alternative theory of the plot that would leave Moscow out of it. They have had allies ready to assist them—men in the press in the West, in intellectual circles and even in governments (the overwhelming majority of them are in no sense Soviet agents, apologists or admirers of communism) who longed, and still long, for an explanation of the origin of the scheme that would absolve Kremlin leadership. The *Terrible Secret*[33] syndrome is a natural Western reaction to situations such as this. But even such people are offended by shrill, repetitious charges of CIA complicity, Reagan Administration vindictiveness, American recruitment of Grey Wolves and grandiose Brzezinski-instigated plots to destabilize Poland. I myself am less offended than amused by being accused of arranging the assassination of a prominent Turk and then going on to arrange for Agca to try to assassinate the Pope. It is indeed a distinction to be selected as a major target by such a well known purveyor of misinformation and disinformation as *Literaturnaya gazeta*. As it happened, the head of the Foreign Department of *Literaturnaya gazeta* Oleg Bitov defected in Rome on 9 September 1983. Moscow claimed that he was kidnapped by the CIA in an attempt to cover up its role as the organizer of the plot against the Pope (*The Daily Telegraph*, 25 Oct. 1983).

DISINFORMATION by the Soviet Union, using brazen lies to cover up its own crimes, is not a new phenomenon. The pattern and the techniques of this Orwellian inversion, of the Big Bad Wolf blaming Little Red Riding-Hood for the murder of the grandmother, are by now all too familiar. Soviet misdemeanours have now been generally recognized in the West for what they were—whether it is a case of the Moscow Trials and the assassination of Trotsky, of Katyn and the trial of the 16 Polish underground leaders, or of the more recent example of the Korean airliner. It is unfortunate that these mendacious techniques are still

[32] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Flight 007 and the Pope," the *Washington Post*, 16 Sept. 1983. I analyzed the pattern of Soviet lying in a long article in the Istanbul daily *Tercüman* on 18 Oct. 1983, "The Russians have squeezed themselves into a corner in the papal affair." A detailed account of my personal contacts with Agca's first victim Abdi Ipekçi, highly respected editor of the newspaper *Milliyet*, in the period before his assassination was published in *Yeni Forum* (Ankara), 1 Sept. 1983. Re-examination of the Ipekçi murder is leading to the conclusion that he was killed not for internal Turkish reasons, but as part of the massive Soviet effort to destabilize that country during the late 1970s. Whether or not Agca knew whom he was serving when he committed this murder, he may have been a Soviet instrument. The selection of a Turk to attack the Pope was intended by Moscow to exacerbate strains between Turkey and its NATO allies and reinforce doubts about Turkey's reliability.

[33] Cf. Walter Z. Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret* (1980). It chronicles the appalling reluctance of world opinion, including most Jews, to recognize the reality of the Nazi holocaust when it was happening.

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capable of creating confusion in the West—by sowing doubt and by making the issues " controversial "—in spite of the fact that past cases of such Soviet propaganda have been shown to have been thoroughly fraudulent. Like the self-contradictory Soviet " explanations " about the Korean jumbo-jet, Soviet disinformation about the attempt to kill the Pope should be seen for what it is: a Wicked Queen's endeavour to pass for Snow White, the perversion of news and information media by spreading disinformation. The media themselves, however, bear a heavy responsibility for allowing themselves to be abused.

There *was* a plot against the Pope. It was carefully planned over a long period. Agca's shooting was not a casual act, nor was the plot developed for Turkish reasons, or Bulgarian reasons, or Italian reasons. Its origin does not lie in the Middle East, as the Russians tried to claim in a Novosti article distributed two weeks after the attack, or in American disagreements with the Vatican over Middle East policy. Its genesis has nothing to do with Polish internal affairs. It has everything to do with Soviet-Polish relations.

In its lust to dominate Poland, the Kremlin has committed three major crimes against the Polish people: Katyn in 1940; the failure to support the Warsaw Uprising in 1944; and the attempted assassination of the Pope in 1981. In the intervening years Moscow tried to bring Poland to heel, always unsuccessfully. The election of a Polish Pope in 1978 was perceived in the Kremlin as an event of the utmost gravity. Press attacks in Soviet provincial newspapers began long before the shooting in Rome and mounted to a level of extraordinary viciousness in the period immediately preceding the incident. In March 1981 the Byelorussian journal *Polymya*, for example, accused John Paul II of having been a Nazi collaborator in Poland during the Second World War. There is of course no evidence whatever for such charges, but they are indicative of the venomous hatred the Polish Pope has inspired among the members of the " New Class " who operate the Soviet empire.

What we have witnessed in the attempt to shoot John Paul II is another act in a power drama that can be described in several different ways, each of which has some validity. One can see it as a struggle between Rome and the Third Rome, Moscow, between freedom and pluralism on the one hand, and totalitarianism on the other. This struggle has been unfolding since the earliest years of the Soviet system, which declared itself superior to, and hostile towards, the outer world. Moscow's fear and suspicion of the non-Soviet world is generated in Moscow itself, not from the outside. The rest of the world has repeatedly been indulgent of Soviet misbehaviour beyond the point of reason.

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The Okhrana and Burtsev

Provocateurs and Revolutionaries

Nurit Schleifmann

VLADIMIR Lvovich Burtsev is best remembered as the man who brought about the exposure of Evno Azeff and other police agents. He is also cited as the editor of the historical periodical *Byloe*—one of the most important source materials for the study of the Russian revolutionary movement. For his former activity he was dubbed " the Sherlock Holmes of the Russian Revolution " by the foreign press of his day,[1] while in our own time he has been described as a " one-man espionage agency."[2] Burtsev's work as a journalist and his struggle against police agents within the Russian revolutionary movement—which led him to become deeply involved in revolutionary life—are in themselves sufficient to arouse interest in him and in the standing and influence he wielded in the revolutionary camp. That his activity made him, paradoxically, the sworn enemy and a source of constant concern to the Police Department, but also the object of the deep and overt enmity of many of his revolutionary colleagues, only augments our interest in him. The attitude of the police towards Burtsev seems natural and understandable in view of the fact that within the six-year period from 1908–1914 he caused the exposure of dozens of their secret agents throughout the revolutionary movement. Yet it is precisely because of this activity that his colleagues' attitude towards him, as reflected in their refusal to assist him despite all his entreaties, appears incomprehensible. It was known that he spared no effort and no resources to cast the Okhrana's searching eyes away from the revolutionary movement. Why, then, was he so hated?

His revolutionary contemporaries, severely critical of the means and methods he adopted in his struggle, paid scant heed to the broader goals of his activity. This may well also explain why the few scholars who have dealt with the subject in one form or another have been unable to fathom it or have disregarded his objectives. In one passing reference, for example, Burtsev's activity was attributed to some inner compulsion: " As some collect coins or stamps or feminine conquests, he collected spies."[3] In a more recent attempt to grasp the nature and character of Burtsev's activity, Frederick Zuckerman explained it as being the product of his belief that for the sake of the revolution it was necessary first to destroy the effectiveness of the political police, since that was the only way left for the defeated revolutionaries.[4] Similarly, according to another

[1] See below note 67.
[2] B. D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made A Revolution* (Delta Books, 1964), p. 536.
[3] Ibid.
[4] F. S. Zuckerman, " Vladimir Burtsev and the Tsarist Political Police in Conflict, 1907–14," in *Journal of Contemporary History*, 12 (1977), p. 197.

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viewpoint Burtsev, like many veteran revolutionaries, continued to pursue his youthful struggle by means of his pen, to which end he assumed a special task: to expose police agents within the revolutionary camp.[5] What all these explanations have in common is their perception of Burtsev's struggle against the police as constituting an end in itself. However, this would seem too narrow an approach and one, moreover, that is unable to offer a satisfactory analysis of his controversial methods, of his standing in the revolutionary movement, or of the unusual attitude that was adopted towards him.

The present article attempts to examine Burtsev's activity within a broader framework: against the background of his political views. The hypothesis is that against this background the methods of his struggle will be understood as stemming from defined political objectives. The elucidation of these goals may help to account for his position in the revolutionary camp and for his relations with a large part of that camp, while also focusing attention on one of the neglected aspects of revolutionary life.

ALTHOUGH Burtsev's anti-police activity was concentrated in the period from 1908–1914, the political viewpoint that underlay it was evidently crystallized as early as the 1880s. In his memoirs, Burtsev attests that he continued to adhere to this viewpoint throughout the entire period of his activity and that it guided him from the moment he first joined the emigration in July 1888, after having escaped from his place of exile in Siberia.[6] From the outset, Burtsev defined himself as a *narodovolets*—the same name he gave the periodical he published in London at the end of the 1890s.[7] This despite the fact that he himself was never a member of *Narodnaya Volya* and that, as he said, he formed his political outlook precisely under the influence of those elements that were critical of Russian populism. These included, according to Burtsev, the journals *Golos, Vestnik Evropy, Poryadok* and others. Burtsev says he was struck by the criticism they levelled against inciting one part of the people against another in the name of the popular revolution. As an example, he cites the pogroms against Russian Jews in the early 1880s, viewed by many populists as essentially a positive revolutionary manifestation which in the future they would succeed in channelling towards the appropriate objectives. In contrast, Burtsev saw the pogroms as merely a manifestation of the ugliest instincts of the masses against the Jews; and he viewed the position of the populists who supported the pogroms as a manifestation of the sacrifice of the interests of certain elements among the people in the name of narrow class interests. In this connection,

[5] M. Hildermeier, *Die Sozialrevolutionäre Partei Russlands* (Köln, 1978), p. 383.

[6] V. L. Burtsev, *Bor'ba za svobodnuyu Rossiyu. Moi vospominaniya 1882–1924 gg.* (Berlin, 1924), p. 32. For a detailed account of the earlier period of Burtsev's activity see the recent article by D. Saunders, "Burtsev and the Russian Revolutionary Emigration (1885–1905)," in *European Studies Review*, Jan. 1983, No. 1, Vol. 13.

[7] *Narodovolets. Sotsial'no-politicheskoe obozrenie* (Red. V. L. Burtsev), Apr. 1897–Aug. 1903 (Nos. 1–4), London.

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Burtsev quotes A. D. Gradovsky who warned in *Golos*: " Don't release the beast! " The " beast," in Burtsev's view, consisted of the dark and dangerous instincts of the masses, " an irrational and merciless Russian *bunt*," and " spontaneous [*stikhiinye*] popular movements." Among these he included " the sick hopes " that populist revolutionaries pinned on a popular revolutionary movement.[8] It was this same criticism which later underlay his attacks on the SRs, to whose revolutionary propaganda he attributed the " terrible consequences " of 1917. Under the influence of this criticism, Burtsev writes in his memoirs, he formulated, at the very outset of his public career, his stand of opposition both to Lavrov and the members of his group, and to Social Democrats like Plekhanov.[9]

If Burtsev actually was a *narodovolets*, he adhered to no more than the minimum programme of *Narodnaya Volya*—a struggle of political terrorism until the attainment of complete civil liberties—or, as he put it:

> I gave prime place to the constitutional struggle in the name of the all-national tasks, and I attached great importance to the intelligentsia and to the revolutionary organizations and their struggle. It was just for that reason that I insisted then on adopting the most acute revolutionary means in the struggle against the government.[10]

This combination of constitutionalism and terrorism led to Burtsev's being derided as a " liberal terrorist." Yet the inherent irony of the description notwithstanding, it does in fact convey well the operative political conclusions that Burtsev drew at the time. Believing that the revolutionary struggle alone would not save Russia, and attaching considerable importance also to lawful struggle, he began to form ties among both the revolutionaries and the liberals in order to publish, together with " moderate oppositionary forces," a periodical which would wage a struggle against the Russian autocracy to guarantee civil rights in the country, and to that end would also support terrorism. In 1889 he managed to set up a short-lived partnership with Mikhail Dragomanov and Debagory-Mokrievich: together they published the periodical *Svobodnaya Rossiya*.[11] Only three issues appeared before the partnership collapsed due to the constant tension between its two components: the liberal and the terrorist. Burtsev sought to repeat this enterprise in 1908 when he again joined the emigration after three years of lawful activity in St Petersburg. Convinced that the failure of the revolution and the intensification of government repression necessitated the united mobilization of all the elements struggling against the regime in an uncompromising war against reaction, he began once more to seek ways and means to found a " free " periodical to be based on a platform which was " not Lenin, not Chernov and not reaction."[12] Once more he

[8] Burtsev, *Bor'ba za svobodnuyu Rossiyu*, pp. 31–32.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., p. 32.
[11] *Svobodnaya Rossiya*, Pod redaktsiei V1. Burtseva i V1. Debagorya-Mokrievich, Feb.–May 1889 (Nos. 1–3), Zheneva.
[12] Burtsev, *Bor'ba za svobodnuyu Rossiyu*, p. 216.

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failed, and when he found himself unable to establish a periodical along the lines of *Svobodnaya Rossiya*, he began to publish his own *Obshchee delo*,[13] which soon folded, and thereafter *Budushchee*.[14] The latter became not only a platform for his ideas but also an instrument in his struggle. Through it he sought to convince, to precipitate the struggle, to accuse, and finally also to operate on his own in a manner he regarded as serving the goals he preached.

" Never in the past 50 years," he wrote, " has the effort of the forces of reaction reached a level such as this. Never has the influence of the forces of darkness been greater than in the years after the revolution. Clearly, the struggle for the freedom of Russia must begin afresh."[15] In this struggle, all citizens and all opposition forces must cooperate with one another, because a regime of political freedom is as necessary to them as the air they breathe.[16] On that basis, he asserted, all parties could cooperate despite their deep differences.[17] To reinforce his argument, he cited the example of *Narodnaya Volya*, whose well-known letter to Alexander III had put forward demands for constitutional guarantees and for the establishment of a constituent assembly, even though these issues were not contained in its platform. By doing so, according to Burtsev, it posited political freedom as a precondition for its existence as a party, since it sought a formula for action which would be acceptable to the entire nation and not just to a narrow circle of like-minded persons.

> *Narodnaya Volya* began to speak in all-national terms . . . and to that end did not flinch even from the price of undertaking to forgo the tactic which had typified it until then [i.e. terrorism]. It adopted this behaviour because it understood well what was called for at that time and [realized] that on its own it lacked the strength to meet those needs.[18]

Similarly, Burtsev argued, the struggle for the freedom of Russia was still beyond the strength of individual groups or parties. In his view, the experience of 1904–1906 had demonstrated that the government's resistance could be broken only with the aid of united forces—requiring a common goal and conception[19]—even if this meant temporarily forgoing long-term goals. This common goal and conception he found in the issue of the Duma, for a number of reasons: first and foremost, because the sovereignty of a legislative assembly is the crowning glory of civil liberties in general; and also because the Duma, its severe limitations notwithstanding, remained the only platform in Russia from which it was possible to exert freedom of speech—hence its great importance as a means of propaganda.[20] Very probably Burtsev also took into account the fact that

[13] *Obshchee delo*, Izdaetsya pod red. V. L. Burtseva 15 Oct. 1909–15 Aug. 1910 (Nos. 1–4), Paris.
[14] *Budushchee*, Yezhenedel'naya gazeta. Red. Vl. Burtsev, 22 Oct 1911–4 Jan. 1914 (Nos. 1–48), Paris.
[15] *Budushchee*, No. 1, 22 Oct. 1911, leader.
[16] *Budushchee*, No. 2, 29 Oct. 1911.
[17] *Budushchee*, No. 5, 12 Nov. 1911.
[18] *Budushchee*, No. 2, 29 Oct. 1911.
[19] *Budushchee*, No. 1, 22 Oct. 1911.
[20] *Budushchee*, No. 2, 29 Oct. 1911.

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the Duma was the only arena in which most of the forces struggling against the regime participated, and he saw it as a means which would facilitate further cooperation among them. In any event, in his articles he stressed the first two reasons cited above as binding on representatives of the opposition parties in the Duma, writing: " Nowhere more than in Russia does the society have the right to demand of its representatives the courage to protect its interests so fiercely. Nowhere should the position of the delegates be a sinecure or a means to a personal career, and especially not in Russia. In all countries the possibility exists of taking part also in extra-parliamentary activity. Only in the Russia of our day are the avenues closed to any serious political activity save for that in the Duma."[21] At this point Burtsev offers explicit and trenchant criticism of the part played by the opposition parties in the Duma, while expressing disappointment at his own failure to create a common front for action among them. He accuses them of having failed, in their discussions of the most burning issues facing Russia, to take a clear and unequivocal stand, of having demonstrated neither courage nor vigour, and of having adopted no political tactic. Moreover, " when they occupied their seats in the Taurida Palace they seemed to be engaged in forced labour." They allowed the government to intimidate them and refrained from appealing to the public on a series of vital questions when discussion of them was still within the realm of possibility.[22]

Nonetheless, Burtsev argues, whatever the opposition may do in the Duma, forces of struggle against reaction also exist outside that body; and just as successful activity within the Duma contributed significantly to agitation in Russia, so too agitation and struggle outside the Taurida Palace were a crucial condition for bringing activity in the Duma to the requisite level.[23] With these explicit words, then, Burtsev took on the task of exerting external pressure on the opposition parties in order to force them to cooperate even against their will. However, since he regarded himself as a person whose " political life took place not in public assemblies, not in the street and not in party meetings or international talks . . . [but as] a litterateur and a journalist,"[24] Burtsev transformed his paper *Budushchee* into the main platform for his political struggle, while also making use of his other writing activities, including his historical periodical *Byloe*.

His intentions were clear and he made no secret of them, asserting overtly that his goal was to bring about the organization of a broad all-national movement for the establishment of a sovereign Duma and the universal franchise; and that this, the paramount task in the life of Russia, required the participation of all citizens, though chiefly of the opposition parties. Burtsev declared forcefully that he did not intend to create a new party but to work for the advancement of the paramount task in order to

[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Burtsev, *Bor'ba za svobodnuyu Rossiyu*, p. 6.

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make the opposition (i.e. revolutionary) parties aware that they must give that task priority in their " realistic programmes."[25] Thus, he declared in advance that he would not relent on the subject of the Duma and would follow its activity closely. He asked " his correspondents in Russia " to help him keep meticulous track of everything that happened in and around the Duma. Behind all this lay the desire to undermine the tsarist autocracy internally and externally by " exposing its corrupt nature," and what Burtsev believed to be its non-legitimacy.[26]

ON the surface, the struggle against the Okhrana and against provocation—the Police Department's main instrument in its war against the revolutionary movement—suited Burtsev's purposes perfectly. From his point of view, the Okhrana was one of the bases on which the tsarist regime rested, and to attack it was to attack the entire regime. The struggle necessarily involved all the elements in the opposition camp, since there was not a single movement or party in Russia into whose ranks secret agents had not infiltrated. The exposure of secret police agents usually generated a political storm and was charged with powerful emotions. No one could remain indifferent. To raise the issue of the Duma within the framework of the question of the legality of the police *modus operandi* would perforce cause a raucous scandal in which all the opposition parties—the protestations of the revolutionaries among them notwithstanding—would be swept up in the imbroglio of the struggle against the government and its supporters. Thus, in the very nature of things Burtsev's one-man struggle against provocation would bring into his political struggle those elements in whose participation he was interested, though to date they had remained largely aloof. Finally, the entire subject aroused curiosity and reverberations among the general public both in Russia and abroad. The struggle, then, was not intended to protect the revolutionary camp by exposing the secret agents in its ranks; it was not, as some contend, aimed primarily at uprooting this affliction because of the immense damage it was causing to the revolutionary movement. Burtsev himself attested to this when he wrote: " We have launched a struggle against provocation, not because it is one of the major obstacles to the revolutionary struggle, but because it constitutes—so we are convinced—the basis for all current Russian politics. We wanted to direct attention to it—*not of other revolutionaries* but of *the entire Russian public*."[27]

Thus, from the outset Burtsev's objectives appear to have been antagonistic to those of the revolutionary parties. Although for them provocation was something utterly evil, a vocal struggle against it would, instead of releasing them from that evil, expose their vulnerability, undermine their revolutionary credibility and provide their enemies with

[25] *Budushchee*, No. 2, 29 Oct. 1911.
[26] *Budushchee*, No. 6, 26 Nov. 1911.
[27] *Budushchee*, No. 7, 3 Dec. 1911. My emphases.

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ammunition.[28] It was one thing quietly to uncover secret agents within the revolutionary organizations, but quite another to flaunt these cases as a banner: to what purpose? In order to drag them into a political struggle in the Duma which they had no interest in joining? It is true that among the Mensheviks voices were heard advocating some form of cooperation with the liberals against the government. The Duma's importance as a platform for propaganda was broadly recognized, but at the same time the Social Democratic faction served as the main arena for Lenin's struggle (with the aid of the police agent Roman Malinovsky) against the Mensheviks, enabling him to further the final rift in which he was interested.[29] Broad cooperation would therefore conflict with the Bolsheviks' immediate interest, this without even taking into account their deep enmity towards the liberals.

Out of principle, the SRs initially rejected completely the idea of participation in the Duma; they were pulled into it half-heartedly for a brief time only because of the pressure generated by the stand of the peasants, who flocked to it. The constrained attitude of the SRs towards the Duma was well reflected in the level of the delegates they sent to it and in their activity there. Since they regarded lawful activity as *ipso facto* conflicting with the tactic of terrorism, the kind of participation being proposed by Burtsev would have compelled them to carry out an absolute shift of orientation.[30] This would have meant confining the revolutionary struggle to the political sphere, and an anti-police struggle in that sphere they would have found unacceptable. The same approach is implicit in Victor Chernov's comment:

> Burtsev grasped the revolution one-sidedly or, if you wish, superficially. He excluded from it the movement of the masses, whom he viewed as a revolutionary, anarchist, destructive elemental force [*stikhiya*]. For him there was no more alien formulation than the words of the ancient poet: " If the Olympus does not respond, I shall raise up the forces of the underground." His own formulation was the exact opposite. To preclude any mass movement—" the forces of the underground "—the Olympus, and it alone, must be forcibly convinced or intimidated in order to compel it to make concessions in the spirit of the times . . . Hence he shifted the revolution to the narrow sphere of a purely technical struggle: the *apparatus* of the secret police vs. the *apparatus* of the revolutionary organizations.[31]

What follows from these comments is that Burtsev's struggle was not a genuine revolutionary struggle, and the methods employed in it, commensurate with its goals, might even cause considerable harm to revolutionary interests, which were diametrically opposed to those that motivated Burtsev. This conflict was particularly marked between him

[28] See, for example, the Mensheviks' position vis-à-vis Malinovsky. R. C. Elwood, *A Life Without a Cause* (Newtonville, Mass., 1977), Chap. 3.

[29] L. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London, 1970), pp. 135–38.

[30] Hildermeier, *Die Sozialrevolutionäre Partei Russlands*, pp. 175–83.

[31] V. Chernov, *Burtsev i Gekel'man-Landezen-Garting*, an undated handwritten manuscript. Nicolaevsky Collection No. 233, box 6, fol. 36, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, California. Emphases in the original.

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and the SRs, since he chose to make uncovering provocation the instrument of his struggle and the SRs were highly vulnerable in that respect.

THE conflict between the political interests of Burtsev and of the SRs was first revealed immediately after the exposure and flight of Azeff. Burtsev's actions as the affair developed showed that the issue of Azeff's guilt or innocence constituted only one aspect of the dispute between him and the SR leadership, and in the last analysis perhaps not the most important one. We know that the exposure adversely affected one of the pillars, if not the chief one, of SR activity: terrorism. The central involvement of a police agent in activity that brought the party its greatest achievements cast a heavy pall over those achievements, and the SRs tried with all their strength to disown him. Their organ *Znamya truda* scathingly refuted the allegation that " Plehve was murdered because Rachkovsky [Head of the Foreign Agency 1885–1902] wanted it; and because Rachkovsky wants it, Stolypin is still alive! "[32] That is, the party tried to sever any possible connection between the successes of terrorism and the heads of the Police Department. However, it was precisely with the aid of that connection that Burtsev could transform the affair into a political instrument, a lever for his purposes. Only that connection could impart significance to Burtsev's battle against the Okhrana. His principled advocacy of terrorism prevented him from supporting the conclusion drawn by the detractors of terrorism—in large measure thanks to Burtsev himself—that the naïve members of the Battle Organization were not, as they believed, sacrificing their lives for the good of the people, but were in fact puppets whose strings were pulled, through Azeff, by rival police factions.[33] Burtsev argued that even if the police had not actively supported the terrorist actions, and even if it had been unaware of Azeff's role in them, several of its heads realized that Azeff was not getting his information about the SRs thanks solely to his connections with several of the party's leaders, but because he was the person closest to Grigorii Gershuni and Boris Savinkov, and as such perforce took part in a number of terrorist acts. However, the police chose to ignore this because of the benefit they derived from it[34]; or, as Burtsev put it in 1917: " The government, knowing that it was Azeff who headed the party, tolerated the fact that he perpetrated these acts, as though to say: 'He is useful to us and we will exploit him—and if someone is killed, what can we do? It is of no importance.' "[35]

On the basis of these accusations, Burtsev demanded that A. I. Gerasimov (1905–1909 Head of St Petersburg Okhrana Section, Azeff's case officer) be placed on trial. Repeating his accusations in 1911, he insisted in a letter to I. G. Shcheglovitov (Minister of Justice) that M. I.

[32] " Tysyacha i odna gipoteza," *Znamya truda*, No. 15.
[33] B. Savinkov, " Terror i delo Azefa," *Znamya truda*, No. 15, p. 10.
[34] Burtsev, *Bor'ba za svobodnuyu Rossiyu*, p. 286.
[35] P. M. Shchegolev (ed.), *Padenie tsarskogo rezhima* (Leningrad-Moskva, 1924–1927), Vol. I, p. 305.

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Trusevich (1906–1909 Director of the Police Department), P. G. Kurlov (1909 Deputy Minister of the Interior) and Z. A. Rataev (1902–1906 Head of the Foreign Agency) also be tried in connection with additional affairs of provocation.[36] We need not assume that Burtsev expected his demands to be acceded to, though through his letters he did obtain part of what he sought: the affairs were once again raised in the Duma. First was the Azeff affair, which generated a turbulent debate; against the defensive Stolypin were aligned representatives of the Cadets and the Social Democrats. When it came to the SRs, Burtsev was only partially successful. They took no part in the Duma nor, *ipso facto*, in the offensive against the government. The party felt itself harmed by the campaign, which reinforced the deepest doubts that the Azeff affair had aroused vis-à-vis its leadership and its terrorist activity, its great pride. Faced with a spate of accusations linking the police and the SRs, *Znamya truda* on the one hand adopted a tactic of self-defence, while on the other hand it came out with its own accusations against the opposition's activity in the Duma. That activity was perceived as being directed against the SRs, and the party's organ accused the opposition of attempting to extract a double profit from the affair: to defame the government and terrorism alike. The party viewed Burtsev as the source of inspiration for these opposition attacks.[37]

For the SRs this constituted the initial proof of where Burtsev's political struggle had led them.

BURTSEV did not rest content with exerting journalistic pressure on the parties or with making the issue of provocation a subject of general discussion. Simultaneously, he set up his own machinery of information and detection in order to expose police agents in the ranks of the revolutionaries. He used his own private resources in this work and ran publicity campaigns to drum up additional funds. With the money he obtained he would bribe Okhrana agents in Paris, inducing them to defect to him and reveal police secrets. Meticulously he gathered one bit of information after another about persons who for some reason—a hint from a certain source, or his own intuition—had aroused his suspicion. He employed detectives to trail the objects of his investigations and exerted heavy pressure on the parties to conduct their own inquiries to prove suspects' guilt. He thus became a standing threat to the Foreign Agency of the Okhrana in Paris and his activity generated strong pressure on the parties' centres there. The Bolsheviks established a commission of inquiry, of which Burtsev was a permanent member, on issues relating to provocation.[38] Burtsev stayed in informal but continuing contact with the SRs through Mark Natanson by virtue of the latter's membership on the

[36] Ibid., p. 296.
[37] " Tysyacha i odna gipoteza."
[38] A copy of Lenin's letter, 18 April 1912. Nicolaevsky Collection No. 95, box 4, fol. 34.

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party's Conspiracy Committee.[39] Whatever one may have thought about Burtsev personally, neither he nor the information he possessed could be disregarded. In the SR party his activity fanned the atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust which had so devastated it since the Azeff affair. The party leadership was caught between the devil and the deep blue sea: between the fear of falling prey to a new Azeff affair, and its efforts to calm down its members. Burtsev's aim of placing the issue of provocation at the head of the revolutionary agenda and of making it a banner in the anti-tsarist struggle could no longer be consistent with the party's interests. However, the SRs distress tempered neither Burtsev's fervour nor his adamance that the issue of provocation be dealt with as he saw fit. The result was that many persons held him responsible for the oppressive atmosphere in the party, irrespective of the justness of his allegations.

The Tsytsin affair provides a useful illustration of the web of relationships and pressures that developed between Burtsev and the SRs.

Burtsev's suspicion was aroused by a conversation whose content was made known to him. In that conversation, I. V. Dobroskok, an Okhrana man in St Petersburg, spoke of the random circumstances to which a secret agent was liable to fall victim. As an example, he cited the case of a postcard inviting Ivan Tsytsin to a meeting at the Eiffel Tower and which had been found by Tsytsin's lodging companion—fortunately without making him suspicious. Learning of the story in St Petersburg, Burtsev was intrigued and he launched an investigation in Paris; his suspicion fell on Tsytsin. However, since in itself this story was not an adequate basis for the SR party's Investigation Committee to launch an inquiry—that is, to summon Tsytsin for clarification—Burtsev approached the suspect and several of his friends himself. They retorted fiercely, charging that Burtsev was simply a madman being fed false reports by Okhrana personnel whose only aim was to liquidate *bona fide*, devoted revolutionaries. Nonetheless, following pressure from Burtsev, Natanson finally agreed to summon Tsytsin for an inquiry to explain the affair of the postcard.

On the morning of the day set for the inquiry—22 January 1913—Tsytsin shot himself in the train station at Versailles. He left a letter stating that he had been compelled to kill himself because of the severe and suffocating conditions in the party. That same day Natanson called on Burtsev; furiously and deeply upset he told him about the suicide and requested that the scheduled inquiry remain a secret.[40] For many, the suicide was proof of Tsytsin's innocence and of Burtsev's vicious methods, the more so because since Azeff's exposure it was the third suicide to be committed against a background of accusations of provocation. So it was that the SRs, convinced of their comrade's revolutionary integrity, followed his coffin carrying red banners and wreaths in the

[39] Pokazanie Vebera, protokol 2-go zasedanii tovarishcheskogo suda ot 25 dekabrya 1913, Arkhiv P. S.-R. No. 218, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. Also: Pokazanie Natansona, protokol 6–80 zasedanii ot 25-go dekabria 1913.

[40] V. L. Burtsev, *Moya bor'ba s provokatorami* (1912–14 gg), pp. 19–22, Nicolaevsky Collection No. 95, box 3, fol. 8.

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name of the party. One of the eulogists at the funeral affirmed that Tsytsin had fallen victim to party rivalries and to a new tendency towards mutual suspicion. Burtsev declared that he was assuming moral responsibility for the affair.[41] It was only afterwards, when Tsytsin's papers were being sorted, that his correspondence with his Okhrana case officer was found, including the postcard in Dobroskok's handwriting. A party communiqué definitively declared Tsytsin's guilt.[42]

Tsytsin was not the only person who had connections with the Okhrana, came under Burtsev's suspicion and left a suicide note levelling accusations at him. The case of Mass was a similar one, except that he left farewell missives to his wife and friends—and fled to America.[43] For Tsytsin, suicide was evidently the last resort, though both he and Mass—who merely staged suicide—could have hoped that this drastic step would save their honour, since they were not alone in holding Burtsev responsible for introducing an atmosphere of unwarranted suspicion.

Natanson's behaviour demonstrates how pressed he was by Burtsev. Since the postcard story did not provide sufficient cause to summon Tsytsin for clarification, Burtsev himself disseminated the rumour amongst the comrades, meaning it could no longer be kept secret until more substantive proof became available. Under pressure of these rumours, Natanson had no choice but to give in and summon Tsytsin for an inquiry. However, after the latter's suicide had led him to be considered guiltless, Natanson was quick to ask that Burtsev keep secret the planned inquiry, apparently for fear that he would be considered an accomplice in Burtsev's offence.

NATANSON'S behaviour in the Tsytsin affair shows that the criticism levelled at Burtsev stemmed not only from conflicting political interests, but also from what many regarded as a violation of revolutionary ethics. It was the out-of-hand rejection of Burtsev's political goals that allowed his actions to be judged in this manner and to be condemned. Thus Vera Figner, replying to Burtsev's complaint that he was being left without support, and isolated in his struggle against the provocation, wrote:

> What a dark figure you represent, Vladimir Lvovich! You stride about like the angel of death bearing the scythe, even worse than the angel of death . . . like a black phantom with long, twisted fingers . . . and your dark shadow falls everywhere that you turn. From your black bag you pull out broadsheets on informers, on betrayal, on the selling of one's soul, on crimes against comradeship, against friendship, against everything that man holds precious and sacred. You sow suspicion, you sow loathing and contempt for people, for mankind in general . . . You are a terrible person, you are dark-

[41] Ibid.

[42] *Znamya truda*, No. 50, 13 April p. 16. Also: Head of Foreign Agency to Director of Police Department, April 20/May 3 1913, No. 620, Okhrana Archive XVI d, fol. 1/B.

[43] On the Mass affair, see *Moya bor'ba*, pp. 32–45.

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> souled . . . You call for a struggle against provocation—with what means? Is there any other way to root out wild weeds than by revolutionary and cultural activity inside Russia, among the people, in the cities, the villages, the factories and the fields—everywhere, amongst all classes? . . . That leprosy [provocation] will be transformed into a minor rash when freedom prevails in Russia. We must call for its achievement, for activity aimed at obtaining it. But you issue no such call . . . You want the institution of espionage itself. You want endless exposures, condemnations, proofs, judgments. Is that creative work? Is it for that that we must call on those who still remain in the ranks? To waste the few pennies yet remaining in one's empty pocket? No, it is better that you remain alone. Go by yourself and complain about the cool indifference [accompanying you] in this murderous campaign.[44]

Thus, while the criticism was in the main ethical, it did not lack ideological demurrers as emerges from the remarks of Chernov and Figner. Some of the elements which were clearly implicit in Burtsev's political goals were viewed by the revolutionaries as essentially invalid, because they were perceived as conflicting not only with political interests, but also with emotional attitudes. Noteworthy in this context were Burtsev's relations with Okhrana personnel in general and with exposed secret agents in particular. On the one hand, he struggled to prove the crimes of the police and their illegal and immoral methods, while at the same time he relied on police sources to further this struggle. Almost inevitably, then, he was caught on the horns of a dilemma when he sought to convince revolutionaries that one of their comrades had betrayed them. Again and again he encountered the same reaction: mistrust of his sources and the contention that they were deliberately feeding him false information in order to harm the revolutionary movement. Moreover, since Burtsev's motives were primarily political in nature, he did not regard the actual exposure as marking the termination of his task. On the contrary, it was only then that his true mission commenced, for which he often required the services of the very agent he had just exposed. A bizarre situation ensued: if before the exposure he often found himself isolated against a suspect and his revolutionary comrades, once his allegations had been proved he would often try to enlist the very persons who had been betrayed to finance his cooperation with the betrayer, or at least to recognize its importance. It is with considerable anger and no little vituperation that he describes how his efforts to enlist police agent Myacheslav Kensitsky in his cause were thwarted.

In 1908, following reports he received about the connections of that particular maximalist with the police, he approached his revolutionary colleagues, only to be rebuffed and accused of being afflicted with "espionage mania." It was alleged against him that Mikhail Bakai, of the Okhrana,[45] had given him this information with the aim of harming the

[44] Vera Figner to Vladimir Burtsev, 12 May 1913, Nicolaevsky Collection No. 95, box 4, fol. 34a.

[45] Mikhail Yefimovich Bakai, an Okhrana man in Warsaw, who supplied Burtsev with the initial hints

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party. Nonetheless, Burtsev succeeded in having a customary inquiry carried out; Kensitsky's guilt was established, but he managed to escape.[46] After a time Burtsev tracked him down, contacted him secretly, and suggested that they meet, assuring Kensitsky that he would come alone and that he was not laying a trap for him. Burtsev relates that in their meeting he explained to his interlocutor that he had gone abroad in order to wage a struggle against provocation and against the Police Department, that he regarded provocation as the basis of Russian reaction, and that the revolutionaries would never acquiesce in it: after the revolution they would act against the *provocateurs* with a vengeance wherever they might be. He suggested to Kensitsky that in order to atone a little for his sins he should help him out with the information in his possession, promising to pay him 200 francs per month for that information so he could settle somewhere in Europe or America and turn over a new leaf. Kensitsky demanded 3,000 francs as a one-off payment in addition to a monthly stipend of 100 francs for two years. " We parted," Burtsev relates. " I promised to contact him the moment I could transfer the required sums to him. I thought of approaching the SRs, the SDs, the Cadets—anyone who would believe me and would have no trouble raising 5,000–6,000 francs. [I thought] that they would allow me to contact Kensitsky and do together with him what I had already done in Bakai's case. But apply as I would to the SRs, to the Cadets, I did not succeed in convincing anyone to spend these few pennies in order to bolster our struggle against provocation. I never saw Kensitsky again."[47]

BURTSEV was utterly insensible to the SRs attitude towards Azeff. His relentless struggle to expose Azeff was extensively described in his own memoirs and in those of many SRs, who openly expressed the fury and hatred that was directed at Burtsev until the moment when he succeeded in proving Azeff's guilt beyond any doubt. No less powerful are the portrayals of the severe emotional reactions of his colleagues in the leadership and in the Battle Organization following the end of the trial against Burtsev and Azeff's flight. Only three years later, in 1911, Azeff made his well-known appeal to the SRs, requesting that he be tried before his comrades and given the opportunity to explain his deeds. A fierce debate erupted afresh in party circles. There were some who had never ceased searching for Azeff with the intention of taking revenge on him,[48] while others maintained that under the revolutionary code of justice a judgment handed down *in absentia* was invalid from the moment the accused could be heard.[49] A third opinion held that by the very act of

regarding Azeff's treachery, was arrested following the revelation of these connections with Burtsev, but succeeded in fleeing abroad, and thenceforth worked with him in exposing secret agents of the police.

[46] Burtsev, *Bor'ba za svobodnuyu Rossiyu*, p. 213. Also: Head of the Foreign Agency to Director of Police Department, 7/20 May 1908, No. 171 and 13/26 May 1908, No. 185, Okhrana Archives, XXIVc, fol. 2, cont. 212.

[47] Burtsev, *Bor'ba za svobodnuyu Rossiyu*, pp. 214–15.

[48] B. Nikolaevsky, *Istoriya odnogo predatelya* (New York, 1980), p. 361.

[49] Viktor Chernov to Boris Savinkov, an undated intercepted letter enclosed with report from Paris to St Petersburg, No. 1023, 11/24 Aug. 1912, Okhrana Archive XII C(1), fol. 1/c., cont. 106.

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fleeing, Azeff had relinquished his right to be heard.[50] Those who advocated the latter view effectively supported the position of the party's official representatives, led by Mark Natanson, who rejected totally the idea of a formal party trial for Azeff, but who tended not to oppose such a trial if it came at the initiative of interested comrades and under their full personal responsibility.[51] What was abundantly clear was that all these approaches had their origins in the powerful emotional storm whipped up by the affair and which had not yet abated. The entire matter focused on settling past accounts, whether by liquidating Azeff in revenge for what he had wrought, or by bringing him to trial in the hope that this would purge the guilt that had rubbed off on others. (As Chernov expressed it: " In my opinion, only those who support terrorism can be members of the court, and not those who oppose it," or: " I believe that a trial of Azeff would necessarily clarify the entire Rutenberg affair which he [Rutenberg] maliciously exploited against us in order to justify his cowardly behaviour."[52]) The absolute refusal to speak with him and reopen the painful affair, with all its destructive ramifications, also originated in this attitude towards the past.

Burtsev joined the debate in the pages of his own paper:

> We think that a different attitude must be adopted towards Azeff's declaration. In our view, we must do in this case what *Narodnaya Volya* did at the time in the Degaev affair. Azeff must be interrogated if he ever decides to appear for trial . . . Azeff has something to tell about the Stolypins, the Gerasimovs, the Truseviches, and right now he has no need to cover for them. He has no interest at all now in preserving their secrets. In our view, like any paid agent, deep down he is always contemptuous of those he served, particularly the Okhrana and the government representatives. Indeed, yes, otherwise he would be wholly incapable of thinking about them. And the various Plehves he killed " with a revolutionary's happiness of heart," as he put it. At the same time he is utterly devoid of any moral scruples. He was always just as easily ready to inflict disaster on Kalyaev as to throw a bomb at Plehve. Now, when the Okhrana no longer has any need for Azeff, after all the revelations, and he is out of the Police Department, there is nothing more natural for him than to expose the Gerasimovs, whom he has always despised . . . At all events, whether Azeff will face a revolutionary trial, whether he will explain himself or not—none of it makes any difference. The Azeff period, the Azeff affair are gone for good. Now begins the exposure of the Azeffs, and in this period Azeff's revelations themselves could play an important role.[53]

In the midst of the debate, Burtsev made a secret trip to meet Azeff, after

[50] Felix Volkhovsky to SR readers, London, 12 Oct. 1912, Arkhiv P.S.-R., No. 506.

[51] Yevgenii Kolosov to Valentina Kolosova, an undated intercepted letter, enclosed with the report of the Head of the Foreign Agency to the Director of Police Department, No. 1239, 29 Sept./12 Oct. 1912, Okhrana Archive XII C(1), fol. 1/c., cont. 106.

[52] Chernov held no official position at that time. He resided in Italy and favoured the holding of a trial of Azeff, in contrast to the stand of his former colleagues on the leadership. Viktor Chernov to Boris Savinkov, op. cit.

[53] *Budushchee*, No. 3, 5 Nov. 1911.

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having assured him, naturally, that he would not reveal his hiding place. Manifestly, then, he did not make the trip as an historian interested in unravelling the past, as Nikolaevsky believes. Burtsev had one purpose in mind: to obtain from Azeff additional ammunition for the political war he was waging then against the tsarist government.

It is not difficult to understand the unbridled fury of the SRs when they learned of the secret meeting, after their efforts to find Azeff at an address given to them by Burtsev proved unavailing, which led them to conclude that Burtsev had kept from them his information about Azeff's hiding place[54] and, moreover—they could not but think this—had conspired with Azeff against them. " When they hear Burtsev's name," Yevgenii Kolosov wrote in a letter to his wife, " they tremble with rage. They threaten—God knows what. They accuse him of having deliberately given them an incorrect address so they did not kill him [Azeff]. ' He led us astray,' ' We will never forgive him,' ' A shameless fraud,' etc."[55]

Whether this was a genuine misunderstanding due to which Azeff's pursuers were unable to track him down and were therefore frustrated in their plan to murder him, or whether Burtsev deliberately misled them because he opposed their plot, the affair once more reveals the basic conflict of interest between Burtsev and the SRs. Their attention was focused entirely on the problem of their past. Burtsev's struggle was perceived as striking at the party's very essence, and therefore as being inadmissible and unethical. Felix Volkhovsky expressed this feeling in a letter in which he rejected the idea of putting Azeff on trial: " To obtain this information [about provocation within its ranks] the party must wallow in filth. Is this justified? I believe not. The party's honour, health and security are more important than all the exposures of all the agents in the party in the past or present."[56] While these remarks are directed at those who advocated a trial for Azeff, they are also implicitly critical of Burtsev's activity. And since that activity was perceived as being unwarranted and harmful, its moral blemishes began to be pointed out, and Burtsev the man began to be the object of villification as one who was constantly surrounded by *provocateurs*,[57] disregarding his own past remarks that " Betrayal is never outdated; all sins are forgiven, but the sins of Judas are never pardoned," and " We must be meticulous in remembering the names of the *provocateurs*, because revolutionaries very often forget them."[58]

Thus, despite the fact that Burtsev never ceased to explain his political goals and their significance, his methods were not discussed in that

[54] Yevgenii Kolosov, a former member of the SR party and at that time a member of the editorial staff of *Byloe*, maintained in that letter that no deception was involved, but only a misunderstanding. Yevgenii Kolosov to Valentina Kolosova, op. cit.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Felix Volkhovsky to SR leaders, op. cit.

[57] A. Lipin, " Burtseviada " in *Sud nad azefshchinoyu* (Paris, 1911), p. 115.

[58] " K chitatelyam ' Bylogo ' i ' Revolyutsionnoi mysli,' " proklamatsiya Kruzhok SR. Paris, Dec. 1908. Enclosed with report of Head of Foreign Agency to Director of Police Department, No. 494, 13/26 Dec. 1908, Okhrana Archive XXIVb, fol. 5, cont. 211. Although the leaflet refers to the Azeff affair and to Bakai's part therein prior to Azeff's final exposure, it does express the subsequent approach as well.

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context but were explained solely in terms of personal motives: publicity-seeking, attention-getting, headline-making—indeed, the press devoted considerable space to him.

THE loud publicity that accompanied virtually all of Burtsev's activity was certainly one of its distinguishing features. This publicity riled his revolutionary colleagues, who were used to acting out of the spotlight; Burtsev, by contrast, viewed it as natural and self-evident. The attainment of his objective—the de-legitimization of the tsarist regime—required as many headlines as possible, both to present the regime in its most negative light vis-à-vis international public opinion, and to inform the Russian readership about his revelations by means of quotations from the foreign press. To that end he divided his paper *Budushchee* into two sections: one Russian and the other a translation into French. In addition, he approached the mass-circulation free press. In Paris, his permanent residence, he made considerable use of two large papers, *Le Matin* and *Le Journal*, both considered mouthpieces of the conservative bourgeoisie. The two journals devoted prominent place to Burtsev's spectacular exposés, such as the Garting-Landezen affair.[59] In June–July 1909, *Le Journal* serialized Burtsev's memoirs with considerable publicity. Early the following year Burtsev spent four months in the United States raising funds for his continued activity and in order to inform American public opinion about his work. Special committees formed in key cities preceded Burtsev's appearances with massive publicity campaigns in order to attract Russian *émigrés* to the meetings and to interest the American press. They had considerable success. Thousands sought entry to the halls where Burtsev spoke in the wake of press advertisements such as: " Attention! Burtsev is coming! Boston is being treated to a visit from one of the most remarkable men in modern history—a Detective-Revolutionist—Vladimir Burtseff [*sic*]."[60] Or, in St Louis: " You have heard of Vladimir Burtzeff [*sic*]? Who has not? Do you want to see him?"[61]

More important for Burtsev himself was probably the extensive coverage he received in papers large and small throughout the United States. The day after his arrival in New York, the *New York Times* devoted half a page to him, headlined: " Bourtseff [*sic*]—Leader of the Foes of the Czar, Famous Russian Detective, Just Arrived in America."[62] The rival *Tribune* also ran a major story that day: " A Terror to Spies—How Bourtseff Has Stirred Russia."[63] And in Chicago: " Bourt-

[59] Arkadii Mikhailovich Garting headed the Foreign Agency in Paris from Aug. 1905–Jan. 1909. He was forced to flee and give up his position after it was discovered, with Burtsev's aid, that he was in fact the person who was known at the time as Landezen, an Okhrana secret agent who was apprehended in France in July 1890 with a group of Russian revolutionaries in the wake of an explosion. He was sentenced along with them to five years' imprisonment, but escaped. The exposure caused a major scandal in France and was reported by the entire press.

[60] Arkhiv P.S.-R., No. 19.

[61] Ibid.

[62] *New York Times*, 23 Jan. 1910.

[63] *The Tribune*, 23 Jan. 1910.

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seff in Speech Holds Czar to Blame. Secret Letters Show that Russia's Ruler Is Guilty of Bloody Acts."[64] For the revolutionaries, the following headline could well have been equally infuriating: " Bourtzeff, Much Dreaded Russian Revolutionist, Is Mild, Blue-Eyed, Smiling, and Talks with a Lisp."[65] These and other headlines served the purpose declared by Burtsev immediately upon his arrival in the United States:

> The public opinion of Russia and that of Europe and America will in the near future demand an account from the Russian government for the crime perpetrated by methods of traitorous provocation. I hope that I shall not leave this country before the Russian government is branded with shame by the American press for the crimes committed by it in connection with Azeff and his traitorous fellows.[66]

Criticism of Burtsev's links with the press was both substantive and personal. The Menshevik Mikhail Pavlovich (" Volonter ") considered the matter from the perspective of revolutionary ethics. In September 1901 he published in Paris a special pamphlet, mimeographed in 10 copies, which he sent to the heads of the revolutionary parties (Lenin, Deich, Chernov and others). In the pamphlet, Pavlovich accuses Burtsev of having deviated from the rules followed by revolutionaries of the old school, of which Burtsev himself had once been a member. When these veteran revolutionaries had revelations worth publishing, Pavlovich wrote, they would publish them in the underground press, or at most in the sympathetic legal press. Pavlovich admits that this method had its disadvantages. Yet even if these papers had small circulations, they were nonetheless able to arouse all Russia to a new life. In contrast, Burtsev had chosen to publish his revelations (whose nature also came in for severe criticism in the pamphlet) in the " scandal-mongering extortionist " press. An anomaly was thus created, the writer continues: whereas on its front page *Le Matin* carried the story of Bakai's exposure and heaped praise on Burtsev—" the Sherlock Holmes of the Russian Revolution "—on the inside pages the same paper reported extensively on Russia's flourishing economy and called on French capitalists to invest in its plants.[67]

Yet if this criticism sought to reply to Burtsev's arguments and refute his contention regarding the need for publicity in the type of press that revolutionaries did not regard as serving their interests, other revolutionaries disregarded these arguments altogether and explained Burtsev's actions as deriving exclusively from personal motives: a lust for

[64] *The Chicago Daily Socialist*, 14 March 1910.

[65] *The Evening World*, 20 Jan. 1910.

[66] Burtsev's speech in New York, 23 Feb. 1910, Arkhiv P.S.-R., No. 19.

[67] M. Pavlovich, (" Volonter "), *Vladimir Burtsev v roli istorika* (Paris, 1910), Nicolaevsky Collection, No. 65, box 6, fol. 30. In fact, the government of Russia paid large sums to certain French papers—*Le Matin* among them—so they would present the tsarist regime in a positive light and refute revolutionary propaganda. Thus, Burtsev's sensational revelations found their way into the papers' reportage, while articles praising the regime were printed in the features section. On the Russian funding of the French press, see C. Bellanger, *et al.*, *Histoire générale de la presse française:* T. III: de 1871 a 1940 (Paris, 1972), pp. 269–75.

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publicity and a hunger for headlines. Some of the most acute criticism levelled at Burtsev came from Yudelevsky, one of the leaders of a splinter Paris-based Social Revolutionary group. Calling his comments " Burtseviada," he published them as an appendix to the conclusions of his inquiry into the Azeff affair. This way of publication was in itself sufficient to make Burtsev part of the abominated *Azeffshchina*. Yudelevsky wrote: " Evidently the head of the new Sherlock Holmes has gone dizzy on him. The world press is talking about the extraordinary skills he demonstrated in the Azeff affair, he is being photographed and presented to the public view in the theatre of the market-place: the moving pictures. Yet now Burtsev is bursting into a new, entirely mad career."[68] All the noise generated by his revelations and the attendant publicity led to a sense of revulsion, as was expressed, *inter alia*, in Victor Chernov's comment about Burtsev: that he completely embodied the yellow press.[69]

Burtsev himself rejected all this criticism. He replied in his own paper *Budushchee*:

> We are sometimes accused of giving too much space in our paper to the issue of provocation. A strange rebuke! We do not know whether the legal press in Russia will, under special circumstances, be given the opportunity to deal with issues like these. In the meantime it must remain silent [with respect to them] or make use of quotations from foreign papers. Russian readers are now getting reports about how Yeremin in 1906 organized Ryss's escape in Kiev[70]; how Gerasimov fabricated, through Brodsky and others, the charges against the members of the Second Duma; how Azeff actively participated in the assassination of Plehve, the Grand Duke Sergei, and others. All these matters were covered long ago in our paper. We believe wholeheartedly that ultimately the Russian public will recognize our charges against the government regarding how provocation was organized, nor will the government be able to deny them. We have spoken and we are continuing to speak so much about the Okhrana for two reasons: first and foremost, because the Okhrana is the pillar of Russian reaction . . . and secondly, because until a very short time ago it was impossible to speak about it. Whereas now it is being talked about incessantly, albeit within the framework of the censorship. As to the current place of provocation in Russian political life, that is indicated by the fact that the session of the Duma has been reopened with two entire meetings devoted to that subject—and the entire Russian reading public is following with baited breath its discussions on provocation. No, we cannot be accused of talking over-much about the Truseviches, the

[68] *Sud nad azefshchinoyu*, p. 115.

[69] Viktor Chernov to Boris Savinkov, op. cit.

[70] Solomon Ryss, a maximalist who was arrested in Kiev in July 1906 following an " expropriation " (armed robbery) accompanied by murder. He tried to mislead the Okhrana, suggesting to its commander in Kiev, Aleksandr Yeremin, that he would become a secret agent were he to be released from prison. The suggestion was accepted. To camouflage Ryss's release, an escape was staged. According to Gerasimov's memoirs, so convincing was this escape that a policeman and a warder were placed on trial for it and sentenced to hard labour.

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> Gerasimovs, the Yeremins and the Azeffs—but of talking too little about them. However, to that rebuke we reply that we are doing all we can, and if anyone can do better—let him![71]

Externally, then, Burtsev was satisfied with the results of his activity. But since in implanting the issue of provocation in the public consciousness he was in fact seeking to serve a more important purpose, it is difficult not to conclude that, his own remarks notwithstanding, his success was at best partial.

THE impossibility of attaining effective cooperation among the opposition stemmed from a multitude of complex factors, among which Burtsev's struggle was certainly not the most important. The elucidation of these factors is beyond the scope of the present article. However, as for Burtsev himself, the path he chose to try to coerce such cooperation was the least appropriate one. In the first place, the raising of the Azeff affair (and of others after it) underlined precisely the divisive elements among the opposition forces, and exposed one section among them—the advocates of terrorism—to attacks by their rivals who condemned this tactic. In addition, Burtsev, in his political fervour—and perhaps also in the obsessiveness that gripped him in the course of his activity—showed insensitivity to the SRs special feelings regarding the provocation and to the intra-party consequences of his exposures. The methods he regarded as perfectly natural and as clearly serving his political goal deviated sharply from accepted revolutionary ethics, and therefore set in motion against him the very forces on which he had, ultimately, built his political calculations.

Finally, Burtsev's relations with the revolutionaries need to be understood not only because he was a prominent figure in the opposition camp, deeply involved in revolutionary life and of major importance for present-day scholars who have constant recourse to his sources. An examination of Burtsev's relations with part of the revolutionary camp enables us to focus on his unique political position between the leftist and rightist political opposition; and, no less crucial, throws light on the role of provocation as a permanent factor in the life of the revolutionary movement, affecting political and social developments within it. Burtsev's activity and his relations with the revolutionaries against this background are one important aspect of this broad phenomenon.

[71] *Budushchee*, No. 12, 12 Nov. 1911.

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The Okhrana Abroad

Agents and Exiles

Wojciech Karpinski

IN tsarist Russia, special laws were enacted against Russian *émigrés*; they were pursued abroad by the secret agents of the Third Section. Men who dared to leave Russia became outcasts and brought the wrath of the authorities on to their families' heads. Those who refused to return were subject to the death sentence or, for the lucky ones, the *knout* and hard labour. Those who encouraged others to remain abroad were also deemed to have committed an offence. Russia signed a number of international treaties which made it feasible for the authorities to bring the guilty to " justice." Under Nicholas I, it became progressively more difficult to obtain permission to go abroad and those who could afford to go found themselves under ever stricter surveillance. All their letters were read, certain books were not allowed back into the country, Russian embassies reported on their movements. But all this seemed inadequate, and in 1831 the Third Section opened its own secret agency abroad.

Its initial purpose was to keep an eye on the Polish *émigrés* who found themselves in the West in the aftermath of the November 1830 Insurrection. The network of agents, thus established, took over at a later date the surveillance of the growing Russian emigration.

The research so far carried out covers only the " outstanding " agents of the Third Section, and Yakov Tolstoy was the most successful of them all. In his youth, he was befriended by Pushkin and had links with the Decembrists. He happened to be abroad in December 1825 and preferred to stay there. He wrote for French literary periodicals, an occupation which failed to bring in an income large enough to keep him in the lordly state he wished to maintain. He then published a number of pamphlets in which he argued against Russia's critics, hoping thus to get into the good graces of the tsarist authorities. With the backing of Paskevich he finally achieved this aim. In 1837 he was made an official representative in Paris of the Ministry of Education. In fact he reported directly to the Third Section and was on its payroll. His tasks were to " inspire " those French journalists who were friendly towards Russia, to transmit Russian subsidies to selected papers and to report on the current mood in Paris. Tolstoy was also responsible for a pamphlet aimed against de Custine's work on Russia. Despite all this he managed to gain the confidence of Russian *émigrés* and only an unintentional indiscretion of Uvarov's unmasked him.

The existence of the network of agents, coupled with the tentative attitude of the whole of society towards *émigrés*, created a murky and unhealthy ambience. There appeared a number of " unwanted men,"

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some bizarre, some unbalanced and some ambiguous figures. The distorted sense of values encouraged waste and corruption of talented individuals unable to find a proper niche for themselves: the whole of Russian intellectual life was adversely affected. Such circumstances created a closed circuit, a vicious circle within which all kinds of Russian demons came out to play. Only the sheer intellectual perseverance of individual *émigrés* and some relaxation of the political climate inside Russia allowed, for a time, the recognition of the need for an alternative voice and even some recognition of the positive role the emigration could play. Herzen's time had come. Before his time, in his time, and later, many broken, entangled victims of tsarist tyranny lived on, making up a gallery which illustrates the tragic fate of the *émigrés*. The life of Ivan Golovin, that " Khlestakov *in partibus infidelium*," as Herzen called him, is one example. Herzen did not know everything about him, however: Golovin's offer to collaborate with the secret police came to light, much later, in the archives of the Third Section.

Golovin's decision to remain abroad was in the nature of an accident, the result of information held against him by Yakov Tolstoy. Golovin published *La Russie sous Nicolas I* and a volume of essays and stories, *Les types et les caractères russes*. Neither is a searching analysis but they are important works nonetheless: for the first time, a Russian described frankly and freely the mechanism of tyranny. It should be said that Golovin's attitude towards the Polish problem was unusual: he was one of the few Russian writers who, like Herzen, without any reservations wanted to see Poland become free and independent. His objectives included religious toleration; he was a man utterly free of the ideological fanaticism so frequently present in the statements of his countrymen. For a time, he was a member of the editorial committee of *Trybuna Ludu* but resigned in protest against Mickiewicz's Bonapartist views.

Wherever Golovin went he provoked hostility and dislike of himself and his views, flexible as these were. He travelled a great deal, lived in France, in Italy and in Britain. He went to America and wrote disparagingly about it, then returned to Europe. His " double life " started at that time. He bombarded the tsarist officials with requests to be allowed to return to Russia, while continuing his *émigré* pursuits which were completely unacceptable to the authorities. He became involved once again with the Polish *émigrés*, and wrote for *L'Espérance*, a newspaper published by Adam Mickiewicz's one time secretary, Armand Levy. His public stand at the time of the January 1863 Insurrection in Poland was remarkable and should be remembered by the Poles. Yet shortly afterwards, the same man wrote a memorandum for the Third Section, in which he pointed out the need to circumvent the influence wielded by Polish *émigrés* and offered to start a paper with this aim in view. Golovin was of course not the only *agent provocateur* operating among the Polish exiles. The Okhrana had many others.

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THE publication of *Raporty szpiega* (Reports of a Spy)* pinpoints two areas of interest: first the personality of the man who wrote these reports, Julian Aleksander Balaszewicz, and the problem of national apostasy which his case exemplifies. Secondly, the mechanism of which he was a part and which he helped to develop, and the problem of political provocation. The two areas are of course inexorably linked.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the national dilemma was foremost in the minds of the Poles. The enslaved country struggled for independence and when this appeared unattainable within the foreseeable future, the society tried to preserve at least that which it still had. A few individuals who found the pressures of the situation unbearable openly rejected the burden that their national tradition forced them to carry. Their reasons differed, but all those who made the choice publicly invariably met with public condemnation.

Admissions of loss of faith in national survival were backed by varying arguments. Some—like Adam Gurowski—were motivated by a belief in the inexorable working of the laws of history, others—like Henryk Rzewuski—were followers of a singular form of conservatism. Others still—like Kazimierz Krzywicki—accepted as their own the *raison d'état* of their victors. All of them acted in the name of political realism: the Tsar represented power and authority and therefore, in their eyes, law and order too. It was without pleasure that those men made their views public. Yet they acted according to their principles and within the generally accepted moral norm. It is of interest to be able to follow the way in which they reached their ultimate decision. There also existed, however, a different kind of renegade: one who did not declare his beliefs openly and publicly. He threw off the burden of loyalty to kith and kin, and mankind as a whole, in secret because he lacked courage or, as he would have put it, because he lacked the *naïveté* which could make him expose himself to public disapproval. In any case he was of the opinion that campaigns against subversive movements had to be fought by every means available, including secret infiltration of underground organizations. Clearly, the most effective way was to pose as a convinced and fervent fighter for the cause.

Without a doubt, some *agents provocateurs* did it entirely for the money, and some were victims of blackmail who allowed themselves to become entangled in the net. This last category is not really of much interest, if only because more often than not they were unsuccessful, perhaps because they lacked the necessary conviction: they either gave themselves away or had to be recalled. Successful agents had to be made of sterner stuff and to share a very unusual psychological make-up and moral and political approach. Were they, in fact, fully aware of their own position? Did they see themselves from every angle? Were they capable of distancing themselves sufficiently to observe the split in their own personality from the outside? And to be able to comprehend the meaning of the inner division? We cannot, alas, be sure. Even if they were, their

* Albert Potocki (Julian Aleksander Balaszewicz) *Raporty szpiega*, ed. Rafael Gerber, 2 vols. (Warsaw 1973).

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reports fail to disclose this. They show only one of the two faces they wore. But the availability of these reports enables us to come closer to the secrets of their existence and to place the portrait of each spy against the whole mechanism within which he operated. In the case of Balaszewicz, it enables us to compare him with his peers in the tsarist secret police.

JULIAN Aleksander Balaszewicz was born in 1831 into a family of poor Polish gentry. He tried, without much success, to make a career for himself in the Russian army. This plan having come to nothing, he decided to search for another way in which to fulfil his ambitions. In 1860 Balaszewicz published a volume of poetry, *Niezabudki z brzegow Newy* (Forget-me-nots from the shores of the River Neva). But a literary career was not his final choice. Soon, he was writing a memorandum for the Grand Duke Alexander on the subject of the revolutionary movement. It failed to attract attention but Balaszewicz managed to reach the Tsar himself and to submit to him a plan to infiltrate the ranks of the Polish political *émigrés*. The date was 1861 and political agitation in Poland was creating much concern in St Petersburg. Balaszewicz's offer was accepted and he was dispatched to Paris with the added bonus of a new name, that of Albert Henryk Potocki who had died in the Caucasus. As Potocki, Balaszewicz entered the ranks of the Polish exiles. He lacked neither the necessary nerve nor the intelligence. Soon, he gained the confidence of General Henryk Dembinski. On behalf of the, fictitious, Society For National Defence he nominated the general President for Polish Affairs. But the reports Balaszewicz sent to St Petersburg failed to create confidence there. He was regarded as a humbug, given to boasting and overestimating his success. He was soon recalled. Later, in the tense atmosphere just before the January Insurrection, Balaszewicz offered his services again, arguing that in order to keep Poland quiet it was necessary first to destroy the emigration. On his return to Paris, Balaszewicz organized a complete network of agents. He penetrated the secrets of a number of *émigré* factions and managed to set them at odds with one another. His plan was to disrupt the emigration from within. Simultaneously, he gave information against the underground couriers whom the *émigrés* sent to Poland, and caused a number of arrests and deportations.

He made clever use of personal antagonisms: " In order to discredit Czartoryski I bought the publishing rights to a letter from General Rybinski to Bishop Rodez and two thousand copies are to be printed in London. The letter is of great importance at this juncture and it will ruin all their plans for unity. An article had been ordered from one of the *émigré* writers arguing against the Proclamation and against Mieroslawski. This will be published separately." " I am about to produce a pamphlet against the Jesuits, which I will send on as soon as it is ready. I am also writing a short essay on the Pope and the Jesuits. It should damage the influence of the clergy." He also wrote a pamphlet against General Dembinski which succeeded in damaging the General's ambition and in driving a wedge between him and the whole of the movement.

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Balaszewicz also suggested some indirect means of disruption: " It would be a worth-while move to dispatch abroad some persons of limited means. In a foreign country, among strangers, without knowledge of the language, they are likely to experience poverty and want. By becoming a nuisance to their families and friends with their requests for help they will discourage others from emigrating. Most important, as they will be living the lives of proletariats, they will destroy the myth of the dignified life led by *émigrés*. The more *émigrés* there are who are both poor and young, the better. Europe's sympathies are likely to be cooled by their presence there. Rich *émigrés* do nothing but harm."

Balaszewicz was always full of new ideas. He sent back a design for buttons worn by Poles involved in the patriotic plot: the wearing of these should be forbidden! He suggested to a prefect of the Paris police that photographs should be subject to censorship, like the press, and forwarded the same plan to Russia. One of his ideas was to start a central file of political suspects in St Petersburg. New projects followed in succession. And, to justify his methods, he culled a slogan: " Secret enemies have to be fought by secret means."

Balaszewicz was not content to be just a spy. He did not restrict himself to shadowing political suspects. Instead, having penetrated an organization he would proceed to agitate and to lead it in a direction chosen by himself. He firmly believed that universities, in Russia and abroad, should have their own networks of agents: " we should have a man in each faculty, who would live among the students and attend lectures, thus acquiring knowledge of their mood and their plans. The agents must remain unknown to one another. The best plan would be to introduce without delay a body of secret inspectors. I submitted a detailed memorandum in September (. . .) It is an idea of my own never tried before." Of all the universities, Heidelberg was most suspect: " Nearly all the faculty of philosophy is involved in the plot. All the student lodgings should be placed under surveillance. It is particularly important to find out whether any students under suspicion make journeys to Poland or Russia."

Balaszewicz's most important task remained that of sowing discord among Polish *émigré* groups and organizations and causing arguments between Polish and Russian *émigrés*. In this, Balaszewicz managed to acquire an important ally. At the beginning of his second year in Paris, Balaszewicz reported: " I have the honour to confirm that the negotiations concerning cooperation with Monsieur B. the police prefect have been concluded satisfactorily." With the help of his French brethren Balaszewicz obtained access to the *émigrés*' correspondence and was able to report to the French police anyone who was " inconvenient " from the Russian point of view. He was also able to stop the distribution of *émigré* publications in France. On 24 October 1862 he was able to report as follows: " With M. Boittelle's assistance we received yesterday two letters from Bakunin to Cwierczakiewicz, a member of the secret Paris committee (. . .) M. Boittelle will make available to us the corre-

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spondence of Bakunin, Herzen and Ogarev." Now Balaszewicz was able to put his plan into operation: " In order to drive the final wedge between Bakunin and Herzen on the one side, and Mieroslawski on the other, and to make any future accommodation out of the question, I had copies prepared of Bakunin's letters concerning Mieroslawski (now in my possession), and of Mieroslawski's letter concerning Bakunin. I made use of some facts of which I happen to be aware, added a few strong words and sent the letters off: one from Brussels to London for Bakunin, another from London to Paris for Mieroslawski; they were enraged to such a degree that they vented their anger in articles they wrote for the press here."

Balaszewicz's inventiveness knew no bounds. Immediately after the start of the Polish Insurrection he forbade Herzen, supposedly on behalf of the Polish National Government, to interfere with Polish affairs and he planned a similar action to discourage Czartoryski and Garibaldi. Much later on, Balaszewicz became a leader of the Polish *émigrés* in Britain and had plans for taking over the Polish section of the International, if not the whole of that organization. This self-appointed rival of Marx, undoubtedly a man of considerable acumen, was finally betrayed by one of his agents who was too fond of drink.

WHAT were Balaszewicz's motives? Was he pleased with what he achieved? It would be difficult to answer the first question with any degree of certainty. He did not, presumably, do it just for the money. Was it to gain power over men? Or was it because he believed that history was on the side of the strong? Was Balaszewicz pleased with his achievement? Presumably the answer should be in the affirmative: the Insurrection collapsed, the tsardom seemed stronger than ever, the secret police were in great demand, as were the *agents provocateurs*.

Yet what seemed to Balaszewicz a demonstration of power, a proof of the Tsar's supremacy, was in fact the onset of insidious degeneration, a kind of self-administered poison. But Balaszewicz was unable to see that far ahead. Only after the revolution did a special commission examine the ex-ministers, deputy ministers and heads of departments in the Ministry of the Interior. The total disregard for law, rampant within the administration, came to light. The secret police, like a cancerous growth, attacked all parts of the body politic and destroyed their normal functioning. In the end, the practitioners of political provocation were struck down by their own weapons.

AT the outset of the reign of Alexander II, Liprandi submitted a plan to organize a spy network in secondary schools. This was done. Liberal writers were all placed under surveillance. To take the example of Chernyshevsky: before his arrest a whole system of controls was instituted. The concierge and his servants were bribed. His letters were read by the police. When he was about to engage a new cook, a suitable person was produced by the police. When his son-in-law was looking for

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new rooms, he was offered some, together with a new neighbour, whose task it was to befriend him in order to get closer to the writer himself. All this must have cost a great deal in terms of effort and money.

But money was never short. Roman Malinowski, an agent who infiltrated the Social Democratic Party, started with a salary of 50 roubles which grew to 500 by the time he became a member of the Central Committee. The most notorious of them all, Azeff, a member of the Central Committee of the Social Revolutionary Party and the perpetrator of 28 assassinations including that of Plehve and the Grand Duke Sergei, was paid 1000 roubles a month. For that sum he sent to their deaths not only revolutionaries, but also holders of the great offices of state and some members of the imperial family. The mechanism of infiltration and provocation worked not only as a tool in the struggle against political suspects, but also as a means to gain influence and power. In later years, the latter role became paramount. The agents, besides infiltrating the existing organizations, were in the business of creating their own in order to prove their usefulness and indispensability. Dzhunkovsky, a deputy minister in the Ministry of the Interior admitted when examined after the revolution: " For a time there was a vogue for secret printing works (. . .) the secret police would get them going and then ' discover ' them so as to get more decorations for their work."

The game had its risks for the secret police. The methods used against the revolutionaries and against some men in positions of power, were ultimately capable of destroying all human bonds, law and order, the agents and their patrons. A good example of the interlocking mechanisms of treachery and provocation can be obtained by following the story of Sergei Degaev, a triple agent. Degaev was recruited by a Colonel Sudeykin, a man overflowing with ambition and dreams of power. They came to an understanding while Degaev was serving a sentence. Sudeykin offered to spring Degaev out of prison. Once free, Degaev was to infiltrate and lead the revolutionary movement; he would have to betray some members to the police and place himself in control of the rest, who would gladly follow the hero of a successful escape. Degaev was to organize a number of assassinations, terrorizing the government and getting rid of Sudeykin's rivals in the process. Sudeykin would thus become indispensable and be made Minister of the Interior. He would then present Degaev to the Tsar: they would become joint rulers of Russia.

Degaev accepted and handed over some of his fellow revolutionaries. But further progress proved less simple. Sudeykin was not promoted and Degaev lived in fear of those he had betrayed and those to whom he had betrayed them. He went abroad and there, near Geneva, he met Lev Tikhomirov, a respected figure in the revolutionary movement. After a few days of talks Degaev confessed and told Tikhomirov the whole truth, placing himself in his hands. Tikhomirov advised him to return to Russia in order to save those comrades who could still be saved and to kill

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Sudeykin. Degaev returned but was in no hurry to redeem his promise. Instead, he handed over more of his fellow revolutionaries to the police, still hoping, with at least a part of his soul, to be able to carry out Sudeykin's lunatic plan. The cards were shuffled again, not once but several times: Degaev organized some genuine *coups*, some false attempts, then some doubly false attempts. Sudeykin, by that time, came to distrust Degaev, but he still needed him. Degaev hesitated, came to the conclusion that he no longer needed Sudeykin and killed him. Distrusting everyone, he then fled to America, where he died, after lingering there for some years under an assumed name.

The case of Degaev exposes clearly the essence of the mechanism. A bright strong light shows up the effect it had on the whole of society, as well as on the people directly involved. In all probability, Balaszewicz-Potocki would have regarded the picture with abhorrence and his superiors would have repudiated Sudeykin's methods. Yet it was they who prepared the ground for Degaev and started the mechanism within which such actions were deemed worthy of a reward (metaphorically and literally: Degaev was paid 300 roubles a month plus bonuses). The cost was born in the first instance by the Polish emigration, but in the ultimate reckoning also by the tsarist bureaucracy, the realm Julian Balaszewicz chose for his own and one which, in his own and his superiors' view, he served well.

Translated by Krystyna Bronkowska

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The KGB Abroad

" Active Measures "

*The Soviet Union uses the term " active measures " (*aktivnyye meropriyatiya*) to cover a broad range of activities designed to promote Soviet foreign policy goals, including undercutting opponents of the USSR. Active measures include disinformation, manipulating the media in foreign countries, the use of communist parties and communist front groups, and operations to expand Soviet political influence. In contrast to public diplomacy, which all nations practice, Soviet active measures often involve deception and are frequently implemented by clandestine means. Active measures are carried out not only by the KGB but also by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.*

Source: Special Report 101, US Dept. of State, *Bureau of Public Affairs*, Washington DC.

Unacceptable Intervention*

ACTIVE measures are not a new addition to the Soviet political repertoire. In the 1920s, Soviet political operatives infiltrated Russian *émigré* organizations in the West to set them squabbling among themselves. During the 1930s, Soviet agents manipulated front groups, skilfully camouflaging Moscow's hand until the Hitler-Stalin Pact in August 1939. At the time, a veteran communist organizer working for the Comintern, Willi Muenzenberg, spoke cynically of these fronts as " innocents' clubs." An early post-war Soviet disinformation campaign orchestrated false charges of US use of " germ warfare " during the Korean war.

On occasion, we get a glimpse of active measures from the Soviet side. The defection of former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko, who coordinated active measures in Japan from 1975–79 while nominally a correspondent for *New Times*, and who for a while was Acting Chief of the KGB's active measures group in Japan, yields such an opportunity. Levchenko recalls in his recently released testimony before the US Congress several successful forgery and disinformation operations. He states that during the 1970s the KGB influenced Japanese politics through numerous agents of influence including a former Cabinet Minister, Members of Parliament, and prominent journalists. Levchenko estimated that the Tokyo KGB residency received several hundred active measures directives each year. Of these, according to Levchenko, it was able to implement successfully about one-third.

* Excerpt from the article published in *NATO Review*, April 1983.

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The exposure by Danish authorities of the clandestine relationship between the KGB and Arne Herloev Petersen, an author and journalist, provides another glimpse into active measures operations. In the summer of 1981, the Soviets arranged to cover Petersen's expenses for placing a series of advertisements in which Danish artists expressed support for a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone. On one occasion, Petersen delivered to the North Korean Embassy foreign policy documents which were supplied by the Soviet Embassy and which, on instructions, he misrepresented as coming from an American source. In another typical disinformation ploy, Petersen published a pamphlet attacking British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the text of the pamphlet having been supplied by the Soviet Embassy. As the Danish government statement on the case noted, it was typical of these efforts to influence public debate that the Soviet origin of the opinions was concealed in order to preserve their effectiveness. Vladimir Merkulov, a KGB officer serving as a Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen, was exposed as Petersen's clandestine contact and was expelled from Denmark in October 1981 for improper conduct.

A large organizational structure in the USSR sustains the active measures effort. The covert arm of active measures is Service A of the KGB's First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Techniques for Active Measures*

THE Soviet active measures structure continues to make frequent use of falsely attributed or non-attributed press material as a means of reinforcing its overt propaganda items placed in the foreign media. The clandestine press placements are Soviet authored or inspired articles placed in foreign publications over the name of a non-Soviet author or without any indication of their real source. The primary purpose of such press placements is to influence local public audiences. These press placements additionally are often replayed by other Soviet press assets and by the open Soviet and Bloc media in an effort to create the impression of genuine broad international support for Soviet policies.

In open societies covert press placements by the Soviets and their surrogates are frequently difficult to spot. On occasion, however, the topic of a given article may give a clue to a possible Soviet role. For example, critical commentaries on the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which are frequent targets of Soviet and East European propaganda, are not uncommon in the West European press. However, occasional articles attacking the two radio organizations seem

* From "CIA Study: Trends and Developments in Soviet Active Measures" in *Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, 13, 14 July 1983, pp. 36–43.

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out of place when they appear in Third World newspapers and can almost certainly be considered Soviet press placements in those countries.

In many cases the Soviet role of influencing the media is well known. For example, the Indian magazine *Blitz* is a well-known outlet for anti-US propaganda. *Blitz* has been used by the Soviets to surface forgeries, identify alleged CIA personnel or agents, and disseminate Soviet-inspired disinformation. *Blitz* has recently tried to implicate the CIA in disturbances in Indian Kashmir by alleging that the CIA has financed and armed anti-government groups in the region.

In the 1970s, overt cultural and information activities by officers of the Soviet cultural centre in a West African country were used to establish covert ties to local journalists. KGB officers working under diplomatic cover established a substantial degree of control over the content of the two major daily newspapers in this country. The Soviets made cash payments to key members of the newspapers' editorial staffs on the understanding that they would promote the publication of articles critical of, or detrimental to, the West. The articles were sometimes written by the Soviets, but were published under the bylines of notional local journalists. One of the editors was also used by the Soviets as a fully-fledged agent of influence in the highest circles of the country's government.

Forgeries

Soviet forgeries may be fabricated out of whole cloth, or they may be altered versions of genuine documents. The Soviets have used both techniques in active measures campaigns in order to mislead foreign governments, media and public opinion.

Since 1975–76 the number of forged documents known to have surfaced in foreign countries has increased from about three to four to a current count of more than twice that number per year. In some cases a Soviet role in manufacturing these documents may be uncovered by content and forensic analysis of the document, the method of surfacing, the relative level of sophistication of the forgery, or its quick replay by the Soviet media. This method of determining sponsorship of a forgery has been validated by a Soviet defector, a KGB active measures specialist who served under cover in Japan as a correspondent of the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *New Times*. In the following examples, the forged documents clearly serve Soviet foreign policy interests and provide grist for the Soviet propaganda mill. Among hostile intelligence services, only the KGB and possibly the Czechoslovak and East German services are believed to have the resources and ability to produce forgeries of such relatively high quality.

The above-cited Soviet defector confirmed the Soviet origin of the forgery known as US Army Field Manual 30–31B. The KGB residency in Tokyo received copies of the forged document from Moscow packaged in pre-addressed envelopes for mailing to selected newspapers. Although the residency ultimately failed to surface the manual in Japan, the manual

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was successfully surfaced elsewhere as part of a concerted Soviet effort to link the United States with terrorist groups. It also accused the United States of trying to infiltrate friendly and allied governments.

The same defector confirmed that in 1976 the KGB forged the " last will and testament " of the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, an active measures operation directed against China. The forged " testament " alleged that the Cultural Revolution was a mistake, that China's economy should stress the expansion of heavy industry, and that there should be greater cooperation among all " democratic and socialist " forces to ensure world peace—implicitly including the USSR. The " testament " was intended to cause unrest in China and to create distrust towards China among the Japanese public. A KGB officer managed to surface the forgery in the *Sankei Shimbun*, one of the leading moderate (not leftist) Japanese daily newspapers, and subsequently in other Japanese publications. After the text was published in Japan, the Soviet news agency TASS picked it up and replayed it world-wide. According to the defector, KGB headquarters evaluated this active measures operation as " the most successful ever carried out " by the KGB.

The Soviets have even used forgeries in an effort to influence communist governments. According to the same defector, in August 1979 the KGB residency in Tokyo received from Moscow a copy of a forged US Department of State memorandum dealing with the situation on the Korean Peninsula and US policy regarding South Korea. The residency was directed to have it passed to the North Korean intelligence service in such a way that the North Koreans would not know that the Soviets had anything to do with the document. It was intended to create unease among those close to North Korean party chief Kim Il-song. It was passed to a North Korean living in Japan, who the Soviets knew was an agent of the North Koreans.

Since early 1980 the Soviets have been involved in the surfacing of a number of damaging forgeries in Western Europe aimed at aggravating relations between the United States and its allies, and undermining West European support for NATO's Theatre Nuclear Force (TNF) modernization. For example, the Soviets were behind the surfacing of forged and altered US war plans, all dating from the early 1960s. At least some of the documents which formed the basis for this operation (with respect to format and style, for example) were obtained from US Army Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson, who was eventually arrested and convicted as a KGB agent. These documents, which were originally surfaced in the mid-1960s, have recently reappeared, almost certainly at Soviet instigation, in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom in a pamphlet entitled *Top Secret Documents on US Headquarters in Europe: Holocaust Again for Europe.* The pamphlet plays on European fears about nuclear weapons by claiming that the United States would use such weapons against the territory of its NATO allies. The purpose of the reissue is to encourage West European opposition to TNF modernization.

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In December 1980 in Norway, a forged copy of a US State Department cable surfaced immediately before the visit of the Norwegian Foreign Minister to Moscow. The forged document had allegedly been sent originally by the US State Department to certain US embassies in Europe. The forged cable touched on a number of controversial issues for the Norwegian government and put the United States on the wrong side of each issue. The method of surfacing and the document's contents point to Soviet authorship.

Disinformation

In attempts to discredit individuals, institutions, governments, or certain policies, particularly those of the United States and its allies, the Soviets frequently use *dezinformatsiya*, or disinformation. In KGB parlance the term " *dezinformatsiya* " denotes a variety of techniques and activities to purvey false or misleading information, including rumours, insinuation, and altered facts. In its efforts to carry out *dezinformatsiya*, the Soviet authorities have repeatedly used accredited diplomatic personnel abroad in a fashion not usually considered appropriate diplomatic practice.

In one example of oral disinformation, Soviet diplomats spread the rumour in late 1979 that the United States was behind the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca. In a related case, KGB officers and Soviet diplomats in Islamabad tried to convince third-country officials and even US personnel that the Pakistani Army was involved in the burning of the US Embassy, which took place shortly after the Mecca incident.

In another case, this one aimed at China and Japan, a KGB officer told a contact with access to the Japanese Foreign Ministry that a West European country was thinking of selling a nuclear reactor to the Chinese and that the sale was to remain secret. Japanese firms believed they had the inside track to get the contract. The false information circulated around the ministry, and Japanese military attachés in Europe were reportedly asked to try to check out the story. The Soviets considered the operation a success in irritating Japanese-Chinese relations.

Non-ruling Communist Parties

Traditional Soviet active measures programmes regularly use non-ruling communist parties, international and local front organizations, and friendship societies to help promote Soviet policies abroad. Pro-Moscow communist parties, whether legal or banned in their respective countries, serve a variety of functions in the overall Soviet foreign policy scheme. They can, under Moscow's guidance, influence the domestic political situation in their own countries even when they are not included in the government. Communist parties in foreign countries are also used by the Soviets as intermediaries to influence other communist parties on Moscow's behalf. The CPSU's International Department is in charge of liaison activities with non-ruling communist parties abroad. Currently there are more than 70 such parties that are considered pro-Soviet and

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are occasionally or permanently in touch with the Soviet Communist Party apparatus.

Contacts between the CPSU and foreign communist parties are usually overt and, at the leadership level, well publicized. The degree of Soviet control or influence varies with the organizational strength, financial resources, and political maturity of the party concerned. Where the parties are illegal, or where the nature of the contact is such that its discovery would lead to prosecution or embarrassment, the KGB—because of its expertise in operating clandestinely—may participate in the communications arrangements. As a noteworthy example, KGB officers have accompanied representatives of the International Department in some instances when the Soviets have passed funds to communist parties, even in countries where the party is legal.

The CPSU provides covert funding to some foreign communist parties via the open payment of large commissions to local party-owned or affiliated firms or printing houses. The latter in turn pay part of the commission clandestinely to the party. For example, communist-owned local travel agencies are allowed excessive profits by Intourist in buying package tours to the USSR by overcharging costs. This excess profit is then "contributed" to the local communist party. There have been instances of this activity in several West European countries. In some cases the Soviets use active measures to influence even other communist parties, particularly when the target does not follow routine Soviet direction. For example, in 1981 Moscow was encouraging pro-Soviet elements in the Italian party to pull it back into the Soviet sphere; and the Soviets have repeatedly tried unilaterally to influence regional organizations of the PCI.

International and Local Front Organizations

Over the past 30 years the Soviets have created and supported a wide range of major international front organizations whose objective is to support Soviet policies abroad. The leaders of such groups are amenable to Soviet direction of their organizations. Many of the rank and file as well as much of the general public may not be aware of the Soviet influence in the front organizations. Because they pretend not to profess communist ideological goals and are designed to attract members from a broad political spectrum, the front organizations are more effective than admittedly pro-Soviet groups. The four largest and most active front organizations are the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the Women's International Democratic Federation. They claim millions of members and have qualified for official observer status with UN organizations, where they represent themselves as independent, non-government spokesmen.

The CPSU's control of the international front organizations is exercised through the International Social Organizations Sector of the Central Committee's International Department. This control runs from

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the sector through the Soviet affiliate of the front involved to a Soviet representative at the front's headquarters.

With its headquarters in Helsinki, the World Peace Council (WPC) is the largest international front group, with affiliates in approximately 130 countries. The CPSU's directives are routed through the Soviet Committee for the Defence of Peace, a propaganda and liaison organization. One of the vice chairmen of the committee, Oleg Kharkhardin, is a functionary of the ID. The committee directs the activities of the WPC headquarters and makes arrangements for Soviet and East European financing of WPC activities. Soviet officials, such as Aleksandr Lebedev, who directed the WPC's administrative and financial activities until August 1979, help exercise direct Soviet control over WPC activities.

The WPC is one of Moscow's major instruments in reinforcing, and at times generating, opposition in Western Europe to NATO's TNF modernization. In spring 1981, the WPC was advised by the Soviets to focus its attention on current and planned activities on behalf of the anti-NATO campaign. The Soviets recommended that the WPC concentrate its efforts on broadening the publication of anti-NATO themes in the Western media and organize an international meeting of media representatives to discuss the role of the mass media in publicizing the dangers inherent in the arms build-up.

The Soviets proposed that the WPC coordinate a meeting of media specialists in Europe in 1981 to consider how disarmament is treated in the Western media. The Soviets also suggested that the WPC devote more attention to local government bodies throughout Western Europe as instruments of the disarmament campaign. To support this effort the Soviets recommended publicizing recent efforts by British local government bodies against deployment of nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom.

In recent years the effectiveness of the large well-established communist international front organizations has been eroded in many areas because of their pronounced pro-Soviet bias on virtually every issue. To compensate for this development, as well as to take advantage of new situations that may have a more specific appeal, the Soviets and other communist parties now make greater use of ad hoc front groups. These groups, which do not have an overt tradition of close association with communist and Soviet causes, try to attract members from a broad cross section of the political spectrum. Nonetheless, they are dominated by pro-Soviet individuals and are, as a rule, covertly financed by the Soviet Union and various communist parties and front groups. Their position on a given issue almost always supports Moscow's stand. Examples of such organizations include the Salvadoran solidarity committees, " Generals for Peace," recently established in Western Europe to oppose NATO's TNF modernization; the " Democratic Front Against Repression," which operates from Costa Rica and Mexico; and the " Association of Filipino Women Workers (SKMP)." The Soviets are also trying to exploit environmentalist and anti-nuclear-power groups in their anti-TNF effort

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by promoting the formation of still other local fronts with special interest groups which they influence but do not control.

Friendship Societies

Soviet " friendship " and cultural societies in various countries represent themselves as non-political organizations intended to promote cultural and economic understanding between the countries involved and the Soviet Union. Unlike the situation of similar Western-sponsored organizations, the Soviets view these groups as political tools, and activities involving them are manipulated by the International Department. They are used as a bridge to people who may be reluctant to participate in organizations that are openly pro-Soviet or sponsored by the local communist parties, and are also available to the local KGB residency as a spotting mechanism for potential active measures and espionage agents. The leadership of these societies is weighted in favour of the Soviets, and the local society's board of directors often includes KGB officers under diplomatic or " unofficial " cover.

For example, prior to mid-1981 the Soviets were in the process of promoting the establishment of a bilateral friendship association in an African capital. The proposed leadership was to be divided between local and Soviet officials. The local side was to fill the executive positions. The local members of the new committee were all considered friendly to the Soviet Union. The Soviet side was to provide the new association's secretary and treasurer—that is, the key functionaries in charge of administrative and financial matters.

Manipulation of Mass Organizations and Non-Communist Political Parties

This is one of the most aggressive—and sometimes the most effective—of the techniques the Soviets use for active measures abroad. It may be practised either directly by Soviet representatives in foreign countries or through the agency of friendly pro-Moscow communist parties, fronts, or other political parties or organizations already influenced by active measures programmes. The techniques range from the encouragement of anti-government or anti-US protests and demonstrations aimed at promoting or opposing any given cause, to work with labour and student organizations and efforts to protest and overthrow the democratically elected leadership of targeted organizations by subsidizing and supporting leftist or pro-Soviet forces or candidates, or even non-communist political parties.

As one example, before a recent election of the leading officials of an African confederation of trade unions, the campaign of the incumbent president was known to have been heavily financed by the Soviet Union. The financing was done through the World Federation of Trade Unions, which, in turn, channelled the money through individual unions within the confederation.

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Clandestine Radio Stations

The Soviets maintain two clandestine radio stations: the National Voice of Iran (NVOI) and Radio Ba Yi, which broadcast on a regular basis from the Soviet Union to Iran and China. NVOI represents itself as a voice of unidentified " progressive " elements of the Iranian people. Radio Ba Yi poses as a Chinese station representing Chinese political dissidents, particularly among the Chinese military. Moscow has never publicly acknowledged its sponsorship of these stations. The broadcasts of both clandestine stations support Soviet foreign policy goals.

NVOI has been broadcasting from Soviet Azerbaijan since 1959. It has never admitted its true location. The station broadcasts in Farsi and Azeri to Iran for 75 minutes daily. The dual purpose of this station is to promote Soviet policies towards Iran and to offer indirect propaganda support to the Soviet-controlled Iranian Communist Tudeh Party. Expatriate Tudeh Party members form at least part of the staff of the station. NVOI commentaries are couched in nationalistic and occasionally religious tones. Anti-US propaganda has been the station's most important feature since its inception, but attacks against the United States have been especially strident since late 1978.

NVOI has had to tread a fine line in having to defend Soviet policies and at the same time pose as the voice of the Iranian people. These functions have not always been mutually compatible, and NVOI occasionally has been out of harmony either with official Soviet propaganda or with the mood in Tehran.

NVOI broadcasts were particularly inflammatory in the immediate aftermath of the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran. The station broadcasts endorsed the actions of the militants in seizing and holding the embassy and its diplomatic personnel and encouraged other anti-US acts. On 5 November 1979, NVOI declared:

> In Tehran, struggling and enthusiastic young people occupied the building of the US Embassy, the centre of corruption and anti-Iranian conspiracies, and in this way they reflected the anti-imperialist feelings of our homeland's people. The reason for the climax of these anti-American struggles in our country should be sought most of all in the conspiracies of US imperialism directed against the Iranian nation and revolution. . . . The occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran by struggling young people, regardless of its outward aspects, is in fact a decisive response to the overt and covert conspiracies of US imperialism and to the US government's hostile act of settling the deposed Shah in the United States.

On 10 November, NVOI stated:

> By occupying the espionage nest of the United States in Tehran and its branches in other cities and publishing a part of the secret documents and evidence existing in this nest of corruption and espionage, in fact they [the " struggling young people "] proved to the world the conspiracies and intrigues of US officials [against Iran].

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Broadcasts such as these prompted strong protests by the US government to the Soviet government. Although NVOI never departed from its anti-US stance, the station did moderate its broadcasts to some extent after the protests. For example, on 20 November 1979, NVOI " welcomed with satisfaction " the release of some of the American hostages and declared that " the release of all these hostages is imperative. . . ."

Although not located on Soviet soil, two other clandestine radio stations broadcast in the Turkish language from East Germany for the Turkish populations of Turkey and Cyprus and Turkish workers in West Germany. " Our Radio " and the " Voice of the Turkish Communist Party " indirectly promote Soviet policy goals and serve as extensions of the Soviet active measures effort.

Economic Activities

The Soviets frequently use a variety of covert economic manoeuvres to achieve both economic and political goals. They apparently try to manipulate the operations to ensure that, if the political objective is not attained, at least the Soviet Union's economic interests are served.

For example, in 1979 one KGB residency was apparently under instructions to drive up the price of gold, which would increase foreign concern over the stability of the US dollar and its value as a world standard. KGB officers passed out both true and false information to their assets, who in turn used the information with influential businessmen and government leaders. The information concerned the gold market and comparative values in various international marketplaces. The financial aspects of this operation were apparently not fully understood by the KGB residency, and the effort failed.

Military Operations

The emergence of " national liberation movements " since the Second World War and Moscow's greater confidence in its own ability to project power have led to a significant increase in Soviet involvement in both overt and covert military activities in the Third World. Covert operations, in which Cuba has played an important surrogate role in recent years, supplement the diplomatic, propaganda, and economic support Moscow frequently gives to " liberation movements." These activities reinforce the Soviet Union's " revolutionary " credentials. Moscow has, for example, gained considerable prestige in many Third World countries because of its support for " liberation movements " in Angola and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), even though in the latter case the group it backed did not " win." In both cases many aspects of the Soviet military assistance role—such as training and the provision of equipment—eventually became known, but others remain clandestine. The GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) plays a major role in paramilitary training of " liberation movements." The KGB is involved to a lesser degree. The

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political decision about which group to support is made by the CPSU's International Department under Politburo guide-lines.[1]

The military aspect of active measures is a more limited concept than the paramilitary element of covert action as understood in the United States. In active measures the military operations are used to mislead or to create a false impression of a Soviet military threat to put pressure on a target country (or third parties such as the United States). The purely military aspects of such operations—even if clandestine—are controlled by the appropriate component of the General Staff; the KGB and other agencies involved in active measures may play a supporting role through the use of other active measures techniques.

Certain initial activities undertaken by the Soviet military in the " Northern Territories " of Japan have been characterized by a former KGB active measures officer, who served in Japan, as an example of military active measures. This source believed that the activities were designed at the time, prior to a genuine military build-up, to impress the Japanese with a change in the Soviet military deployment in the Soviet-occupied islands of the Kuril chain, which Tokyo would like to have returned to Japan. The early activity was supposed to create the false impression that Moscow wanted to make the islands an integral part of the Soviet defence perimeter. The short-lived operation, this source believed, was politically motivated to persuade the Japanese government to sign the Japanese-Soviet peace treaty by implying that otherwise there was no hope for return of the islands. The Soviet leadership apparently calculated that the early deceptive military activity on the islands would be observed. This military active measures operation was paralleled by other classic active measures techniques, including press placements, all aimed at supporting the same deception.

POLITICAL influence operations are the most important but least understood aspect of Soviet active measures. They are difficult to trace and to deal with because they fall in the grey area between a legitimate exchange of ideas and an active measures operation. Political influence operations range from the utilization of what the Soviets call " agents of influence," to the manipulation of private channels of communication, to the exploitation of unwitting contacts. These operations have a common aim: to insinuate the official voice of the Soviet Union into foreign governmental, political, journalistic, business, labour,

[1] There have been few military operations that fall clearly within the realm of active measures; however, there are many examples of Soviet clandestine military activities that, in US parlance, would come under the rubric of covert action as a paramilitary operation—but which are not considered active measures by the Soviets:

In Angola, Soviet, East German, and Cuban advisers trained guerrillas from the South West African People's Organization.

In 1967, Soviet pilots in North Yemen flew combat and supply missions in South Yemeni-marked aircraft on behalf of republican forces putting down an insurrection by royalist supporters.

From April 1969 to August 1970, Soviet pilots in Egypt flew combat air defence and reconnaissance missions in aircraft with Egyptian markings. In July 1970 four of these Soviet pilots were shot down over Egypt by Israeli fighters.

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artistic, and academic circles in a non-attributable or at least seemingly unofficial manner. The foreigners involved in political influence operations are not usually recruited agents in the strict sense of the term. The Soviets making the "unofficial" statements are acting out a part when they make these statements. They often falsely attribute the source of their statements and/or skew commentary and information from that passed "officially," so as to elicit the desired response and exploit the vulnerabilities of the target.

The KGB, which is actively involved in this type of activity, entrusts a variety of individuals (KGB officers as well as other Soviets) with developing strong personal relationships with political, economic, and media figures in the West and the Third World. Moscow thus tries to secure the active collaboration of these individuals on matters of mutual interest while the individuals retain their integrity on other issues. In return for collaboration, the KGB offers intangible rewards tailored to meet the specific requirements or vulnerabilities of the individuals involved. Such rewards have included publicity for the collaborators' accomplishments and promises of special communication channels to the Kremlin.

Agents of influence

In 1980, Pierre-Charles Pathé, a French journalist, was convicted for acting as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959. During his career as a Soviet agent, Pathé was handled by KGB officers who worked under the cover either of the Soviet delegation to UNESCO or the Soviet Embassy in Paris. Early contacts between Pathé and his Soviet handlers were overt, taking place at receptions or restaurants; after 1962 all meetings were clandestine. His articles, sometimes written under the pseudonym Charles Morand, were published in a variety of French newspapers and journals, including *France-Observateur*, *Libération* and *Réalités*. All of the articles subtly pushed the Soviet line on a wide range of international issues. The Soviets reviewed Pathé's articles and provided information that formed the basis of others. Pathé also published a private newsletter, *Synthesis*, with funds provided by the Soviets. He did not receive a regular agent's salary from the Soviets, but he was paid for individual analyses of French and international political developments he provided to the Soviets.

His established reputation among journalists and political figures, many of whom took his information and views at face value, made Pathé a valuable asset. Pathé was well integrated into the political establishment.

In an Asian country the Soviet Embassy reportedly has several agents of influence in the pro-Soviet faction of the major opposition party who are responsible for ensuring that the pro-Soviet members retain control of the party. Once, when it seemed that the moderate faction would gain control over the party, the embassy expended a considerable amount of time and large amounts of money in an unsuccessful attempt to split the party.

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Use of Academicians

Soviet academicians (including some with high positions in the Soviet party and government hierarchy) are frequently used in political influence operations because they are often accepted as legitimate counterparts of their non-Soviet colleagues. In fact, they frequently act on the basis of instructions from bodies which control and administer Soviet active measures—the KGB, the International Department, and the International Information Department—even when they are expressing allegedly private or personal opinions.

Academic conferences on current issues are a prime example of this method of active measures operation. The Soviets take part in such a conference to influence its participants and the political line taken by the conference in directions favourable to Soviet policy interests. Soviet delegates to conferences such as the Pugwash series, which normally deal with disarmament and other international issues, commonly receive guidance from the Central Committee's International Department. The International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs generate ideas for Soviet papers to influence non-Soviet conference participants; the KGB and the ID play a role in the selection of delegates.

Use of Journalists

KGB officers frequently serve abroad under journalistic cover. Overtly, they function much as any other journalist would, but their real mission is covert and may involve espionage or active measures. One KGB officer, who later defected, served under cover as a *New Times* correspondent in Tokyo. During this time, he sometimes engaged in influence operations and he also used his cover to engage in passing forgeries, as well as publishing numerous propaganda articles aimed at influencing the Japanese media. Journalistic cover is frequently used by the KGB because journalists generally have better access to a wider range of influential individuals than diplomats or other officials.

Soviet journalists who are not KGB officers also play a major role in political influence operations on behalf of the KGB, the International Department, or the International Information Department. In such operations the technique and the affiliations of the Soviets are frequently more significant than the substance of their messages. The journalists used in these operations have usually lived abroad for some time and have managed to gain direct access to, and sometimes have developed close ties with, influential political figures. Through frequent contacts over an extended period of time, they try to build rapport and gain the confidence of their contacts. In the process they try to influence the attitudes of their targets by claiming—sometimes falsely—to represent a private or unofficial channel of communication to the Soviet leadership. The aim is that their message, which frequently does not differ substantially from overt Soviet propaganda, would gain added weight and authority (and

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thus "influence") by implicit or explicit attribution to the Soviet leadership.

Testimony of Ladislav Bittman*

UNTIL the late 1950s the Soviet bloc covert action was designed and conducted by individual territorial, operational departments without a well-orchestrated effort and clearly designed long-term strategy. The situation changed when the KGB established the special department for active measures around 1959.

In the following years all satellite services followed the Soviet example. The Czechoslovak Department 8 for Disinformation, Active Measures, was created in February 1964 and I became the deputy commander with the rank of a major.

Many Americans probably think that a small country like Czechoslovakia, Hungary or East Germany cannot possibly maintain an intelligence service that could seriously challenge and hurt the American giant or the North Atlantic Alliance. The fact is that satellite countries operate huge intelligence apparatuses that significantly contribute to the spreading of Soviet influence around the world.

For example, the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department, Department 8, alone, with a staff of around 20 to 25 experienced operatives, conducted in 1965 about 115 active measures around the world. About 50 to 60 per cent of them were based on forgeries leaked either to the foreign press or foreign governments.

The development of the last 4 to 5 months in Iran reminds me of several operations conducted by the Czechoslovak service in developing countries during my tenure as a disinformation expert. The Czechoslovak services orchestrated, in 1964–65, a long-term anti-American operation in Indonesia using a variety of disinformation techniques like forgeries, influence agents and manipulation of the press, that escalated existing anti-American feelings to the level of political hysteria.

At the end of August 1965, American-Indonesian relations reached their lowest point in history. This success, however, was only temporary. The Indonesian Communist Party, without knowing about the Soviet bloc involvement, decided to exploit the situation and launched a *putsch* that totally failed.

A half-billion dead communists and sympathizers were the result. This operation shows the great potential danger of every provocation. The perpetrator can escalate existing anti-American feelings, but he doesn't control all major factors in the game. At a certain point the provocation can backfire and hit the perpetrator, or it can develop into a major military conflict.

* Former Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service. Source: *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, 6, 19 February 1980, 35–36.

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Testimony of Stanislav Levchenko*

IN 1974, after finishing the course of on-job training, I was told that the First Chief Directorate was going to assign me to Japan as a field case officer to collect political intelligence. In the final stage of preparation for this assignment, I was sent to work for almost one year for the Soviet international magazine *New Times*. I had to improve my journalistic skills—I had been writing for Moscow Radio while working for the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee—and to study the mechanism of editorial work and to publish several long articles in the magazine. After arriving in Japan I was supposed to use the position of Tokyo correspondent of *New Times* as a cover for my intelligence activities. To be able to dissolve into the international journalistic community in Tokyo and in order to hide the real purpose of my assignment to Tokyo from Japanese counter-intelligence, I had to have real journalistic experience.

New Times magazine, which is published in Russian, English, Spanish, Arabic, Czech, Polish and German, formally belonged to the Soviet Trade Unions, but actually it is a propaganda hand of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union International Department and of the Active Measures Service of the First Chief Directorate, KGB. It is also used by the KGB as a cover for its operatives stationed abroad. When I was going through the on-job training in the *New Times*, the magazine had 12 foreign correspondents. Ten of them were KGB operatives.

In February 1975, with my family, I arrived in Tokyo and started to work as a case officer for the Tokyo residency of the KGB, line PR, political intelligence.

One or two times a month I sent articles to *New Times* magazine. Two weeks after I arrived, my predecessor turned a developing contact over to me, a prominent figure in the main opposition party of Japan, the Socialist Party. In several months I started to handle several agents of the KGB's network in Japan, and during the next four years I recruited four agents. By 1979 I was handling 10 agents and developmental contacts with whom I had from 20 to 25 clandestine meetings a month.

Four of the agents I handled were prominent Japanese journalists. Having high-level contacts in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party or contacts with high-level government officials, including members of the cabinet of ministers, these agents were providing the Soviets secret oral information and documents on the Japanese government's plans in internal and external politics. One of the agents was a close confidant of the owner of a major Japanese newspaper with a daily circulation of more than 3 million copies. He had been used by the Soviets to implement a variety of active measures through this newspaper.

Shortly before he was turned over to me, he published the so-called "Testament of Zhou Enlai," which was one of the most successful

* Former KGB major. Source: *Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence*, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, 13, 14 July 1982.

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THE GULLIBLE . . .

FOREIGN NEWS: DIPLOMACY

A girl's best friend

Claudia Wright explores the often secret relationship between US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and South Africa

THE UNITED STATES Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, celebrates her birthday on 19 November. Last year the South African government sent a special courier to the Ambassador's New York office to deliver a birthday greeting. It was signed by Pieter Swanepoel, the Information Counsellor at the South African Embassy in Washington, who had just arrived from Pretoria. There were also 'best regards and gratitude' from Lieutenant-General P. W. van der Westhuizen, head of South Africa's military intelligence. With the letter (see illustration) came a birthday gift, a 'token of appreciation', honouring Kirkpatrick's 'activity for freedon and democracy'.

Now birthday presents are normal enough among friends and Kirkpatrick has been a friend, if not of freedom and democracy, at least of the parody version practised in South Africa. According to United States law, Mrs Kirkpatrick is obliged to report any gift to the Protocol Office of the Department of State. If it is of more than nominal value, she may not keep it for herself.

Kirkpatrick has not reported her gift from the South African government. In the annual list of gifts to US officials – published in the Federal Register on 26 March 1982 – Kirkpatrick remembered to record a small rust and green rug, worth $300, given to her on 30 August 1981, by General Mohammed Zia of Pakistan – but that was all. When I asked the Ambassador's office about a gift from South Africa in 1981, the response was there had been none. Swanepoel and the South African ambassador, Brand Fourie, also say that they 'know nothing about such a gift'.

Forgetfulness in reporting gifts has caused trouble for exalted officials in the Reagan Administration, among them the President's first Assistant for National Security Affairs, Richard Allen, who lost his job because of a Japanese watch and honorarium. More important, however, in the case of Mrs Kirkpatrick are the reasons General van der Westhuizen and the Pretoria government felt so grateful to the ambassador.

DURING 1981, General van der Westhuizen had several reasons for being personally grateful to Kirkpatrick. She was, for example, the most senior US official to meet him and four other South African military intelligence men on 15 March (see *NS* April 3, 1981). Until that meeting, the US had barred official visits by South African officers of brigadier rank or above. Early reports about Kirkpatrick's meeting were denied. She then admitted there had been a meeting, but lied about her knowledge of van der Westhuizen's identity. The then Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, intervened to tell the press that Kirkpatrick's meeting with van der Westhuizen had his personal authorisation.

The South African general returned to the US again, on 23-24 November, to attend a negotiating session on Namibia which was held near Washington. The State Department admits that Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker, was at this meeting. Kirkpatrick's office denies meeting van der Westhuizen at that time. He returned for another visit (his third at least), this time to the State Department in Washington, on 22-23 February, this year. In Kirkpatrick's absence, the meetings were monitored by an official from her office.

Each of van der Westhuizen's visits have preceded major shifts in US policy, and large, usually secret, concessions to South African demands. Kirkpatrick's role on each occasion has been that of a 'go-between', according to officials at the UN, relaying South African requests to Washington, and helping to coordinate joint American-South African positions and negotiating tactics. According to a State Department official, she is one of several members of 'President Reagan's entourage (whose) furtive association . . . with some foreign governments, the South African regime in particular . . . will inflict serious damage to the long-term interests of my country'.

After the March 1981 meeting with van der Westhuizen, the administration sent Assistant Secretary Crocker to Pretoria. Summaries of his talks there were leaked and published by the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*. The documents reveal that Crocker told the South Africans that 'top US priority is to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa. US wants to work with SAG (South African Government) but ability to deal with Soviet presence severely impeded by Namibia . . . USG (US Government) assumes Soviet/Cuban presence is one of (SAG's) concerns and we are exploring ways to remove in the context of Namibia settlement.' This was the beginning of a US-South African shift on the terms of the settlement for Namibia, undermining the current UN resolution on Namibia and ending the effective negotiating role carried out so far by the Namibia 'contact group' – the US, UK, Canada, France and Germany. It was also the beginning of the 'linkage' in US and South African policy between the withdrawal of South African forces and the independence of Namibia on the one side, with a simultaneous withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola to the north. According to South African officials, the idea of this 'linkage' was 'something the Americans initiated, wanted, and pursued'.

The Kirkpatrick and Crocker meetings in early 1981 were also the green light for General van der Westhuizen and his fellow generals to widen their military operations in Namibia and Angola and to escalate covert operations against Mozambique and Zimbabwe. As South African troops advanced into southern Angola in August 1981, Kirkpatrick played the role of public defender at the UN. The draft resolution requested by Angola condemning the South African invasion had overwhelming support in the Security Council on 31 August. But Britain abstained and Kirkpatrick cast the American veto. The justification she gave was that South Africa's attack was a legitimate reprisal for SWAPO raids from Angolan bases into Namibia – the same view Crocker had privately offered in Pretoria on 15 April.

Kirkpatrick was to play the same role protecting South Africa from UN votes on sanctions through the autumn of 1981, and



EMBASSY OF SOUTH AFRICA
3051 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON D.C. 20008

December 1, 1981

H.E. Mrs. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Ambassador
United States Mission to the United Nations
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

Excellency,

I am pleased to announce my recent arrival as Counsellor (Information) at the South African Embassy, replacing Mr. W. Lotz in that position. My curriculum vitae is attached for your information.

I have the privilege of informing you that my Government as priviously highly appreciates your activity for freedom and democracy. The bearer of this message has been authorised to present you with this gift on the occasion of your birthday as a token of appreciation from my Government.

I was also requested by Lt. Gen. P.W. van der Westhuizen to convey his best regards and gratitude.

Yours sincerely,

Pieter A. Swanepoel
COUNSELLOR (INFORMATION)

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. . . NEW STATESMANSHIP

UNITED NATIONS

Kirkpatrick's riposte

On 5 November the NS *carried a story about the relationship between the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick, and the South African government. It was based in part on a letter allegedly sent to Mrs Kirkpatrick by a member of the South African Embassy in Washington. The letter is reproduced on this page (the reproduction of the letter with the original article was compressed for reasons of space).*

We have now received the following letter from Mrs Kirkpatrick's spokesman at the UN:

United States Mission to the United Nations
November 19, 1982

Dear Sir:
In case any of your readers have not followed the matter in the press, I am responding here to Claudia Wright's article entitled 'A Girl's Best Friend,' published in the November 5, 1982 *New Statesman*.

For the record, I wish to state:

1. The United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations has never received any gift from the Government of South Africa or from any representative of that government.
2. The letter purportedly sent to the United States Permanent Representative by a South African diplomat, and reproduced in your magazine, was never received by Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I am reliably informed, moreover, that no such letter was composed at the South African Embassy in Washington, as alleged in the article.
3. The allegations and insinuations in the article, based largely on the fictitious letter, are no more credible than the letter itself.

Your readers should know, then, that there was no gift and no letter, only what appears to be malicious fabrication. In addition, the article's title, presumably chosen by the editors of your journal, is clear in its innuendo and in its gratuitous calumny. Overall, in fact, the article is so outrageous that legal action against your magazine is being contemplated by the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

Sincerely,
Joel Blocker
Counsellor for Press
and Public Affairs

The letter referred to by Mr Blocker came into the possession of the *New Statesman* from a source in the US State Department, which has previously proved reliable. If the letter is a forgery, therefore, it implies that a person or persons within the State Department are concerned to damage Mrs Kirkpatrick's reputation.

Other points in the way the story has been presented are relevant. First, the letterheaded stationery on which the letter was typed is identical to that used by the South African Embassy in Washington. Second, the typeface used for the letter appears to be identical to the face of a typewriter used in the South African Embassy. Third, it has been suggested that two mis-spellings in the the letter are not mistakes that would have been left in an official South African Embassy communication. But, if genuine, the circumstances in which such a letter would have been typed would have been clandestine. Fourth, at first Mr Swanepoel claimed that a middle-ranking diplomat like himself would not have written such a letter to Ambassador Kirkpatrick and that in any case he would not have signed it with his initials. Mr Swanepoel has subsequently admitted in an interview with a US newspaper that the signature on the letter is his normal one.

The denial on Ambassador Kirkpatrick's behalf must be regarded in the light of earlier statements she has made about the secret communications that have passed between her and General van der Westhuizen. After her clandestine meeting with the General in March 1981, the US press was able to expose her spokesmen's statements as misleading and false, and retractions were issued (see *NS* 3 April 1981).

It is also relevant to note that Mr Swanepoel joined the South African Ministry of Information in 1970. From 1973 to 1977 he was posted in Australia, and between 1977 and 1979 he was Information Attaché in London. During that period, as the revelations of the 'Muldergate' scandal have indicated, his Ministry, Minister, Connie Mulder, and Permanent Secretary, Eschel Rhoodie, were engaged in an extensive campaign of secret gifts, bribes and influence-buying on behalf of their government. □

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Yours sincerely,

Pieter A. Swanepoel
COUNSELLOR (INFORMATION)

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Soviet forgeries in the 1970s. This testament was fabricated by specialists in the active measures service of the KGB's First Chief Directorate and was intended to show that the leadership of the PRC had been deeply divided on the major political issues in the period before the death of Mao Zedong. The forged testament then was replayed in the mass media of most of the countries in the world.

One of the other agent-journalists had access to confidential documents issued by the Japanese intelligence and had been providing information from them to the KGB.

Another agent is a high-ranking member of the Japanese Socialist Party. He was used mainly for implementing active measures in his party responsive to interests of the Soviet Union, to prevent its shifting to the Right or to closer relations with the PRC.

During the years I had been assigned to Japan, the KGB had a network of recruited agents in that country numbering more than 200. They were utilized by political intelligence, external counter-intelligence and scientific and technological intelligence of the First Chief Directorate.

Among the most effective agents were a former member of the cabinet of ministers, head of a major parliamentary public organization; several senior officials of the Japanese Socialist Party; one of the most prominent scholars of the PRC who had close contacts with government officials; several members of the Japanese parliament.

More than 50 per cent of my time I had to spend on implementing the great variety of Soviet active measures in Japan. The major objectives of Soviet active measures in Japan were:

First, to prevent further deepening of political and military cooperation between Japan and the United States.

Second, to provoke distrust between Japan and the United States in political, economic, and military circles.

Third, to prevent further development of relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China, especially in political and economic fields.

Fourth, by any means to eliminate the possibility of the creation of an anti-Soviet so-called triangle, Washington-Beijing-Tokyo.

Fifth, to create a new pro-Soviet lobby among prominent Japanese politicians, first of all, in the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese Socialist Party, which would be consistent in its activities of developing close economic and political ties with the Soviet Union.

Sixth, to convince the leaders of the Japanese Government of the necessity of drastic broadening of economic ties with the USSR through high-ranking agents of influence, prominent business leaders, mass media.

Seventh, to organize in Japanese political circles the movement for signing the friendship and neighbourly relations treaty between Japan and the USSR.

Eighth, to penetrate deeply the main opposition parties, first of all, the Japanese Socialist Party, to influence their political platforms in order to

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prevent the Liberal Democratic Party from creating its political monopoly in the Japanese parliament.

Ninth, at the same time, to discourage the leaders of opposition parties from creating a coalition government, the Soviets need a politically stable Japan.

Tenth, to maintain a high level of activity in implementing operation KORYAK, which Moscow intended as a means of affecting the Japanese perception of Soviet intentions by sending military contingents to the Kuril Islands, by construction of new housing complexes on the Northern Territories, *et cetera*, and thus to show the Japanese government the uselessness of disputing Soviet control on these territories.

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The KGB Abroad

"Wet Affairs"

Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping*

IT has long been known that the Soviet state security service (currently the KGB) resorts to abduction and murder to combat what are considered to be actual or potential threats to the Soviet regime. These techniques, frequently designated as "executive action"[1] and known within the KGB as "wet affairs" (*mokryye dela*), can be and are employed abroad as well as within the borders of the USSR. They have been used against Soviet citizens, Soviet *émigrés* and even foreign nationals. A list of those who have fallen victim to such action over the years would be a very long one and would include even the co-founder of the Soviet state, Leon Trotsky. Several well known Soviet assassination operations which have occurred since the rise of Khrushchev attest to the fact that the present leadership of the USSR still employs this method of dealing with its enemies.

The sudden disappearance or unexpected death of a person known to possess anti-Soviet convictions immediately raises the suspicion of Soviet involvement. Because it is often impossible to prove who is responsible for such incidents, Soviet intelligence is frequently blamed and is undoubtedly credited with successes it actually has not achieved. On the other hand, even in cases where the Soviet hand is obvious, investigation often produces only fragmentary information, due to the KGB ability to camouflage its trail. In addition, Soviet intelligence is doubtless involved in incidents that never become officially recognized as executive action, such as assassinations which are recorded as accidents, suicide, or natural deaths.

All of the factors cited above have helped to obscure Soviet practices in regard to assassinations and abductions outside the USSR. Certain observations can be made, however, which will help to put these practices into their proper perspective. These observations are set forth in the following paragraphs and are based on information produced by the investigation of known or suspected Soviet operations which have occurred since the Second World War, as well as from information supplied by defectors during this period.

Targets

The large numbers of former citizens of the USSR (and of imperial

* This is a declassified CIA report to J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.

[1] Strictly speaking, the term "executive action" encompasses diversionary activities (such as sabotage) as well as terrorist activities. This paper, however, discusses only the terroristic aspect of Soviet executive action, namely kidnapping and assassination.

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Russia) living abroad in protest against the Soviet regime have been a continuing cause for concern to the Soviets since the early 1920s. Reducing and keeping to a minimum the potential threat to the regime represented by these *émigrés* is one of the functions of the state security service. Soviet intelligence seeks to neutralize, discredit and destroy anti-Soviet groups by luring *émigrés* back to the USSR, by penetrating *émigré* organizations, and by kidnapping or murdering individual *émigrés* considered to be particularly dangerous.

Emigré leaders who participate in anti-Soviet activities have been primary targets of Soviet abduction or assassination operations. Such operations are sometimes designed to demonstrate that the Soviet regime can strike its enemies anywhere in the world. The Soviets hope thereby to create fear, unrest, confusion and dissension within *émigré* organizations and at the same time deter other *émigrés* from joining their ranks. The planned assassination of NTS leader Georgi S. Okolovich in February 1954 represented a particularly significant step towards achieving this goal, but the act was not carried out because of the defection of state security Captain Nikolai Khokhlov.

On the other hand, assassinations of some *émigré* leaders have been carried out so skilfully as to leave the impression that the victims died from natural causes. Details of some of the techniques used to achieve this were brought to light in 1961 when professional KGB assassin Bogdan Stashinsky defected to the West and revealed that he had successfully performed two such missions. In 1957 he killed Ukrainian *émigré* writer Lev Rebet in Munich with a poison vapour gun which left the victim dead of an apparent heart attack. In 1959, the same type of weapon was used on Ukrainian *émigré* leader Stepan Bandera, although Bandera's death was never fully accepted as having been from natural causes. These cases are discussed in more detail later in this paper.

Executive action is also triggered by any signs of possible disloyalty on the part of Soviet officials abroad. The Soviets have gone to great lengths in the past to silence their intelligence officers who have defected, as evidenced by the assassination of former state security officer Ignace Reiss in 1937 and the unexplained " suicide " of former Soviet military intelligence officer Walter Krivitsky in 1941. In the post-war era, their determination to prevent such defections was vividly demonstrated by the unsuccessful attempt to force the wife of Vladimir Petrov to return to the Soviet Union from Australia after his defection in April 1954. The practice of physical restraint applies with equal force to other Soviet officials who attempt to defect or are suspected of being on the verge of doing so. Examples were witnessed in Calcutta, India in January 1958 and Rangoon, Burma in May 1959. The respective victims, Aleksandr F. Zelenovsky and Mikhail I. Strygin, were both portrayed by the Soviets as mental cases, were taken into custody by means of strong-arm tactics, and were forcibly removed to the USSR in a matter of days.

Foreign nationals are sometimes victims of Soviet executive action. The targets who fall into this category may be indigenous agents who have

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become suspect or former citizens of satellite countries who have turned against the Soviet regime. In the latter case, actions against such individuals are usually carried out through the corresponding satellite intelligence service, aided and abetted by Soviet state security. The abductions of Dr Walter Linse and Bohumil Lausman exemplify this type of operation. Linse had fled East Germany in 1947 and later became a leader of the "Society of Free Jurists," an anti-communist organization that the Soviets considered particularly dangerous. He was kidnapped from West Berlin in July 1952 by agents of the East German security service, with the full knowledge and approval of Soviet state security; he was later turned over to Soviet authorities in Karlshorst, East Berlin and eventually sentenced to imprisonment in the USSR.[2] Lausman, a prominent Czech anti-communist who had fled to the West in 1949, disappeared from Vienna in 1953. It was later learned that he had been kidnapped by agents of Czechoslovak intelligence, with the official sanction of Moscow. The Soviet state security *rezidentura* in Vienna also had been directed to assist the operation by supplying a car for transporting Lausman to Prague and arranging for the vehicle to have free passage through the Soviet Zone of Austria.

Foreign political leaders are also potential targets of Soviet executive action operations and, according to recent information, the KGB's executive action component includes such persons among its targets. There is, however, no evidence proving that any Western leader has been the victim of Soviet executive action.

THE executive action component of the Soviet government is currently designated the Thirteenth Department of the KGB intelligence directorate (First Chief Directorate). The earliest known predecessor of the Thirteenth Department was the so-called "Directorate of Special Tasks" reportedly established within the NKVD in December 1936 for terror purposes. During the Second World War, terror missions were performed by the NKGB Fourth Directorate which was responsible for partisan activity behind German lines. In late 1945 or early 1946 this directorate was replaced by a unit of the MGB known as *Spets Byuro* No. 1 which was organized to retain Fourth Directorate personnel to support and direct partisan activities behind enemy lines in the event of a future war. In the summer of 1952, however, the long-range aspects of *Spets Byuro* No. 1's mission were abandoned, and emphasis was shifted to using all available agents for sabotage and other violent activities. *Spets Byuro* No. 1 was given a new, and at present still unknown, designation sometime in 1953 and assigned to carry out "special action tasks," such as sabotage, political murders and kidnappings. With the creation of the KGB in 1954, the executive action component was redesignated as the

[2] Linse died in a Soviet prison camp on 15 December 1953, according to a statement issued by the Soviet Red Cross on 8 June 1960, a virtual admission of Soviet responsibility for the kidnapping. The cited date of his death is at variance, however, with information from fellow prisoners of Linse who reported having seen him in 1954 and 1955.

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Thirteenth Department. Although the jurisdiction of the department is global, its main target areas are the United States and members of Western treaty organizations. There is no evidence of the existence of any unit within the Soviet military intelligence component (the GRU) responsible for the type of executive action discussed in this paper, although the GRU reportedly can undertake such operations under certain circumstances.

The Thirteenth Department is believed to be divided into sections (*otdeleniye*) or directions (*napravleniye*) by countries or groups of countries, such as, for example, the United States ("the principal enemy"), Britain, Latin America, etc. At Moscow headquarters the department has approximately 50–60 experienced employees, and was last known to be headed by General Rodin, who under the alias Korovin had previously been the KGB resident in Great Britain. Secrecy about the work of this department is maintained through the careful selection and training of its personnel; the officers do not discuss their experience among others; department documents are not circulated.

In addition to headquarters personnel, the Thirteenth Department has its own support officers in legal residencies in Western countries and in some satellite countries. Such support officers work under the instructions of the legal resident and the Thirteenth Department. One of the more active groups is a unit in East Germany which numbers perhaps 20–30 persons. As of 1960 there was a group in China, but it probably no longer exists. Prior to 1955 there was also a group in Austria. In a country in which a support officer of the Thirteenth Department is stationed, the legal resident and the headquarters department for that country are aware of the targets of the Thirteenth Department in that country, although they are not aware of illegal agents who are in direct contact with the Thirteenth Department.

Although the Thirteenth Department is the KGB's executive action component, the *Emigré* (Ninth) Department directs all operations, including assassination operations, against Soviet *émigrés*. The *Emigré* Department's assassination operations, however, are believed to be conducted jointly with the Thirteenth Department and sometimes other KGB components; for example, the counter-intelligence directorate (Second Chief Directorate).

The Thirteenth Department also supports the Disinformation (Twelfth) Department of the First Chief Directorate in the latter's covert propaganda campaigns aimed at the creation of confusion and panic in Western countries. An example is the campaign conducted, in 1959 and later, for the purpose of creating adverse world opinion towards West Germany. This campaign included setting fire to synagogues and painting swastika signs in public places and attributing these acts to West Germans. Other operations in which both the Thirteenth Department and the Disinformation Department are involved include attempts to remove the threat to Soviet interests posed by certain members of Western governments. Sometimes this entails arranging for the dismissal

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of such persons from public office, but, in theory at least, it could mean "eliminating" them physically.

THE defector Khokhlov described two laboratories associated with the executive action department. One produced special weapons and explosive devices, whereas the other developed poisons and drugs for "special tasks." The explosives laboratory was located near Kuchino, outside Moscow, and was responsible for the development and production of weapons, from drawing up blueprints to melting and pouring bullets. In no case was assistance obtained from military ordnance or other outside agencies.

The laboratory for poisons was supposedly a large and super-secret installation. No agents were permitted access to it or even knew of its location. Khokhlov could provide no first-hand information on it. Other sources, however, have reported the existence of this type of laboratory dating back to the purges in the late 1930s. A report from one source in 1954 described an experimental laboratory within *Spets Byuro* No. 1 known as the "Chamber" ("*Kamera*"). This laboratory conducted experiments on prisoners and persons subject to execution to test the effectiveness of different powders, beverages and liquors and various types of injections, as well as research on the use of hypnotism to force prisoners to confess. Besides its staff, only certain high-level persons were permitted to enter its premises. Although its existence officially was kept a secret, it was generally suspected or known by many state security functionaries that a unit of this sort was maintained. The Soviet government allegedly abolished the "*Kamera*" in October 1953, according to an announcement made to selected state security and Party officials, attributing the establishment and operation of the laboratory solely to Beria and his cohorts. Whether or not this step actually was taken does not rule out the possibility, however, of the same type of unit continuing to exist in some other form.

Training for executive action operations was conducted at a base in Moscow by a staff of instructors who specialized in such subjects as the use of small arms, ju-jitsu, code, wireless, driving, surveillance, and photography.

Although executive action operations outside the USSR are planned, directed, and sometimes carried out by state security staff personnel, a mission may also be performed by one or more agents recruited specifically for this purpose. Khokhlov himself, for instance, was categorically forbidden to assassinate Okolovich personally. Two German agents, Hans Kukowitsch and Kurt Weber, were to carry out the deed under Khokhlov's supervision. This reflected Soviet theory that indigenous personnel would have better access to the target, and also had the advantage of avoiding direct Soviet attribution. It appears from the Stashinsky case, however, that security considerations ruled out the involvement of non-Soviets in more recent operations.

Even though some sources have made statements to the contrary, it

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appears that the agents (as opposed to staff employees like Stashinsky) who perform executive actions for the Soviets may be used for more than one mission of this nature. Khokhlov spoke of special executive action units known as "*boyevye gruppy*" (literally, combat groups) which consisted of indigenous agents and/or Soviet illegal staff officers situated outside the borders of the USSR on the territory of hostile governments or in close proximity thereto. Such groups were armed and prepared to perform executive actions when required to do so, either in time of peace or war. A group of this type under the direction of the executive action department base at Karlshorst ostensibly was involved in the kidnapping of Dr Alexander Trushnovich, an NTS leader in West Berlin, in April 1954. Khokhlov believed the abductors to have been recruited and organized by the East German security service at the request of the KGB chief at Karlshorst. The same type of group was mentioned in connection with the abduction of Dr Linse; the actual abduction was reportedly performed by four German members of a "*boyevaya gruppa*" from East Germany. It is probable that such teams are a modern variation of the "mobile groups" described by a pre-war source as units dispatched from Moscow to foreign countries to assassinate Trotskyites and state security officers who refused to return to the USSR, as in the case of Reiss and possibly Krivitsky.

MANY known or suspected executive action cases in the post-war period have involved the use of poison rather than guns or explosives. It is conceivable that the Soviets tend to favour poisons because murders can be accomplished more surreptitiously in this manner and in some instances without leaving easily recognizable traces of foul play. Drugs are also used to incapacitate a person temporarily for abduction purposes, as reportedly happened in the Trushnovich case and in the kidnapping of another NTS member, Valeri P. Tremmel, from Linz, Austria in June 1954. There are, however, many unknown, uncontrollable factors in the use of poisons and drugs which limit and often preclude their usage. Probably the most important is the narrow span between a dose that will cause disability and one that will cause death. Dosages vary from one individual to another depending upon the person's weight, state of health, and the way the poison enters the body. The type used obviously is determined by the result desired. It is no problem to cause death, but often difficult to control dosage successfully when the objective is to incapacitate an individual only temporarily.

There appears to be consistency in the use of poisons by Soviet intelligence to cause disability or death, or in the repetitious use of any one drug. Chemicals which have been used in cases known or suspected to be Soviet instigated include arsenic, potassium cyanide, scopolamine, and thallium. Other likely substances are atropine, barbiturates, chloral hydrate, paraldehyde and Warfarin. Combinations of two or more substances may also be used, which further complicates diagnoses and tracing.

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One well publicized poisoning case involved the defector Nikolai Khokhlov. Khokhlov suffered a sudden and severe illness while attending an anti-communist meeting in Frankfurt, Germany in September 1957. A positive diagnosis was precluded by the initial treatment given him at a German hospital, but there was evidence of his having been poisoned by a thallium derivative of arsenic and/or other chemical agents, and a strong possibility that the poison had been administered at RIS instigation. Khokhlov himself believed, and allegedly had supporting medical opinion, that he had been poisoned by radio-activated thallium. He believed that the poison was of Russian origin because it was such a complicated substance that it was difficult to analyze and had been carefully prepared to leave virtually no trace. A unique mechanism for administering poison was described by a knowledgeable source as a pneumatically operated poison ice " atomizer " which leaves no wound or other evidence of the cause of death.

IN November 1961 a Soviet intelligence officer, Bogdan Stashinsky, surrendered to the West German police, stating that he had, acting under official orders, assassinated two individuals during the previous few years: Lev Rebet, a Ukrainian *émigré* writer; and Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Ukrainian Nationalist movement. In both cases, a similar type of weapon had been used: a gun which fired vaporized poison which killed almost instantly upon being inhaled. The properties of the killing agent were such that, until the defection of the assassin, both victims were officially believed to have died from heart attacks. In the case of Bandera, however, there was some unconfirmed suspicion of potassium cyanide poisoning although there was insufficient evidence to prove it.

The Weapon

The weapon used to assassinate Rebet was a light-weight aluminium cylinder, 15–18 cm. long and approximately 3 cm. in diameter, and weighing about 200 grams. The cylinder was divided into three separate chambers, one of which contained liquid poison sealed hermetically into a plastic-type ampule container under low pressure. (At normal temperatures the poison would evaporate, disappearing without trace in about two minutes.) The three components could be assembled by means of a thread which allowed one part to screw into the other. The first component was the poison ampule portion, the front end of which had a fine metallic screen. The poison ampule fitted solidly against the walls of the metal cylinder. The centre component contained a piston and a piston arm which extended into the third or activating component. The latter contained a spring-mounted activating arm which, when drawn back, armed the weapon. A releasing arm was appended to the third component at an angle and was attached to the activating arm by means of a releasing catch. A small safety arm permitted the weapon to be placed in the safety position. The third component also contained a few grams of powder.

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The maximum effective range of the weapon was about half a metre; at one and a half metres the effect of the vapours would be questionable; and at two and a half metres, the vapours would be totally ineffective. (The assassin was instructed to fire the weapon only inches from the face.)

The weapon was activated as follows: the activating arm was pulled back and the safety released. The weapon was then activated. It was held in the palm of the hand in such a fashion that it fired when the user pressed the releasing arm towards the activating arm. The releasing arm, when pressed, acted upon the releasing catch, permitting the spring-held activating arm to fly forward against the small charge of powder. The exploding powder (which made a noise approximating the sound of a loud handclap with the hands cupped) drove the piston arm forward, causing the piston to strike against the poison ampule. The poison was thus driven out through the fine screen in the form of a liquid spray.

The weapon used for the second assassination was similar, except that it was double-barrelled. Each barrel contained a charge of poison similar to that contained in the single-barrelled weapon; however, the two barrels could be discharged separately or together as a unit. Thus, in the event the first charge did not kill the victim, a second attempt could be made. The two barrels were welded together and the weapon had two releasing arms, two releasing catches, two safeties, and two activating arms. The effect of the poison was the same.

Utilization of the Weapon

For maximum effective results it is recommended that the liquid poison be shot directly into the face of the victim, in order to introduce the vapours most quickly into the respiratory system. Since the vapours rise upwards very rapidly, the poison is still effective when aimed at the chest; conceivably, this would be sufficient time to allow the victim time to scream.

Effects of the Poison

The effect of the poisonous vapours is such that the arteries which feed blood to the brain become paralyzed almost immediately. Absence of blood in the brain precipitates a normal paralysis of the brain or a heart attack, as a result of which the victim dies. The victim is clinically dead within one and a half minutes after inhaling these poisonous vapours. After about five minutes the effect of the poison wears off entirely, permitting the arteries to return to their normal condition, leaving no trace of the killing agent which precipitated the paralysis or the heart attack.

Allegedly, no foreign matter can be discovered in the body or on the clothes of the victim, no matter how thorough an autopsy or examination. The liquid spray can be seen as it leaves the nose of the weapon, however, and droplets can also be seen on the face of the victim.

Stashinsky claimed that, before using the weapon on his first victim, he

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tested it on a dog. He fired the gun directly into the dog's face, holding his hand approximately one and a half feet from its nose. Almost immediately after the liquid spray had hit its face the dog rolled over, without making any sound whatever. It continued to writhe for almost three minutes, however. Stashinsky was told that the poison affected a human much sooner, causing death within one and a half minutes.

Safety Precautions for the User

Stashinsky was told that neither the poisonous liquid nor the fatal fumes affected any portion of the body other than the respiratory system, and that, since it could not enter the body through the skin or the pores, one could safely place one's hands into a pail of the poison. In as much as the weapon was held at arm's length when fired and the liquid spray ejected forward in a conical pattern, the user, under normal conditions, is safe from the effects of the poisonous vapours. Nevertheless, as an extra precaution, Stashinsky was provided with counteractive agents to use if he so desired.

Concealment Methods

For transportation, the weapon was transported hermetically sealed in a container, and inserted between sausages in a can which was itself hermetically sealed. It was suggested to Stashinsky that he should carry the weapon to the site of the planned assassination wrapped in a light newspaper, in which he had torn a small hole to enable him to reach the safety quickly just before using the weapon.

Method of Attack

In the first assignment, Stashinsky observed Rebet disembarking from a streetcar at about 09:30 hours. Observing that the victim was heading for his office, the assassin preceded him into the building and climbed the circular staircase to the first floor. On hearing Rebet's footsteps on the staircase, Stashinsky turned and started walking down, keeping to the left, and carrying the weapon, wrapped in newspaper, in his right hand. The two met about halfway between the two floors. Firing directly into Rebet's face from a distance of approximately half a metre, Stashinsky continued walking downstairs without even breaking his pace. The victim lurched silently forward and fell on the staircase. While still in the building, Stashinsky shook off the liquid drops from the weapon and put it in the breast pocket of his suit. (A laboratory examination of the suit later revealed nothing of significance.) Although he had no reason to believe that he had inhaled the poisonous fumes, he used the counteractive measures provided. He later disposed of the murder weapon in a shallow canal in the city.

In carrying out his second mission, Stashinsky used a similar approach. Having previously abandoned an attempt to corner Bandera in the latter's garage, the assassin gained entry into the victim's apartment house by reproducing a key which he had observed being used in the front

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door lock. On the day of the assassination, having seen Bandera drive into his driveway, Stashinsky let himself into the apartment building and waited. Bandera, carrying several packages of fruit and vegetables in his right hand, entered the front door with the aid of a key which was on a key-ring together with other keys. As he was attempting to disengage the key from the lock, Stashinsky moved away from the elevator, where he had been standing, towards the front door. The weapon was in his hand with the safety released. As he walked past the victim, who was still trying to extricate the key from the lock, the assassin took the door handle with his left hand, as if to assist Bandera, asking him, " Doesn't it work? " By this time, Bandera had succeeded in pulling the key out of the lock. Almost at the instant he replied, " Yes, it works," Stashinsky fired both barrels similtaneously into his face at almost point-blank range. Seeing the victim lurch backwards and to the side, the assassin walked out of the apartment building and closed the front door. Although he did not wait to see Bandera drop to the ground, Stashinsky is certain that, contrary to press reports, the man did not scream or otherwise call for help. Stashinsky later threw the murder weapon into the same canal in which he had discarded the first weapon.

Although the press reported that Bandera had been attacked physically before he was poisoned, Stashinsky insisted that he had used no force, since it had not been necessary to do so. Some newspapers also reported that Bandera had died of potassium cyanide poisoning. Stashinsky claims that he was told, and believes, that the chemical was not potassium cyanide, since (1) he thinks that substance could not have been introduced into the body by the method employed, and (2) he believes the RIS would have no reason to deceive him on this matter, especially since he had to be provided with counteractive precautions. Stashinsky claimed that one of his Soviet contacts was pleased to learn that the police suspected potassium cyanide, since this allegedly indicated that the true cause of the victim's death was not evident.

Radio Free Europe

The *New York Times* reported on an attempt to poison the staff of RFE on 21 November 1959, by placing atropine in the salt shakers of the cafeteria used by RFE personnel. Atropine is a derivative from the deadly nightshade plant; it can cause paralysis or death if taken in sufficient quantity. The amount of poison in each salt shaker was said to be 2.36 per cent by weight of the contents. White crystalline alkaloid is indistinguishable from salt. (*NYT*, 17 December 1959.)

Stein

In March 1955, Lisa Stein, an interviewer with RIAS, the American propaganda radio station in West Germany (" Radio in American Sector "), was fed candy containing the highly dangerous poison scopolamine. (Scopolamine is used in the so-called " twilight sleep."

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Given in small doses it induces a kind of euphoria; in larger doses it is supposed to be a deadly poison.) It was intended that Frau Stein would become ill and would be abducted. The plan was that the agent—someone whom Frau Stein trusted and with whom she was meeting in a West Berlin café—would offer the poisoned candy towards the end of the meeting. The lady was expected to become ill while walking from the café to her nearby residence. On becoming unconscious, she was to be picked up by a waiting car which would appear to be passing by chance. The plot was not carried to fruition, however, because Frau Stein did not become ill until she was near her apartment, at which point neighbours came to her aid and she was moved to a hospital. She was severely ill for 48 hours, after which an antidote was found. (From the testimony of Theodor Hans, formerly with US Military Intelligence, Germany, 21 September 1960, before a Congressional investigating committee.)

Another weapon used is described as a noiseless gas pistol, powered by a 300 volt battery, which fires a lethal, odourless unidentified gas. The gas acts in two or three seconds, and is effective up to 15 or 20 metres. The pistol has three buttons: one for arming, one for firing, and the third for recharging the battery. (After 50 firings the battery may be recharged by plugging a transformer into normal house power source.) The pistol is normally fired 20 times, very rapidly and automatically—" Bzzzd." Although one squirt could kill, 20 squirts are emitted in order to saturate the area, since the gun is fired at a silhouette, rather than at a point.) The gas shot by the pistol would penetrate the victim's clothing and enter the skin. There is allegedly no danger to the user.

SINCE the Second World War, and especially in the years since Stalin's death, assassination attempts abroad have become increasingly rare. Currently the emphasis in the executive action field is placed on sabotage and sabotage planning rather than terrorism against individuals. The Soviets now apparently resort to murder only in the case of persons considered especially dangerous to the regime and who, for one reason or another, cannot be kidnapped. A kidnapped person is obviously more valuable in as much as the Soviets may be able to extract from him information of interest, as well as use him for propaganda purposes by making it appear that he defected to the Soviet side of his own free will. This course was followed in the case of Dr Trushnovich. It is also likely that the Soviets find it increasingly difficult to find persons willing to undertake murder assignments, while the same may not be true of abduction operations. It can further be conjectured that the Soviets are now more concerned about the adverse publicity generated by Soviet assassinations in general than they were in previous years.

In this connection, comments made by state security defectors Petr Deryabin and Yurii Rastvorov in 1954 about what the Soviets would or would not do are still of interest. Both believed that the Soviets would murder one of their officials on the verge of defecting if that were the only way of preventing the act. The same would apply to a Soviet official who

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had just defected if thereby state secrets could be preserved and if they believed that killing him would not bring about a more adverse situation, in terms of politics and propaganda, than already existed. Deryabin and Rastvorov doubted, however, that the Soviets would murder an official who had been in non-communist hands long enough to have been exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes. While both granted that in particular cases the Soviets might go to any extreme, they both believed, generally speaking, that the adverse propaganda resulting from such an act would negate its original purpose. On the other hand, Khokhlov, who might have been in a better position to know, has stated without qualification that the Soviets would continue to assassinate defectors in the future. The threat of Soviet executive action against defectors is also considered a real one by Reino Hayhanen, who defected from the KGB in 1957. A still more recent Soviet intelligence source also believes that standard Soviet practice is to mount a kidnapping or assassination operation " through all intelligence opportunities " against defectors from the Soviet intelligence services.

Deryabin and Rastvorov further agreed that the Soviets, without hesitation, would forcibly return to the USSR someone on the verge of defecting at a mission abroad. This was borne out by the aforementioned Strygin and Zelenovsky cases. Deryabin and Rastvorov also believed that the same policy would apply to a Soviet official who had just defected, or one who had been in non-communist hands long enough to have been exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes, if the capability existed for returning him physically to the USSR.

Lastly, Deryabin believed that the assassination of an Allied official would be highly unlikely and probably unprofitable. He also doubted that the Soviets would attempt to kidnap any US officials unless they were particularly knowledgeable. Such an incident would not be worth the trouble for an average official, but an important person conceivably would have sufficient information to make it worthwhile.

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The KGB Abroad

" Murder International, Inc."*

Testimony of Petr. S. Deryabin†

Mr Sourwine: I believe you used the phrase " wet business " in referring to political assassination by communist security personnel. Can you tell us the derivation of that phrase, what it means, how it came to be used?

Is it because blood is spilled, or has it some other connotation?

Mr Deryabin: It is common among Soviet security officers that when they talk about *Spets Byuro* No. 1—formerly the Ninth Department, now the Thirteenth Department—they never use the name or the number of the department, they just use the name " *Mokryye Dela*," which means the department of wet affairs. If the state security officers talk among themselves, they usually refer to the " *Mokryye Dela* " or to going to the " *Mokryye Dela* " for information.

Mr Sourwine: I was simply trying to find out whether it was merely a code word which might have no particular basis, or whether it had some derivation because of the kind of things they did.

Mr Deryabin: To translate it into English, it means " dirty affairs," " *mokryye* " means " wet," and in this case " *mokryye* " means " blood wet."

Mr Sourwine: You say " dirty business "; is it like a " department of dirty tricks?"

Mr Deryabin: No; it means more than tricks. When we say in Russian " *mokryye*," it means a wet affair, thinking about the Thirteenth Department, that they are involved in dirty business and that their hands are covered with blood. It is hard to translate, but " *mokryye* " means " wet affairs," without saying " blood."

Mr Sourwine: It means the doings of men whose hands are covered with blood?

Mr Deryabin: That would be a more correct explanation.

The Case of Leon Trotsky: An Interview with Isaac Don Levine‡

Q: Mr Levine, why have the communists gone to such great lengths to take the murderer of Leon Trotsky into the communist empire? Is it important?

* From *Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary*, United States Senate, Eighty-Ninth Congress, First Session, 26 March 1965.

† A former officer of the Soviet state security.

‡ From *US News & World Report*, 23 May 1960, p. 85.

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A: It is important. It is a public demonstration of the fact that the Soviet government has decided to recognize its erstwhile "prodigal son" whom Moscow had repudiated and disowned, at least in public, for nearly 20 years.

Q: The assassin himself never confessed a connection with Moscow?

A: The assassin consistently has denied any connection with the Soviet regime, despite fingerprints, his use of fake passports and other evidence amassed by police.

Q: And now what has happened?

A: Now the reds, after the visit of Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan to Mexico last November and to Cuba in February, have paved the way for this "lost son" of Stalin's murder ring to come out of Mexico with a Soviet-Czech diplomatic passport.

Q: With diplomatic protection, so to speak?

A: Yes. He was escorted on the plane from Mexico City by two Czechoslovak diplomats, and taken to Havana by them to go into hiding. Then he will proceed to join, let's say, Noel Field, Mr and Mrs Alfred Stern—Martha Dodd—and a few other comrades of his behind the Iron Curtain. He is an adopted Soviet citizen now to all intents.

Q: Is that pretty generally accepted?

A: Listen to what the *New York Times* said in an editorial the other day:

"For two decades the world has been reasonably sure that the killer (of Trotsky) was a Moscow agent sent by Stalin to murder the hero of the Bolshevik Revolution who had lost the Kremlin power struggle. If any doubt of this remained, it was dispelled last Friday when the killer walked out of jail with a diplomatic passport from Communist Czechoslovakia and, accompanied by two Czechoslovak diplomats, boarded a plane with Prague as his final destination."

Now, that is something that could not have been printed two years ago, because the assassin denied any connection with the Soviet murder apparatus.

Q: What is the meaning of all this for America?

A: Moscow has just shown the world that the United States has engaged in a certain kind of indispensable, let us say, espionage. Yet the government of the United States has never shown the world—as it could—that the Soviet government, for the last 30 years, has had an organized apparatus for abduction, for murder, for assassination.

The Trotsky case, particularly the manner of the release of the assassin from prison and the asylum granted to him by Soviet authorities, shows the necessity for us to call attention to the innumerable crimes of homicide committed on foreign territory by the Soviet murder apparatus.

Q: Is that murder apparatus still functioning?

A: It may be on the shelf temporarily, but Khrushchev has never repudiated its use.

Q: Has it reached into America itself?

A: The Trotsky case is particularly significant for the United States in that respect. Why? Because many of those who were witting and/or

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Partial list of terrorist actions attributed to Soviet security and intelligence services between 1926 and 1960, inclusive

Date	Name	Event and place	Comments
1926	Ado Birk	Kidnapped, Moscow	Estonian Minister. Kidnapped in broad daylight by OGPU.
25 May, 1926	Gen. Simon Petlyura	Assassinated in Paris	Leader of Ukrainian Nationalist Movement.
26 Jan., 1930	Gen. Alexander Kutepov	Kidnapped in Paris	President, White Russian Federation of War Veterans.
27 July, 1931	George Semmelmann	Murdered by a Serbian Communist, allegedly a medical student, Andrei Piklovich	Piklovich was tried, found not guilty, pro-Piklovich demonstrations in Moscow.
22 May 1932	Hans Wissengir	Shot in Hamburg	Courier link to United States on Hamburg-American Line vessels. (See Valtin (Krebs) " Out of the Night " (1941), which attributes killing to Georg Mink and Hugo Marx.)
1934	Valentin Markin	Killed in New York City	Chief, OGPU, in United States. Protégé of Molotov.
1936	Jean Cremet	Macao	Agent of French sections, Soviet Military Intelligence.
7 Nov., 1936	Trotsky archives	Burglary in Paris	Headquarters of International Institute of Social History (Boris Nicolsevsky).
21 Jan., 1937	Dimitri Navachine (Navashine)	Murdered in Paris	Killed on eve of trial in Moscow of Gregorii Piatakov. Navachine had publicly announced his intention to make exposé in Paris regarding the trial.
3 June, 1937	Juliet Stuart Poyntz	Disappeared in New York City	Had been associated with George Mink, (See Budenz, " This Is My Story " (1947), and Ben Gitlow, " I Confess " (1940).)
5 Sept., 1937	Ignace Reiss (also known as Hans Eberhardt).	Murdered in Lausanne, Switzerland	Reiss defection letter to CC, CPSU dated 17 July 1937. He was GRU. Killing carried out from Paris by surveillance execution team, Roland Abbia, alias François Rossi, Rena Steiner, Etienne Martignat, Gertrude Schildbach.
22 Sept., 1937	Gen. Eugeniy Miller	Kidnapped in Paris	President, White Russian Federation of War Veterans. Kidnapping was consequent to penetration by General Skobline who became friend and protégé of Miller. Skobline disappeared from France on 23 Sept., 1957.
December 1937	Adolph Arnold and Rut Maria Reubens (also known as Robinson).	Arrested for espionage, Moscow; Adolph Reubens disappeared.	
1937	Henry Moulin	Killed in Spain	French Communist.
1937	Andrew Nin	Found dead in street in Madrid	Leader of the Workers Party of Marxist Union (POUM), Spain.
1937	Kurt Landau	Kidnapped and killed in Spain	Austrian refugee.
1937	José Robles	Disappeared in Valencia, September 1937	Ex-professor, Spanish literature, Johns Hopkins University

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1937	Marc Rein	Spain; disappeared without trace	Son of Menshevik exile. Raphael Ambramovich.
1937	Walter Schwartz	Arrested in August 1937	Trotskyist, POUM leader.
1937	Camillo Berneri	Found dead in Barcelona, 6 Nov., 1937	Anarchist.
1937	Hamilton Gold	.....	British citizen, /T technician. Sent to Spain. Forcibly repatriated to USSR from Barcelona, end 1937. (See Margaret Buber, " Under Two Dictators " (London, 1949).
1937	Walter Held and wife	Arrested, USSR	Trotskyites arrested in transit, USSR from Sweden.
1937	Bob Smillie	Died Valencia jail; allegedly appendicitis	British citizen.
1937	Erwin Wolf	Kidnapped and disappeared in Spain	Ex-secretary of Trotsky.
1937	Hans Freund	*ditto*	
16 Feb., 1938	Leon Sedov (also known as Martin)	" Natural " death following stomach operation in Paris.	Trotsky's son.
March 1938	George Arutiunov (also known as Agabekov)	Abducted and killed allegedly in Belgium	Defected 1930, Turkey. (See his book, " OGPU—Russian Secret Terror." Alexander Orlov; mentioned that Agabekov was killed in Belgium.)
May 1938	Lt. Col. Evhen Konovalec	Killed by explosion of parcel bomb, Rotterdam	Konovalec was leader of Ukrainian Nationalist Movement. Killing attributed to financial supporter and confidant, one Waluch, who disappeared after K's death.
1 July, 1938	Jay Lovestone papers	Burglary in New York	
13 July, 1938	Rudolf Klement (also known as Walter)	Disappeared in Paris (probably murdered and identical with a corpse found in Seine, 16 July).	Secretary of International Bureau of 4th International.
August 1938	Russell Blackwell	Disappeared, Barcelona	U.S. citizen.
24 May, 1940	Robert Sheldon Harte	Abducted; murdered	Trotsky bodyguard abducted in first abortive *coup* against Trotsky's villa, by David A. Sequeiros. Killing attributed to Louis and Leopoldo Arenal.
June 1940	Willi Muenzenberg	Apparent suicide in France	
1948	Chief Inspector Maref	Disappeared in Vienna	Police official.
22 Aug., 1949	Dr. Karl Sondermann	Attempted abduction in Vienna (British sector)	
October 1949	Paul Markgraf	Disappeared in Berlin (East Zone)	Head of police in East Sector, Berlin.
September 1947	Georgi Tregubov	Kidnapped from West Berlin	Tregubov, *émigré*, lured to East Berlin by Soviet agent, Elizabeth Randal.
Summer 1950	Mrs. G. S. Okolovich	Attempted kidnapping, Munich	
June 1951	G. S. Okolovich	Planned kidnapping	Failed because Okolovich was warned and informed police authorities.
1953	Bohumil Lauschman	Kidnapped, Salzburg	Kidnapped by Czechoslovak IS with Soviet sanction and facilitation.

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unwitting accomplices in the plot for this murder were American citizens.

Q: Who were they?

A: There is Louis Budenz, who admittedly played a key role in the preparations for this murder without being aware of the end objective. He is an American citizen and a former editor of the *Daily Worker*. He has since renounced communism and has cooperated with the FBI.

Sylvia Ageloff, the New York social worker and the " dupe " in the case, who was victimized by the plotters, is an American. Ruby Weil, now Mrs Ruby Weil Lewis, who works in New York City, is an American citizen who was brought into the affair by Louis Budenz.

There is Jack Soble,* now serving a sentence in Federal prison at Lewisburg, Pa., for espionage. From 1931 until Trotsky's assassination he was assigned by Moscow to " cover " Trotsky. Unquestionably he had a hand, both in Moscow and Paris, in the world-wide stalking of Trotsky prior to the murder. Jack Soble also is an American citizen.

Q: What about the assassin himself? Did he operate in America?

A: Oh, yes. He came to the United States in 1939 and lived for a short time in New York City. Then he went to Mexico, returned to New York in 1940 and got money from the Soviet consulate. I might add that five American members of the Communist Party were involved in an attempt to rescue the assassin from prison in 1943, under the auspices of the Soviet consul in New York, Pavel Klarin. They have never been examined in so far as their relationship to the Trotsky assassination was concerned.

To sum up: here is a crime of murder committed in Mexico, the accomplices of which, the financial resources of which—to some extent, at least—and much of the plotting of which originated on the territory of the United States. But our government has never made a coordinated effort to gather up the loose ends and tie them together in a case involving our national security, as Khrushchev now is doing in the case of the American pilot brought down in Russia.

Q: Have the Soviets ever committed any of these crimes in the United States itself?

A: Indeed they have. Of course, you remember the NKVD (secret police) officer, Gen. Walter Krivitsky, who defected from the Soviets and was later found shot to death under very mysterious circumstances in a hotel right here in Washington back in 1941.

You may also remember the case of Carlo Tresca, an American radical of Italian parentage who died from a bullet in New York City in 1943 at a time when he was conducting his own investigation into the Trotsky murder and was on the trail of the US branch of the Soviet murder apparatus.

There was a woman named Juliet Stuart Poyntz, who disappeared in New York City in 1938—she just went out of the American Women's

* Cf. Arthur Spencer, " Strange Interlude: a footnote to the Soblen [Soble] case." *Survey*, no 49, Oct. 1963, pp. 113-128.

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Club on 57th Street in broad daylight and was never seen again. She was a dissident Communist, a native, I think, of Indiana.

Q: Is it an efficient apparatus for murder, then?

A: I think it is better organized, more disciplined, more on the alert and less capable of detection than any in history. The Kremlin has had exactly 42 years of experience in this business of murder on foreign soil. The Nazis were mere novices, Mussolini was a very poor imitator.

This Soviet apparatus operated around the globe. Gen. Alexander Kutepov, the White Russian, was abducted in the middle of the street in Paris in 1930. Six years later, Gen. Yevgenii Miller, who succeeded Kutepov as head of the White Russian veterans' organization, met the same fate. Krivitsky's friend, Ignace Reiss, was found early one morning in the summer of 1938 on a highway near Lausanne, his body riddled with bullets. In that case, some of the accomplices were arrested, but there was never any question in the minds of European authorities but that this was a job directed by the Soviets.

The Case of Ignace Reiss [Ludwig]*

THE breaking point of a disillusioned believer is a strange thing, not to be determined by any kind of measure ever invented. It can be erasure of a name from a history book where erasure of millions of the living from the earth did not provide a lifted eyebrow. The trial and execution of General Tukhachevsky, hero of Bolshevik battles, was Ludwig's breaking point. It was estimated that 25,000 Red Army officers were executed in connection with the Tukhachevsky trial.

He sent a defiant letter to Stalin, describing what was going on in Moscow for the insane horror he saw it to be; and he sent a copy to every one of the agents who had worked under him in Stalin's service, urging them to break their apprenticeship to the evil sorcerer. The startling declaration immediately set the vast machinery of the Soviet police in a new frenzy of motion. Ludwig had been of top importance. While agents under him and their sub-agents knew little of each other and the import of their work, Ludwig could expose and thus forever ruin whole networks. There were countless old crimes hidden by the shiny promises of Soviet propaganda and new crimes yet to be committed that he could disclose by the simple act of telling what he knew and naming names. He did not, for the enemy was still Hitler and he said he would not give the enemy aid or comfort. But his mere existence, once so valuable to Moscow, became, in the eyes of the dictator there, an affront and an intolerabe danger.

On 4 September 1937, Ludwig was mowed down by a gunner at the side of a lonely Swiss road. Stalin's GPU claimed its own. The assassination caused a major scandal in Switzerland, and eventually its

* From *The Red Pawn* by Flora Lewis, pp. 96, 97.

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immediate authors were tracked down. A GPU officer named Spiegelglass had been sent to Paris expressly to arrange the murder. It was to have been done with a box of candy containing strychnine, which Gertrude Schildbach, a GPU agent in Italy who had worked closely with Ludwig, was to give the victim. She knew his wife and son and apparently had not the heart to present the candy, which could easily have caused several irrelevant deaths, for it was left behind in her Lausanne hotel room when Ludwig had been shot and the conspirators had fled. But Gertrude Schildbach, by implying that she, too, was beginning to share Ludwig's revulsion for Stalin and his works, did succeed in luring Ludwig to a rendezvous to talk it over. He came out of hiding to have dinner with her at a restaurant near Chamblandes. Afterwards they went for a walk, and he was ambushed. Ludwig tried to fight off his assassins. The police found strands of grey hair in his dead fist, but the dozen bullet holes showed that he had been shot from the back.

Obviously a large number of people were involved in making the careful plans for the murder. The police tracked down several of them and found the names of others, including a 29-year-old Swiss woman student, a White Russian who belonged to a tsarist society, a Frenchman and a Monegasque who were GPU agents in Paris. These were the direct participants. Others must have helped by following Ludwig, arranging the assassins' escape, and covering the GPU's tracks. No one ever knew all the names.

Noel Field apparently talked with Spiegelglass about it, but just what part he played, if any, has never been proved. Later he boasted to Paul Massing and to an important Swiss communist that he had had a key role; but if he did, it was perfectly hidden.

The Case of Dr Walter Linse*

Soviet Says Kidnapped German Died In A Russian Prison In 1953

BERLIN, June 8.—The Russians announced today the death in the Soviet Union of a kidnapped Berlin lawyer whose whereabouts they had long denied knowing.

The lawyer was Dr Walter Linse, who was abducted by communist agents from a suburb in the US sector 8 years ago.

Officials of the German Red Cross said they had received notification from the Soviet Red Cross of Dr Linse's death in a Soviet prison camp 15 December 1953. The Soviet statement was in reply to a routine German check on the whereabouts of missing persons, the official said.

Dr Linse's kidnapping in daylight on 8 July 1952, in full view of numerous passers-by, caused a storm of indignation in Berlin. It was the city's most sensational post-war abduction.

* From the *New York Times*, 9 June 1960.

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The Russians, in reply to repeated American protests and demands for Dr Linse's return, said they had no knowledge of him or his whereabouts.

At the time of his disappearance Dr Linse headed the economic department of the Committee of Free Jurists, a private West Berlin organization dedicated to uncovering illegal actions in East Germany.

There is general agreement that Dr Linse was abducted because his investigations had become embarrassing to the East German authorities.

The Committee of Free Jurists said today that it had received information that Dr Linse had been sentenced to 25 years in prison by a Soviet military tribunal in East Berlin in the summer of 1953. He was taken to a prison camp in the Soviet Union to serve his term.

The Soviet Red Cross did not say in which prison Dr Linse had died or give the cause of death, officials said.

Two of Dr Linse's abductors were arrested some years ago in West Berlin and sentenced to long prison terms on kidnapping charges. Both are East Germans with long police records.

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The Bulgarian Connection

My husband Georgi Markov is buried in an ancient and beautiful country churchyard in the West of England. . . . It was on 7 September 1978 that Georgi was attacked by an assassin on London's Waterloo Bridge, sometime between the early afternoon and evening. As he passed a bus stop he experienced a sudden stinging pain in the back of his right thigh and, turning sharply, saw a man behind who bent to retrieve an umbrella and murmured " I'm sorry." Georgi noted that the man sounded un-English and that when he almost immediately hailed a taxi its driver seemed to have difficulty in understanding him. But so relatively unimportant did the incident obviously seem to Georgi that when he came home that night he did not mention it. He had, it is true, mentioned it to a fellow *émigré* and friend shortly after it occured. But he had not been sufficiently alarmed to call a doctor, and neither had he gone to the police. It was not until the early hours of the next morning, when his temperature had risen suddenly and alarmingly, that he at last said to me: " I have a horrible feeling that this may be connected with something which happened yesterday. . . ."

But even as Georgi told the story, and displayed a small puncture mark on his thigh, I did not feel he really believed that what he had feared had at last happened. Yet this was a man who, for nine years, had felt himself to be in danger; and who, for the past nine months, had lived with the certain knowledge that his enemies planned to kill him.

Until 1969, Georgi Markov was one of Bulgaria's top novelists and playwrights, his work known throughout the Eastern bloc. He was a member of the privileged elite and an acquaintance of the President, Todor Zhivkov. . . . As one of the country's top writers, Georgi got to know everyone of influence in Bulgaria and, along the way, observed at first hand the corruption of absolute power. In 1975, in a series of weekly talks broadcast by the Munich-based station Radio Free Europe, he began to share his memories with those he had left behind. . . . Zhivkov was enraged by the memoirs (and most particularly by a series of talks in which Georgi described their meetings).

During the period when the memoirs were broadcast, Georgi would sometimes receive telephone calls from Bulgarians visiting the West who wished to express their appreciation. Then, in January 1978, there came a very much more sinister call, the purpose of which was to warn Georgi that, if he continued to write for Radio Free Europe, he would be killed. Similar warnings recurred throughout five months and then, in late May, the Bulgarian who had delivered the warnings, who professed to be a friend, came to visit Georgi personally. The decision to kill had been taken by the Bulgarian Politburo, he said; and the means with which the murder would be effected had already been transported to the West. Georgi would be poisoned with a rare substance which would be undetectable (and had, by the way, been tested in Moscow), and he would develop a high fever before his death, which would be put down to natural causes. Everything the Bulgarian said, incidentally, led Georgi to believe that his enemies would attempt to administer the poison orally, and this may have been intentional. . . .

I now believe that Georgi's enemies always knew exactly when they would try and kill him, and that specific threats were issued and then not

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carried out as part of a deliberate policy both to terrify him and eventually to make him drop his guard. ("They're playing with me," Georgi said, when he returned unscathed from that Italian holiday.) In Georgi's memoirs he stresses the importance of 9 September in the calendar of Communist Bulgaria. It was on 9 September, the anniversary of the imposition of Communist rule, that Georgi, by now in hospital, suffered a terrible collapse from which he was only saved through the efforts of doctors and his own great will to live. He survived for two more days, believing that he would be able to talk with Special Branch officers, who had by then been alerted. But the poison in his system was impossible to resist.

For just a few hours after Georgi's death on the morning of 11 September, it was purely a tragedy for his family and friends. By the end of the day it had become a public sensation also; and, within three weeks, the world-wide rumours that he had been murdered were confirmed. Scotland Yard announced the finding of a minute precision-made metal pellet in his thigh: exactly the same weapon as had been used in an unsuccessful attempt on the life of another Bulgarian defector, Vladimir Kostov, in Paris. At the inquest into Georgi's death the coroner ruled that he had been killed unlawfully, and the poison used to fill the pellet was identified as ricin, rare and exceptionally deadly, which is known to have been extensively researched in Eastern Europe.

It is very clear whose interests were served by Georgi's death; and a wealth of circumstantial evidence exists which heavily implicates them. But because of the nature of the weapon used, which allowed the assassin to get clear away before murder was even suspected, it is unlikely that murder charges can ever be brought (though the British police continue their investigations). . . .

From Annabel Markov's introduction to *The Truth That Killed* by Georgi Markov (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 22 Sept. 1983, £9.95).

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Eastern Poison

Whether the DS, the Bulgarian secret service, tried to kill the Pope is non-proven–at least for the time being. But there is no question in the minds of the British Foreign Office, the British police and Georgi Markov's colleagues at the BBC, that it was an assassin working for the DS who fired a poison pellet into Markov's leg in September 1978, in revenge for a series of broadcasts he made about Bulgaria for Radio Free Europe. Those broadcasts have now been collected and published*; and it is thus open to a wider audience than the five million or so in Bulgaria who originally listened to them, to judge how far he provoked the small, obedient clique which has gathered around the Bulgarian Party Secretary, Todor Zhivkov.

John Simpson in *The Listener* (London), October 1983

* *The Truth That Killed* Georgi Markov (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1983).

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Shattered Illusions

The UN and the USSR

Juliana G. Pilon

ON 7 September 1982, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar lamented in his Annual Report that " we have strayed far from the Charter in recent years." He observed: " We often lack the vision to differentiate between . . . politically expedient positions and the indispensable objective of creating a civilized and peaceful world order." It is indeed difficult to disagree that the UN has been a major disappointment: the avalanche of " newspeak " in the General Assembly and other UN forums, or the affinity of some 120 so-called " non-aligned " UN members with the Soviet bloc are hardly the basis on which to promote the classical liberal principles professed by the founders of the UN.

It is certainly possible to maintain that such hopes were doomed from the outset. A war-worn, dying President Franklin D. Roosevelt—just back from the Yalta conference—could not have been more wrong in his unrealistic optimism when he said that the UN:

> spells the end of the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and the balances of power, and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries—and have failed. We propose to substitute for all these a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join.[1]

The UN principles themselves were unclear and/or inconsistent, and certainly easy enough to ignore. The famous " non-interference " clause of the Charter—Article 2, section 7—which provides that " nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state " is a case in point. That clause was invoked by the Soviet Union in 1968 when its tanks rumbled into Czechoslovakia. It is also the principal stumbling-block in the work of the Commission on Human Rights. Even attacks upon freedom of information invoke that principle: on 22 November 1982, 88 nations used it when voting in the General Assembly in favour of censuring satellite TV broadcasts from foreign countries.

IF it cannot coerce, the UN might at least provide some inspiration and a degree of moral leverage. This is difficult, however, when its own philosophical principles are not only violated but flawed in definition. The concept of " human rights," for example, whose protection was intended to be guaranteed or at least promoted by the Universal

[1] Cited in Ruth B. Russell, *A History of The UN Charter* (The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1958), p. 547.

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Declaration on Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948, was full of confusion from the outset. There has never been a consensus on what such " rights " really were.[2]

The Soviet Union made it abundantly clear that it had no intention of being bound by definitions of human rights that would conflict with its political interests. On 10 December 1948, Soviet delegate Andrei Vyshinsky explained that " the rights of human beings cannot be considered outside the prerogatives of governments, and the very understanding of human rights is a governmental concept."[3] This is why members of the Soviet bloc belonging to the UN in 1948 voted against the Declaration.

The Soviet Union did support the adoption by the General Assembly of an International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, but only after the original text was modified radically. As Dr Alfred J. Schweppe on behalf of the American Bar Association testified before the Senate on 10 March 1971:

> As originally drafted, the Convention included " political " as well as " national, ethnical, racial and religious groups." The Soviets announced that they wouldn't play unless " political groups " were expunged from the draft. They insisted on preserving the right to assassinate and exterminate the political opposition as essential to the safety of the state . . . Result: the United States yielded, and " political groups " were eliminated from the draft.

American delegates also wanted to include the phrase " with the complicity of government " in the concept of genocide, but the Soviet Union again objected, and the US yielded. As a result, some of the worst and most common forms of genocide are now exempt from the Convention. Because of such omissions, the US has not ratified the Genocide Convention.

More problems emerged as the Soviet Union succeeded—with the backing of repressive Third World regimes—in diverting the sense of " human rights " away from the classic Western concern for civil and political liberties towards so-called economic rights. By 16 December 1977, the UN even codified a resolution, 32/130, establishing a " right to development."[4] By then it had become all too clear that the Western definition of human rights, like the Western position on most matters, " was not merely on the defensive, but had been effectively routed in the UN."[5]

In retrospect, these structural deficiencies are not particularly surpris-

[2] Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents* (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1949), p. 97.

[3] Quoted in John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (the Macmillan Company, New York, 1950), p. 203.

[4] See Moses Moskowitz, " Implementing Human Rights: Present and Future Prospects," in B. G. Ramcharan, ed., *Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration* (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1979), pp. 109–130.

[5] Jack Donnelly, " Recent Trends in UN Human Rights Activity: Description and Polemic," in *International Organization* 35, Autumn 1981, p. 639.

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ing: the UN reflects world realities. Thus an effective UN system, says Professor of Law J. S. Watson, " can only be set up in the context of a pre-existing political stability and it is only within such a hierarchic system that one can talk of actually ' enforcing ' human rights." And " until the world reaches the requisite political stability, the supra-national approach must be rejected as an attractive but unrealistic idea."[6] The UN is inevitably failing to meet high standards of idealism, its human rights failures are moulded into a rigid double standard. The list of those condemned and those exempted never changes.

THE original flaws in the Charter were only compounded with the passage of time as the UN's political vocabulary was being formed in such organs as the so-called Committee of 24, elaborately entitled the " Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." Recommendations of the Committee of 24 have usually become first resolutions of the fourth of the General Assembly's six Committees, and then of the Assembly itself. The US and Britain have long since withdrawn from the Committee because of its virulent rhetoric. By now, the tone of its resolutions is well known. As the former UN diplomat, Seymour Maxwell Finger put it: " If such resolutions are changed from one year to the next, the change has usually been in the form of adding inflating adjectives or inserting still more unattainable provisions."[7]

The Declaration, whose implementation the Committee of 24 is pledged to ensure, had been Nikita Khrushchev's gift to the UN on its 15th anniversary in 1960. It was the first of a series of moves shaping the UN's ideological climate that led to the admission of so-called " National Liberation Movements " (NLMs) as observers at the General Assembly on a par with nation states. The 1960 Declaration stated that self-determination is " a right belonging to all people," hence " all armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease."

Five years later, Resolution 2105(XX) of 20 December 1965 recognized " the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, and invites all states to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial territories." This was followed in 1970 by an endorsement of using " all the necessary means at their disposal " to achieve their ends (Resolution 2708(XXV) of 15 December). The sum of these resolutions was official encouragement to extremists and terrorists to use the Charter as legitimation of the use of force—and this is an organization founded to preserve world peace.

[6] J. S. Watson, " The Limited Utility of International Law in the Protection of Human Rights," paper presented on 17 April 1980 to a panel on " Perspectives on Enforcement of Human Rights."

[7] Seymour Maxwell Finger, *Your Man at the UN: People, Politics and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy* (New York University Press, New York and London, 1980), p. 30.

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Oscar Schachter, former Director of the General Legal Division of the UN, finds that " in recent years, at first almost imperceptibly, we have witnessed a counter-trend toward the justification and, one might say, the licensing of international violence "[8] at the UN.

The UN has been careful, however, to define " wars of liberation " selectively. The UN blessing is not extended to members of Poland's Solidarity movement, nor to Czechs or Hungarians fighting for their liberation from Moscow's rule, indeed, not even to non-extremist black African groups such as Inkatha, led by Gaftsa Buthelese, head of the Zulu nation, which is the chief black opposition to the South African government. " Imperialism " at the UN is a label routinely attached to the US and the West, but never to the USSR.

The architects of that ideology are well aware of the mechanics that operate in linguistics: connotations are woven from associations. Thus, words like " imperialism," " colonialism," and " racism " are deliberately used together at the international conferences in the UN and its agencies such as the International Labour Organization, UNESCO, or the World Conference of International Women's Year.

Conferences, resolutions, and reports cannot be dismissed as mere rhetoric. They mould the international diplomatic environment. Even if the results at times are belated, they are not difficult to trace. As Finger pointed out:

> Some of the most important results of Assembly sessions do not come from resolutions at all but rather from changes in attitudes of key governments that result from both formal debates and informal talks during the session. Having represented the US in the Second (Economic) Committee of the General Assembly from 1956 to 1963, and having watched it closely since then, I have been impressed by the way prolonged discussion there can bring about major changes in attitudes on economic issues.[9]

General Assembly resolutions and speeches alone do not shape the rhetorical atmosphere of the UN and the world community. There is another dimension behind the public image, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick discovered when some of the Third World delegates joined Cuba and several other totalitarian countries in signing a vituperative anti-US, anti-Western " Communiqué "—the product of the September 1981 meeting of the non-aligned countries in Havana.[10] In a letter responding to the Communiqué, she stated what should have been obvious: " In fact, your excellency, I think you no more believe these vicious lies than do I and I do not believe they are an accurate reflection of your government's outlook." The *Christian Science Monitor* reported on 16 October 1981, that many in the UN thought this letter a mere " tempest in a teapot [and] many moderate non-aligned diplomats shrugged off her statement as

[8] Oscar Schachter, " The Generation Gap in International Law," in *Proceedings*, 1969, p. 232.
[9] Finger, op. cit., p. 30.
[10] Cited by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the *Congressional Record*, 22 Oct. 1981.

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rhetoric. They believe that rhetoric is part of the political game at the UN."

THE Soviet Union is clearly getting more than a fair shake at the UN. Not only can it count on the majority supporting its policies, some 100 so-called " non-aligned " nations voting alongside the Soviets 84.9 per cent of the time in the General Assembly; not only can it depend on the US barely mustering a majority of 9 votes to support a resolution in the Security Council condemning the shooting down of a civilian aeroplane (which does not even mention the Soviet Union, and which is then duly vetoed); it can even fill the Secretariat with KGB agents, most of whom are known to the FBI, in flagrant violation of Article 100 of the UN Charter,[11] and get away with it.

The USSR's penchant for flouting the UN Charter has long been known. Soviet bloc citizens in the UN Secretariat, assisted by communist bloc[12] nations, by radical and even by moderate Third World Secretariat employees, have long been known to be undermining the impartiality of the UN civil service, on occasion in open defiance of the UN's personnel policies. Former Soviet Under Secretary General Arkady Shevchenko, until his defection to the US in 1978 the highest-ranking Soviet civil servant, reports that the Soviets scoff at the very idea that international civil servants could be impartial. He charges that over a third of all communist bloc nationals in the Secretariat are officers of their respective secret police, under the direct guidance of the KGB. Their activities range from direct recruitment of Secretariat employees, gathering information of a political nature from UN employees and diplomats, to using the UN as a basis for espionage activities throughout the US by taking advantage of the UN exemption from the stipulation of requesting travel permission from the US government.

The Soviet Union's support from the Third World at the UN can be juxtaposed with Moscow's also well-known niggardliness in the UN. Counting both assessed and voluntary contributions, the USSR—including the Ukrainian and Byelorussian shares[13]—paid only 4.21 per cent in 1981 to the UN system.[14] To the UN's assessed and peacekeeping collections, the Soviet Union paid only 10.66 per cent in 1980 while the US paid 31.42 per cent. The Soviet Union is currently behind in its UN payments by about $200 million.[15]

[11] " In the performance of their duties the Secretary General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization." (Article 100, UN Charter).

[12] This also includes Rumania, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos and Yemen.

[13] Stalin succeeded in having the Soviet Union receive 3 votes in the UN. This highly controversial matter, which may well be seen as a defeat for the US, has been widely discussed. For example, see John C. Etridge, Library of Congress Congressional Research Service study, " Ukraine and Byelorussia in the UN. Background and Arguments For and Against Expulsion," 5 November 1971.

[14] UN Document A/37/445, 28 Sept. 1982, p. 78.

[15] For a comprehensive study of various aspects of defaulting, see " UN Financial Management: A Staff Analysis," drafted for the Subcommittee on International Organizations and the Subcommittee on International Operations, released in early 1982.

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Yet the Soviet Union enjoys much greater support from the underdeveloped majority of UN members than does the far more generous US. The percentage of support for the USSR in General Assembly resolutions among the almost 100 so-called " non-aligned " nations was not less than 84.9 per cent in 1981, as compared with 25 per cent average agreement with the US (keeping in mind that the US and the Soviet Union voted together 17.6 per cent of the time, usually on budgetary or administrative matters). Among the reasons for the Soviet success at the UN, particularly since 1960, are skilful " conference diplomacy," effective use—and occasional abuse—of the UN machinery, as well as extensive contact with UN-affiliated non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the media. Many NGOs are Soviet fronts or are Soviet-manipulated. In addition, the USSR reportedly resorts to all the techniques routinely used by the KGB in its recruitment efforts, including payment of hard cash and a variety of inducements in kind to UN employees and UN diplomats in exchange for various degrees of assistance to the USSR in its ideological war with the West, even to the point of outright direct cooperation with the KGB.

The UN has thus become an important tool for the USSR, an effective part of the Soviet " active measures "[16] programme of disinformation coordinated from the highest levels of the International Department of the Communist Party. Today the Soviets can count on having UN support for most of its political agenda in the General Assembly, an agenda which spills over into the entire UN system. The UN is currently fulfilling Stalin's hope that the organization would become a useful tool in the Soviet Union's foreign policy offensive.

Espionage

The FBI has traditionally referred to the UN in New York as " the spy factory." And indeed the sheer number of communist intelligence officers there is overwhelming. FBI Director William H. Webster has noted the recent increase there in intelligence-trained individuals, in general mostly under diplomatic coverage.[17] R. Jean Gray, head of the FBI's New York section that keeps an eye on the Soviet bloc employees at the UN, said that there are about 1100 communist bloc officials in New York; the number reaches 3000 if all communist personnel is included. More than 150 Soviets work in the UN Missions alone; in the Secretariat there are about 180 Soviets. Gray comments: " The Soviets seem to prize quantity."

They also prize quality. A conservative FBI estimate, slightly lower than the figure cited by Arkady Shevchenko, is that about 30 per cent of Soviet UN employees, including Missions and Secretariat, are skilled

[16] On " Active measures," see pp. 49–67.

[17] See 1983 Appropriation Request of the FBI submitted before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 1 April 1982.

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KGB officers. The " heavies " are in the Missions, particularly since 1978, all their work being coordinated by Vladimir Kazakov, a Deputy to the USSR's Permanent Representative, American-educated Oleg Troyanovsky.

Whether or not they are KGB officers, however, Soviet and other communist bloc Secretariat employees are reportedly involved in intelligence-related activities. Shevchenko confirmed this, saying that the post of assistant to the UN Secretary General is " traditionally KGB." The current incumbent is Gennadi Yefstaf'iev, previously stationed in New Delhi, then KGB " Resident " in Sri Lanka and later in Tokyo.

Coordination of all UN-connected diplomats and UN civil servants from the communist bloc countries takes place on a regular basis in each of the bloc's UN Missions. In these meetings, Mission diplomats and Secretariat employees receive specific instructions regarding their activities, behaviour, and role in the overall plan of ideological warfare.

One of the main aspects of Soviet espionage activities in New York, according to Shevchenko, is the electronic monitoring of telephone conversations, directed primarily from the mansion owned by the Soviet Mission in Glen Cove, New York, which is full of electronic spying equipment aimed primarily at Long Island industry. There is also abundant evidence available to the FBI that Glen Cove serves as a meeting place for KGB officers for " pass operations " and " dead drops."[18] These operations, of course, also take place throughout the city of New York.

Since UN Secretariat employees have free travel privileges anywhere in the US and have access to cars bearing US licence plates, FBI officials confess that it is practically impossible to monitor all their activities. The FBI is also aware of extensive contacts with " illegals "—Soviet or communist bloc citizens who are in the US with false documents, or under false pretences.

According to FBI officials, the main role of the so-called " diplomat spies " is not direct spying but recruitment. Recruiting a spy involves—besides traditional KGB techniques[19]—a whole spectrum of methods designed to identify individuals in the UN system willing to offer information and help to the KGB in exchange for money, jobs, promotions, and other services, such as health care in the Soviet Union, gifts, vacations, even political influence. Shevchenko laughingly reports that the Soviets had actually acquired a reputation in the UN—he himself having been approached on several occasions by individuals asking for " loans " in return for cooperation with the KGB. He says that some of these people are still in the UN Secretariat.

One of the most significant tools in the USSR's recruitment efforts, as Shevchenko emphatically points out, is access to the files of all UN employees, through the UN's Personnel Department. " The Department

[18] " Pass operations " involve passing espionage equipment to individuals directly; " dead drops " involve leaving material at arranged locations.

[19] See John Barron, *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*. Reader's Digest Press, 1983.

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is heavily infiltrated by the KGB," says Shevchenko, " at the highest levels." The files are then supplemented by personal data collected through well-coordinated activities supervised by the Soviet Mission—all of which adds up to an impressive espionage machinery.

The Propaganda Value of the UN

From the outset, the USSR understood the potential significance of the UN in its propaganda efforts.[20] When the UN was just being organized, Stalin addressed a large secret Communist Party meeting with the following message, reported by former KGB officer Petr Deryabin, a participant who has since defected to the US: " We do not need the UN," said Stalin. " What we need is a stage from which we can express any opinion we want." This attitude seems to be more prevalent today than ever. The USSR's " active measures " programme launched, or at least intensified, since 1978, which involves the use of all means available to create political perceptions most conducive to the goals of the Communist Party of the USSR, finds fertile soil at the UN. As US Permanent Representative Jeane Kirkpatrick said, the Soviets virtually " shape the international political agenda." Both the vocabulary in which that agenda is discussed and the ways of conceiving the issues are subtly but consistently and forcefully affected.

One of the most effective propaganda tools for the USSR is, as noted, the " Committee of 24 " (now 25), created by resolution 1654 (XVI), 27 November 1961, a year after the Soviet sponsorship of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960). Although by 1960, 1,500 million of the roughly 1,600 million colonial people at the end of the Second World War had won their freedom, the Soviets seized the issue to create for themselves a pro-freedom image.

Under the label of " colonialism," the US, South Africa, and Israel are routinely castigated in the UN—despite the fact that the US, itself a former colony, has always supported decolonization, as has Israel. As for South Africa, its role in Namibia is hardly more reprehensible than the Soviet Union's genocide in the Ukraine, or its annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, to the Soviet Union.[21] To recognize once again the colonialist nature of the Soviet Union, on 26 July 1983, President Reagan sent a statement to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar charging that the Soviet Union violates these nations' right to self-determination.

Yet opposition to " colonialism " is the business of the communist-dominated Fourth Committee which deals with that topic, thus assuring

[20] See the Report by the National Security Council marked " Top Secret," 30 March 1948, since published in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, Volume I, General; The United Nations* (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1976), pp. 545–550; also pp. 551–564 and passim.

[21] In the Memorandum Concerning the Decolonization of the USSR submitted to the 35th General Assembly by the Ad Hoc Committee Consisting of the World Councils of Byelorussians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Turkestanians and Ukrainians in October 1980, there is an excellent summary of the Soviet policy of Russification and colonization.

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the passage of vituperative anti-Western resolutions. The Committee takes every opportunity to attack the West, and especially the US. A perennial thorn is the Puerto Rican issue. Despite the fact that Puerto Ricans, when asked by referendum, voted against independence from the US by an overwhelming majority, the Cuban-sponsored resolution in 1982, A/37/250 on " the question of Puerto Rico," presented during the last session of the General Assembly was widely supported, notwithstanding unprecedented US efforts to explain the situation privately to UN diplomats.

The barrage of anti-Western propaganda parading as anti-colonialism serves also to obscure the fact that the Soviet Union is currently involved in colonizing by war the people of Afghanistan. It was the Yugoslav Permanent Representative Ignac Golob who said with frankness uncharacteristic of communist bloc diplomats that " the Third World is very upset about the Afghan invasion. After all, no one likes to be dominated by someone else, everyone likes independence. And that is what the Soviets are violating in Afghanistan—the people's independence." Yet the General Assembly has never criticized the Soviet Union by name in any resolution condemning that invasion.

Racism

Among the Soviet Union's most successful propaganda techniques is the use of guilt by association. The campaign against South Africa—which culminated in that member's illegal denial of participation in the General Assembly in 1974—has been used to taint most Western nations. Recently, principal targets have been the US and Israel. Dracheva, the USSR's former representative to the Third Committee, would routinely chastize Israel's alleged close cooperation with South Africa, calling it " an unholy alliance between Zionism and apartheid."[22] The anti-racist campaign is interpreted in Marxist terms, and quickly becomes a general anti-Western tirade.

The anti-racist rhetoric against South Africa has become a veritable industry. During its 36th Session alone, the General Assembly considered the item entitled " policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa " in 9 plenary meetings between 27 November and 17 December 1981 (see A/36/PV.75–79, 81, 101–103). It adopted 16 resolutions, based mainly on the recommendations of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, which is virtually Soviet-run.[23] According to Arkady Shevchenko, during his own tenure as Soviet Under Secretary General, many speeches of the Committee's Chairman, the Nigerian Alhaji Yusuff Maitama-Sule, were written by the Soviet front organization the World Peace Council (WPC). Sule was unanimously re-elected to his post on 11 January 1982. Vladimir Kravetz, currently the Soviet Vice Chairman of the Committee, reportedly orchestrates the

[22] " The Soviet Union at the 37th Session," USSR Press Release, p. 21.

[23] Its 18 members are: Algeria, GDR, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, the Ukrainian SSR.

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Committee's anti-apartheid activities with vigour. Generally, the Soviet-engineered campaign against racism is part of an elaborate, and successful, effort to legitimize support for Soviet-backed insurgents in the area.[24]

One of the most outrageous examples of Soviet-inspired (and Arab supported) UN moves intended to twist the concept of racism for political purposes is resolution 3379 (XXX) adopted by the General Assembly on 10 November 1975, which declared Zionism to be a form of racism. A host of previous UN documents had linked the concepts of " Zionism " and " racism,"[25] the drive being traceable to the 1960s, especially 13 June 1967, when A. Kosygin, then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, sent a letter to the President of the General Assembly comparing Israel to Hitler's Germany.[26] While the Arab states embraced the image eagerly, the Soviet Union continued to be in the vanguard of the UN's anti-Israel campaign.

Aggression

The Soviet Union was also in the vanguard at the UN in pressing for its own definition of aggression. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia reports that the term was raised by the Soviets in the UN in 1950, 1951, 1953, 1954, and 1957 in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union chooses to use the term " aggression " selectively to refer to Western opposition—even non-military in nature—to " national liberation organizations " (as defined by the Soviets) but never to communist military interventions. Soviet Senior Adviser to the Soviet Mission Sergei N. Smirnov thus predictably denied that Afghanistan is a case of " aggression "; rather, he said, " it must be understood in context." That context is defined in the halls of the General Assembly by inverting reality. Permanent Representative Oleg Troyanovsky and Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko both claimed to be seeking the cessation of " intervention in Afghanistan's affairs." To accuse the West of aggression in such a situation is precisely the kind of Big Lie used for purposes of propaganda and it is given a sort of pseudo-respectability in the UN. It is on a par with the accusation that the US caused the massacre of flight KAL 007 by " sending " the plane behind Soviet borders.

In short, the picture the Soviet Union is trying to create at the UN is a seductively simple antinomy between the communist " struggle for peace " and capitalist aggression:

> The struggle in the international arena between the forces of

[24] See the entire hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate on " The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa," 22, 24, 25, 29, and 31 March 1982, Volumes 1 & 2 (Serial No. J-97-101).

[25] For an excellent analysis of the history, see Moses Moskowitz, *The Roots and Reaches of United Nations Actions and Decisions* (Sijthoff & Noordhoff Alphen aan den Rijn 1980), Ch. VI, " The Racial Equation," pp. 131–153.

[26] UNGA Official Records, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Plen. 1526.

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socialism and democracy and the forces of aggression and imperialist reaction is also taking place at the UN.[27]

Disarmament and Peaceful Coexistence

The issue of disarmament was used by Soviet propaganda prior to the Second World War. In his book, *The Soviet Union at the UN*, Alexander Dallin pointed to Moscow's " uncanny ability to make sweeping and appealing proposals while resisting the type of specific controls or inspection arrangements that other powers have deemed essential."[28] He cites many examples of purposeful stalling and eroding of disarmament agreements at the UN; yet the Soviet Union continues to capitalize on its allegedly strong commitment to disarmament.

The concept of " peaceful coexistence " is used as a code word. According to a recent Soviet authoritative monograph on the UN by G. K. Shakhnazarov, president of the Soviet Political Science Association, " peaceful coexistence must not be confused with the simple concept of peace." It is rather a tool which " creates the prerequisites for the freer development of the class struggle."[29] The UN is seen as a crucial forum from which the Soviet Union can create these prerequisites. An interesting aspect of the Soviet disarmament campaign which appeals greatly to the Third World is the notion that world development is contingent on disarmament. The resulting impression is that the West must be blamed for Third World poverty and hence must make amends.

The New International Economic Order (NIEO)

NIEO is a slogan whose popularity was enhanced by an unlikely American source, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who, on 22 September 1975, urged all nations: " Let us fashion together a new world order."[30] Kissinger, however, cannot be blamed for launching the phrase to symbolize the socialist redistribution of resources favoured by the Soviet Union.[31] First introduced in earnest in 1964 at a UN Conference on Trade and Development, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of a NIEO in 1975. The idea is understandably popular with underdeveloped nations. Hence, according to Dennis Goodman, US Deputy Representative to the Economic and Social Council, the Soviets are active in supporting NIEO whenever possible. But although for them the concept is shorthand for the kind of revolutionary demanded by Marxist ideology it does not oblige them, for example, to become members of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN, to which the Soviets have never given one rouble.

[27] *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (Macmillan, Inc. New York 1981), vol. 18, p. 707.
[28] Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the U.N.* (Praeger New York 1962), p. 70.
[29] Cited in *Intelligence Digest*, 20 Jan. 1982.
[30] Cited, in context, in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place* (Berkley Books, New York 1980), p. 155.
[31] For an incisive analysis of the history of NIEO, see *USA*, vol. XIX, 30 Sept. 1975, No. 14 by UN scholar Alice Widener.

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Human Rights

Despite numerous references to international human rights treaties in Soviet academic literature, the USSR of course never intended to have the UN set on a general course of protecting human rights.[32] The Charter's principle of non-interference cited in Article 7 is routinely invoked by the Soviet academic literature, the USSR of course never intended to have the violations, whether in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or in the USSR itself. But human rights violations are routinely invoked to attack South Africa and Israel. The rhetoric has by now been stepped up to protest the " genocide " taking place in those countries. On 8 October 1976, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister offered a succinct summary of the reality that Soviet propaganda was moulding:

> It is the struggle against the most gross violations of human rights in Chile, in South Africa and in the Arab lands occupied by Israel, that constitutes a fundamental means of deepening the cooperation among states in the promotion of respect for and observance of human rights.[33]

In reply to one example of this kind of rhetoric, US representative to the Third Committee, Carl Gershman, stated: " I was struck by the true enormity of the untruths that were told, the inflated rhetoric, the rather large arrogance."

Such arrogance is not always successful, as can be seen from the following example: a Press Release disseminated (on 14 June 1983) by the Soviet Mission (which was a reprint of a *Pravda* article by Alexei Petrov) referred to several critical analyses prepared in 1982–83 by Soviet " experts " attempting to refute American charges that the Soviet Union used chemical weapons in South-East Asia. These analyses were published in official UN papers. But notwithstanding attempts by Soviet Under Secretary General Ustinov to stall it, the UN study arrived at the conclusion that chemical warfare is indeed used in that area in defiance of international agreements.[34]

Soviet Proxies

On many occasions radical Third World nations do the Soviet Union's work in the UN. To be sure, both superpowers try to have other nations introduce resolutions, gather political support, and present arguments on their behalf. But the tactics used by the USSR are qualitatively different from those of the US especially given the existence of Soviet " proxies " in the Third World. Among these are Vietnam, Laos, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, and several others, whose allegiance to the Soviet Union is virtually automatic.

In general, the voting pattern at the UN is strikingly pro-Soviet,

[32] Theresa D. Gonzales, " The Political Sources of Procedural Debates in the United Nations: Structural Impediments to Implementation of Human Rights," in *NYU Journal of International Law and Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 427 ff.

[33] UN Document A/31/PV.15, p. 17.

[34] UN Document A/37/259, 1 Dec. 1982.

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confirming Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's claim that its " proposals invariably get extensive support in the UN"[35] One of the principal reasons for that support is the USSR's skilful manoeuvring of the so-called " non-aligned " nations.

Coopting the non-aligned

As US Ambassador Kirkpatrick observed, the Soviet Union is often capable, through the UN's regional organizations, such as the Organization for African Unity and the Islamic Conference, but especially through the Non-Aligned Movement, to mould the international agenda. " Moscow tries to use the UN to achieve its goals, foremost among them being the weakening of the US, South Africa, and Israel." The impact of radicals in the Non-Aligned Movement in recent years reached a climax in 1979 when Cuba gained its leadership. Israeli diplomat Arieh Eilan, recently retired as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem, reflected that:

> The Soviet proxies inside the non-aligned camp need only point at the disunity of the West to nip in the bud any pro-Western or anti-communist initiative among the non-aligned.[36]

Referring to Cuba's persistent attempts to radicalize the non-aligned, Burma decided to leave the movement. It provided some words of explanation: " There are those among us who . . . deliberately exploit the movement to gain their own grand designs."[37] Despite claims that with Indian chairmanship the movement might be becoming more " moderate," there is little reason to hope that Soviet manipulation will cease or even be considerably reduced.

PLO, SWAPO, ANC, and other NLMs

Since 1979, the intimate relation between the Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) became particularly evident—exposed by documents found in the Lebanon.[38] The relationship is also reflected in the UN, where the PLO can count on Soviet backing of their proposals and rhetoric. The PLO Representative to the UN Zehdi L. Terzi can count on being automatically echoed by the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and/or Soviet representative(s), in a triplicate of hate-filled attacks on Israel.

Particularly strong Soviet backing in the UN is also received by the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC), both heavily subsidized by the USSR. These movements, as well as the MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in

[35] USSR Press Release.

[36] Arieh Eilan, " [The Soviet Union and] Conference Diplomacy." in the *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1981, p. 27.

[37] K. P. Misra, " Burma's Farewell to the Non-Aligned Movement," in *Asian Affairs*, vol. XII, Part I, February 1981, p. 53.

[38] Raphael Israeli (ed.), *PLO in Lebanon*, Ch. V, " The Communist Bloc Connection," (Weidenfeld and Nicolson London 1983).

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Mozambique were recognized by the General Assembly in the late 1970s as National Liberation Movements and regularly budgeted UN funds were provided to support them. In particular, Article 58 of the UN Charter which states that the UN should " make recommendations for the coordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies," began to be used to allow financial assistance to NLMs from the entire UN system. The total UN aid to SWAPO alone has been estimated to be $40 million. Despite promises to verify this figure the UN has yet to do so.

Other communist Missions to the UN can also be counted upon to help NLMs in various, sometimes unexpected, ways. For example, Cuba, with a sizeable Mission (at 33 members, it is twice the size of Britain's Mission), is well known for its active role on behalf of NLMs. To illustrate: on 14 July 1982, the FBI submitted to the US Congress a document captured in a terrorist house in El Salvador, which contained an interview by Farid Handel, brother of the head of El Salvador's Communist Party, with members of the Cuban Mission to the UN who were to help him organize support for insurgency in El Salvador—in clear violation of the UN Charter.[39]

The Secretariat

Among the most serious problems facing the Secretariat is the reportedly large number of Third World nationals recruited by the KGB. According to former Under Secretary General Shevchenko, KGB agents offer various inducements in exchange for cooperation. Usually, however, recruitment is not necessary in the case of nationals of radical Third World nations. The Soviet Mission, he says, simply asks the respective government to " intervene " with its national(s) to " cooperate " with a Soviet employee in the gathering of information, slanting a report to suit the Soviet Union's purposes, or Xeroxing and disseminating UN material when the Soviets need it.

Soviet Tactics Towards Moderate Third World and Western Nations

The nature of its ideology suits the USSR well in its efforts to win over Third World and left-wing Western support. As Dr Devendra Kaushik, Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, put it " the Leninist assumption of interdependence and complementarity of socialism and anti-imperialist struggles for national liberation forms the core of the overall Soviet view of the Third World."[40] According to one Indian diplomat the Soviet success in gaining Third World support at the UN is due not to diplomatic skill but to the intrinsic seductiveness of Marxist ideology and—perhaps even more important—to " military realities," i.e. Soviet military strength. Other diplomats concur, but believe that the recently improved diplomatic style of Soviets both in the Missions and the Secretariat enhances their efforts

[39] See Hearings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, Second Session, 13, 14 July 1982, " Soviet Active Measures," p. 215.

[40] Devendra Kaushik, *The Non-Aligned World*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan.-Mar., 1983, p. 76.

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to fraternize with representatives of moderate nations. Another important Soviet asset is the extensive UN experience of some Soviet Secretariat employees, who have developed many UN contacts over the years.

The sheer barrage of UN propaganda has its own effect. Western nations become exhausted, exasperated, or possibly intimidated into silence. Among the most devastating effects of Western complacency or " irritation " with UN propaganda (a British diplomat's term) and Soviet-inspired rhetoric is the lack of a Western " agenda." Ambassador Kirkpatrick points to this weakness in the Western approach to the UN as one of the principal reasons for the Soviet Union's success.

Department of Public Information (DPI)

The DPI's functions have grown significantly over the past decade. Despite the provision in General Assembly resolution 13 (I) of 13 February 1946, Annex 1, that the DPI " should not engage in ' propaganda ',' it has on occasion done just that. In line with the mandate in the same resolution to " engage in positive informational activities " to promote UN actions, the DPI is actively assisting national information services, educational institutions, NGOs, and the media. As such it is a key target of Soviet disinformation activity.[41] Arkady Shevchenko maintains that the DPI plays a crucial role in the Soviet Union's disinformation campaign. According to him, " The whole Department is mobilized."

The principal Soviet citizen in the DPI is Anatoly Mkrtchyan, head of the External Relations Division. Shevchenko states that Mkrtchyan is a KGB colonel; in fact, the post has always been held by a KGB colonel, ever since a Soviet citizen was placed there. Among the Division's main functions is the dissemination of UN material to all the 64 UN Information Centres throughout the world. A high-level DPI official disclosed that the dissemination of this material is coordinated by DPI personnel in New York who alert groups in various parts of the world—in particular, in Europe—regarding information packages ready for use in propaganda activities.

The External Relations Division has recently acquired a new function, cited in DPI Director Yasushi Akashi's statement to the Committee on Information of 20 June 1982, to follow developments in member states which are " relevant to the work of the UN." This new function could be of considerable use for the Soviet Union in its efforts to gather political intelligence, particularly from distant or small Third World nations where Soviet presence might be limited.

Arkady Shevchenko, as well as some DPI staff members, point out that the Soviet Union is skilful in using Third World nationals in the DPI. Notable among them is Mkrtchyan's Principal Officer, who is also Chief

[41] Curiously, the sole public use by the Soviets of the term " active measures "—which refers to broad Soviet attempts to influence public opinion—appeared in a Soviet report to the UN of 5 May 1981, distributed by the DPI.

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of Information Services, Samir Sambad, a " Lebanese " who arrived from Beirut about a year ago, whom Israeli diplomats have long identified as an active member of the PLO.

Among the DPI's chief functions is the radio broadcasting service. The Soviets are strategically placed there, with Arkady Chapaev heading the European Unit, and Gleb Kossov as Chief of the Pamphlets Unit. DPI publications, notably *Suggestions for Speakers*—and in particular the 1981 edition—show a clear Soviet tilt. The 1981 edition, whose bias was admitted even by the DPI, which agreed to reissue it, was never recalled—60,000 copies having already been disseminated by the DPI.

The pro-Soviet tilt in the DPI was recently criticized even by UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar when a Report of the Joint UN Information Committee dated 10 June 1983, commended socialist countries for reporting regularly on UN activities while criticizing Western media for presenting an allegedly biased view of the UN.

Office of the Under Secretary General for Security Council and Political Affairs

This is the title of the highest-ranking Soviet employee in the UN Secretariat, currently Vyacheslav Ustinov, a seasoned diplomat with extensive experience in Africa. Though concerned to appear interested in a " balanced " approach to political issues, when asked whether he considered himself to be a truly impartial civil servant he said: " We bring with us our ideology, our friends, our beliefs." His predecessor, Arkady Shevchenko, observed that the Soviets laugh at the idea of an impartial civil service. Shevchenko reported having had daily contacts with the Soviet Mission.

Aside from the usual attempts to resist the appointment of Americans and other Westerners in the Secretariat, especially in the higher reaches, the Soviets go to surprising lengths to block the advancement of people who fail to cooperate with them. On 17 February 1981, the *New York Times* reported that Martin Robinson, an experienced employee next in line to the directorship of the Outer Space Division, had been denied promotion by his Soviet superior, then Under Secretary General Mikhail Systenko. Although a UN panel on personnel practices came out in Robinson's favour, he still failed to be promoted until the US threatened not to participate in the 1982 UNISPACE conference in Vienna unless Robinson be justly treated. Now retired, Robinson explained that standing up to his Soviet superior was no easy task. " I can understand how many cannot do it. For me it was a matter of principle to push my case," and he added that " it is scandalous that the UN permits this kind of thing to go on."

Yet this kind of thing still goes on. When US citizens are involved, pressure from the US sometimes overcomes Soviet opposition, as in the case of Pedro San Juan, a professor of Russian studies who started as Officer in Charge of the Political Affairs Division in September 1983. Other nationals, however, are less fortunate. A Nepalese employee in

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Ustinov's department, for example, Upadja, has been denied promotion for several years on grounds that the UN itself considers to be altogether inadequate, although it stops short of calling them political, which they are. Ustinov himself had conceded, in a staff meeting, that Upadja should be promoted—yet he continues to engage in elaborate manoeuvres designed to keep Upadja in the " Siberian section " (a term used by UN employees to describe a position of little or no meaning, reserved for employees who do not cooperate politically with their communist bosses).

" Cooperation " with the Soviet Union is not an inaccurate description of the cosy relationship between the Centre Against Apartheid and the KGB. The Centre is one of the principal organs of communist propaganda against South Africa and the Western nations who have relations with it. Arkady Shevchenko accused the Centre's Chairman, Enuga Reddy, of working in consort with the KGB. Currently the principal Soviet hand at the Centre is Alexander Baichorov of the Centre's Publicity, Assistance and Promotion section in the International Branch. Knowledgeable UN diplomats also point to a citizen of the German Democratic Republic in the Centre's Committee Services and Research Branch, Mathias Zachman, as a coordinator of the Centre's activities.

These activities involve a disinformation campaign, elements of which were recently exposed in a succinct booklet produced by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled *Fact vs. Fiction*, which sets out a point by point rebuttal of about two dozen falsehoods contained in one UN report, Document A/AC 115/L.491 of 22 May 1978. But this kind of Western effort is difficult and expensive, especially considering the barrage of " fiction " produced by the Centre to the tune of over $3 million a year.[42] Included in that budget, according to one Under Secretary General, is a heavy " subsidy " (his word) of the World Peace Council—though he also points out that no written document is available in any official UN publication to substantiate the charge. The WPC, a Soviet front, awarded its highest award on 30 March 1983, to Centre Chairman Reddy as well as the Chairman of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, A. Y. Maitama-Sule.

Office of Personnel Services

The Soviet Union has always been and continues to be, against the concept of a genuine professional civil service, by opposing permanent appointments in favour of temporary assignments—an attitude which is definitely not in keeping with the UN Charter. A high-level UN official confessed that he felt " you cannot trust the Soviets with confidential information." Yet the Soviets are constantly in contact with just such information—in particular, the files of all UN employees. The Personnel Office is essential not only to the KGB's recruitment activities but to every aspect of Soviet influence operations where knowledge of a person's background can prove useful. Among the key Soviet bloc posts

[42] UN Document A/AC. 198/68.

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in that office are: Director of the Division for Policy Coordination (Victor F. Yeliseev), Classification Officer (A. Abramov), Director of Division of Recruitment (I. D. Radovic), Assistant Chief in the Professional Recruitment Services (I. Zavrazhnov), Recruitment Officer (Miroslav Plasek, a Czech), and Staff Service Personnel Officer (Ivan Kovalenko).

One of the crucial functions of the Soviets in the Personnel Department, according to Arkady Shevchenko, is to secure employment for people who have incurred disfavour with their governments, in exchange for cooperation with the KGB. A former head of the Personnel Department asserts that recruitment of Third World nationals in the Secretariat probably goes on all the time, even though " not in a systematic manner." When asked whether the UN investigates such cases, he answered: " The Disciplinary Committee is very lax. You have to kill someone before they even look into a problem." Although the official felt that the Soviets have a limited influence in the Secretariat itself, he did not discount the importance of Secretariat personnel to the Soviet Union for its own broader political purposes.

Pervasive Infiltration

Among strategically located personnel the most significant is the post of Special Assistant to the Secretary General. The current Soviet incumbent, Gennadi Yevstaf'iev, is well situated to intercept letters, even confidential ones, sent to the Secretary General, which he can then pass on to the Soviet Mission. Although described by one Western diplomat as " thick and clumsy," Yevstaf'iev is known as a seasoned KGB officer with extensive experience in Japan.

Another crucial Soviet post in the Secretary General's Executive Office is the Acting Chief of Protocol, currently Alexander S. Taranenko. In his function, Taranenko has some leeway in deciding how to handle sensitive matters of protocol and political symbolism.

An invaluable benefit accruing to the Soviet Union from the UN comes from the Hammorsjkold Library—headed, conveniently, by a Soviet. It is well known that the Soviets make extensive use of the library's Xeroxing facilities. Given the fact that a library can request a wide variety of materials from all over the UN, including microfilms, dissertations, and other scientific and technological data, the Soviet Union reaps great value from the UN Library where such requests may be made unobtrusively, efficiently, and free of charge to the USSR.

One section of the Secretariat that has recently been a focus of controversy is the UN Centre on Transnational Corporation, for the blatantly illegal activities conducted by the highest Soviet functionary there, Assistant Director of the Information Analysis Division R. Tsvilev. According to US Deputy Permanent Representative Jose Sorzano, on 20 July 1983, Tsvilev succeeded in suppressing the Annex of a Centre report which documented the fact that several communist bloc countries have accepted foreign investment by Western transnational corporations (TNCs), that the bloc has 359 joint ventures in the

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West, and other data which justified Ambassador Sorzano's charge of " specious reasoning that alleges that merely because a TNC is based in a socialist economy it should not come under close scrutiny or be subject to the TNC code of conduct."[43] As in the case of human rights violations, this is another instance of the double standards the Soviet Union is pressing on the UN.

Another Secretariat department significant from the Soviet perspective is the Office of Legal Affairs. The Codification Division of that Office is headed by Valentin Romanov of the USSR. According to the international legal scholar and former Israeli representative to the UN's Legal (6th) Committee, Shabtai Rosenne, this Soviet functionary, aided by several others in that Division, notably Legal Officer Sergei Shestakov, is a brilliant manipulator of UN procedure who does not hesitate to use protocol for political purposes. Rosenne gave examples of cases where he saw Romanov manipulating rules during sessions of the UN's (now communist-dominated) Legal Committee, such as ignoring speakers, instructing selected diplomats on how to use procedure to their advantage, and intimidating some diplomats.

The Relationship with Un-connected Groups (NGOs)

Early in the history of the UN, the Soviet Union understood and manipulated quite cleverly the rules governing the UN's relationship with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). At present, several Soviet-front groups routinely " sponsor " NGO conferences in cooperation with UN units such as, for instance, the Centre Against Apartheid. The already mentioned Conference on " The Unholy Alliance Between South Africa and Israel " held in Vienna in July 1983, is a case in point: paid by the UN (despite opposition to this financial arrangement not only by Ambassador Kirkpatrick but also by high-level UN officials), the proceedings of the Conference, which are viciously anti-Israeli, have now been " adopted " by the UN and will be disseminated widely by the DPI with the UN emblem.

Among the hundreds of NGOs affiliated with the UN, many are recognized Soviet fronts:

* The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). Though the NGO list cites AAPSO's headquarters in Geneva, it is actually based in Cairo. Officially coordinator of the " national struggle of the peoples in Africa and Asia," AAPSO is closely connected with the World Peace Council and totally controlled by the Soviets. One of its Deputy Chairmen is Mirza Horagimov of the USSR. Its New York representative is Laura Pasternak.

* The Christian Peace Conference (CPC). The FBI is well aware of the close connection between the CPC, headquartered in Prague, and the WPC. Its political guide-lines are mainly provided by Moscow. CPC delegations are actively involved in meetings of the Special UN Committees on disarmament and racism. Its New York

[43] 29 June 1983, Press Release USUN 51-(83), p. 1.

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representative is Dr Philip Oke, who is located at 777 UN Plaza—a building that houses a number of religious NGOs.

* International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL). The IADL was founded in 1946 through Soviet fronts in Europe. Igor Blishchenko, one of the IADL's Secretaries, is closely associated with the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee. Its President is a French communist, Joe Nordmann. Moscow also has other high-level positions in the IADL. Its New York representative is Lennox S. Hinds.

* International Organization of Journalists (IOJ). Headquartered in Prague, the IOJ is profoundly influenced by the Soviets. Out of 8 Secretaries, 6 are from the Soviet Union or a communist bloc country. Its Secretary General, Jiri Kubka, is from Czechoslovakia. New York representative is Joe Wacker.

* Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF). Headquartered in Berlin, the WIDF is one of the most active Soviet fronts. Most of its leaders are Soviet or communist bloc nationals. Its New York representative is Winnie Burrows.

* World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY). Headquartered in Hungary, the WFDY supports Soviet policy, including the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party has direct links to most of the leaders of the WFDY. Its New York representative is Daniel Rosenberg.

* World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Its President, Sandor Gaspar, is a member of the Hungarian Politburo. Headquartered in Prague, the WFTU is totally controlled by the International Department of the Central Committee. New York representative is Ernest de Maio.

* Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Headquartered in Switzerland, the WILPF cannot be considered to be a direct Soviet front organization. It does, however, collaborate actively with the WPC. Its New York representative is Dr Elizabeth Fehrer.

* World Peace Council (WPC). The WPC is the main Soviet front at the UN. Its policy guide-lines are provided directly by the International Department and its president, Romash Chandra, an Indian communist, is an important agent of influence. WPC representatives are active in a large number of UN conferences, where they have the opportunity to disseminate Soviet propaganda material. Its New York representative is Professor of Philosophy Howard Parsons.

When asked about the meaning of a " non-governmental " organization in a context where the state controls all expression of a political nature, NGO Chief Sally Swing Shelley declared that ordinary citizens contribute to these organizations from their own earnings. Several NGO representatives, however, stated in private their dissatisfaction with these groups and indicated that controversy regarding their status has been going on at the UN for quite a long time.

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The Press

The UN Correspondents' Association lists only about a dozen members from the Soviet bloc, but according to a knowledgeable Western correspondent the number of communist media personnel at UN headquarters is actually about twice that number.

One of the principal attractions of the UN's location in New York is the possibility for Soviet access to US and other Western journalists, publishers, and other media personnel. Arkady Shevchenko emphasizes that this aspect of the UN is of great significance, particularly in the USSR's disinformation campaign. Although American journalists are by no means considered easy prey to unsophisticated Soviet disinformation agents, active measures are nevertheless promoted with some success, because of the *naïveté* of some Western journalists with respect to Soviet tactics. The same is true of individuals in government and business, who may be approached by Soviets—whether diplomats or civil servants—without full awareness of the context in which the Soviets operate.

THE Soviet Union's use of the UN involves violations of both the spirit and the letter of the UN Charter. Aside from the high proportion of secret service agents it places in the Secretariat, who are reported to be consistently involved in recruitment of Third World UN personnel through all kinds of inducements, the Soviet Union is also attempting to manipulate the UN machinery by exploiting the DPI for propaganda purposes, using personnel files as well as the promotion mechanism to manipulate individuals for Soviet political ends, turning sections of the Secretariat into bases of operation for the Soviet Union, suppressing information that does not suit its propaganda purposes (such as an Annex in a study by the Centre on Transnational Corporations), or " doctoring " economic statistics.

Short of a more fundamental reassessment of the UN itself, at least some measures should be taken:

* The US and its allies should continue to oppose in the strongest terms every Soviet attempt to compromise the impartiality of the Secretariat. They should insist, for example, that permanent Secretariat assignments replace temporary ones whenever possible.
* Article 100 of the UN Charter should be strictly enforced. Reports of improper cooperation with governments by Secretariat employees should be investigated and punished.
* All reported cases of harassment and employee discrimination on political grounds should be vigorously opposed by the Western group.
* Soviet violations of UN procedures—misuse of UN rules, altering documents, stalling reports, manufacturing statistics—should be roundly condemned.
* Attempts should be made by the US to reduce the size of Eastern bloc and other communist Missions in New York.
* Soviet propaganda and falsehood in speeches made at the UN,

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as well as resolutions, " studies," papers, etc., should be vigorously answered by both the US and its allies.

Were the UN's level of integrity higher, the Soviet Union might have been ousted from the UN long before South Africa. Instead, the USSR has rather coopted the organization in its campaign of " active measures " against the West. Consistent and effective exposure of the Soviets' tactics in the UN will at least help salvage some of the principles for which the UN was ostensibly founded.

The UN and Yellow Rain

When one investigates the use of Soviet chemical weapons in Laos and Cambodia (and, for that matter, in Afghanistan as well), the difficulty lies not in gathering evidence, which by now is within the grasp of anyone who searches for it, but rather in understanding by what sophisticated mechanisms this evidence has been obscured, discredited, and minimized by the very persons who should bring it forward. And since the great falsifiers are all Westerners, one encounters a second difficulty: how to explain to the victims the absurd game of political complicity by which the " chorus of closed mouths " has come to be organized . . . The documentation is immense (indeed, the Thai government has a special section of its intelligence service to deal with this material), and for some time the embassies collecting it have considered the evidence irrefutable. But the West is silent. Arrogantly challenging the obvious, the American national press continues to raise subtle questions, as if instead of a tragic reality one were talking about the Loch Ness monster; the press continues to say, " if it is true that 1,500 Hmong tribesmen have been killed by nerve gas," when it is sufficient to go there to discover that the number of dead is closer to 15,000, if not more . . . This silence permits the most shameful and the most aberrant complicities between the Vietnamese and the West. An impressive example: the doctors of the International Red Cross—in violation of all medical standards—refuse to help victims of gas attacks, " because to accept them in the hospitals would create a political problem." Protests are lively, but useless. The International Red Cross in Thailand is under United Nations control, and UN organizations favour with their silence the slaughter of Laotian and Cambodian anti-communists, guilty of having refused to accept their " liberation " by the Vietnamese . . . The assistance agencies that work alongside the UN carry out their own campaign of obfuscation, while the newspapers say that " evidence is insufficient."

Almost all the medical agencies, even the private ones, are under UN control, and they have adapted to these methods and deny help to gas victims. On 2 December 1982, the question was raised by a scientist, Dr Jibbhong of the Catholic Office for Emergency Relief to Refugees (COER), who pleaded that the doctors " respect professional ethics and put their personal or political interests aside." The appeal was not in the transcript. All the UN humanitarian agencies make efforts to prevent the truth from appearing in the press: there is no worse enemy of the journalist who tries to work in the area than the United Nations. Indeed, we owe some of the most brilliant operations of suppressing the truth to UN officials.

Lucio Lami in *Commentary*, October 1983

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Soviet Strategy Towards Northern Europe and Japan

Marian Leighton

MOSCOW'S targeting of SS-20 missiles on Japan and its warnings to Tokyo against rearming or engaging in defence cooperation with the United States constitute an Asian equivalent to the Soviet campaign of harassment and intimidation on NATO's northern flank. Not only do the patterns of Soviet coercion against northern Europe and Japan display striking and disquieting similarities, but the geopolitical and strategic characteristics of the two regions are also remarkably similar.

Norway, the key to the defence of NATO's northern flank, is one of the most strategic pieces of land in the world. Just 200 miles off the tip of north-eastern Norway lies the Kola Peninsula, site of the Soviet Union's most extensive complex of military bases and headquarters for its powerful Northern Fleet. In order to gain access to the Atlantic Ocean, this fleet must cross the narrow, ice-free stretches of water along Norway's northern coast. There it is subject to constant surveillance by Norwegian and other NATO monitoring facilities. Norway not only must provide its allies with warning of a Soviet naval breakout before the fleet reaches the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (G-I-UK) Gap, but it must guard the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Atlantic by which US reinforcements could reach Europe in wartime.

Norway's defence tasks have increased greatly with the steady growth of Soviet land-based air power on the Kola Peninsula and naval (particularly submarine) strength off the Norwegian coast. The Barents Sea, directly north of Norway, is a virtual Soviet lake, and control of the Norwegian Sea, to the west, would be strongly—and probably successfully—contested by the USSR in the initial stages of any East–West conflict in Europe. In recent years, the Northern Fleet's exercise area has been extended from the Barents into the Norwegian and even the North Sea. Moreover, the Barents Sea serves as a sanctuary for the Soviet Union's ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Although the Yankee-class submarines must move into the Atlantic in order to be in firing range of their US targets, the Delta-class boats, equipped with 4,200-nautical-mile-range missiles, can strike at the United States from " home waters " in the Barents.

Japan, like Norway, lies in an area where, until recently, Western seapower enjoyed supremacy. The country is also vitally dependent, as is Norway, upon trans-oceanic links with its US ally for reinforcements in case of war. Today, the Soviet Union is extending its defence perimeter in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. The Soviet Pacific Fleet, like its Northern counterpart, monitors, patrols and exercises in an ever-widening zone.

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Vladivostok, an ice-free port off the Sea of Japan, is the headquarters for the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Just as Northern Fleet warships moving from the Kola Peninsula to the open Atlantic must cross chokepoints under NATO surveillance, so Pacific Fleet vessels going from Vladivostok to the open Pacific must pass through straits controlling entry to and egress from the Sea of Japan.

The Sea of Okhotsk, directly north of Japan, is analogous to the Barents Sea in its status as a virtual Soviet lake and as a sanctuary, test firing-range, and staging area for Delta-class submarines which, like those off Norway, can strike targets in the United States from Soviet " home waters." The Kurile Islands constitute a natural barrier guarding the Soviet Far Eastern coast from penetration by hostile naval forces. The Kola Peninsula performs a similar function along NATO's northern flank.

FURTHER analogies between the regions north of Norway and around Japan relate to serious territorial disputes in both areas. The islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri (part of the Southern Kurile chain) and Shikotan and the Habomai group (the Lesser Kuriles), off the coast of Japan's northernmost home island of Hokkaido, were seized by Soviet troops at the end of the Second World War. Although on some past occasions Moscow offered to return at least some of these " Northern Territories " in the context of signing a peace treaty with Tokyo, it now calls the island question non-negotiable. As a sign of its determination to retain the territories permanently, the Soviet Union conducted a military build-up there, beginning in 1978.

Japanese forces assigned to defend Hokkaido would be greatly outnumbered in a contest with Soviet forces. The situation is similar to that of northern Norway, where two Soviet motorized rifle divisions, totalling some 27,000 men and outfitted with a sizeable complement of snow vehicles, face a mere 500 Norwegian border guards across the 150-mile-long frontier.

The status of the Svalbard (Spitsbergen) archipelago constitutes a bone of contention in Soviet-Norwegian relations in some respects not unlike that of Japan's " Northern Territories." An international treaty signed by some 40 countries, including the USSR, grants Norway sovereignty over Svalbard and mandates it permanent demilitarization. The Soviet Union, however, has sought relentlessly to undermine Norwegian sovereignty by engaging in illegal military activities on the archipelago.

Just as the Kola Peninsula looms across the Norwegian frontier, so Sakhalin Island lies beyond northern Hokkaido and Kunashiri. A heavily fortified region, Sakhalin contains, *inter alia,* at least two motorized rifle divisions, radar installations, and large airfields capable of handling Soviet Backfire bombers. (Hokkaido's vulnerability became manifest when a defecting Soviet pilot in a MiG-25 easily penetrated the island's airspace and reportedly circled undetected in search of a landing place.)

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DISPUTES over economic resources in the waters off Norway and Japan constitute still another parallel in the context of Soviet policy towards these regions. Soviet-Norwegian relations have been inflamed by quarrels over demarcation of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea and over fishing rights. The shelf is also believed to contain sizeable oil deposits. In 1978 Moscow and Oslo signed a temporary accord drawing the Barents Sea boundary line west of the median that Norway seeks ultimately to establish. The accord also grants the USSR a fishing monopoly in certain disputed waters. The Kremlin is attempting to use this temporary agreement to prejudice negotiations leading to a final resolution of the disputed issues.

The Sea of Okhotsk has long been the scene of Soviet-Japanese fishing disputes and may contain the potential for a struggle over oil resources. Thousands of Japanese fishing trawlers have been seized and fined for operating in waters off Sakhalin and the disputed "Northern Territories."

Last but certainly not least in terms of analogies, important restraints govern the conduct of both Norwegian and Japanese foreign policy. Far from acknowledging these restraints as signs of moderation, the Soviet attitude towards these countries combines contempt for their relative military weakness with threats of dire consequences should they abandon their restraints.

Norway joined NATO only on condition that no foreign troops or military bases would be allowed on Norwegian soil in peacetime, that no allied air or naval activity east of 24°E longitude would be permitted, and that no allied manoeuvres would be staged in the northernmost county of Finnmark. The Norwegian government later forbade the deployment of nuclear weapons in the country in peacetime. In addition, Oslo has given prior notice of major military exercises on Norwegian soil and has conducted them along relatively predictable lines, with an accent on defensive rather than offensive operations. More recently, in compliance with the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Norway has invited Warsaw Pact observers to these exercises. Oslo has announced forthcoming military manoeuvres even if they do not reach the 25,000-man threshold dictated by the Helsinki accords. With regard to the strategically sensitive Barents Sea, Norway has restricted offshore oil drilling operations north of latitude 62°N to its own state-controlled oil companies.

In an interview with the conservative daily *Aftenposten*, 2 Jan. 1978, then Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Frydenlund, reiterated that:

> We belong to NATO, but during the formulation of our defence policy we have taken as much account of the Soviet Union as can be reasonably expected of a country's government. Our base policy, nuclear policy, and severe restrictions on military manoeuvres all constitute what in Helsinki terminology we call confidence-inspiring measures. And they are unilateral Norwegian measures.

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Denmark, like Norway, forbids nuclear weapons or allied troops to be stationed on its territory in peacetime. There have been rumblings of dissatisfaction with this policy of restraint, however, because of growing Soviet military activity off the Danish coasts and on the edges of Danish airspace. If modifications in these policies of restraint are contemplated, they will result not, as Moscow contends, from " imperialist " warmongering or " outside [i.e., NATO] pressure " on Oslo or Copenhagen, but rather from the alarming Soviet military activity along NATO's northern flank.

The restraints on Japanese military policy were not self-imposed like those of Norway and Denmark, but were incorporated into the post-war Japanese Constitution that was drafted under American supervision during the Occupation period. Article 9 of the Constitution stipulates that " the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right " and that " land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." In 1954 the Japanese government created the Self-Defence Forces (now roughly 260,000 strong) but forbade them from acquiring " offensive " weapons or operating abroad. The government also decreed that defence spending should not exceed one per cent of the gross national product. The US-Japan Security Treaty, signed in 1960, obligates the United States to come to Japan's defence in case of attack but does not impose a mutual obligation on Japan. In 1968 Tokyo adopted a self-restraining policy in the form of the " three non-nuclear principles—no manufacture, possession, or ' introduction ' of atomic weapons " into Japan.

The Soviet Union's top priority vis-à-vis Europe and Japan is to preclude their coalescence into an alliance (in fact if not in name) that would work hand in glove with the United States (and perhaps with China) to thwart the Kremlin's global ambitions. While the USSR appears obsessed with fears of a war on two fronts, however, its own military preparations reflect a strategy to fight on two fronts. Having engaged during the past two decades in a massive military build-up aimed largely at Europe, the Soviets have embarked on an unprecedented build-up of their forces in North-East Asia. Unlike the half-million or so Soviet troops stationed along the Sino-Soviet frontier—troops equipped to wage a land war with China—the new deployments in the Soviet Far East suggest acquisition of a capability to take on US forces in the Pacific, neutralizing Japan in the process.

Although the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of either northern Norway or northern Japan in the absence of a generalized war appears remote, the towering presence of Soviet military power so close to these countries creates psychological pressures and doubts as to whether US support would be forthcoming in the event of such attacks. Moreover, Moscow, which believes firmly in the utility of military power as an instrument of political leverage, has sought to manipulate its regional military prowess to dictate to the northern flank countries and, increasingly, to Japan on political issues. The Soviets want to bring about a reflexive accommoda-

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tion by countries in both regions to Moscow's foreign policies and thus to establish predominant Soviet influence without having to resort to war. As William F. Buckley, Jr. wrote of this Soviet objective in another context, " Some dare call it Finlandization."

NATO's Northern European Command (AFNORTH) has its headquarters at Kolsaas, near Oslo, and covers Norway as well as the Baltic area—including Denmark, the West German state of Schleswig-Holstein, and the Baltic approaches. Under AFNORTH is the Joint Baltic Command (COMBALTAP), which consists of Danish and West German forces. This article will concentrate on Norway as the key to the defence of the northern flank.

Norway may be viewed as an umbilical cord linking West Germany—the European heart of NATO—with the United States. As the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* has pointed out, " The 'front in Central Europe,' where four American divisions stand, can be held only if the northern flank can be covered. The [US] Seventh Army can pose a creditable deterrence outside the Iron Curtain only if a security cordon stretches from the Baltic Sea outlets to Spitsbergen." Loss of the northern flank would prevent the reinforcement of West German forces either via Scandinavia or through the Baltic and would render virtually impossible the US ability to resupply its European allies by sea. A substantial proportion of US airborne reinforcements also would be unable to reach the Central Front.

Norway, as mentioned above, lies in the shadow of the Kola Peninsula. The 400-mile stretch of the Barents Sea from the North Cape (situated on an island off the northernmost Norwegian province of Finnmark) to the Svalbard Archipelago constitutes a major chokepoint for Soviet naval forces leaving the Kola area for the open ocean.

Norway lies along both the Soviet Northern Fleet's access route to the Atlantic and along the Warsaw Pact's maritime route to the Baltic via the North Sea. The Arctic Ocean between northern Norway and Svalbard is warmed by the Gulf Stream and offers the Soviet fleet year-round access to European waters. As the experience of the Second World War indicates, however, hostile forces in northern Norway can harass Soviet naval operations out of Kola, while enemy concentrations in southern Norway can hinder Warsaw Pact movements through the Baltic exits.

Denmark's strategic importance to the northern flank lies both in its role as a bridge between Norway and the NATO countries on the Central Front (especially Germany) and as the guardian of the Belts and Sounds (notably the Oresund Strait between Denmark and Sweden, the Kattegat and the Skaggerak) leading from the Baltic to the North Sea and the Atlantic. The latter role also bolsters the defence of southern Norway, thus allowing Norwegian defence forces to concentrate on northern Norway.

As I have written elsewhere,[1] it is useful to speak of two military

[1] Marian K. Leighton, *The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank* (National Strategy Information Center, New York, 1978,) pp. 2-3.

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theatres impinging on Norway: the " northern theatre," where Soviet naval forces based on the Kola Peninsula would try in wartime to disrupt the reinforcement of Norway by its NATO allies and to neutralize air and naval bases and electronic surveillance systems, and the " southern theatre," where the Soviet Union's Baltic Fleet and armies based in the Leningrad Military District could attempt to block the Baltic approaches and hamper the movements of West German troops assigned to aid Norway.

Norway is the only NATO country besides Turkey that has a common border with the USSR. The 150-mile border results from a Soviet-Finnish treaty of 1947, by which Finland ceded territory lost in wartime as well as additional land along what is now the Norwegian-Soviet frontier.[2] At the time the common frontier was created, Norway's security was not seriously at stake because US and British maritime supremacy in the waters around northern Europe was unchallenged. The enormous growth of the Soviet Northern Fleet and its transformation from a coastal defence force into a blue-water fleet (along with the rest of Moscow's navy) has irrevocably altered the security environment along NATO's entire northern flank. In the view of many observers, the preponderance of Soviet military power on the Kola Peninsula and the surrounding seas has placed Norway and her Scandinavian neighbours effectively behind the Soviet front lines.

An emerging factor of great significance for the strategic environment in northern Europe is Moscow's interest in exploring the feasibility of military operations against North America under the polar ice-cap. In order to carry out submarine probes in this area, the Soviet Union will guard jealously its strategic prerogatives in the north European seas. These seas lie along the shortest direct route between the USSR and USA.

Japan, like Norway, lies in an area where, until recently, Western seapower enjoyed supremacy. The country also is vitally dependent, as is Norway, upon trans-oceanic links with its US ally for reinforcements in case of war (as well as for peacetime supplies of food from the West and oil from the Middle East).

The Sea of Japan was a virtual preserve of the US navy for more than 25 years, and General Douglas MacArthur's famous landing at Inchon—a turning point in the Korean war—probably would have been impossible were it not for control of this sea and of various islands off the North Korean coast. Today, Soviet naval combatants use the Sea of Japan for sea trials. By contrast, the United States has denuded its naval forces in the Pacific by transferring ships to the Indian Ocean in the aftermath of the crisis in Iran and Afghanistan.

[2] A recent article in the Soviet military newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star) took note of Soviet offensive operations in 1944 against the Nazis in the Norwegian-Finnish border area. As a result of these operations, " the enemy was driven out of the Soviet polar regions. Fulfilling their international duty, Soviet servicemen liberated northern Norway from the German fascist invaders." *Krasnaya zvezda*, 11 March 1983.

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Soviet naval vessels crossing from the Pacific Fleet headquarters at Vladivostok to the open ocean, face geographical obstacles similar to those confronting warships en route from the Kola Peninsula to the open Atlantic. In both instances, these consist of chokepoints subject to surveillance by unfriendly powers. En route from Vladivostok to the open Pacific are three sets of straits around the edges of the Sea of Japan. The Soya (or La Perouse) Strait runs between Sakhalin (part of the USSR) and the northernmost Japanese island of Hokkaido and separates the Sea of Japan from the Sea of Okhotsk. The Tsugaru Strait lies between Hokkaido and the main Japanese island of Honshu. The Tsushima Strait (together with the Korea Strait) runs between Japan and South Korea and separates the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea. The strategic importance of all these waterways for the USSR is so great that Japan's recent announcement that it would mine or otherwise blockade them in a crisis situation set off an international war of words between Moscow and Tokyo.

General Edward C. Meyer, the US Army Chief of Staff, has likened Japan to a cork in a bottle that holds back a massive surge of Soviet warships from Vladivostok to the Pacific (and Indian) Ocean. Iceland plays an analogous role on NATO's northern flank by " corking " a potential flood of Soviet submarines from their Kola bases into the open Atlantic. When Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone declared his intention of turning his country into an " unsinkable aircraft carrier," he was using another phrase long applied to Iceland.

The extensive presence of Soviet submarines, particularly of the nuclear variety, in the waters off northern Europe and Japan raises serious questions about the feasibility of sending US aircraft carriers to do battle along the periphery of the USSR. The carriers and their escorts would be subject to withering fire from the Soviet submarines as well as from Soviet land-based airpower.

While much attention in recent strategic discussions has focused on Vladivostok, the importance of Petropavlovsk, a key submarine base for the Soviet Pacific Fleet, has received less notice. Petropavlovsk lies on the Kamchatka Peninsula, just north of the Kurile Islands. Like the Northern Fleet bases on the Kola Peninsula, Petropavlovsk offers access to the open ocean through waters that are navigable all year round with the help of icebreakers. Submarines from Petropavlovsk and from adjacent Talinskaya Bay can deploy into the open Pacific without crossing the straits around the Sea of Japan, but they would be under surveillance by US installations on the Aleutian Islands and Alaska.

The Soviet Union is pressing for the permanent stationing of submarines and surface warships at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, from where they could also reach the Pacific without passing through narrow chokepoints.[3] As the USSR increases its access to naval and air bases in

[3] The Soviet navy's access to the US-built base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam is particularly unsettling from Japan's standpoint. Cam Ranh Bay was the staging area for the Japanese fleet that decimated the Russian Baltic fleet in the Tsushima Strait in 1905, in the major naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War.

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Indochina and steps up its reconnaissance flights along the Chinese coast, it will be able to forge a ring around Japan as solid as that around Norway.

Petropavlovsk is also a major port and naval base on the northern sea route. The military as well as economic potential of this route has been greatly enhanced in recent years with the USSR's use of atomic-powered icebreakers to keep the passage open. The Kremlin is anchoring both ends of the northern sea route with military strongholds. This process is virtually complete at the European end and is based on the Kola Peninsula.

EVEN when one allows for Russia's alleged paranoia where defence is concerned, the build-up on the Kola Peninsula far exceeds the requirements for a strictly defensive role (" unless one accepts ' defence in depth ' in terms of a secured and enlarged geographic zone and the domination of contiguous waters ").[4] The naval and air components of the build-up in particular reflect the Soviet posture of forward deployment. Also of great significance are the accelerating emplacement of infrastructure that is applicable for both military and economic purposes and the drive to promote colonization, industrialization, transportation and communications links and the overall economic modernization of the Kola region. This activity, in turn, should be viewed in combination with the ambitious new " virgin lands " programme, an attempt to raise agricultural yields by 50 per cent as well as to consolidate small towns into larger cities and to speed industrialization in the vast " non-black-earth zone " stretching from the Arctic frontier southwards beyond Moscow and from the Baltic states westwards to the Urals. The total picture is one of building a secure rear base for defence in depth as well as for possible thrusts beyond the northern and Baltic boundaries.

The Soviets have enlisted Finland's assistance (as a partner in joint industrial projects and a source of manpower and financial largesse for the building of militarily-applicable infrastructure) in developing the north-western corner of the USSR, including the Soviet-Finnish border region.

Since the beginning of the Second World War, the population of the Kola Peninsula and Murmansk Oblast has more than tripled—from about 300,000 to one million—and the growth continues. Murmansk, the world's largest city north of the Arctic Circle, is the terminus of a railway line from Leningrad and of the North-East Passage across the Arctic. In addition to the warships that use Murmansk as a point of egress, the numerous fishing trawlers, merchant vessels, and other civilian ships operating out of Murmansk and nearby Arkhangelsk, could be used as troop carriers to help launch a surprise attack on NATO's northern flank.

Are Soviet naval strategists contemplating a Tsushima-in-reverse during a future conflict? Cam Ranh Bay has still another historical connotation. It was the Japanese move into Cam Ranh that led the United States to impose oil sanctions against Japan—a catalyst for the Second World War in the Pacific.

[4] See John Erickson, " the Northern Theater: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts," in *Strategic Review*, Summer 1976, p. 6.

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Murmansk Oblast was enlarged at the end of the Second World War with incorporation of the city of Pechenga (the former Finnish Petsamo). An ice-free port on the Barents Sea, it serves as a principal home port for Northern Fleet warships, a base for a Soviet naval infantry brigade, and an exercise area for Soviet amphibious units. It is also the northern terminus of an Arctic highway.

Shipbuilding and repair—largely military-related—is a major economic activity in and around the Kola Peninsula. It has been said, for example, that the submarine yards at Severodvinsk alone have an annual output equal to that of all US submarine-building facilities combined.

The military build-up on the Kola Peninsula apparently results from the discovery during the Second World War of serious vulnerabilities in that sector. The " Great Patriotic War " also indicated the great need for coordination between the Soviet Union's northern and Baltic-based military forces. Weakness in this sphere nearly cost Russia the war and has now been corrected. For instance, recent enlargement of the Baltic-White Sea Canal has dramatically improved Soviet ability to coordinate the activities of the Northern and Baltic fleets, as well as to facilitate transit between the Kola bases and the naval maintenance and repair facilities in the Leningrad area, without sailing either around Norway or through the Baltic straits under the eye of Danish coastal surveillance.

These and other improvements in coordination among Soviet forces have resulted in the emergence of a north-western theatre of operations (TVD)[5] as a strategic entity in its own right. Having incorporated the means of linking its Baltic, North and Norwegian Sea, and Atlantic Ocean components, this operational theatre presages an unprecedented danger for NATO's northern flank.

THE Soviet Union's Far Eastern complement to the strategic bastion around the Kola Peninsula and the White Sea is developing north of Japan on the Sea of Okhotsk and the Kamchatka Peninsula. The Sea of Okhotsk, which is virtually encircled by Soviet territory, makes a natural strategic sanctuary and protective barrier for the USSR's Asian landmass. Blanketed with an air defence network consisting of radars, missiles, guns and interceptor aircraft, the areas surrounding the sea would be all but impossible for hostile planes to breach. Enemy submarines would be deterred by the fact that the Sea of Okhotsk is covered by ice for about five months of the year. Submarines would have to surface in order to fire their missiles. The Soviets, for their part, presumably use the frozen sea to practise the under-ice operations that they seem to view as increasingly important.

The Soviet ring around the Sea of Okhotsk has been closed with the fortification of the Southern Kurile Islands, which control passage from the Pacific to the Sea of Okhotsk (across which supplies from Siberia to

[5] In Soviet parlance, a TVD (*teatr voennykh deistvii*) is a sub-section of a theatre of war (*teatr voiny*). Thus, for example, the north-western TVD is a component of the European theatre.

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Kamchatka are transported) and which are claimed by Japan. As noted, the quarrel between Moscow and Tokyo over these islands is somewhat similar to the dispute between the USSR and Norway over the Svalbard Archipelago.

The Kurile Island chain, extending from the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula to a point directly north-east of Hokkaido, serves the Soviet Union both as a defensive barrier against hostile intrusions into the Sea of Okhotsk and as an offensive arm pointed at Japan. Hugging the eastern littoral of the Sea of Okhotsk is Kamchatka, which the USSR is ringing with naval bases (notably the submarine base at Petropavlovsk) and naval air installations. The eastern shores of Kamchatka are washed by the Bering Sea, site of the recent sinking of a Soviet nuclear submarine—one of many evidently engaged in training operations in the world's northern seas.

There are two naval bases on Sakhalin, at Korsakov and Aleksandrovsk, and a third may be established at the port of Kholmsk. An important submarine base is located in the central Kuriles on Simushir Island. Submarines are built in the shipyards at Komsomolsk, on the Amur River in south-eastern Siberia. From there they sail to Nikolaevsk and into the Tatar Strait, which affords entry into the Sea of Okhotsk. Other shipbuilding and repair facilities dot the Siberian and Far Eastern regions, notably in the vicinity of Vladivostok.

Soviet emplacement of a military-industrial complex in the north-western USSR has its parallel in the Far East, notably around Sakhalin and Kamchatka, but also in the area around Vladivostok, where the new port of Vostochny at Nakhodka, on the Sea of Japan, is potentially important for military as well as commercial activity. With some two-thirds of its national territory in Asia, the USSR is determined to make its mark as a Pacific power, both in an economic and a strategic sense. Moscow is trying to enlist the help of Japan in tapping energy and mineral resources and setting up joint industrial ventures in Siberia and the Far East, just as it has sought the assistance of Finland in the north-west. A pipeline running from Sakhalin (where joint Soviet-Japanese exploration for oil and natural gas has been underway) through the 40-mile-wide Soya Strait to Hokkaido is one of the most promising projects from Moscow's standpoint.

Construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railway, Russian colonization of the Eastern regions, and the overall industrialization and modernization of the area along the Sea of Okhotsk, spanning Siberia, Sakhalin, Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands, are designed to create a vast secure rear base like that in the north-western USSR and a defence in depth against China and the West in Asia.

In 1978, in the wake of an important journey to the Soviet Far East by Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Defence Minister Dmitri Ustinov, a theatre high command was established to coordinate the activities of the Far Eastern, Trans-Baikal and Siberian Military Districts, as well as Soviet units stationed in Mongolia. By all

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indications, the missions of these districts in wartime would be aimed not only against China but against Japan and the Pacific theatre as well. Coordination of wartime missions by a regional authority in this vast area is reminiscent of Soviet planning for joint Northern Fleet-Baltic operations in northern Europe under the aegis of the north-western theatre of operations.

IN line with the role of Europe as Moscow's prime foreign policy target, the forces designed for deployment in the European theatre traditionally received the greatest attention from Soviet military planners. The strategic importance of the complex of bases on the Kola Peninsula for the defence of the USSR necessitated the transformation of this area into a redoubt that inevitably overshadowed the small and relatively weak countries of northern Europe.

Just as the occupation of Norway and Denmark by Nazi Germany in the Second World War was the prerequisite for the subsequent attack on the USSR—notably Leningrad—so now the " Finlandization " or control of Norway by the Soviet Union would be a prelude to applying decisive pressure on West Germany, NATO's heartland.

The north-western TVD, based on the Leningrad Military District and covering the bulk of Scandinavia, has an increasingly coherent structure adapted for offensive land, sea and air operations against NATO's northern flank. Roads and railways have been constructed to enable troops to move northwards rapidly from the Leningrad region to Murmansk Oblast. Domestic waterways similarly facilitate the movement of warships from the Leningrad and Baltic areas to the Kola Peninsula.

Soviet airpower based on Kola has been greatly augmented with the deployment of the MiG-23 Flogger, the SU-19 Fencer and, most recently, the Backfire supersonic bomber which is capable of deep penetration strikes with nuclear weapons. The 40-odd airfields on the Kola Peninsula hold more than 300 fighters and long-range bombers in all, as well as some 20 medium-range transport planes and more than 50 maritime reconnaissance aircraft. Several hundred naval aircraft, including Backfires, operate with the Northern Fleet. Units of the Soviet Naval Air Force designed for anti-ship and anti-submarine missions operate continuously over the Barents and Norwegian Seas and the North Atlantic. Soviet MI-24 " Hind " helicopter gunships, which have proved their worth against the insurgents in the mountains of Afghanistan, now are deployed on the Kola Peninsula and may well be earmarked for missions in the mountainous terrain near the Soviet-Norwegian frontier.

With regard to the Northern Fleet, Soviet military expenditures during the past decade have focused heavily on the strategic submarine force, of which some two-thirds are with that fleet. The Northern Fleet is now believed to include about 70 nuclear-powered submarines. The Delta-class subs (each armed with 16 SS-N-8 missiles) have a 4,200-nautical-mile range, while the Yankee-class subs (outfitted with SS-N-6 missiles) have a range of 1,500 nm. Both classes of submarine use the Barents Sea

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as their principal area of peacetime deployment, exercise and patrol. In wartime, the Yankees would have to move into the western half of the Atlantic in order to reach targets in the United States, but the Deltas could remain in the Barents as a reserve force for second-strike operations. Thus, the Soviets will insist on maintaining this sea as a strategic redoubt and will not tolerate intrusions there by NATO naval forces.

" The growth in Soviet submarine deployments [along NATO's northern flank] is awesome," declared Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott, commander of the US airbase at Keflavik, Iceland. He cited a 300 per cent increase in the number of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines alone that sailed past the Icelandic coasts during the past decade.[6]

Aside from its submarine components (which include more than 130 non-nuclear attack subs), the Northern Fleet has been strengthened in recent years with such major additions as the USSR's first aircraft carrier, the *Kiev* (equipped with up to 20 KA-25 " Hormone " anti-submarine helicopters and 12 Yak-36 vertical take-off planes) and the first Rogov-class amphibious landing ships—the largest of their kind in the Soviet navy. The Rogovs can accommodate both helicopters and hovercraft. Moreover, many of the Northern Fleet's surface combatants have undergone such modernization measures as the replacement of their gun units with missile batteries. The fleet has about 70 major surface warships.

INCREASED Soviet military activity in the northern theatre has its counterpart in the Baltic arena, where the USSR, assisted by its Warsaw Pact allies, has all but transformed this maritime gateway to Russia into a communist lake. The Baltic Fleet in times past was the USSR's chief naval arm, but it suffers even more than its Northern counterpart from geographical constraints. While the Northern Fleet must break out of the Murmansk area through a series of " gaps " to reach the open ocean, the Baltic Fleet is subject to a bottling up by Western naval forces that could mine or otherwise block the Baltic exits in the event of an East-West crisis. Preventing the entry of NATO naval forces into the Baltic and keeping open the Baltic entrances for Warsaw Pact reinforcements are important wartime missions of the Northern Fleet in the Baltic theatre.

As a result of the recent build-up (involving especially the growing quantity and quality of amphibious and assault landing ships),[7] the Baltic Fleet's strength far exceeds what local requirements would warrant, even if the Swedish navy were added to NATO forces in the Baltic. Evidence from Soviet naval exercises indicates, however, that the Baltic Fleet's operational commitments may now extend to the North Sea and parts of the Atlantic. The North Sea links the two vital areas of Allied naval

[6] The *Washington Post*, 11 July 1983.
[7] For details, see Leighton, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

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operations on the northern flank and serves as the conduit for bringing British reinforcements to the Continent. North Sea ports are also major terminals for US troops and supplies destined for the northern flank.

A joint Soviet, East German and Polish amphibious force permanently stationed in the Baltic could attack Denmark with an extremely high likelihood of success. " This is not to say that the Warsaw Pact powers necessarily intend to do so," a British observer noted several years ago, " but it is a capability which they have chosen to acquire and which they did not possess before."[8] A 2,000-man naval infantry regiment is attached to the Soviet Baltic Fleet.

Addressing himself to the Soviet naval build-up, Norwegian Prime Minister Kaare Willoch has pointed out that:

> It is of particular importance for the northern areas that the Soviet Fleet is a major factor in the Soviet Union's strategy. . . . We do not think that this build-up is aimed at the Nordic area, but . . . it would be naïve to ignore the fact that these military forces are there and that, objectively speaking, it would be advantageous for Soviet strategy to have control over Norwegian territory.[9]

The Soviet ground force build-up on the Kola Peninsula has been less spectacular than that of the naval and air strike forces; but that is cold comfort for Norway, which has a mere 500 border guards at Kirkenes facing two Soviet motorized rifle divisions (totalling some 27,000 men) deployed between the Norwegian frontier and the Murmansk railway. These units reportedly are equipped with an abnormally large complement of snow vehicles and are maintained in an extremely high state of readiness. They are supported by Scud surface-to-surface missiles, by SAM-4 anti-aircraft missiles, and by an army artillery regiment. There are at least five Soviet divisions deployed on the Kola Peninsula, in addition to the two divisions along the border. The total number of troops in place would thus be at least 70,000. Other contingents that can be brought to bear on Kola include at least three airborne divisions, a naval infantry brigade (based at Pechenga) of 3,000–4,000 men, and so-called naval pioneers, consisting largely of demolition experts and frogmen. Moreover, the ground and air forces in the region can be speedily reinforced with the addition of six more motorized rifle divisions and an airborne division from the Leningrad Military District. Still other sizeable reinforcements could reach the Kola Peninsula within two weeks from the Moscow Military District.

The Soviets clearly are capable of launching a *blitzkrieg* against Norway not only from the Kola Peninsula, but also across Finland and northern Sweden. The Norwegians almost certainly would have to yield Finnmark and fall back upon the province of Troms, immediately to the south, while awaiting NATO reinforcements to regain the lost territory. However, if the Soviets succeeded in seizing Norwegian coastal bases

[8] The *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 27 March 1977.
[9] Quoted in *Hufvudstadsbladet* (Helsinki), 1 March 1983.

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before the reinforcements arrived, Backfires could be flown from there to attack incoming NATO convoys.

A new challenge to the northern flank arose in 1976 with the stationing in the Baltic Sea of six Soviet Golf-class submarines, each carrying three SS-N-5 missiles with a 750-mile range. Since Soviet submarines in the Barents Sea can deliver nuclear strikes against northern European targets, the Baltic-based subs probably are intended chiefly for purposes of intimidation—although they also bolster the Warsaw Pact's theatre nuclear strike force. When the submarines (which are diesel-powered) first appeared in the Baltic, littoral countries assumed that they were on temporary manoeuvres or were en route to nearby repair facilities. When it became clear that they were permanent launching platforms for atomic warheads, both NATO and Swedish officials protested to the Kremlin. The Swedish cited Soviet hypocrisy in deploying such weapons in an area that Moscow advocates as a " sea of peace and cooperation."

The deployment of Soviet mobile, land-based SS-20 nuclear missiles, beginning in 1977, represents perhaps the greatest threat to date to NATO's northern flank (and to all of Western Europe and Japan). The Kremlin has given short shrift to NATO's concerns. When US arms control negotiator Paul Nitze complained to his Soviet counterpart, Yulii Kvitsinsky, that the 3,000-mile-range SS-20s could strike as far north as northern Norway, Kvitsinsky first denied the charge and then declared contemptuously, " So why should you worry if we kill a few reindeer? "[10]

A development worth watching with respect to NATO's northern flank is the construction in Rostock, East Germany, of a site for Soviet SA-5 " Gammon " anti-aircraft missiles. According to a recent article in the *Wall Street Journal,* the SA-5 can be armed with a nuclear warhead. If these missiles, which already form part of the USSR's air defence network, are placed in Eastern Europe, the consequences for NATO's northern flank would be grim. Western military strategists believe that SA-5s in East Germany could be used to " fight Western reconnaissance planes of the AWACS E 3-A type, to achieve air superiority in the western Baltic in case the straits to the North Sea should be opened in a war, and to threaten ground targets in north Germany with nuclear weapons."[11]

MOSCOW'S military build-up vis-à-vis northern Europe has its counterpart in North-East Asia, where Japan is both literally and figuratively as much under the gun as are Norway and her Scandinavian neighbours. Forward deployment is the chief characteristic of Soviet military configurations in both regions. As former US Defence Secretary Harold Brown noted during a 1979 visit to Tokyo, the Russians are " pushing at the edge in northeast Asia . . . as elsewhere."[12]

In line with its strategy of achieving readiness not only for a land war

[10] John Barry, " Geneva Behind Closed Doors," *The Times* (London), 31 May 1983.
[11] *Die Welt* (Bonn), 19–20 February 1983.
[12] The *New York Times*, 21 October 1979.

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with China, but also for a Pacific conflict, the USSR has dramatically expanded and upgraded its Pacific Fleet. Moscow's policy of according preferential treatment to the Northern Fleet in terms of delivery schedules and provision of top-class equipment has been modified. Partly because the Northern Fleet already possesses the newest Soviet naval systems, and partly because Moscow is concerned about the possible emergence of a US-Japanese-Chinese coalition in Asia, modernization of the Pacific Fleet has assumed a high priority. The fleet contains roughly 600 combat ships. These include about 135 submarines (a sixfold increase in one decade), of which some 65 are nuclear-powered. According to Western military sources in Japan, the fleet is receiving one or two new SSBNs every year.[13]

More than 70 major surface combatants, well over 350 planes and helicopters, 150 amphibious units and a 6,000-man naval infantry (Marine) force, belong to the Pacific Fleet. In the past few years the aircraft carrier *Minsk* (designed for anti-submarine warfare), Rogov-class amphibious assault ships, two missile-carrying cruisers and three modern destroyers, have been added to the Pacific Fleet.[14] The *Minsk* (together with a sister ship expected to join the fleet on a permanent basis) presumably will be assigned to protect the SSBNs in the seas around Japan during a war and has carried out flag-showing missions in South-East Asia.

The number of ship-days at sea for the Pacific Fleet rose from 7,000 in 1975 to 11,500 in 1980, and apparently continues to increase. A permanent naval command to coordinate ship movements has been set up in the central Kurile Islands, with direct communication links to Petropavlovsk. Access to naval and air bases in Vietnam has extended the fleet's range into South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean and has poised the Soviet navy to interdict the sea lanes running from the oil-rich Persian Gulf to Japan in an international crisis.

Dwelling at length on the Pacific Fleet's capabilities, the 1981 volume of the *Far Eastern Economic Review's Asia Yearbook* noted that:

> Even if the *Minsk* group and its accompanying submarines may have problems in detecting and destroying US nuclear-powered submarines because of their quietness and high performance, it can demonstrate Soviet military power to the countries around the Western Pacific, the South China Seas and the Indian Ocean in peacetime. Ivan Rogov is an amphibious assault ship capable of carrying at a minimum either some 800 troops or 40 tanks and landing them through its bow ramp or stern dock as well as by hovercraft or helicopter—new capabilities not found in the conventional Soviet amphibious vessels like the Ropucha and Alligator classes. Ivan Rogov, given air cover and anti-submarine protection, would be a useful means of intervening in local conflicts around the

[13] Drew Middleton, the *New York Times*, 4 July 1980.

[14] See *Asia Yearbook (Far Eastern Economic Review)*, 1983, p. 23; *US News & World Report*, 8 December 1980, p. 35; and the *Baltimore Sun*, 26 November 1981, p. 13. Also, Osamu Kaihara, "Japan's 'Sea-Lanes' Mission is Wishful Thinking," in the *Wall Street Journal*, 29 August 1983, p. 13.

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Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, carrying out commando operations or simply backing up friendly countries.

Tokyo has watched the increase in Pacific Fleet strength with considerable anxiety. " The [Japanese defence] strategists . . . once thought only in terms of an attack from the Soviet Union on . . . Hokkaido. Now the growing weight of Soviet seapower exposes other home islands to danger."[15] Counterpoised to the massive Soviet Pacific Fleet is the small Japanese navy (limited in size by Japan's Constitution, which forbids the establishment of " offensive " forces, and by the country's reliance on US naval power for protection). The Japanese navy's largest ship is a 4,000-ton helicopter carrier. There are no known plans to build US-style aircraft carriers.

Moscow's build-up of naval strength in the Far East has been matched by an impressive growth of airpower. The total number of warplanes in the Soviet Far East exceeds 2,200. Nuclear-capable MiG-23s, with a range enabling them to hit targets anywhere in Japan, have replaced older models of the MiG in the Soviet Far East and on Etorofu Island north of Japan. Fincers (fighter-interceptors), Bears (in both reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare models) and other modern aircraft, have also entered the Pacific-oriented inventory.

BY far the most significant addition to Soviet airpower in the Pacific region, however, has been the supersonic Backfire bomber. From its bases on Kamchatka and Sakhalin, the Backfire can hit Japan with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and return to base without refuelling. Backfires have also been assigned to Soviet naval aviation, with a mission to interdict vital sea lanes in the event of war. It would be impossible for ships carrying reinforcements from the United States either to Japan or to NATOs northern flank without entering the path of Backfires based on Kamchatka or Kola, respectively. In addition, the great-circle aerial routes around the North Pole are within range of the Backfires.

Since 1978, the USSR has deployed SS-20 missiles east of the Urals. There are about 110 of these missiles there now, and all are within reach of Japan. The Soviets contend that if Moscow and Washington sign an accord limiting SS-30s in Europe, missiles above the agreed limit could be transferred to Soviet Asia. A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman called such a prospective transfer " totally unacceptable, out of the question."[16] But Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa told his hosts during a visit to Japan that Moscow would deploy intermediate-range missiles wherever it saw fit, without taking Japanese opinion into consideration.[17]

Moscow's military build-up in North-East Asia has not neglected the ground forces. In mid-1981 the Japanese Defence Agency told the Diet (parliament) that 51 Soviet army divisions were stationed in the Soviet

[15] *Business Week*, 23 June 1980, p. 58.
[16] The *New York Times*, 8 May 1983.
[17] *Asiaweek*, 29 April 1983, p. 17.

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Far East—an increase of five from the previous year. According to the JDA official, 20 of these divisions were deployed in areas other than the Sino-Soviet frontier (15 divisions in the Maritime Provinces and the rest on Sakhalin and Kamchatka), and thus seemed earmarked for use in the Pacific theatre.[18] These forces have been upgraded both quantitatively and qualitatively. They no longer lag behind their comrades deployed against the European theatre in terms of receiving the latest generation of weaponry.

Soviet commentaries contend that Japan's defeat in the Second World War did not result from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but rather from the decimation of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria at the hands of the Soviet troops. Soviet military writers also glorify the victory against Japanese forces in the Battle of Khalkin Gol along the Manchurian border in 1938. Moscow's recounting of these battles evidently is intended to remind Japanese " neo-imperialist " of the " lessons of history." Applied to the present period, the " lessons " are that Soviet military prowess should be respected and that Japan should avoid antagonizing the USSR.

THE USSR has resorted increasingly to shows of force aimed at intimidating its adversaries and at gaining political leverage over them by demonstrating the hopelessness of trying to resist Soviet military power.

Underlying tensions in Norway's Arctic theatre have been brought to the forefront by increasingly provocative Soviet behaviour along the coasts. During the summer of 1978, for example, a number of Soviet merchant ships stopped illegally inside Norway's four-mile territorial waters, citing excuses such as engine trouble, injury to crew members or dangerous weather conditions, which turned out to be phoney.[19] The incidents occurred chiefly in the Barents Sea off the Nordkyn and Varanger peninsulae in north-east Norway. Gambik, on the Nordkyn Peninsula, is the terminus of a cable that links seabed sonar installations between Norway and Svalbard and is specifically used to monitor Soviet submarine activity. Thus, the ships were studying the cable or, perhaps, dropping sonar devices of their own.[20] At any rate, the insolent attitude of the ships' captains and the fact that the vessels tarried during the season of the midnight sun, when detection was unavoidable, prompted a high Norwegian official to comment: " We have reluctantly come to the conclusion that we are confronted with a pattern of deliberate activity. My own belief is that the Russians are engaged in a general probing of Norwegian attitudes and response capabilities." Rolf Hansen, then

[18] See *News-World* (New York), 26 August 1981. US troops in Japan were pared from 65,000 to 45,000 in the period 1972–81.

[19] International law permits ships to sail through these waters but not to stop.

[20] One vessel, the Soviet cargo ship *Grumant*, was seen by a NATO reconnaissance plane hauling wires or lines out of the water while anchored inside the Norwegian territorial sea off Nordkyn. The plane arrived too late to see whether the lines had been thrown overboard by the crew or were being hauled in from the sea.

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Defence Minister, termed the Soviet actions an example of " gunboat diplomacy."[21]

Soviet military exercises in recent years have included amphibious attacks along the Pechenga Peninsula coast that duplicated the pattern of the Nazi assaults against Norway during the Second World War. Norwegian defence officials state that Soviet Backfire bombers have been probing farther south along Norway's coast than in the past.[22] There also have been firings of unarmed Soviet ballistic missiles in the disputed waters of the Barents Sea. These firings, a blatant form of intimidation, occurred after Norway had conducted seismic probes for oil in the contested area. *Aftenposten* called the Soviet actions " a curious kind of negotiating tactic " and added that " good neighbours should have no need to demonstrate their military power to enter into a dialogue on such a complex problem."[23]

In November 1982 a Soviet icebreaker was discovered trespassing in a military area near the island of Fugloy, north of Tromso. Norwegian police had to board the vessel and warn twice that they would torpedo it. When it finally departed, Oslo filed a formal protest with Moscow. In April 1983 a Soviet " research " vessel entered Oslo's harbour without a permit and had to be escorted out. In May a Soviet ship began drilling for oil in the Barents Sea west of the median line that Norway regards as the demarcation between the Soviet and Norwegian sections of the continental shelf. Another serious incident occurred in the Barents Sea in August, when a Norwegian fishing trawler was rammed by a Soviet coast guard vessel and boarded by six Russians. According to Moscow, the trawler was fishing in the disputed " grey zone "; the trawler's logs disprove the charge. A Norwegian foreign ministry spokesman, however, cited regulations to the effect that Soviets and Norwegians may not board each other's ships, even when they are in the disputed zone; only ships of third parties may be boarded.

MOST disturbing of all the provocative incidents staged by the USSR in Norwegian waters have been the intrusions of Soviet submarines into Norwegian fjords, evidently with the aim of spying on submarine-detection devices and testing Norway's anti-submarine capabilities. In view of their so-called " 9th of April complex," created by the surprise German U-boat landings on that date in 1940, the Norwegians are peculiarly wary of this kind of Soviet naval activity.

Submarine sightings have become virtually routine occurrences—as have Moscow's denials of the penetrations. On 30 June 1983, after Norway's navy detected a submarine (evidently Soviet) in Andsfjord, in the vicinity of the NATO base off Andoey Island, *Agence France-Presse* reported that this was the latest of some 230 alleged violations of Norwegian territorial waters by unidentified submarines since 1970.

[21] The *New York Times*, 4 August 1978.
[22] The *Washington Post*, 4 June 1983.
[23] Quoted in the *New York Times*, 2 October 1975.

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Some Norwegian military officers speculate that the submarines are on training missions. Other officers believe that the USSR wants to use the Norwegian fjords, which are exceptionally deep, for wartime operations by Soviet submarines, including SSBNs.[24] The depth of the fjords has frustrated Norwegian efforts to force the intruding submarines to the surface by means of depth charges and even missiles. A number of the submarines were prowling in a region not far from Norway's principal naval defence centre.

The most dramatic incident of Soviet submarine probes in northern European waters occurred in October 1981 when a Whiskey-class submarine ran aground on a rocky outcropping near Sweden's top-security naval base at Karlskrona, on the Baltic, " Whiskey on the Rocks " was a symbol of Soviet contempt for Swedish neutrality at a time when Social Democrat Olaf Palme, a leading proponent of *détente* and disarmament, had just regained the prime ministership. Far from expressing regrets for the incident, however, the Soviets continued to send their submarines into Swedish waters—all the while professing their desire to turn the Baltic into a " sea of peace." In September 1982 the Swedish defence ministry issued a statement declaring that the " number of violations has been considerably higher " than in years past and that the intruding submarines " act a great deal more provocatively."[25] Within a week of the statement's publication, still another suspected Soviet submarine was discovered—this time near the Musko naval base, which lies across the Baltic from the USSR. The Swedish government announced that this was the latest of some 60 known infringements of Swedish waters since the " Whiskey " episode.

The intrusion continued relentlessly in 1983, and in April, Georgi Arbatov, head of the USSR's " research " institute on North America and a member of Palme's disarmament commission (under Socialist International auspices) reportedly told a seminar in Washington that Sweden was naïve to think that proclaiming neutrality could stop Soviet submarine activity.[26] It should be noted in this context that Moscow heaped further scorn on Stockholm's neutrality by declaring that Swedish airspace was, in effect, within the USSR's defence perimeter and that any cruise missiles flying over Sweden en route from Western Europe to the Soviet Union would be shot down.[27]

[24] The *Washington Post*, 4 June 1983.

[25] *Ibid.*, 12 October 1982.

[26] See, for example, the editorial in *Svenska Dagbladet* (Stockholm), 19 May 1983.

[27] On 12 September 1983, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick referred to this Soviet note on the occasion of the UN debate on the shooting down of the Korean airliner KAL007: " Let us recall for a moment the incident almost five years ago when a Soviet W-class submarine penetrated deep into restricted Swedish waters near Karlskrona naval base and ran aground there. In response to the protest of the Swedish government, the Soviet government said: ' It was expected, of course, that the Swedish authorities would abide by existing international norms under which if a foreign warship does not even observe the rules of a coastal state regarding passage through its territorial waters, the only thing the coastal state may do to the given warship is to demand that it leave its territorial waters.'

" According to this unique interpretation of international law, if a Soviet warship—a *warship* mind you—invades the territorial waters of another state, that state cannot even detain the warship but must simply escort it out of its territorial waters. But if a civilian airliner with 269 people aboard happens to

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His tolerance exhausted by the repeated submarine intrusions, Palme named a high-level commission of inquiry, composed of deputies in the Riksdag (parliament) representing Sweden's various political parties and chaired by former Foreign and Defence Minister Sven Andersson. The commission's White Paper, issued on 26 April, concluded on the basis of a six-month investigation that up to six submarines had penetrated Sweden's territorial waters near the Musko naval base and that " mother " submarines as well as " mini-subs " were involved. The midgets, which represented a new Soviet underwater device, were equipped with tank-like treads that allowed them to crawl along the sea floor like caterpillars and to enter shallow waters where standard-sized submarines could not navigate. One of the miniature submarines may have slithered along a waterway running right through the centre of Stockholm, which is built on a series of islands. The commission's report added that a " mini-sub " navigated the shallow channel into Stockholm's harbour in September 1982 while US naval vessels were paying a courtesy call. The " mini-sub " came within a mile of the King's palace (according to tread and keel markings), which stands on an island in the centre of the capital.[28]

Sweden's commission of inquiry confirmed suspicions that the foreign submarines violating Swedish waters on this as well as on 40-odd other occasions in 1982 alone belonged to the USSR. Moreover, a consensus emerged that the Soviets had developed both manned and unmanned midget submarines for missions involving reconnaissance, intelligence-gathering (notably at naval facilities where anti-submarine detection devices and torpedoes were manufactured), and perhaps the laying of remote-controlled mines. Several Swedish investigators and Western naval specialists suggested that the USSR may be using the submarine probes to determine how to disperse its fleet in wartime and to study the feasibility of using submarines to land mobile strike forces in Sweden to knock out early warning and command centres and commit other acts of sabotage. Carl Bildt, a conservative member of the *Riksdag* and of the submarine commission, wrote that Moscow's principal objective may indeed be the destruction of command and control installations as a prelude to gaining entry to Norway and Denmark (presumably through the Baltic).[29]

Prime Minister Palme reacted to the submarine commission's report by sending Moscow a protest against " gross violations of Swedish territorial integrity," recalling the Swedish Ambassador for " briefings " (a term suggesting an absence from Moscow of longer duration than " consultations " would entail), and announcing that future submarine intruders would be attacked and sunk without warning. " It is unjustifiable for a major power to behave like this in relations with a non-aligned

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stray into Soviet airspace, the Soviet Union is justified in shooting it down, even as it is about to exit that airspace."

[28] *Time*, 9 May 1983, p. 42.

[29] *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 May 1983, p. 39.

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neighbour," said Palme.[30] Sweden's supreme commander, Lennart Ljung, declared that: " This is the gravest incident that Sweden has had in modern times. It represents a completely new element in the relations beween civilized nations."[31] The chairman of Sweden's (" Eurocommunist ") Left Party-Communists told a radio interviewer that he was ". . . surprised and . . . damn furious that a country which says it wants to promote disarmament endeavours in Europe behaves with this . . . big-power arrogance. . . ."[32]

IT soon became apparent that the USSR's provocative behaviour was not confined to the waters off Sweden and Norway. In July, Denmark reported that Soviet submarines had been prowling in Danish territorial waters off Greenland, which is under Danish sovereignty and houses important US and Danish defence installations. The Danes found a radio buoy in the area, used by Soviet submarines to communicate with their home base while submerged. On 17 July, an editorial in the Danish newspaper *Berlingske Tidende* revealed another important development regarding Soviet activity near Greenland:

> . . . Andropov has sent " warm greetings " to . . . the Nordic peace festival . . . and assured [the participants] that " the Soviet Union is doing all it can to preserve peace. . . . As if to fully underline the Soviet Union's . . . peace-loving enterprise . . . he allowed a Soviet submarine to surface during the festival in Denmark's internal territorial waters in Disko Bugt, on Greenland's west coast. This is a gross violation of Danish sovereignty and turns [Andropov's] pious wishes for peace into almost gross insolence.
>
> A Soviet submarine does not find itself in the Disko Bugt's coastal waters by accident. The excuses the Soviet government generally uses when its submarines run aground in Swedish archipelagoes do not apply near Akunak. You do not come in as far as Egedesminde as a result of a minor navigational error. You are only there intentionally. Nor are the waters off Greenland's west coast anywhere near the Soviet fleet's routes from Murmansk to the world's oceans. A submarine does not lose its way and travel from the Atlantic up through Davis Sound to Disko Bugt unintentionally.
>
> [The] sighting of the submarine's conning tower is the first concrete confirmation that the Soviet Union is not only visiting the Swedish archipelagoes and the Norwegian fjords, but is also reconnoitering deep within Greenland's waters. . . .

Danish defence officials also have been stunned by the implications of the Swedish submarine commission's report for Denmark's own security. Aside from concern over the vulnerabilities of Sweden—the lynchpin of Baltic defence, despite its neutrality—the Danes worry about the potential uses of " minisubs " in their own waters. Defence Minister Hans Engell told *Berlingske Tidende* on 27 April (the day after the

[30] The *Washington Times*, 28 April 1983.
[31] The *Daily Telegraph*, (London), 27 April 1983.
[32] Swedish domestic radio, 26 April 1983.

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Swedish commission's report appeared) that: " The waters off our coasts are simply too shallow for ordinary submarines, but the new mini-submarines represent a completely new situation for us." The newspaper quoted former Social Democratic Foreign Minister Kjeld Oelsen's reaction to the Swedish affair as " the grossest violation to date by the Soviet Union in what it calls the sea of peace, and our scepticism vis-à-vis Soviet propaganda has increased considerably." Conservative Party foreign affairs spokesman Ole Berndt Henriksen was quoted as saying that the Soviet violations came " as close to aggression as a country could come in its relations with another without declaring open war. It shows that you get no thanks for meeting the Russians halfway but that this is seen as a sign of weakness which is immediately exploited by the Soviet Union."

Increasing Soviet and Warsaw Pact activity in the Baltic presses especially hard on Denmark (which, like Norway, has a " 9th of April complex "). The main fleet exercise areas for the Warsaw Pact navies that formerly were concentrated off the USSR's Baltic republics or near the Polish frontier have now edged westwards to Rügen, which lies only 55 miles off Denmark. Still other exercises have taken place in the Kattegat near Zealand, the island on which Copenhagen stands. Circumnavigation of Denmark's islands has become virtually routine during Warsaw Pact training manoeuvres. A Danish military analyst has pointed out that " activities that previously warned of hostile action have today become part of the normal scene, making the distinction between a naval exercise and an isolated attack against Denmark difficult. This, in turn, has reduced the early warning and reaction period."[33]

Soviet pressure in the Baltic is mounting not only from the sea but also from the air. Warsaw Pact naval exercises in both the Baltic and the North Sea have been accompanied by flights of long-range bombers. As the British analyst John Erickson noted as far back as 1976, " Soviet air activity results in the commitment of flights of strike bombers to within minutes of Danish airspace, turning what was an abnormal alert situation into a regular occurrence and thus straining the Danish military alert system."[34]

JAPAN, like the countries along NATO's northern flank, has experienced Soviet military provocations that are evidently intended both for gaining political leverage and conducting dry runs for wartime operations.

During the Soviet Union's worldwide *Okean II* exercises in 1975, four naval task forces took up positions around Japan. Then, in July 1976:

> Soviet warships sailed through the Sea of Japan and, via the Tsushima Straits, continued southwards past Okinawa. Simultaneously, Soviet reconnaissance aircraft from . . . bases in the Vladivostok area flew southwards on both sides of the Japanese islands to back up the

[33] Orla Moller, " Danish Security Policy " in the *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall 1977, p. 329.
[34] Erickson, " The Northern Theatre," *op cit.*, p. 10.

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> Soviet naval units. It was noted in the Japanese press that this was the first time that the USSR had sent its aircraft to fly down both sides of the home islands.[35]

Manoeuvres by Soviet naval task forces and flights by reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft around Japan have become increasingly frequent. The regular flights of " Bear " reconnaissance planes over Japan en route from the Soviet Union to Vietnam have come to be dubbed the " Tokyo Express." More than 150 Soviet warships cross the Tsushima Straits each year; the number passing through other chokepoints in the area has increased steadily. Moreover, Soviet intelligence-collecting ships called AGIs operate extensively off the Japanese shores. The large number of fishing trawlers, merchant ships and oceanographic research vessels that ply these waters must also be regarded—as Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy so regards them—as integral components of Soviet naval might that can perform military-related missions when needed.

During the 1977 summit of the major industrial powers that took place in Japan, the Soviet aircraft carrier *Minsk* appeared off the coast near the conference site. This action was interpreted as a warning to Japan, which was hosting such a summit for the first time, to back off from displays of collaboration with the West.

In June 1980 a Soviet TU-16 " Badger " long-range bomber crashed while circling a Japanese naval vessel exercising in the Sea of Japan. This was the first time that the " Badger," which is capable of delivering nuclear-tipped air-to-surface " King Fish " missiles, buzzed a Japanese ship in this manner. Another serious provocation occurred in August 1980, when a Soviet nuclear submarine that evidently had been on a spying mission caught fire and became disabled off the Japanese coast. Brushing aside Japanese inquiries as to whether the submarine had nuclear weapons aboard or was leaking radioactive materials, a Soviet tug pulled the crippled vessel through Japanese territorial waters. The incident was particularly disturbing in view of Japan's well-known " nuclear trauma."

During a large-scale US naval exercise in the northern Pacific in the autumn of 1982, Backfire bombers staged simulated missile strikes against two American aircraft carriers for the first time. The Soviet intention evidently was to demonstrate to Japan the vulnerability of the US forces on which it depends for protection. In the meantime, according to the Japanese Defence Agency, Soviet warplanes have been making an average of 240 flights yearly just beyond Japan's airspace, thus causing the Air Self-Defence Force, as well as US aircraft based in the country, to " scramble " repeatedly. The pattern is analogous to that along NATO's northern flank, where warning and reaction time in the event of a Soviet attack have been reduced drastically.

[35] David Rees, " The Gorshkov Strategy in the Far East," in *Pacific Community*, January 1978, p. 144.

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MOSCOW flaunts its military power blatantly in the areas of northern Norway and Japan where serious territorial and economic disputes exist. Soviet pressure tactics against Norway with regard to Svalbard and against Japan in connection with the " Northern Territories " follow remarkably similar patterns—from scoffing at Norwegian and Japanese prerogatives to militarizing the islands.

A treaty signed in Paris in 1920, by Norway and some 40 other nations, awarded sovereignty over the Svalbard Archipelago to Oslo but guaranteed all the signatories equal access to the islands' resources, guided by Norwegian law and regulations. In addition, the treaty forbade bases or permanent naval installations on Svalbard and declared that the archipelago " may never be used for warlike purposes." The USSR (which adhered to the treaty in the 1930s) is one of the few countries besides Norway that has taken advantage of the access clause. Moreover, as early as 1944 Moscow unsuccessfully petitioned Oslo for joint Soviet-Norwegian administration and defence of the archipelago.

The Soviet Union's Artikugol Company maintains coal-mining centres at Barentsburg and Pyramiden on the island of Spitsbergen. Some 2,000 Soviet citizens live there. The chief of the Polar Division of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice contended several years ago that the Russians " do not really need the coal. They use it as an excuse to keep a presence [on Spitsbergen], to keep an eye on other people."[36] The same reasoning presumably explains why six Russians have stayed permanently at Svalbard's airport, which handles only one Aeroflot flight per month.

Soviet use of the Barents Sea as a strategic redoubt for nuclear submarines has led the Kremlin to seek some degree of control over Svalbard. Oslo has rebuffed Moscow's proposals for joint Soviet-Norwegian rule over the archipelago—proposals that, in view of the vast differential in military power between the two countries, are tantamount to a bid for Soviet hegemony.

The USSR has resorted to such harassment tactics as refusal to use Norwegian postage in the islands or to supply a list of Barentsburg and Pyramiden residents for income tax purposes, insisting instead on paying taxes in a lump sum. Thus, the Russian communities have become virtually autonomous enclaves, in violation of the 1920 Svalbard treaty. The Soviets also have refused to recognize a special fishing zone established by Norway off Svalbard or to comply with Norwegian environmental regulations. Safety standards for exploratory oil drilling have been flouted. In addition, the USSR failed to register a new power station at Barentsburg and embarked, without consulting the Norwegians, on a plan to build a fish-freezing plant there and to station nearby two trawlers (which regularly double as intelligence-gathering vessels).

Although the Norwegians reluctantly permitted six Soviet airline

[36] The *New York Times*, 6 August 1978.

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employees to stay permanently at Svalbard's new airport, Moscow antagonized Oslo by failing to pay required airport taxes and fees on time and by staging the " wives episode," in which the spouses of four airport personnel were flown to Svalbard after Norway specifically vetoed family accommodation near the airport. All these vexations, however, pale before mounting evidence of Soviet military activity on Svalbard.

First, Soviet military delegations disguised as mineral prospecting teams visited the islands, and the USSR began moving ships and aircraft in and out of Svalbard without Norwegian consent. Then, in 1975, an actual Soviet military colony was established at Kapp Heer, near Barentsburg, complete with electrified fencing, a road network and round-the-clock security guards. Norwegians were forbidden to enter the area. A landing strip for helicopters was added more recently. Several helicopter crashes occurred on Svalbard, but the Russians failed to report them to Norwegian civil aviation authorities and hastily removed all instruments and other wreckage.

On the night of 21 August 1978, helicopters secretly delivered the components of a mobile radar base that was set up at Kapp Heer. Soon afterwards, a Soviet TU-126 spy plane (the rough equivalent of the US AWACS, with " lookdown " radar) crashed on the island of Hopen, off the Svalbard coast. Soviet and Norwegian naval vessels vied to reach the scene first. Soviet commando units were prevented from landing on Hopen's beach when a Norwegian naval patrol boat pulled the cover off its guns—a signal that it would fire on a landing party. (Norway's " victory " in the race to collect the AWACS wreckage was a *coup* comparable to that of Japan in gaining access to the MiG-25 " Foxbat " after its pilot defected.) Moscow was further embarrassed by Oslo's refusal to return the plane's flight recorder, pending investigation as to whether the plane had deliberately violated Norwegian airspace. Many Norwegian officials believed that the aircraft had been manoeuvring at various altitudes to test the range of the new Soviet radar at Kapp Heer. They believed, further, that the radar might enable the USSR to control all air traffic on and around Svalbard.

On 4 September 1978, during the course of investigating the spy plane crash, Norwegian officials inspected the Soviet installations at Kapp Heer. They found construction underway to improve the helicopter platform, allegedly to facilitate landing under difficult weather conditions and with heavy loads. What aroused even greater concern, however, was the type of MI-8 helicopters found at the base. As a dispatch in *Aftenposten* noted on September 5:

> The MI-8 . . . helicopter . . . is . . . found in both military and civil versions. The helicopters at Kapp Heer have civil registration markings and are painted in Aeroflot colours, yet there is much to indicate that it is the MI-8 version which is normally used as a troop transport and attack helicopter. . . .

Norwegian newspapers featured reports, accompanied by aerial photo-

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graphs, of Soviet construction of a landing strip on Svalbard for planes other than helicopters.

During the summer of 1981, two Polish scientists from a research station on Spitsbergen and a Soviet radar technician from Barentsburg defected to Norway in two separate incidents. The London *Daily Express*, which claimed to have photos of Soviet military facilities in Svalbard, published a lengthy report on 10 January 1982, entitled " The Kremlin's Secret Fortress Inside NATO." The report reaffirmed that the Soviets had built a large helicopter base on the island of Spitsbergen, including a runway " which experts say could quickly be extended," and had deployed several MI-8 military-lift helicopters there. The report also took note of the Soviet radar station, as well as a new communications centre at Barentsburg and the presence of new ventilation shafts atop mines that had not been worked for decades (the implication was that military personnel were active underground). The report went on to state that troop carriers had been seen in Barentsburg's streets and that the Soviets had stored millions of gallons of aircraft fuel near the town. The *Daily Express* quoted a Norwegian intelligence officer as saying:

> There is no doubt that in the event of a war the Russians would attempt to take over Spitsbergen. They have all the elements of a military base; they just have to put on some uniforms. Most people don't realize that, just like the Germans in the last war, the Russians will fight a U-boat war. They will try to cut off supplies and reinforcements to NATO crossing the Atlantic by ship. Between the North Cape and Spitsbergen both [superpowers] have a chain of detection devices on the seabed to monitor submarine movements. Spitsbergen then becomes doubly important.

THE disputed " northern territories " just north of Japan have similar strategic importance for the Soviet Union. These are the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri, in the southern party of the main Kurile chain, and Shikotan and the Habomais, in the Lesser Kuriles that parallel the main chain. The dispute over the territories can be traced back at least to 1855, when the Treaty of Shimoda between tsarist Russia and Japan assigned the northern Kuriles to the Russians and the southern Kuriles to the Japanese. In the Treaty of St Petersburg, in 1875, Russia exchanged the northern Kuriles for the southern half of Sakhalin (the northern half of which it already possessed). Russia, however, had to cede southern Sakhalin in 1905 after losing the Russo-Japanese War.

At the end of the Second World War, Soviet troops seized southern Sakhalin and the whole Kurile chain, which had been promised to the USSR in the Allied declaration signed at Yalta in February 1945. Moscow later promised to return Shikotan and the Habomais in conjunction with the signing of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. Negotiations for a treaty began in 1973, but when Japan made return of all the islands a condition for its signature, the Soviets balked. To add insult to injury, Moscow decreed in 1976 that Japanese visiting the graves of their

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ancestors on the Kuriles would have to obtain Japanese passports—a procedure that would be tantamount to recognizing Soviet sovereignty over the islands and that Japan therefore rejected. In 1977, the Soviet Union established a 200-mile fishing zone off the Kuriles, in waters that were a traditionally valuable area for Japanese fishermen. The Soviets also forbade Japanese fishermen from gathering seaweed on a large rock called Kaigara, just two miles off the coast of Hokkaida.

In February 1978 Moscow gave Tokyo the draft of a treaty of good neighbourliness and cooperation but refused again to discuss the " Northern Territories." The Japanese declined the treaty offer and opened negotiations with China on a peace treaty (signed in November 1978), which incorporated an " anti-hegemony clause " aimed at the USSR. While the Sino-Japanese negotiations were in progress, the Soviets dispatched about 5,000 troops to Kunashiri and Etorofu, which had been manned only by small garrisons since the bulk of Soviet troops was withdrawn in 1960. Most of the original Japanese population of the islands had been removed, and Soviet fishermen had been sent to colonize them (a move reminiscent of the Soviet " coal miners " and " scientists " sent to Spitsbergen).

By early 1979 Japanese Defence Agency officials were reporting brisk Soviet military activity on the islands, including the construction of radar installations, extension of runways, building of heliports, improvement of port facilities, and deployment of surface-to-air-missiles.[37] Soviet troops also were sent to Shikotan. Even the token garrison on the Habomais was reinforced. When the Japanese Foreign Ministry demanded the removal of the troops, the Soviet Ambassador rejected the protest as part of a " campaign of interference in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union."[38]

A 13,000-strong Soviet motorized rifle division is now deployed on a obviously permanent basis in the " Northern Territories." Its equipment reportedly includes some 300 tanks, 250 armoured personnel carriers, Hind helicopters (of the type used in Afghanistan and recently deployed on the Kola Peninsula opposite Norway) and 130-mm guns. A Soviet army division headquarters has been set up on one of the islands. Anti-aircraft missile emplacements, shore batteries, heliports, underground bunkers and other support facilities, have been installed on the islands at an accelerating pace. A squadron of MiG-23 supersonic fighter-bombers has just been stationed on Etorofu. A new airfield on Kunashiri may be capable of handling Backfire bombers.

Soviet behaviour on the contested islands is remarkably similar to that on Svalbard. Aside from turning the islands into a military bastion, the Soviets have engaged in provocative activities obviously aimed at intimidating Japan. As early as May 1978 Soviet troops held military exercises on Etorofu. Troops on Kunashiri stage regular invasion manoeuvres, comparable to those held off the Norwegian coast by Soviet forces from the Kola Peninsula. The Soviets also conduct missile firings

[37] *Ibid.*, 31 January 1979.
[38] Reuters, 2 October 1979.

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and gunnery practice in the Sea of Okhotsk around Etorofu. Their warships regularly harass Japanese boats, from naval vessels to fishing trawlers. Soviet warplanes based on the " Northern Territories " have invaded Japan's airspace on innumerable occasions. At least one intrusion occurred over Rebunto and Rishiri Islands, just off the north-west coast of Hokkaido. Control of this airspace would enable the Soviets to secure the Soya Strait in wartime.

The USSR's military build-up in the Far East in general and on the disputed islands in particular has left northern Japan as isolated as northern Norway. In the summer of 1980, Colonel Shoji Uno, then Chief of Japanese Northern Army defence planning, lamented that Hokkaido is " caught by the jugular " by the growing Soviet military presence northwards and eastwards. " We are isolated from the rest of Japan [by the Tsugaru Strait in the south], and if the Russians had a strong will to invade us, it would be very easy for them to accomplish."[39] Discussing the military situation on Hokkaido as of autumn 1981, a correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* wrote:

> Four of the Ground Self-Defence Forces' 13 divisions are situated on Hokkaido, and they have the best equipment available. Of the 400 tanks on Hokkaido, 300 are the new variable-profile type 74 . . . particularly suited for the country's hilly terrain. Self-propelled 105-mm and 155-mm cannons are being introduced . . . . Nevertheless, if war were to break out tomorrow, Japanese defence sources are quick to admit that both in ammunition and in equipment they would be ill prepared to last more than a short while. Whether this would be a matter of hours, or of days, or of weeks, the officers in Hokkaido did not want to say.[40]

Cognizant of the critical situation confronting a Japan vastly outmanned and outgunned by the Soviet army, General Hiroomi Kurisu, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, stated publicly in 1978 that Japanese forces would have to take immediate steps in self-defence if an attack occurred; there would not be time to await orders from the Prime Minister and the Diet (parliament). General Kurisu was forced into retirement for his remarks, which were regarded as undermining the principle of civilian control over the military, but the problems raised by the growing Soviet threat have been discussed more and more openly in recent years, especially in the annual White Papers issued by the Japanese Defence Agency.

ALTHOUGH the strategic location of the disputed islands (at the entrance to the Sea of Okhotsk) might be regarded as sufficient reason for the Soviets to retain them, Moscow has placed the territorial dispute in a broader context. During an interview on 21 April 1981, with the Japanese daily *Mainichi Shimbun,* Aleksandr Bovin, a political

[39] Quoted in *News-World* (New York), 31 August 1980.
[40] *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 September 1981.

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commentator for the Soviet government newspaper *Izvestia,* was asked about the islands:

> **Question:** It is said that a military build-up is in progress in the " Northern Territories ". . . .
> **Answer:** . . . I personally do not know whether or not there has been a military build-up. . . . At the base of this problem, there is probably the question of . . . the safety of navigation in the Pacific. Now that the United States wants Japan to block the exits to the Pacific, we have to safeguard our own exits.
> **Question:** If so, is it for military reasons that the Soviet Union cannot return of the " Northern Territories?"
> **Answer:** This involves an important issue. It is a principled position of the Soviet Union that it will reject any proposal aimed at readjusting territorial delineations reached as a result of the Second World War. It took us 30 years to make Europe understand this position, which was at last recognized at the Helsinki Conference. . . . Our position of preserving political and geographical borders delineated after the Second World War is also applicable to Asia.

The interviewer moved on to other issues and then returned to the contested islands:

> **Question:** The Soviet military build-up in the Soviet Far East, including in the " Northern Territories," poses a serious military threat to Japan. This is not something that is desirable for . . . Japan-USSR relations.
> **Answer:** The build-up of the Soviet Far Eastern forces is directed, first, against China . . . and second, against the increasingly close military cooperation between Japan and the United States. . . . It is too simplistic to talk about a " Soviet threat."
> **Question:** The tough Soviet stand of insisting that the issue of the " Northern Territories " " has long been settled " or " does not exist " is fanning anti-Soviet feelings among the Japanese. To improve Japan-USSR relations, the Soviet Union should . . . negotiate the return of these territories. Otherwise, there will be no progress in Siberian development projects through Japan-USSR cooperation.
> **Answer:** The Japanese people are well aware of the Soviet government's attitude on this issue, and I have nothing to add. If the territoral issue is to be made the starting point for developing Japan-USSR relations, it will only lead us into a blind alley and will not be in the interests of the two countries.

The interview with Bovin took place two months after the proclamation by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of the first " Northern Territories Day," marked in Japan by parades and patriotic singing and in the Soviet Union by charges of revived Japanese "militarism." The 7th of February was chosen for the occasion because this was the anniversary of the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1855 that confirmed Japan's claims to the islands. To lend substance to its disapproval of " Northern Territories

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Day," the Kremlin sent a patrol boat to the area off Nemuro (a city in Hokkaido) and kept it on station for about a week.

On 10 September 1981, Suzuki became the first post-war Japanese Prime Minister to view the " Northern Territories " personally. He flew by helicopter to Cape Nosappu, in north-eastern Hokkaido, and peered through a telescope at the disputed islands. On 12 June the head of the Japanese Defence Agency inspected the " Northern Territories," the first such inspection by a high Japanese military official. K. Tanikawa surveyed the islands through binoculars from a position on the ground and then from a military helicopter. The Soviet Communist Party daily *Pravda* called his actions " openly defiant " and " provocative."[41] Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe viewed the contested islands from a naval patrol boat in August. When a Soviet patrol boat came within two kilometres of the Japanese ship, Abe complained about its " rude manners."[42] In the meantime, the Japanese Communist Party (which renewed ties with its Soviet counterpart in 1979 after a 15-year hiatus) remains among the most vocal organizations in Japan that call for the return of the " Northern Territories." The JCP at times even advocates the return of the southern half of Sakhalin!

THE long-running feuds that the USSR has sustained with northern European countries (notably Norway) on the one hand, and Japan on the other, regarding contested territories, demarcation of fishing grounds and oil exploration areas, naval passage through chokepoints, definition of continental shelves, and so forth, have inevitably generated varying reactions among domestic constituencies in the countries involved. Moscow's provocative displays of military force are intended to influence these countries, out of fear or resignation, to accommodate the Soviets on foreign policy matters. Soviet efforts are not entirely military, however. The Kremlin uses " agents of influence " to turn the public debate over divisive issues in a direction favourable to the USSR.[43] These agents have become especially active in trying to erode support in Norway and Denmark for the deployment of US Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe (even though these two countries are not prospective sites for the missiles). In Japan, they have attempted to discredit Prime Minister Nakasone because of his public emphasis on the need for a strong defence posture, including closer Japanese cooperation with the United States in the military sphere.

The Kremlin has been extraordinarily sensitive to any sign that Norway or Denmark intends to participate more fully than in the past in NATO war planning or that Japan plans, either officially or unofficially, to associate itself more closely with the Atlantic Alliance. A virtually unprecedented display of Soviet arrogance towards Norway occurred during a meeting in December 1977 of Nordic Prime Ministers in

[41] *Pravda*, 20 June 1983.
[42] Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, the *Washington Post*, 31 August 1983.
[43] Cf. p. 60 and p. 63.

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Helsinki. Then Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin warned the Norwegians to desist from unspecified " provocations " along the Soviet frontier and in the Baltic. His displeasure was inspired primarily by plans for a 1,500-man West German contingent to participate in NATO manoeuvres in northern Norway. At Moscow's evident behest, the East German military journal *Die Volksarmee* added its voice to Kosygin's. Aside from " provocative " West German troop manoeuvres, said an article on 11 January 1978, " West German fighters are temporarily stationed at Norwegian supply bases. This practice is undermining Norway's stated policy of not allowing foreign troops to be stationed on Norwegian territory." This typical communist propaganda barrage has also been aimed at the Danes whenever they appeared to be taking a more active role within NATO.

Kosygin's outburst drew sharp criticism from virtually all the participants at the Nordic conference. An editorial in *Aftenposten* on 10 December 1977, commented that while " allegations " regarding Norwegian defence policy had appeared in Soviet media, " when they are made by the head of government at a personal meeting with his Nordic counterparts, they must be taken more seriously. There is little reason to believe that it was a sudden impulse which made Kosygin launch into a ' battle royal ' with Scandinavia. It is more probable that Kosygin deliberately intended using this opportunity mainly to ' read the riot act ' to the Norwegian and Danish Prime Ministers about their countries' NATO membership."

The reaction from neutral Sweden was particularly noteworthy. On 11 December 1977 a Swedish commentator stated that:

> . . . some people interpret the discussion by saying that Kosygin acted as if he were in another circle—the Warsaw Pact countries, where East European brother countries have to put up with the rebukes of Big Brother, the Soviet Union. This time, the Nordic countries were involved, but Kosygin nevertheless took the opportunity to act like a schoolmaster. . . .[44]

Shortly after Kosygin's lecture, Leonid Brezhnev sent the Nordic chiefs of state—and leaders of most other Western countries—identical letters warning them to dissociate themselves from the production and deployment of the neutron bomb. Denmark's *Berlingske Tidende* commented that:

> Brezhnev's warning . . . is stated in a rough and unpleasant manner. . . . The Nordic heads of government were subjected to [the Soviet campaign against the N-bomb] recently in Helsinki, when Premier Kosygin warned them against the neutron bomb in a very maladroit way. . . . The Danish government members have politely and on several occasions during bilateral talks referred to the insecurity caused by the East's military exercises and surveillance activity very close to Danish territory. In Helsinki, Kosygin

[44] Leighton, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

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> brusquely told [Danish Prime Minister] Anker Jorgensen that he did not want to discuss those sort of details.[45]

Out of consideration for Norwegian public opinion, the government had traditionally prohibited West German participation in exercises held on Norway's territory by the Allied Mobile Force (AMF), which is earmarked to reinforce Norwegian units in case of war. On 19 January 1978, *Aftenposten* reported that Oslo had told its NATO partners that West German ground troops could participate in future exercises in Norway on an equal footing with the other allies. According to *Aftenposten*, however, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zemskov came to Oslo to press the Norwegians to renege on their decision. On 9 January, shortly after Zemskov returned to Moscow, the Norwegian defence ministry announced that, instead of a 1,500-man contingent, only individual support sections of some 480 troops would represent West Germany at the AMF exercises. An *Aftenposten* editorial observed that:

> Norway is in fact accepting a Soviet claim that the memories of the war give the Kremlin the right to be heard when it objects to the West German presence in other parts of Europe. The government's latest decision also means a further limitation of Norwegian freedom of action . . . a new restriction of our foreign policy is being introduced.

Although Norway retains its " base and ban " policy, the growing Soviet threat from the Kola Peninsula and surrounding seas led the Storting (parliament) to vote, on 13 January 1981, to allow the United States to prestock weapons and supplies for use by US Marines that would reinforce Norway in case of war. The following day, the Soviet news agency TASS called the vote " another dangerous step in NATO's military preparations in the north of the European continent." Partly in response to Soviet pressure, the Norwegians decided to preposition the NATO equipment in central Norway rather than in the north (closer to Soviet territory), where it would be more readily available in an emergency. Not surprisingly, this change in sites for prestocking weapons and supplies failed to mollify the Kremlin. On 21 June 1983, for example, the Soviet armed forces newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda* delivered a blistering critique of Norway's (and Denmark's) links with NATO:

> Having bound Denmark, Norway, and Iceland with the chains of the Atlantic treaty, Washington's strategists . . . defined . . . those countries as bridgeheads for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. . . . On the one hand, they took account of their advantageous strategic position: a direct strike could be delivered from the flank against . . . the USSR. . . .
>
> On the other hand, after defining the territory of northern Europe as a bridgehead for aggression, NATO . . . calculated that those countries also will incur the retaliatory strike, thereby diverting it from the United States, Britain, and other leading bloc states. In other words, the role of " tin soldier " has been prepared for that

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

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> region. Let us recall that, when that hero in Andersen's well-known tale ceased to be needed, the little soldier was thrown on the fire and burnt. The same fate is also intended for the Scandinavian countries: they are to burn in the fire of nuclear war in the name of " Atlantic solidarity."
>
> To prepare Scandinavian territory for an aggressive war, the NATO leadership has equipped it with military installations . . . That is not enough for the " hawks," however, and they are exerting constant pressure on the Danish government to force that country to carry out more vigorous military preparations. . . . US Defence Secretary C. Weinberger visited Norway [in] June. . . . He inspected " important military installations ". . . In his speeches . . . the Pentagon boss . . . stressed Norway's significance as NATO's main strategic outpost in northern Europe,

In an interview with *Aftenposten* on 2 July, Norwegian Defence Minister Anders C. Sjaastad stated that:

> The Soviet press campaign that has been going on for several months against Norway and the Nordic area is much further from the truth than campaigns we have seen in the past. You could even ask whether the price of Nordic restraint to nuclear arms is that we have to be subjected to increased threats.

Soviet propaganda emphasizes that while Norway (along with Denmark and even Sweden) is strengthening ties with NATO, the USSR is seeking to reinforce regional security in northern Europe—notably through creation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The idea for such a zone dates back to 1959, when Nikita Khrushchev proposed turning the Baltic into a " sea of peace." On 28 May 1963, then Finnish President Urho Kekkonen formally proposed creation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, evidently at Moscow's behest. The Kremlin's chief motivation at that time appeared to be foreclosure of a possible West German role in a NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF). The West German connection has continued to figure prominently in Soviet and Finnish references to a Nordic nuclear-free zone; equally important is the attempt to preclude changes in Norway's policy of forbidding Allied nuclear weapons on its territory.

In a speech to the Swedish Institute of International Affairs on 8 May 1978, Kekkonen recommended that the Nordic states and the " great powers " negotiate a " treaty arrangement covering the Nordic countries which would isolate them as completely as possible from the effects of nuclear strategy in general and new weapons technology in particular."[46] The Swedes, who, like the Norwegians, wish to retain their nuclear options, were presumably unimpressed. Norway's position has best been summarized as follows:

> The official Norwegian position is clear: Northern Europe is already a nuclear-free zone, but creating a permanent obligation to keep it

[46] F. B. Singleton, " Finland Between East and West " in *The World Today*, August 1978, p. 327.

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> that way would deny Norway . . . the right to summon nuclear forces in an emergency; it would thus restrict the room for manoeuvre in Norway's foreign policy, for the threat of changing her nuclear-free status may be considered . . . an effective counter-thrust to rising Soviet pressure on . . . Northern Europe . . .[47]

Similarly, the Swedish daily *Svenska Dagbladet* wrote on 31 July 1983 that:

> . . . Denmark and Norway have a so-called option that, in the event of war or a strong threat of attack against them, they can ask for NATO nuclear arms support. The option is a crucial part of the two countries' security policy strategy. . . . A major question is whether NATO membership can be retained without this option . . . In other words, the nuclear-free zone crucially interferes with the security policy which has so long preserved peace and stability in our part of the world. . . .

The Soviet Union is, of course, the only country with nuclear arms in northern Europe. At no time have the Russians offered to include the Kola Peninsula in any nuclear-free zone. During an interview with a Finnish publication on 6 June 1981, however, Brezhnev stated cryptically that the USSR could envisage discussing measures that would impinge upon Soviet territory bordering a Nordic nuclear-free zone. In addition, he said that the Kremlin would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against countries forming part of the zone. On 7 March 1983, Soviet General Nikolai Chervov stated in a Swedish TV interview that he could imagine the possibility of the withdrawal of the six Golf-class submarines, with their total of 18 nuclear-tipped missiles, from the Baltic. He also reiterated Brezhnev's offer of a guarantee of non-use of nuclear arms. *Aftenposten,* however, published on 9 March an editorial designed to deflate General Chervov's trial balloon:

> The timing of the General's statement is probably no accident. Finnish President Mauno Koivisto arrived in Norway for a state visit the day after Chervov's appearance on Swedish television screens. . . . The Soviet gambit through General Chervov will encourage circles in Norway, Sweden and Finland who are working for the implementation of the zone plan. As an attempt to influence public opinion in the Nordic area, the move is tactically sound. . . .
>
> A nuclear-free zone which does not include the Baltic is an impossibility. But this sea is only one part of the Nordic area where the Soviet Union has nuclear arms. From the huge base on the Kola Peninsula, Soviet nuclear missiles can reach any target in the Nordic area. Thus, the nuclear threat will not cease if the Soviet Union sends its six submarines out of the Baltic. . . . A nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area will be meaningless as long as it does not affect the nuclear missiles on the Kola Peninsula. However, General Chervov said nothing about them.

In addition to focusing on the issue of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, the

[47] George Maude, " Finland's Security Policy," in *The World Today,* October 1975, p. 407.

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Soviets have been extremely active trying to drum up support in Scandinavia to prevent deployment of US Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe. The Norwegian Labour Party, which was in power at the time that NATO's dual-track decision on the missiles was taken in December 1979, now opposes the deployments—at least until the US-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva are given more time to succeed. Commenting on the growing leftist tilt, Einar Forde, Deputy Chairman of the Labour Party, lamented: " I fight against it, but the Soviet Union has won the propaganda race, and Soviet arguments are now often taken at face value."[48] In 1982 the Norwegian government defeated by only one vote a Labour Party motion in the Storting to cut off Norway's financial contribution to the missile bases in Western Europe.

Denmark, like Norway, was never intended to be a host country for the missiles. Nevertheless, in May, the opposition Social Democratic Party, with the largest single bloc of seats in the Folketing (parliament), pushed through a resolution obliging the minority Conservative government to oppose the missile deployments as long as the Geneva negotiations continue. The resolution also ordered the government to withhold further payments of Denmark's share of NATO's deployment costs.

Both Norway and Denmark have spawned sizeable peace movements, which draw upon traditional pacifist and neutralist sentiments, but which the USSR has done its utmost to exploit for its own purposes. The KGB has sought, for example, to infiltrate the Norwegian peace group called " Nei til Atomvaapen " (No to Nuclear Weapons). Stanislav Chebotok, head of the KGB's political intelligence service in Norway, is one of several Soviet officials who have appeared frequently at peace forums sponsored by " Nei til Atomvaapen." Prior to his assignment to Oslo in 1977, Chebotok served in Copenhagen. He left Denmark under a cloud and was succeeded by Vladimir Merkulov, also from the KGB. Merkulov used Danish journalist and writer Arne Herloev Petersen as an " agent of influence " to obtain contact with members of the Cooperation Committee, an umbrella organization encompassing more than 50 Danish anti-nuclear and disarmament groups.[49]

SINCE Japan does not belong to NATO and has not been involved in the controversy over deployment of new US missiles in Europe, the country does not have the kind of organized peace movement that has emerged in Scandinavia. Nevertheless, there is widespread anti-nuclear sentiment. The Soviets have played upon Japanese memories of the Second World War, particularly the atomic bombing of Japanese cities, to warn of dire consequences if Japan rearms and subscribes to the " aggressive " policies of the United States. Moscow's approach is similar to its exploitation of Norway's and Denmark's memories of Nazi

[48] The *New York Times*, 15 May 1983.

[49] Cf. p. 50. Also " Soviet Intelligence Penetration of the West European Peace Movements and Religious Circles," speech delivered by Dutch journalist J. A. Emerson Vermaat at The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 21 July 1983. See Also the *New York Times*, 11 December 1981, and *Time*, 14 February 1983.

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occupation to warn those countries that they face disaster if they embrace NATO's " militarist " course. In August, when Andropov sent letters to NATO and other European governments explaining Moscow's stand on nuclear disarmament, Japan also received a letter.

In view of the fact that the Soviet Union ranks bottom in Japanese public opinion polls of foreign countries most admired, Moscow has been remarkably successful in appealing to leftist and pacifist constituencies in Japan, as well as to businessmen and fishermen.

Hokkaido is the chief focus of Soviet influence-peddling activity. The Soviets have cultivated the business and fishing communities there and have financed (in partnership with local Japanese businesses) the construction of several Soviet-Japanese " friendship halls." In return for joining Soviet-Japanese friendship societies and shunning the movement for return of the " Northern Territories," businessmen receive economic and trade privileges with the USSR, and fishermen (who wear special " friendship badges ") are permitted to fish in disputed waters without being subjected to fines and harassment. Most recently, the Soviets have allowed favoured Japanese fishermen to gather seaweed from the Kaigara rock for the first time in years. In addition to dissociating themselves from groups advocating return of the " Northern Territories," many fishermen have been asked to provide the Soviets with consumer goods, information on the organizers of the annual " Northern Territories Day," and, in some cases, intelligence on the movements of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces on Hokkaido.[50] The Soviets also woo Japanese entrepeneurs, mainly from Hokkaido, by sponsoring an annual coastal trade fair in the Soviet Maritime Provinces.

Summing up Soviet activity on Hokkaido, leaders of Japan's governing Liberal Democratic Party have likened it to an " indirect invasion." Other Japanese officials have expressed concern that the USSR aims to " Finlandize " Hokkaido.[51]

Moscow has stepped up its courtship of businessmen from all parts of Japan, evidently hoping that they will put pressure on their government to loosen sanctions on trade and technology transfer. When some of the large-scale development projects that Japan had planned with China came to naught, the USSR sought to refocus Japanese attention on joint ventures in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. In February 1983 the highest-powered Japanese economic delegation in the history of post-war Soviet-Japanese relations visited Moscow. The 235-member delegation which travelled in a private capacity, was headed by Shigeo Nagano, President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Chairman of the (non-official) Japanese-Soviet Committee for Economic Cooperation. Soviet Minister of Trade Nikolai Patolichev met the delegation.

Besides trying to tempt Tokyo with offers of economic cooperation, Moscow has offered to resubmit its draft treaty of good-neighbourliness

[50] See, for example, the *New York Times*, 11September 1981.
[51] The *Washington Post*, 18 September 1981.

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and has suggested bilateral talks on so-called confidence-building measures (advance notice of military manoeuvres, passage of warships through straits and other chokepoints, etc.) of the type worked out in the Helsinki accords on Europe. The Soviets, moreover, have offered to enter talks with Japan on the issue of SS-20 missiles in Asia, claiming that the missiles are targeted on China and on US nuclear-armed aircraft carriers and submarines in the Pacific, and will not be used against Japan if it promises to keep its territory permanently free of atomic weapons. This Soviet ploy is, of course, analogous to the promises not to strike the Scandinavian countries with nuclear weapons if they enter into a Nordic nuclear-free zone. In the meantime, the USSR continues its own nuclear build-up in the Soviet Far East, from which the weapons can reach Japan as easily as those on the Kola Peninsula can reach Norway and its neighbours.

Tokyo is reassessing its military options as the Soviet threat mounts and the United States seeks greater Japanese cooperation in defending non-communist Asia. In 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Japan (which followed the United States in imposing economic sanctions on the USSR and boycotting the Moscow Olympics) put through the largest annual increase in military spending since the Second World War and established the first post-war committee for defence in the Diet. Japan also participated that year for the first time in the joint naval exercise Operation Rimpac (" Pacific Rim ") with the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

In May 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki paid an official visit to Washington. He announced there that Japan would defend the seas and skies around the home islands and also contribute to the defence of the sea lanes up to a distance of 1,000 miles. The political climate in Japan remained so sensitive, however, that a phrase in the Reagan-Suzuki joint communiqué characterizing the US-Japanese relationship as an " alliance " caused a major uproar. Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito was forced to resign, but US-Japanese military collaboration intensified and included a joint naval exercise in the Sea of Japan in August 1982 and a joint command post exercise on Hokkaido in December of that year. Another recent development has been the start of joint planning by US and Japanese military staffs to provide for contingencies in the event of a Soviet attack. Tokyo has also agreed to export advanced military technology to the United States and to increase its financial support for the maintenance of the 45,000 American troops stationed in Japan.

Nakasone, who became Prime Minister in November 1982, has declared that the time has come " for all of us Japanese to discuss our constitution, to take a fresh look at it."[52] He made an official visit to the United States two months later. In addition to reaffirming Suzuki's pledge about helping to defend the sea lanes up to 1,000 miles from Japan, Nakasone told the *Washington Post* on 18 January 1983 that

[52] Cited in the *Washington Post*, 7 January 1983.

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Japan should become " an unsinkable aircraft carrier " against Soviet Backfire bombers and should control the straits around the Sea of Japan to prevent Soviet warships from crossing between Vladivostok and the open Pacific. The following day, TASS declared:

> Is it not clear that in the present nuclear age there can be no " unsinkable aircraft carrier " and that by deploying " onboard the carrier " arsenals of armaments, including American [arms], the authors of such plans make Japan a likely target for a response strike? And for such a densely populated, insular country as Japan, this could spell a national disaster more serious than the one that befell it 37 years ago. . . .

Moscow's propaganda offensive against Japanese military policies intensified markedly after the arrival, on 22 March 1983, of the US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise* at the port of Sasebo. On 25 March a Radio Moscow commentator said that further visits by American warships to Japan " will result in a rapid expansion of war preparations. . . . The presence of US nuclear weapons in Japan will be expanded at the same time, with the result that Japan's three non-nuclear principles will become just a scrap of paper." The commentator warned that " Japan will be the first victim in all disputes that arise in the Far East." On 5 April, TASS thundered that Japan's increasing military cooperation with the United States " threatens to transform Japan into an arena of nuclear combat and, in the final analysis, to bring about the country's destruction." Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko even came out with the charge that Japan was already " bristling with nuclear missiles."[53]

On 3 August 1983, *Pravda* summed up the prevailing Kremlin view of Tokyo's growing defence cooperation with Washington by contending that " after being an accomplice in the US anti-Soviet strategy, Japan is increasingly becoming a co-participant." Even more disturbing from Moscow's point of view, however, is the belief that Japan will become a *de facto* member of NATO. Currently, there are no ties between Japan and Western Europe on security matters, but Japan has sought on various occasions to establish some type of regular liaison. According to an article of 11 March 1983 in *Le Monde*:

> Through various channels, with the active support of their American allies, the Japanese sounded out the members of the Atlantic Alliance early this year with a view to obtaining the status of " external associate," which would have enabled them to participate . . . in the operations and discussions of the regional organization which relate to East-West economic relations. . . . The French government . . . cut short the initiative, vetoing in principle any expansion or globalization of NATO.

The *Le Monde* article may well have been referring to a tour of West European capitals in January by Foreign Minister Abe, who reportedly

[53] See *Asiaweek*, 29 April 1983, p. 17.

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also suggested the creation of a mechanism for informal consultations between Japan and NATO on political and security issues.[54]

In June, Japan signed the declaration issued at the summit of the world's leading industrial powers, held at Williamsburg, Virginia. The declaration dealt with both economic and political-military issues. It was the first time that Japan associated itself formally with NATO members on a document expressing support for a stronger common defence. Moscow reacted, predictably, by proclaiming that " Tokyo is beginning to play increasingly clearly the role of NATO's Far Eastern flank."[55]

MOSCOW'S provocative behaviour towards the countries of NATO's northern flank and Japan might be expected to be counterproductive by drawing Norway (along with Denmark and even neutral Sweden) closer to NATO and causing Japan to step up even further its military collaboration with the Western allies. There are powerful hurdles to such developments, however—hurdles that the Soviet Union recognizes and exploits to the hilt.

First of all, as described above, there are strong neutralist and pacifist constituencies in Scandinavia and Japan. Although public opinion polls indicate that a healthy majority of Norwegians favour continued participation in NATO, there is widespread concern about maintaining the delicate " Nordic balance."[56] Thus, for example, abandonment by Norway and Denmark of their " base and ban " policies could upset the strategic equilibrium throughout the Nordic region. It is noteworthy in this regard that Norwegian defence planners tend to view prestocking, or prepositioning, of equipment for NATO's use as supporting rather than contradicting the " no-base " policy. Japan, with its "nuclear trauma," will probably be just as vocal about maintaining its " three non-nuclear principles " as Norway is about adhering to " base and ban."

The inherent difficulty that parliamentary democracies face in rallying their populations around a vital national defence issue which falls short of all-out enemy attack, militates against the probability of major changes in Norwegian and Japanese military policies. One can imagine, for example, the tremendous political turmoil that would accompany a fully-fledged effort to delete the " no-war " clause from the Japanese Constitution. In Norway, the Labour Party and other groups on the Left tried repeatedly to prevent the Storting from voting funds for NATO's theatre nuclear force modernization. They came within a hair's breadth of success.

Financial pressures also inhibit greater participation by the northern flank countries and Japan in military activities with their allies. Norway, one of the few countries that adhered to the 1977 NATO decision to devote 3 per cent of the GNP to defence, now feels forced to reduce its defence expenditures—at least temporarily—by decreasing the number of military conscripts and keeping at least one of its frigates in port.

[54] The *Washington Times*, 21 April 1983.
[55] *Izvestia*, 10 June 1983.
[56] For details of this concept, see Leighton, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 76–77.

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A desire on the part of Scandinavian and Japanese businessmen to maintain lucrative economic and trade relations with the USSR constitutes still another barrier to major changes in the countries' defence policies in a direction likely to alienate the Soviets. For example, when Tokyo imposed economic sanctions on Moscow after the invasion of Afghanistan, Japanese companies, engaged in providing technologically advanced products for the Soviet market, protested vocally. Soviet propaganda exploited their resentment towards their government by emphasizing that the sanctions (imposed in conjunction with the United States) caused Japan to fall from second to fifth place among the USSR's trading partners in the capitalist world. The businessmen's fears that European firms had seized their share of Soviet commerce were thus confirmed. Fishermen in both Japan and Norway also have a vested interest in preventing a serious deterioration in their countries' relations with the Soviet Union.

Finally, there is a sizeable element of wishful thinking among various groups in Scandinavia and Japan (including groups well versed in foreign affairs) to the effect that the USSR's dramatic military build-up is not really directed at their countries, but relates only to the superpowers' rivalry. A corollary to this type of thinking is that, while the Norwegians, Japanese, West European NATO members and Americans persist in considering Soviet behaviour towards the outside world as just bluff and bluster, Soviet capabilities continue to grow. The USSR can be expected to continue blending threats and cajolery to vitiate efforts by NATO Europe, Japan and the United States to pool their defence efforts. To the extent that it succeeds, the Kremlin will pursue with impunity its strategy of isolating, neutralizing and encircling the major political and economic power centres of the non-communist world.

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Finnish Foreign Policy and the Kekkonen Legacy

Karen Erickson Orvik

THE Soviet periphery is the focus of increasing attention. Whether we refer to a Soviet attack on a passenger airliner that violates its airspace or to the Soviet invasion of a border state, the Russian actions catch us unaware and unprepared. But dramatic developments are not the only cause for concern. What attention should be paid to the appearances, growing in frequency, of Soviet submarines in Scandinavian coastal waters? Gradual erosions, political as well as military, could prove as unsettling as sudden eruptions on the Soviet periphery.

One example worth noting is the question of the security status of the Soviet Union's North European neighbours. Analyzing it one cannot escape the problem of the impact of Urho Kekkonen's policies on the future of Finland. Kekkonen, the President of Finland for a quarter of a century, was forced to resign on 26 October 1981, when he was immobilized by a stroke. What is the Kekkonen legacy for the security of Finland? Does Finland's response to Soviet interests produce increasing limitations on Finnish policy? Has the Kekkonen-led policy brought Finland to a stronger and more stable position next to the Soviet Union, or has it left the country with fewer options? Has the Finnish leadership overlooked any chances for enlarging the nation's freedom of action?

WHATEVER means he chose for enhancing the security of Finland, Urho Kekkonen was convinced that, ultimately, his country was virtually alone in foreign affairs. He told his fellow citizens that it somehow belonged to the Finnish national character to go its own way alone. The emphasis on self-help might have been declaratory, for the benefit of the Soviets, reassuring Moscow that Finland acted independently of any Western advice and support. The notion, however, gradually became an accepted principle of Finland's foreign policy.

The Finns reasoned that the West had not used its strength in the past to support Finnish interests, and that the Finns themselves had been responsible for the resolution of their nation's trials with Russia. For example, the autumn crisis of 1958 (the Soviet Union abruptly cancelled orders for Finnish ships and recalled its Helsinki Ambassador) seemed to have been finally settled when Kekkonen met Soviet leaders, including Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Leningrad in January 1959. He said that he wanted to remove the "coolness" in Finno-Soviet relations before the opening of the 21st Congress of the CPSU,[1] and he noted with satisfaction the success of his

[1] Tuomas Vilkuna (ed.), *Urho Kekkonen: puheita ja kirjoituksia* (2 vols., Weilin & Göös, Helsinki, 1967), Vol. II, p. 82 (radio speech in Helsinki, 25 Jan. 1959). This two-volume collection contains Kekkonen's speeches and writings, 1936–67, and is cited hereafter as *Puheita*.

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unilateral efforts on Finland's behalf. The Soviet leaders, he said, had not demanded from Finland " anything that might endanger our position or our neutral foreign policy."[2] The crisis of 1961 also came to an end when Kekkonen met Khrushchev, this time in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk, to discuss the Kremlin's demand for joint defence consultations with Finland. Whatever might have been Khrushchev's reasons for dropping the demand, the Finnish President's efforts and diplomatic skill had saved the day.

The security posture that Kekkonen sought to create for Finland was based on the attempt to prevent tensions. His image of security was " opening the door, not building a fence." Kekkonen believed the Finns' principal task was to convince the Soviet Union that it has no problems of security on their western flank, that Finland will remain a friendly, cooperative border state. Finland's " Scandinavian connection " was considered by Kekkonen to be essential to fulfilling Finland's unique security requirements.

WHAT, in Kekkonen's view, was the most viable means of convincing the Soviets of the positive role that Finland can play for them at their border? Writing at the end of the war in the autumn of 1944, Kekkonen reasoned that " it would be most desirable if Finland's Nordic orientation could be coordinated with that political cooperation to which Finland will bind itself with the Soviet Union when peace is made."[3] Eight years later, in 1952, Kekkonen made his notion more concrete by suggesting a neutral Scandinavian league.[4] The neutralization of the Baltic has been a continuing theme in relations between Finland and Russia. It was agreed in principle by the two countries in the Treaty of Tartu of 1920 (Article 12). A step towards operationalizing the principle came in the Kekkonen Plan of 1963, a proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the North.[5]

It is difficult to know whether the Finnish President anticipated an affirmative reaction from his Scandinavian neighbours to his proposals, or whether he was primarily interested in creating an effect for the benefit of the Soviets. Playing the Scandinavian card serves Soviet interests which, in turn, is presumably advantageous to Finland's security. The parallel between Finnish and Soviet efforts in their Nordic policies signifies an unwitting pursuit of mutual interests on the part of Finland; for Kekkonen, however, the role that he wanted Finland to play in the development of those mutual interests carried little risk and possibly high gains for his nation. He risked little in terms of the Scandinavian reaction. Even if it were negative, he did not believe that differences in foreign

[2] Ibid., p. 86.

[3] Pekka Peitsi (Urho Kekkonen), *Tässä sitä ollaan* (Tammi, Helsinki, 1944), pp. 87–88.

[4] *Puheita*, Vol. I, p. 241 (article in *Maakansa*, Helsinki, 23 Jan. 1952). The reference is to Kekkonen's " pyjama pocket " speech which was never given since he was hospitalized before he was able to make the presentation in the Finnish city of Mynämäki. The speech was subsequently published in the form of an interview in the Agrarian Party (now the Centre Party) newspaper.

[5] *Puheita*, Vol. II, p. 284 (speech to the Paasikivi Society of Helsinki, 28 May, 1963).

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policy perspective would impede other forms of cooperation among the Nordic neighbours.[6] The risk, if there were one, could not be compared to the important gains that Kekkonen thought were possible from the realization of his policy: the insulation of the North from international conflict.[7] At the very least, Kekkonen expected that his advocacy of a nuclear-free North would expand the goodwill of the Soviet Union towards Finland.

A long-standing aim of the Soviet Union has been a Nordic foreign policy that would eventually neutralize its entire northern periphery.[8] How might the Soviets accomplish this objective? The answer seemed to lie in policies that would produce a combined political and military weakening of the area, making it more susceptible to Moscow's requirements. One of the Soviet's early efforts to extend their influence in the Northern borderlands was focused on the Nordic Council. They were, however, somewhat ambivalent about it. In principle the Soviet Union opposed strong Nordic cooperation in the post-war period because it would make more difficult the process of influencing individual national policies. Also, the association with the aligned Allied states (Norway and Denmark) might risk drawing the others into NATO's " aggressive policies." This was the position held by the various communist parties of Scandinavia when they opposed the establishment of the Nordic Council in 1952.[9] On the other hand, the Nordic Council, as an organ of cooperation but limited competence, could aid in developing intra-regional ties that would contribute to breaking the bonds of the extra-regional alliance.[10] The Russians could even envision a Nordic Council of the future that included Soviet membership.[11]

THE Soviet Union showed greater interest in the notion of a nuclear-free zone as a means of achieving its goals in the North. When Nikita Khrushchev visited Finland in 1957, he spoke of the Baltic as a " zone of eternal peace," adding that the policy of Finland " favourably

[6] Finland, Ulkoasiainministeriö, *Ulkopoliittisia lausuntojo ja asiakirjoja 1962* (Valtioneuvoston kirjapaino, Helsinki, 1963), p. 13. The statement was made during an interview with Kekkonen in the Oslo newspaper, *Arbeiderbladet*, 7 Feb. 1962.

[7] In his proposal of 1963, Kekkonen said he thought the nuclear-free zone would remove the North from the " sphere of speculation caused by the development of nuclear strategy, and insure that this area will remain outside international tension." *Puheita*, Vol. II, p. 284 (speech to the Paasikivi Society of Helsinki, 28 May, 1963).

[8] Vladimir Prokofjev, *Nordeuropa og Freden* (unofficial translation of *Severnaya Evropa i mir*, The International Press, Moscow, 1966), p. 70. In discussing the desirability of an all-Nordic neutrality, Prokofjev, an expert on Scandinavia, claimed that the idea of a neutral Northern area had the support of the Nordic peoples. The neutralist and pacifist traditions in these countries he noted as " deeply rooted in the consciousness of the Nordic peoples." See pp. 9, 99, and 108.

[9] Ibid., p. 69

[10] Ibid., pp. 68–72.

[11] From time to time it has been suggested that the Soviet Union become a member of the Nordic Council, and that those states should welcome a more active role for the Soviet Union in cross-national cooperation in the Scandinavian Arctic. The suggestions have come mainly from the communist parties of the north. Nils Ørvik, " Nordic Cooperation and High Politics," *International Organization*, XXVIII (Winter 1974) 1, 87.

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influences " conditions in Northern Europe.[12] In 1958, Khrushchev let it be known that the Soviet Union would respect the status of a nuclear-free zone, and raised the subject of guarantees by saying that the Soviet Union would treat the zone as " outside the range " of nuclear weapons.[13] That same year, a Soviet writer, E. Ambartsumov, discussed the nuclear-free Baltic " sea of peace " in an article in the Helsinki conservative daily, *Uusi Suomi.* He noted that if the idea were realized it would have been affected " in a significant way " by the Finnish-Soviet friendship that secured peace in the North.[14]

The Soviet government officially proposed a nuclear-free zone in the North in the spring of 1959.[15] Four years later, in 1963, Kekkonen suggested that the Scandinavian states declare themselves a nuclear-free zone, and pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons nor to receive nuclear weapons on their territories on behalf of other powers.[16] The Scandinavian states could declare themselves a nuclear-free zone immediately, according to Kekkonen, since they already were nuclear-free and it would not, therefore, require a change in existing foreign policies; a Nordic nuclear-free zone would simply confirm, in his view, the prevailing condition.

The Soviet Union, however, seemed intent on the point of guarantees to the Northern zone. In a speech delivered in Helsinki in 1974, the Soviet head of state at the time. Nikolai Podgorny, told the Finns that the Soviet Union was prepared to guarantee, together with other nuclear powers, a nuclear-free zone in the North. In a further elaboration of their position, the Soviets moved towards an emphasis on Soviet, as distinct from superpower, guarantees of a nuclear-free zone for Northern Europe. On 25 June 1981, Leonid Brezhnev offered to guarantee against a Soviet nuclear attack those North European countries that participated in the nuclear-free zone (i.e., countries that renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons, as well as the deployment of the weapons on their respective territories). In an interview with the Finnish Social Democratic Party newspaper, *Suomen Sosialidemokratti,* the former Soviet leader said that an agreement, which could be concluded on a multilateral or bilateral basis, would " seal " and " legally formalize " the non-nuclear status of the region.[17]

With the Soviet Union as the sole guarantor and immediate nuclear power of the area, a basis would be quickly created for increased Soviet influence in Nordic policies that they have not legitimately had up to this point. One should note in this connection that the studied advance by the Soviets towards a nuclear-free zone plan has not implicated Soviet

[12] *Helsingin Sanomat*, 9 June, 1957, p. 12, quoted in John Hodgson, " The Paasikivi Line," *American Slavic and East European Review.* XVIII (April 1959), p. 166.

[13] Osmo Apunen, " Arms Control in Northern Europe," *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1978* (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, 1979), p. 13; cf. p. 11.

[14] *Uusi Suomi*, 25 March, 1958, p. 9 (article by E. Ambartsumov).

[15] Further Soviet views on the nuclear-free zone proposal are found in the remarks by Soviet leaders on the 14th anniversary of the signing of the 1948 FCMA treaty. *Päivän Sanomat*, 7 April, 1962.

[16] *Puheita*, Vol. II, pp. 284–285 (speech to the Paasikivi Society of Helsinki, 28 May, 1963).

[17] *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 27 June, 1981, p. 1.

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nuclear weapons that are present in the area. The Kola Peninsula teems with nuclear warheads and a steady capability is maintained in the Baltic. Indeed, the Serb missiles, with an approximate range of 1,000 miles, were left out of the Salt II framework as " grey area " weapons that did not belong to the strategic count. When asked about the status of nuclear arms in Soviet territory bordering a Nordic nuclear-free area, Brezhnev replied that he would not rule out the " possibilities " of discussing the Soviet area that borders the proposed Nordic NFZ.[18]

In the light of Kekkonen's preoccupation with ameliorating the threat that the Soviets might perceive to their north-western border, his call for a guaranteed nuclear-free zone must be seen less as a framework for a future arrangement in the North than as a political effort to reduce the influence and potential capability of NATO in the area. In his 1978 speech in Stockholm, where he proposed the guaranteed zone, Kekkonen took special note of US weapons technology of the time, the cruise missile and the neutron bomb, but did not refer to Soviet weapons' development. He likewise left untouched by his proposal both the presence of Soviet nuclear submarines in the Baltic and the Kola Peninsula's Northern Fleet that continues to expand. The West received the first clear indication that nuclear weapons are carried by conventionally-powered Soviet submarines stationed in the Baltic in November 1981, when a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine ran aground off the Swedish coast. The radioactivity from the nuclear weapons on board was enough for Swedish officials to measure it outside the hull.[19] The fact that Kekkonen expressed concern about possible American deployments outside the Nordic perimeter but refrained from mentioning the Soviet nuclear installations on the Nordic doorstep indicates that the appeal for a nuclear-free zone had, for Kekkonen, the critical political overtones of demonstrating accord with Soviet policy; the appeal was proof of Finland's interest in doing what it could to reduce the threat that the NATO potential represents to the Soviet Union.

Already in early 1965, Kekkonen caused some eyebrows to be raised when he departed from the more traditional Finnish stand of abstaining from a position on great-power controversies, and denounced the proposed multilateral nuclear force (MLF), a plan that, through joint commands on NATO submarines, would have brought the European allies into a closer alignment on nuclear decisions. Kekkonen said that the MLF would " endanger peace in Northern Europe " because it would strengthen West Germany's nuclear alignment in NATO.[20] While Kekkonen spoke in Moscow on the dangers of the MLF, the chief of political affairs in the Finnish Foreign Ministry was telling correspondents in Helsinki that the MLF did not concern Finland, and there were therefore no grounds for comment on it.[21]

[18] Ibid.; cf. *supra*, p. 6 regarding guarantees for the removal of nuclear weapons from the vicinity of the zone.

[19] *The Baltimore Sun*, 10 Nov., 1981.

[20] *Puheita*, Vol. II, p. 369 (speech in Moscow, 24 Feb., 1965).

[21] *Aftenposten* (Oslo), 26 Feb., 1965, p. 1.

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KEKKONEN also had in mind a reduction of the NATO threat perceived by the Soviets when, in late 1965, he proposed a demilitarized zone between Finland and Norway. Addressing the Young People's Foreign Policy Association in Helsinki on 29 November 1965, he noted that the Finno-Norwegian boundary in Lapland was the only point where the great-power blocs are contiguous in the Northern area. The Finnish leader concluded that in the event of war a neutralized strip between Soviet and Western territory in Lapland would protect that frontier from military action in the event of superpower hostilities.[22] The protection of the Lapland frontier from foreign troops was, in fact, aimed at NATO exercises in the north of Norway, since there are no " foreign troops " on the Finnish side. The annual NATO manoeuvres invariably arouse Soviet antagonism; Kekkonen's call to free the territory of the foreign troops meant, for him, one less cause for Soviet suspicion of Western Scandinavia and, consequently, one more step towards stabilizing Finland's position.

However it might be accomplished, the weakening of the NATO potential in the North was crucial to the Finns' security package as Kekkonen fashioned it. It was crucial because Soviet defensive actions promised more serious consequences for Finland than Soviet offensive moves. To the extent that Finland would be useful at all in a Soviet offensive, it would presumably be for transit purposes. As long as the Soviet leaders were reasonably assured of the cooperation of the Helsinki government, they would probably consider that occupying and holding Finland presented more problems than it solved. A Soviet offensive would more likely be waged in the North Atlantic than it would involve Finland's jurisdictional limits.

On the other hand, Soviet defensive activities based on a perceived threat from NATO could be aimed at preventing Finland from being used against the Soviets. A defensive move could theoretically run the gamut from joint consultations to joint military arrangements to Soviet " help " in resisting an attack.[23] The " help " clause of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) between Finland and the Soviet Union is of concern to the Finns because it could be interpreted to mean that in order to be operationalized the Soviets would have to send military contingents into Finland *before* an attack took place.[24] It is the presence of Soviet troops on Finnish soil that the Finns wish to avoid above all else. But the FCMA treaty of 1948 provides the legal basis for the Soviets to select, from a number of possibilities, the measures they would prefer.

[22] *Puheita*, Vol. II, p. 409 (speech to the Young People's Foreign Policy Society of Helsinki, 29 Nov., 1965).

[23] For a discussion of the concept of defence against help, see Nils Ørvik, " Defence Against Help: A Strategy for Small States? " *Survival*, XV (September/October 1973) 5, pp. 228–231.

[24] Although it was presumably understood by both Helsinki and Moscow from the outset that *both* parties would have to affirm the existence of a *threat* (to Finland, or to the Soviet Union through Finland) before joint military consultations under the treaty would commence, the actual procedures in the event of an *attack* have not been clarified.

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In connection with his effort to convince the Soviet Union of Finland's steadfast position and of the fact that Finnish territory is not a weak and open corridor to the Soviet heartland, President Kekkonen sought to demonstrate that Finland had the capability of repelling an attack for a specified period. A strong national defence was, for Kekkonen, a fundamental pillar of a policy of neutrality. One of the reasons for the failure of Finland's inter-war policy, Kekkonen believed, was that Finland could not affirm the defence of neutrality " in tight spots."[25] Kekkonen opened discussions in London in 1961 that led to a change in the interpretation of the 1947 Peace Treaty prohibiting the use and/or production of atomic weapons and missiles in Finland; in 1963, the Finnish government announced that it would acquire MiG-21 fighter planes equipped with air-to-air missiles from the Soviet Union and Vigilante-type anti-tank missiles from the British.[26] The thrust of Finland's defence reorganization plan, 1977–81, was on the stepping up of Finnish preparedness; provisions were made for a strengthened armed force, an intensified reserves' programme, expansion of the defence infrastructure, and a major effort to increase the military security of Lapland.[27]

Urho Kekkonen was thus preoccupied with doing what he could on a Nordic scale, as well as within Finland's own defence perimeter, to influence Soviet security thinking. But whatever Finland might have done towards reducing the sources of tension on the Soviet Western flank, it is unlikely to have changed the Soviets' views on measures they would consider necessary to safeguard or advance their security interests. Kekkonen was able to influence Soviet security planning as little as he could control Soviet intentions. By thinking that he could persuade his Soviet neighbours with reasonable arguments and trusting relations, he committed an error of judgment similar to that made by the Finns in 1939. At that time, the Finnish leadership tried to put forth rational arguments to Stalin, pointing out that Finland's position in the Gulf of Finland would not constitute a danger to the Soviet Union. It was in vain. The Soviet leadership *thought* that the Finnish shores were critical to their defence, regardless of the logic of that belief. The Finns in 1939 refused to accept this element of Soviet behaviour. In the current period, Finland and Scandinavia in general are of great interest to the Soviet Union no matter how the Finns perceive the situation. The focus of Soviet concern is the military organization in the North and the political possibilities of the nuclear-free zone, including the eventual neutralization of the area. Finland cannot alleviate the pressures created by the continued Soviet pursuit of these interests in the North.

[25] *Puheita*, Vol. II, pp. 188–190 (speech at Kouvola, 28 Dec., 1961).

[26] *Helsingin Sanomat*, 10 Jan., 1963, p. 5. In addition to the MiG-21s from the Soviet Union, the Finns obtained Riga-class escort ships, long-range field artillery, motors for coastal patrol boats which are built in Finland, and some amphibious tank equipment.

[27] Finland, Statsrad, *Andra Parlamentariska Försvarskommitténs Betänkande*, Kommittébetänkande Nr. 37. For a brief analysis of the status of Finnish defence, see Karen Erickson Orvik, " The Limits of Security: Defence and Foreign Trade in Finland," *Survey*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (107), Spring 1979, pp. 92–105.

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BASIC to this direction of Finnish foreign policy was the assumption that Finland had the most to fear from a Soviet *military* incursion into Finnish territory, an incursion that would be justified in terms of the 1948 FCMA treaty. There is no indication that Kekkonen considered a Russian advance probable; but it was possible, and that possibility permeated the framework of Kekkonen's thinking on Finno-Soviet relations. His assumption, based on a fear, was inaccurate, and his hypothesis, based on a hope, was inadequate.

The ends of Soviet policy in Finland are neither obvious nor specific. Since the Winter war, however, when Stalin sought to secure the access to Leningrad, there has been no basis for the Soviets to contemplate territorial conquest in Finland. It would serve no strategic purpose, and the political repercussions would make the effort an outright liability to the Soviet state. What the Soviet Union might need in terms of transit facilities in Finland could be achieved by political rather than military means of influence and control. It would be cheaper in the long run, and quicker when action was required, to have a cooperative government in Helsinki than a nation to occupy. With little or no resistance from the Finnish government, the Soviets could gradually and carefully forge the links for transit and communication facilities; if necessary, the facilities could be operationalized without the added burden of preliminary military manoeuvres to secure them. In a careful calculation of risks and gains,[28] the Soviets have, in the post-war period, rejected overt control in favour of more subtle means of influencing the conduct of relations with the Finns. There is no need to pay the cost of a military effort when the ends can be achieved by other means. Although the specific designs on Finland are unclear, the overall aim of Soviet policy is to achieve flexibility for themselves, and receptiveness on the part of the Finnish leaders in Helsinki.

Since Kekkonen viewed the ultimate Soviet challenge to Finland as a military one, he tried to develop a safety valve in the Finnish people's thinking about possible Soviet actions. Something had to replace war as the condition to be avoided at all costs. Kekkonen wanted a psychological buffer zone against the belief that war would be the inevitable result of tensions in relations with the Soviets. The new " ultimate " sanction implied in the Kekkonen policy was Soviet displeasure, dissatisfaction or disapproval; in short, the sanction of " bad relations " *(huonot suhteet)*. If the Finns developed the sense of avoiding Soviet displeasure at all costs, they could achieve a margin of safety in their attitudes and expectations towards Soviet initiatives. The idea of the sanction of bad relations would replace the idea of a more crucial sanction, the Soviet military response. In attempting to stimulate a full-scale change in traditional Finnish

[28] Risk taking in Soviet foreign policy is systematically analyzed in Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behaviour: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1982). Adomeit sets forth operational principles of the Soviet responses to international crises, all of which point to a cautionary stance. He demonstrates that a Soviet foreign policy operation is generally carefully staged, illustrates due appreciation of the foe, a sensitivity to possible obstacles, and a fallback position for each advance.

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anti-Soviet attitudes, Kekkonen succeeded in fostering a " good relations " complex among his countrymen; the " least " the Finns could do was to uphold good relations with the Soviet Union.

The difficulty with a framework that calls for widening the margin of error of what the Finns considered as possible Soviet sanctions, meant a narrowing of the margin of tolerance of what the Finns thought they could " take " from the Soviets. Theoretically, Kekkonen's reasoning made the possibility of military sanctions against Finland more remote, but, in fact, it intensified the feeling among the Finns of what they should not do. With " bad relations " the sanction to be avoided above all, the Finns had to exercise even greater caution than previously in their actions towards the Soviet Union. It would take much less on the Finns' part to elicit the Soviet response of displeasure than to occasion a military attack. The Finns would fear repercussions at an earlier stage in the course of development of tensions, and were therefore increasingly ready to anticipate Soviet reactions. This anticipation, in turn, contributed to the growth of Soviet influence in Finnish affairs.

Kekkonen gave too little attention to the phenomenon of Soviet influence. His preoccupation with the danger of, and avoidance of military involvement in, Soviet defence alternatives meant that he overworked the military security component and underplayed the psychopolitical factors of the relationship with the Soviet Union. The President emphasized that Finnish foreign policy had to be based on " realistic " assumptions about the nature of Finland's geopolitical position and the preponderant power of the Soviet Union. But he underestimated the strength of non-coercive measures. Carl Friedrich once cogently observed, " the so-called ' realist ' often turns out to be the man who fails to appreciate the subtler realities of influence in the total balance of power."[29] The range of possibilities short of military overtures that the Soviets were likely to use in achieving their objectives escaped President Kekkonen's detailed observation. His concentration on how to avoid Soviet moves that had little likelihood of occurring tended to obscure his vision of more probable Soviet actions. In order to reassure the Soviet leaders of Finland's trustworthy status, Kekkonen marked his foreign policy by the readiness to anticipate Moscow's reactions. The Soviets, in turn, utilized the Finns' determination to cooperate by cultivating their influence in Finnish internal affairs. As the post-war period progressed, the Soviet leadership increasingly developed the political, economic and cultural links in their relations with Finland.

ONE of the most noteworthy developments during the period of Kekkonen's presidency was the increased contact that the Soviets were able to make with non-communist party leaders in Finland. The results of these contacts were first manifest in the break in the traditional government cooperation between the Centre Party and the Social

[29] Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and his Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics* (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1963), p. 214.

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Democrats. Although personal animosities were evident, the gulf of tension between the Centrists and the Social Democrats could also be traced to the fact that the contact Moscow had with some Centre Party leaders and the favour with which the Kremlin regarded the party gave it a pro-Soviet (trust and good relations) image; the Social Democrats, in contrast, acquired willy-nilly an anti-Soviet (pre-Winter war, " correct " relations) image. The difficulties between the Centre Party and the Social Democratic Party coincided with an actual split in Social Democratic ranks. The opposition splinter faction, the Social Democratic League, also became an object of Moscow's courtship, although the affair was relatively brief. The opposition group did not sustain a sufficiently significant following to keep Moscow interested over the longer period. However, the pattern of party contact had been established, and the Soviets continued to work systematically from one major political party to the next, inviting representatives to Moscow and, in effect, opening up direct lines of communication between the CPSU and the non-communist Finnish leaders.

The " Soviet connection " was an effective element in the change of course that finally returned the Social Democratic Party to the government in 1966. For 8 years, the Social Democrats had remained outside the government, alternately refusing, and not being offered, cooperation with the Centre Party. Discussions between Soviet and Social Democratic leaders in Moscow, however, were important in paving the way for the party's comeback in the Finnish government. After their election showing in the parliamentary contest of 1966, the Social Democrats formed a coalition with the Centre Party that included representatives of the People's Democrats. This marked the first time since 1948 that communists had sat in the Finnish cabinet. The contact between Moscow and certain Social Democratic Party members continued, with one visible result being the inclusion in the government (1968) of Väinö Leskinen (he became the Foreign Minister in 1970). Earlier, Leskinen had been *persona non grata* par excellence to the Soviets.[30] Kekkonen singled him out as one of four Finnish leaders whose foreign policy differed from Kekkonen's, and who was not trusted by the Soviet leadership.[31]

The Soviet Union expanded its party contact by select talks with members of the National Coalition (the Conservatives), a party of the right that increased in strength in the 1970s, after having suffered in the shadow of identification with the war effort, 1941-44. In particular, Moscow sought to open the lines of communication to Finnish business and industrial leaders, many of them Conservatives, with the hope of developing tighter links between the Finnish and Soviet economies. As well as providing for mutual defence, the FCMA treaty offers a basis for

[30] Leskinen's close association with Väinö Tanner was a major reason for the Soviet disapproval. Tanner was the long-time leader of Finland's Social Democratic Party and also a convicted war criminal in the trials held in Helsinki after the war at Soviet insistence.

[31] *Puheita*, Vol. II, p. 220 (speech in Helsinki, 7 Jan., 1962). The other leaders mentioned by Kekkonen were: Väinö Tanner (Social Democrat), Tuure Junnila (Conservative), and Georg Ehrnrooth (Swedish People's Party).

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expanding the scope of economic relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Article 5 of the treaty stipulates that the parties develop their economic and cultural relations. Soviet writers have elaborated on the possibility, and the treaty has been projected as going " far beyond the mere ordering of relations with the Soviet Union "; it also " mirrors common opinions " on the problems of international politics."[32]

PRESIDENT Kekkonen's failure to appreciate the subtleties of influence meant that he, in fact, misjudged the realities of Soviet power. Although the Soviets chose to express their power chiefly by influence, it is of course clear that the Soviet position is based on their capacity to constrain the Finns to act in accord with their wishes. But under Kekkonen's tutelage, which emphasized the importance of cooperation with the Soviets, it became difficult to tell whether the Finns conformed to Soviet wishes out of a fear of repercussions or out of a developing conviction that it was in their common interest. Both elements appeared to be present. The ratio of coercion to consent was undoubtedly high in the Finno-Soviet relationship as the Finns revised many basic suppositions of their foreign policy towards the Soviet Union after the war and the new stress given to trust and good relations was at least in part a rationalization of the essentially coercive potential of the Soviet position towards Finland. After some time, however, the rationalization tends to create its own logic, and the original force of constraint behind the change in Finnish foreign policy gradually dropped out of focus. Friedrich observes that " though constraint in many situations may play a very considerable role, it is often obscured by manifest consent."[33] The Finns' dogged stress on good and trustworthy ties with the Soviets in the post-war period made the relations of influence between the two countries appear to be based on a high degree of consent.

The unique contribution of the Kekkonen policy was the effort to turn the manifest consent of the Finnish people into a conviction about: (1) the need to develop trust with the Soviets; and (2) the validity of the Kekkonen-directed foreign policy as the means to fulfil this need. It should be accepted as an article of faith; its breach would promise untold consequences. In this respect, the Kekkonen policy represented a major transition from the earlier post-war policy of President Paasikivi. In contrast to the Paasikivi era, the Finns inherited from Kekkonen a legacy of responding to Soviet demands not merely because it is necessary, but presumably because it is right. What is a major political question—how to deal with the Russians—acquired in Kekkonen's time the quality of an ethical standard. A Finn does not question his nation's foreign policy.[34]

[32] T. Ilunskij, " The Paasikivi Line, A Finnish National Accomplishment," *World Economy and International Relations*, No. 3, 1963, quoted in *Uusi Suomi*, 4 May, 1963, p. 15.

[33] Friedrich, p. 203.

[34] A leading Finnish politician at the time reported that during his parliamentary election campaign of 1978, foreign policy questions did not come up once. Harri Holkeri, in an interview with Seymour Topping, " Under the Shadow of the Kremlin," in *The New York Times Magazine*, 3 Dec. 1978, p. 174.

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He both accepts the official policy as the only possible course and considers that it is to the good for the Finnish nation.

The attempt to de-politicize the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union and to put relations with the Soviets on the level of a crusade has limited the Finns in their negotiating position with Moscow. The Soviets can rest comfortably in the knowledge that Finland's intentions will remain fixed. The trust the Finns wanted to create in order to strengthen their position with Moscow is in fact their major point of weakness. The Soviets have been allowed, in effect, the benefit of a predictable pattern of response by the Finns who, when they experienced increased anxiety over their safety, showed a proportionally greater willingness to conform to Moscow's wishes. This policy gave Moscow, in effect, advance notice that its continued use of influence in Finland would produce the desired results. In theory, the logic of this policy should lead Finland towards a stable condition in relations with the Soviets; tensions would be minimized and mutual advantages maximized. In practice, the Finns are no more secure by the reassurances they provide the Soviets than if they were to adopt a less Soviet-prone position. No one really knows what the Russians feel is necessary at any given time to uphold their security. If Finland continues to try to preempt the non-specific bidding of the Soviets, it not only helps the Russians to increase their influence for influence's sake but it also places the Finns in a position where there are barely any limits to their accommodation of the Soviet Union and little leverage against Soviet wishes.

THE Finns may feel that they have to work towards developing trustworthy relations with the Soviets, but can they ever say that they have achieved this objective? By conforming to, and even anticipating, Soviet policies, the Finns have failed to canvass the possibilities of unpredictability and the greater leverage that it would give them in relations with the Soviet Union. Were the Finns, on the other hand, to give Kremlin leaders reason to doubt that the often strong-handed Soviet policies would perpetuate a high degree of conforming behaviour, they might put themselves in a position where Moscow would have to take into account to some extent *Finnish* reactions. A break in the logic of the Finnish conduct that has provided predictability for the Soviet Union up to now would not necessarily endanger Finland's relations with Moscow. What, in fact, would be the likely Russian response to greater self-assertion by the Finns?

An analysis of probable Soviet reactions towards its periphery must rely first and foremost on an overall view of the state of the world strategic arena. There is no doubt that, with both the Allies and the Soviet Union in agreement, Finland ended up in the Soviet sphere of influence after the war; moreover, Finland could have become a Soviet satellite.[35] Finland was allowed internal autonomy in return for delivering a foreign policy

[35] Adam Ulam, *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970–1982* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1983), p. 18.

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that conformed to Soviet requirements. This factual condition of the post-war state of affairs provided Finnish post-war presidents J. K. Paasikivi and Kekkonen with their cues for structuring Finland's policies in such a way that the Russians would have no grounds for perceiving a threat through Finland.

Today, however, we may be witnessing a change in the prevailing post-war understanding of spheres of influence. The American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, while not a shattering blow, ran contrary to Soviet expectations. It thus raises questions with respect to: (1) how the superpowers ultimately interpret the bounds of their spheres of influence; and (2) how the rules of behaviour within those spheres are interpreted.

As to what comprises the respective spheres, one expert observer suggests that " where the boundaries of the respective spheres will ultimately lie depends largely on the strength of the influence already established and on the adversaries' perceptions of the risk involved in bettering that influence."[36] A sphere of influence today is not always commensurate with the distance from the influencing power. Cuba, for example, bears the established identity and influence of Soviet power; therefore, although it lies on the US periphery, America is not likely to intervene to overthrow the Castro regime there. But, as the American action in Grenada demonstrates, the US would intervene if its security interest were challenged.

The implications of the present uncertainties surrounding spheres of influence are particularly important for Finland. They indicate that:

1) Finland's identity in the Soviet sphere might be more qualified than the assumptions of the Kekkonen policy would indicate;
2) Finland's recognition of the Soviets' security concerns need not assume a Soviet need for extending its influence in Finland's internal policies;
3) Modification of Finland's identity in the Soviet sphere depends on the continued strength and viability of the country's free, democratic government and the continued strength of its social order based on Western values and institutions.

The central point of Kekkonen's policy was that the Finns had to do whatever possible to cultivate that trust. This was his legacy to the present. Trust, however, is an elusive goal. Have the Finns finally achieved the " trust " of the Soviet Union? No matter what the Finns do or refrain from doing, there is no guide nor is there an end to what the Finns must do in order to gain Soviet trust. On the other hand, if the Russians have grounds to be uncertain of Finnish reactions, Finland becomes less " Finlandized " than the Kekkonen policy implied as necessary. If the Kekkonen precepts do persist, Finland's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union will, from here on, be more, not less, difficult.

[36] Paul Keal, " Contemporary understanding about spheres of influence," *Review of International Studies*, IX (July 1983) 3, p. 167.

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Soviet Policy Towards China*

Harry Gelman

TODAY, seven years since Mao Zedong left the scene, two tendencies are visibly contending for predominance in Soviet policy towards China. One current of opinion, which I consider much the weaker of the two, favours more active Soviet steps to conciliate the PRC in order to try to expand the modest areas of improvement in Sino-Soviet relations that have emerged since 1981, and, if possible, permanently to redirect Chinese fears and hostility away from the Soviet Union and towards the United States. The other current, which at present seems to me to have considerably greater strength in Moscow, also would like to see a meaningful Sino-Soviet rapprochement but is highly sceptical that this can be achieved and most reluctant to make significant concessions to Beijing without far-fetching prior Chinese concessions. Above all, those who support this latter tendency appear to be unwilling to sacrifice the concrete geopolitical advantages around China's periphery which Soviet military power achieved in the 1970s at China's expense.

As a result, Sino-Soviet relations now exist simultaneously on two widely divergent tracks. On secondary matters, there continues to be gradual progress; on major matters, there remains a total impasse.

On the one hand, the Soviets and the Chinese both see it as in their interests to continue to pursue a series of slow, step-by-step improvements in certain aspects of their state-to-state relations, particularly in the spheres of economics, sports and culture. The Soviets sought such improvements immediately after Mao's death, and the Chinese allowed them to begin in 1979 and to acquire new impetus since 1981. This process has reduced tension between the two powers and has cumulatively imparted a certain civility and normality to the relationship. But Chinese intercourse with the Soviet Union, in the economic and every other sphere, is still much more restricted in scope than even American dealings with the USSR.

Meanwhile, side by side with this, on the second track an intense conflict of national interest persists between Beijing and Moscow. The Andropov leadership has thus far preserved intact those Brezhnev policies in Asia—regarding the Soviet military build-up along the Sino-Soviet border, Soviet troops dispositions in Mongolia, Soviet strategic deployments of the Backfire bomber and the SS-20, Soviet support for the Vietnamese conquest of Cambodia, Soviet naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay, and Soviet military efforts to enforce their domination of Afghanistan—which the Chinese regard as grave attacks on their interests or threats to their security. On the whole, the momentum behind

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this general pattern of Soviet behaviour seems quite impressive, and I believe the Chinese are quite pessimistic that it will change.

The Dual Nature of Soviet Policy

This duality in Soviet policy towards China—the desire, on the one hand, to improve relations with Beijing, and the determination, on the other hand, to press Soviet interests that conflict with Beijing's—has been characteristic of Soviet behaviour for many years. Throughout the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute, a clash of underlying national interests has been a vital factor in the growth of the conflict, changing and broadening and becoming more visible as the years went on.

To be sure, in the early years of the dispute this factor was interwoven with others, notably the personal struggle between Mao and Khrushchev and the ideological clash between Khrushchev's reformism and Mao's fanaticism. But even in the 1950s and early 1960s, when the Sino-Soviet arguments seemed esoteric and the main arena of the dispute was the international communist movement, the focus of the struggle was over the authority to determine whose national interests—Moscow's or Beijing's—should be accorded greater weight in the formulation of communist policy.

IT should be remembered that the willingness of Stalin's heirs to sacrifice concrete Soviet interests to propitiate the Chinese rapidly dwindled when it became apparent that China could not be harnessed to Soviet purposes. The early Soviet return of Port Arthur and Dairen to China, and the assistance originally given to the Chinese economy and to Chinese military capabilities, were thus eventually followed by the Soviet effort to control Chinese behaviour by demanding establishment of a " joint fleet " dominated by Moscow, by the Soviet refusals to give the atomic weapon to China, and by the punitive withdrawal of Soviet experts from the PRC.

All this is worth recalling now because to some extent, the memory of these events a quarter of a century ago still conditions the attitudes of both sides today. On the Soviet side, it reinforces the attitude of those—notably in the military—who tend to be most reluctant to give up existing Soviet geopolitical advantages in Asia for the sake of a conjectural future pay-off in Chinese goodwill. On the Chinese side, the memory of the past remains a continuing lesson in Soviet perfidy towards China, and a warning against over-optimism in dealing with the present Soviet leaders.

Soviet Motives for the Far East Build-Up[1]

It is primarily since 1965 that the Sino-Soviet rivalry has been militarized. One of the major legacies of the Brezhnev regime has been the long-term

[1] See Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China*, R-2943-AF, August 1982. The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica.

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build-up of Soviet forces confronting China, a process which began early in the Brezhnev era and has continued methodically to the present day, in tandem with the growth of Soviet strategic forces deployed against the United States. Khrushchev's successors began this Asian build-up when they decided that Khrushchev's removal had not altered Mao's hostility towards the Soviet Union and that they faced a serious Chinese challenge to the legitimacy of Soviet borders with the PRC. They resolved to undertake a permanent strengthening of their position in the Far East, both to ensure their hold on the frontiers they claimed and, more broadly, to create the means to exert pressure on China. They have come to regard the tank forces they have stationed in Mongolia, threatening the north China plain, as a key element in this pressure. In sum, they have been determined to create and maintain a continuously updated decisive advantage in firepower facing China at every step up the potential ladder of escalation, with the criterion for sufficiency heavily influenced by the need to compensate for dependence on a long and vulnerable railway for reinforcement. All these considerations were strengthened by the Soviet experience in 1969, when the USSR had a long series of border clashes with China, and then further strengthened by the adamant position upheld by Beijing in the border negotiations conducted between 1969 and 1978.

WHILE this initial Soviet motive for the build-up—to deter and overawe China—endures, over the past decade it has been supplemented by additional motives.

First, the Soviets have also come increasingly to rely on their armed forces' dispositions to China's *north* to inhibit China's response to the military initiatives of the Soviets or their clients to China's *south*. The Soviets first discovered this collateral benefit of their Far East build-up during the India-Pakistan war of 1971, when the US feared that the PRC would come to Pakistan's aid despite Soviet support for India, precipitating a Sino-Soviet conflict. This did not happen, and the Soviet leaders are likely to have concluded that Beijing was effectively deterred by the threat to the north.

This conclusion was reinforced in late 1978 and early 1979, when Vietnam launched its *blitzkrieg* into Cambodia after signing a treaty with the USSR that was obviously intended to deter China. Although the PRC responded in February–March 1979 with a punitive temporary and shallow incursion into Vietnam, the Chinese in effect conceded that they believe a more meaningful, far-reaching and long-lived threat to Hanoi—an attack which seriously attempted to force Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia—would entail unacceptable risks of a Soviet military response to the north. The Soviets extracted concrete geopolitical benefits in return for providing this deterrent and other services to Hanoi.

Secondly, since 1978 the Soviets have been concerned to ensure that their strength in the Far East sufficed to insure a continued Soviet

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advantage in this arena in the event of the evolution of military cooperation between the United States, China and Japan. Partly for this reason, over the past five years the Soviet Far East build-up has been revitalized. A high command has been established for Soviet forces in the three eastern military districts and Mongolia, in effect formalizing Soviet acceptance of the need for a permanent, self-sufficient, and very large military presence in the area. There has been some tendency towards more forward deployment of forces facing the Soviet Union's neighbours—deployments in Mongolia, in the case of China, and in the Japanese " Northern Territories " (the southernmost Kuriles) in the case of Japan. Over the same period, the Soviet Union has made more visible to China and Japan, through the increasing deployment of the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 missile, the threat of strategic weapons of mass destruction. These trends in Soviet military policy in the Far East are clearly intended to intimidate, and have not been halted despite the dwindling of the ephemeral prospect of Sino-Japanese-US joint military collaboration against the Soviet Union. As in Europe, the Soviet Union continues to count on the pressure created by its growing strength to inhibit the response of its adversaries.

Finally, by the time of Andropov's advent to power in November 1982, Soviet policy towards China had also become intertwined with Soviet efforts to consolidate a series of advanced positions staked out through the use of Soviet military power in Asia during the 1970s. In the 9 months since Andropov took office, the Chinese have seen little change in the thrust of these Soviet efforts.

IN Afghanistan, the PRC perceives continuing Soviet punitive war aimed at perpetuating Soviet military control of a country on China's western frontier. The Chinese are scornful of the motives underlying Soviet conversations with Pakistan on the Afghan issue, regarding this as an attempt to separate Pakistan from support of the Afghan rebellion without sacrificing the essence of Soviet domination of Afghanistan.

More important to China than relatively distant Afghanistan is Indochina, where Soviet policy supports Vietnam's military efforts to consolidate its domination over the peninsula and to exclude Chinese influence from a region Beijing has long regarded as essential to its interests. Vietnam is determined to maintain its control over Cambodia, and China is determined to break it; despite some political posturing by both sides, neither really believes that there can be a compromise over these conflicting goals. Meanwhile, in return for Soviet services to Vietnam, Soviet political influence has followed in the wake of Vietnam into Cambodia and Laos and the Soviet Union has secured use of Cam Ranh Bay to support growing naval operations on China's south-eastern flank. Soviet authorities must value these military privileges highly, and would be extremely loath to give them up.

Since Andropov came to power, despite some persistent Soviet friction with Hanoi, and despite evident Vietnamese initial fears that the Soviets

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might betray them for the sake of improving relations with China, this has not happened. The Soviets probably believe that only truly drastic Soviet pressures on Hanoi might possibly bring sufficient Vietnamese concessions to satisfy Beijing, and that the attempted use of such pressures would in the meantime gravely endanger the Soviet relationship with Vietnam and the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay. To run political risks of this magnitude, the Soviets apparently want commensurate payment in advance from Beijing. Thus far, the Soviets have been unwilling to risk losing the bird in the hand—their present advantages in Indochina—for the uncertainties of the bird in the bush—hypothetical Chinese gratitude. The inertia created by existing Soviet geopolitical advantages thus continues to dominate Soviet policy in Indochina, and to perpetuate Chinese resentment.

The Question of Soviet Troops Dispositions

Most important of all is Soviet policy in the north, where the new Andropov regime has thus far been unwilling to make any concessions regarding the disposition of Soviet troops facing China. In the autumn of 1982, the Soviets had dropped a number of public and private hints that they might eventually do so, and Brezhnev shortly before his death had made an allusion to China in an address to military leaders which was also interpreted by many observers as implying the possibility of eventual Soviet conciliatory steps. Since then, however, the Chinese have apparently found, in the two sessions of bilateral talks they have held with the Soviets, that the Soviet leadership has not been prepared to follow through on these hints. The Chinese are evidently particularly disturbed at the Soviet refusal thus far to discuss Soviet forces in Mongolia, which the Chinese see as the most threatening aspect of the Soviet military posture. From the Soviet perspective, as already suggested, these force dispositions in the north are intimately connected with Soviet ambitions in the south. The Soviet forces in Mongolia are, among other things, an instrument of pressure to ensure that China is permanently deterred from intervening in force in response to Vietnam's operations in Indochina. In addition to all other considerations, it is thus quite difficult for the Soviet leaders to be seen making concessions to China regarding forces in the north while fighting continues in Indochina and tension prevails between Vietnam and the PRC.

The Soviets have replied to Chinese demands regarding their forces in Mongolia by asserting that this issue concerns a " third country," and that Beijing can only discuss this with Ulan Bator. From the Chinese perspective, this reply is just hypocritical, since the Mongolian regime, unlike Hanoi, is in fact a Soviet satellite obedient to Soviet wishes. In this context, the Chinese probably regard as ominous the recent Mongolian expulsion of some Chinese nationals. While good evidence is lacking, an explanation for Mongolian conduct which the Chinese may favour is that

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the Soviet Union has instructed Tsedendal to create new bilateral friction between Mongolia and the PRC as a pretext to justify continued Soviet intransigence regarding Soviet forces in the country.

The Intractable Border Issue

The present Soviet posture, in short, is one of waiting for major Chinese concessions before agreeing to reciprocal Soviet concessions. While one can only speculate as to what the Soviets require from the Chinese, one possibility is a further reduction of existing Chinese security cooperation with the United States. Another is a firm indication of Chinese willingness to settle existing border claims against the Soviet Union.

Although the Chinese have not highlighted these claims in recent years, they have apparently maintained them intact. As spelled out in the years of border negotiations in the 1970s, these involve territories which the PRC claims Russia and the Soviet Union have seized *in addition* to the territory given Moscow in a series of " unequal treaties " signed in the nineteenth century. For the most part, this consists of islands in the border rivers in the east, and a large tract in the Pamir mountains in the west. The Chinese for years have demanded that the USSR evacuate every inch of the territory the Chinese define as being in dispute, prior to demarcation of an agreed frontier. It is this demand, in particular, which Moscow wishes Biejing to abandon. While rejecting it, the Soviets have over the years frequently offered China, instead, palliatives such as a non-aggression pact, which Beijing has invariably spurned. The recent Soviet reiteration of the offer of such a pact is thus not regarded by China as a Soviet concession.

On the whole, the border issue has been intractable to date because the Chinese negotiating position has been interwoven with the much broader Chinese geopolitical struggle against the Soviet Union. The Soviets may hope that given enough time, and given a relaxation of Chinese attitudes towards the USSR, Beijing may finally change its position and accommodate itself with Soviet wishes.

The Soviet View of the Internal Chinese Scene

The Soviets today, as often in the past, are making vigorous efforts to appeal to elements in the Chinese elite that they think are the most likely to wish to conciliate the Soviet Union. Although Soviet hopes in this regard were frequently frustrated in Mao's lifetime, since Mao's death in 1976 many Soviet specialists on China have drawn renewed encouragement from the increased Chinese civility in state-to-state relations, from the disappearance of Chinese ideological attack against the Soviet Union, from the rehabilitation of some older Chinese cadres who in the past had favoured a more moderate Chinese attitude towards the USSR, and from

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the evident divisions within the Chinese elite. They set grounds for hope in the similarities between the Chinese and Soviet social systems and state structures and in the resentment shown by some Chinese leaders over what they regard as the subversive effect of Western influence upon their control over the Chinese population.

Finally, the Soviets have for many years believed that there are hidden elements in the Chinese armed forces with attitudes that may be exploitable for Soviet interests, and they continue today to strive to tap such sentiment in the PLA. They maintain for this purpose a clandestine radio—Radio Ba Yi ("August the First"—founding date of the PLA)—broadcasting from the Soviet Far East but purporting to emanate from China and to represent a Chinese faction. This radio has in the past violently attacked Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders; although these personal attacks have now been softened for the time being, the Chinese leadership certainly regards Radio Ba Yi as another in a long series of Soviet attempts to interfere in Chinese internal affairs. This perception is not likely to predispose Deng to wish to make further concessions to Moscow.

In general, the societal factors in China that give Soviet specialists hope, while real enough, are thus far more than counterbalanced by the fact that most Chinese continue to believe, as the Chinese Premier recently reiterated, that the Soviet Union continues to pose a grave threat to Chinese security interests around the Chinese periphery.

Soviet Hopes for the Economic Relationship

The Soviets have also for many years sought to get the Chinese to agree to a major expansion of the economic relationship—drastically cut back by the PRC since the 1960s—in the belief that this would help promote the gradual restoration of some Soviet influence in China. To this end, on a number of occasions in the past they have also made specific offers of technological assistance to China, notably in the fields of coal mining, non-ferrous metallurgy, and oil development. The last such identifiable Soviet proposal was made many years ago; it is not known whether the Soviets have privately revived any such concrete offer in recent years. Nor is it clear whether the Chinese would accept, in view of their memory of the abrupt withdrawal of the Soviet experts in 1960 and Beijing's traditional resistance to the large-scale return of such agents of Soviet influence or to renewed dependence on the USSR. It is likely that the Chinese response, should the Soviets ever reiterate such an offer, would be conditioned by the nature, scope and economic relevance of the proposal. It is noteworthy that in one area in which the Soviets have offered technological help in the past—oil exploitation—the USSR no longer has a significant technological advantage over China.

On the purely trading side of the relationship, the Soviets undoubtedly consider that they have made a major advance with the recent Chinese

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consent to more than double total turnover this year to some $800 million. From the Soviet perspective, this is the most important result yet to emerge from the otherwise marginal recent advances in state-to-state dealings. The Soviets for many years have hoped that the Chinese would eventually be enticed by a desire to secure spare parts and machinery for the large segment of the Chinese industrial base originally built with Soviet help in the 1950s. More recently, the Soviets have counted on a Chinese desire to secure some middle-level Soviet technology more easily assimilated by the Chinese economy than the advanced technology Beijing has bought from the West and Japan. These considerations, along with a PRC desire to conserve hard currency and to diversify its sources of supply, may well contribute to a continued growth of Sino-Soviet trade over the next few years, particularly if total Chinese foreign trade continues to expand. But the growth of Soviet exports to China will continue to be conditioned by Soviet readiness to accept an equal value of Chinese exports every year, since for political reasons the Chinese will accept no imbalances in each year's trading account with the Soviet Union.

Considered more broadly, Sino-Soviet trade today remains only a fairly small fraction of Sino-US, let alone Sino-Japanese trade, and this central fact is not likely to change. The PRC is unlikely to abandon its primary reliance upon the capitalist industrialized world for inputs to China's modernization, and the Soviet Union will almost certainly remain a secondary factor in this process. The political advantages that the Soviets can extract from the growth of their economic relationship with Beijing will therefore probably remain rather limited.

The Sino-American Factor

Soviet conduct strongly implies a belief that Soviet chances of securing further significant concessions from China will be heavily influenced by the future course of Sino-American relations, and that the USSR has a vested interest in the deterioration of those relations. The Soviet leaders thus obviously believe that the growth of Sino-US friction over the Taiwan issue under the Reagan Administration was one important factor that impelled Beijing since 1981 to allow some improvements in Sino-Soviet state-to-state dealings even though the Soviet Union has not yet made any of the geopolitical concessions to China which the PRC had previously posed as prerequisites to any such improvements. Soviet propaganda statements, from those of Brezhnev down, have transparently sought to appeal to Chinese grievances over Taiwan. They have attempted to convince Beijing that those grievances are more important for Chinese interests than the Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet border or Soviet behaviour in Indochina and Afghanistan. They seek to play upon Chinese resentment of the assertions of some Americans that China is dependent on the United States.

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At the same time, the dominant forces in the Soviet elite also appear to believe that Soviet intimidation has played a significant role in securing a modification in Beijing's posture towards Moscow since 1981. As they do in Europe, the Soviets seek both to deny the existence of a Soviet threat to China and paradoxically to encourage a tendency to propitiate Moscow to mitigate the danger created by the threat. The Soviets are well aware of the concerns created in Beijing by the emergence of a two-front confrontation with the USSR and its Vietnamese ally since 1979. They are equally aware of the PRC's grave weakness in military technology and of the desire of the Chinese leadership to limit the diversion to military spending of resources desperately needed for China's economic development. They therefore probably believe that the Chinese decision to permit some improvement in state-to-state relations with Moscow was in large part a move to ease the tensions and reduce the danger created by China's relative weakness and by the Soviet Union's geopolitical hold over China. From the perspective of many in Moscow, however, this Chinese motive is, itself, one good reason to maintain the existing pressure on Beijing, and to make no unilateral concessions.

THE dominant forces in the Soviet elite are intensely suspicious of Chinese intentions and, in particular, of Deng Xiaoping, whom they have known, disliked, and fought against for a long time. They are likely to believe that one of the factors underlying Chinese behaviour towards the USSR over the past two years has been a tactical Chinese desire to use Chinese dealings with Moscow to exert tacit pressure on the United States for bilateral concessions within an overall framework of continued resistance to Soviet policy by both powers. Although they note—and welcome—Chinese criticisms of the United States and the cessation of Chinese calls for a " world united front " against the Soviet Union, they remain highly sceptical of Chinese assertions intended to imply equidistance between the Soviet Union and the United States. They are vividly aware of the extent to which their broad interests and ambitions clash permanently with China's in Asia, of the fact that the United States and the PRC continue to work in parallel to oppose Soviet policy in Indochina and Afghanistan, of the fact that more concrete forms of US-PRC security cooperation evidently continue to exist, of the fact that the PRC continues to seek broader access to US technology with military applications for defence against the Soviet Union, and of the US Secretary of Defence's visit to China. It will therefore seem obvious to The Soviet leadership that despite the many areas of bilateral Sino-US friction, China thus far is still not equidistant; on the contrary, it continues to lean to one side, in fact if not in name. This perception is also likely to reinforce the arguments of those in Moscow who are particularly inclined to maintain an adamant position on the central issues raised in the Sino-Soviet talks.

In sum, for the time being the consensus in Moscow appears to be an inclination to stand firm, and to hope that time will work in the USSR's

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favour. Although some new symbolic Soviet gesture towards the Chinese is conceivable, the trend of thought in Moscow that favours important unilateral concessions appears to be outweighed by the tendency that does not. The first viewpoint may be influential among some academic China specialists; the second seems likely to be particularly strong among the ideologues of the Central Committee apparatus and within the Soviet military. Meanwhile, Soviets of all persuasions are hoping that the process of slow state-to-state improvements, and the growth of economic and cultural intercourse, will gradually change Chinese international priorities. They hope also that heightened Sino-American frictions over Taiwan may in time incline Beijing to take further steps to conciliate the Soviet Union. Finally, they probably have now begun to await the death of Deng as they once awaited the death of Mao, counting on favourable changes to emerge from the maelstrom of Chinese politics once the man they consider their key opponent has departed the scene.

Implications for the United States

Given the incendiary potential of the present constellation of forces in the Far East and the extent of overall Soviet-American tension world-wide, the modest improvements, in Sino-Soviet relations that have taken place in the past two years, by reducing the likelihood of Sino-Soviet conflict that might spread to involve the United States, have somewhat improved the prospects for stability in the region, a fact which itself can be welcome to the United States. At the same time, despite some protestations to the contrary, the Soviets clearly tie their hopes for more meaningful improvements with China to hopes for a radical degeneration of Sino-American relations, and thus seek a significant improvement in their position in the Sino-Soviet-US triangle at the expense of the United States. Such a change would be quite harmful to US interests.

A shift of this kind still seems unlikely, primarily because of the assertive dynamism of Soviet foreign policy, which continues to press against Chinese interests around the Chinese periphery in much the same way that it presses against the positions of Japan, the United States, and a variety of other US allies in Asia and other parts of the world. The Soviets are now seeking to consolidate military advances made at the expense of their rivals in the 1970s in Afghanistan and Indochina, and simultaneously to overcome the adverse political reaction—in China and many other states—without abandoning those gains. At the same time, they steadily augment the military power with which they seek to intimidate their opponents on all sides, including China. Given these circumstances, it is in the United States' interest to so conduct its policy towards the PRC as to encourage the Chinese propensity to resist, rather than accommodate, Soviet pressure.

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The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict Over Kampuchea

Pao-min Chang

ALTHOUGH it must not be separated from the broader geopolitical rivalry between China and Russia, the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Kampuchea is rooted in a fundamental clash between two different perceptions of the status of Kampuchea wrought by geography and history. Nearly 600 miles from the Chinese border and all but enclosed by other South-East Asian nations, Kampuchea until the middle of the twentieth century was marginal to China's concerns and never a target of Chinese political influence. Being the single most Indianized nation in the region, it was also described throughout Chinese history as an independent nation with its own distinct culture and ethnic peculiarities.[1] In fact, Kampuchea is the only country in mainland South-East Asia which has never witnessed Chinese military intervention, even at the zenith of the imperial power during the Yuan Dynasty.[2] Although trade relations between the two countries date back to the third century AD, official contacts were most irregular and perfunctory and were maintained only in so far as the Khmer Empire showed any interest in China.[3] And from the mid-fifteenth century on, Kampuchea for more than 400 years virtually disappeared from China's court records.

Throughout the prolonged negotiations between China and France over Indochina in the late nineteenth century, Beijing was exclusively concerned with the problem of Annam and never raised a question over Kampuchea, which had never been part of the Chinese Empire.[4] When China during the republican era began to show an interest in Kampuchea, it did so by championing the cause of self-determination for all Indochinese nations and by lending considerable moral and material support to the anti-French movement.[5] During the Second World War,

[1] Huang Xionglueh, *Jianpuzai zhilueh* (A Short Survey of Kampuchea) (Zhengzhong shuju, Shanghai, 1957), pp. 27–33. Zhao Lingyang, et al. (ed.), *Southeast Asia in Chinese Reign Chronicles, 1368–1644* (Xuejing Press, Hong Kong, 1976), p. 16ff. The only extensive written account of Kampuchea in the Chinese language before the twentieth century was a thirteenth-century travelogue compiled by Zhou Daguan; it gave every impression that Kampuchea was a strange land which had few similarities with China. See Zhou Daguan, *Zhengla fongtu ji* (The Land and People of Kampuchea) (Zhonghua shuju, Shanghai, 1934 reprint).

[2] Huang, loc. cit. See also, Martin F. Herz, *A Short History of Cambodia* (Praeger, New York, 1958), pp. 39–55.

[3] Huang, loc. cit. Even at the peak of development of China's tributary relations with South-East Asian countries in the early fifteenth century, Kampuchea received the fewest missions from China and also sent the fewest to China of all South-East Asian states, including Brunei. See Wang Gungwu, "Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay," in John K. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Order* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 58.

[4] This fact is evident from the numerous memorials and diplomatic correspondences on Sino-French relations. See Zhongguo shixueh hui (The History Society of China) (ed.), *Zhong-Fa Zhanzhen* (The Sino-French War) (Renmin chubanshe, Shanghai, 1961), in 7 volumes, particularly Volumes 5 and 6.

[5] King C. Chen, *Vietnam and China* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969), pp. 55–85ff; Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny* (Macmillan, New York, 1947), pp. 253–60.

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China in fact clashed with France over the future of Indochina, and throughout the brief period of Chinese occupation of Vietnam following the end of war, Beijing repeatedly declared its wishes to see the full independence of all nations in the region.[6] The communist regime merely continued such a policy when it became the first government to recognize Vietnam in 1949 and set out to promote the liberation of the whole of Indochina.[7]

Vietnam's perceptions of and relationship to Kampuchea have been qualitatively different from China's. Kampuchea and the entire Mekong Delta which it occupied until the late seventeenth century was the natural target of a long and steady process of the southward and westward expansion of the Vietnamese after their full independence from China in the tenth century.[8] As a result of their sheer numerical superiority and better organizational skills, the Vietnamese in their confrontation with the declining Khmer Empire quickly gained the upper hand and also came to view the Khmers as " barbarians."[9] As a matter of historical record, Kampuchea after the sixteenth century paid tributes first to Siam (Thailand) and then to Vietnam, but not to China, and for two centuries until the French arrival, Vietnam repeatedly intervened in Kampuchean affairs.[10] In fact, by the 1830s, the Vietnamese had already occupied and administered most of present lowland Kampuchea and were in the process of Vietnamizing the kingdom in all its cultural aspects.[11] The independence of the Khmer state was only salvaged first by a mass rebellion against the Vietnamese occupation with enthusiastic support from Siam (Thailand), and then by the French intervention in the middle of the nineteenth century.[12]

Although France put an end to the ambitions of Vietnam in Kampuchea, the creation of a French Indochina actually lent legitimacy to the identity of all Indochina as a single, united political entity, by firmly enclosing Kampuchea in the union. It also strengthened the traditional Vietnamese perceptions of Kampuchea and Laos by developing Hanoi into the colonial capital and perpetuating the suzerainty relationship between Vietnam on the one hand, and Kampuchea and Laos on the other.[13] Moreover, the French saw the Khmers as a " fallen race " and encouraged Vietnamese settlement in Kampuchea for both administra-

[6] Joseph Buttinger, *A Political History of Vietnam* (Andre Deutsch, London, 1969), pp. 204, 228–29. Chen, op. cit., pp. 91–92, 95–97, 112. *Zhongyang Ribao* (Central Daily), 25 Aug. 1945, p. 1; 1 March 1946, p. 2; 3 March 1946, p. 3.

[7] Nguyen Khac Huyen, *Vision Accomplished?* (Collier Books, New York, 1971), p. 275. Chen, op. cit., pp. 217–19, 221, 232, 260, 278.

[8] Buttinger, op. cit., p. 51; Milton Osborne, " Kampuchea and Viet Nam: A Historical Perspective," in *Pacific Community*, April 1978, p. 252.

[9] Osborne, op. cit., p. 253.

[10] Huang, op. cit., pp. 23–27; Herz, op. cit., pp. 43–55. Mark Mancall, " The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay," in Fairbank, op. cit., p. 68.

[11] Osborne, op. cit., p. 253.

[12] Ibid., pp. 253–54.

[13] Hanoi in fact did not hesitate to emphasize this historical reality. For instance, Hoang Nguyen, *The Vietnam-Kampuchean Conflict* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1979), p. 1; *Vietnam Courier* (Hanoi), July 1980, pp. 10–11.

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tive and economic purposes. As a result, the Vietnamese continued to regard the Khmers and Laotians more as subject peoples than as peoples of different states.[14] The special relationship between Vietnam and Kampuchea and Laos was further developed, and in fact enshrined, by the protracted anti-French movement in the twentieth century. Not only did the Indochinese Communist Party's platforms throughout the 1930s and 1940s repeatedly cite an independent Indochina or "Indochina federation" as its final goal, but also the entire movement from the very outset was dominated and controlled by Vietnamese with little participation from ethnic Kampucheans or Laotians.[15] As a result, the Vietnamese saw themselves as natural leaders responsible for overseeing the interests and well-being of all three peoples.[16] After all, it was the Viet Minh, i.e., the Vietnamese communists, who occupied the entire eastern part of Laos and established large pockets of guerrilla bases in Kampuchea in the early 1950s.

THE differences between China and Vietnam over Kampuchea surfaced for the first time during the 1954 Geneva Conference, when Hanoi first insisted on retaining its extensive presence in Kampuchea and then only under strong Chinese pressure agreed to withdraw completely.[17] In fact, both at and after the conference, China repeatedly expressed its readiness to accept an "independent, sovereign and neutral" Kampuchea and to develop ties with it on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.[18] It was largely due to such a conciliatory stance that Beijing was able to foster a remarkably close relationship with Phnom Penh in the second half of the 1950s, as manifested in the establishment of diplomatic relations, the conclusion of a series of Chinese aid agreements, and the frequent exchanges of top-ranking delegations.[19] Although Beijing could not have deliberately pitted Kampuchea against Vietnam at such an early date, and was mainly concerned with reducing American influence in Kampuchea, the disparity between Chinese and Vietnamese stances was already revealing. Not only did Hanoi refuse to have any dealings at any level with Phnom Penh after 1954, but it also continued to penetrate the Khmer communist movement, the opposition party Pracheachon, and the 300,000-strong ethnic Vietnamese in the country.[20] Some of the Viet Minh units had also

[14] Osborne, op. cit., p. 254. Also, *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter *REVIEW*), 2 Feb. 1979, p. 18.

[15] Huen, op. cit., pp. 141–42; Osborne, op. cit., p. 257. Robert F. Turner, *Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development* (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1975), Appendices, pp. 314, 317, 324–25, 339, 349.

[16] Huyen, op. cit., p. 220–21. Turner, op. cit., pp. 78–79, 349.

[17] Michael Leifer, *Cambodia* (Praeger, New York, 1967), pp. 53, 59; Chen, op. cit., pp. 308–14. *The Truth about the Vietnam-China Relations over the Last 30 Years* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hanoi, 1979), p. 12.

[18] Leifer, op. cit., pp. 63, 73, 104.

[19] Ibid., p. 74, G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar (eds.), *Documents on China's Relations with South and Southeast Asia* (Allied Publishers, Ltd., New Delhi, 1964), pp. 32–35.

[20] Leifer, op. cit., pp. 11–15; Melvin Gurtov, *China and Southeast Asia* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1975), p. 52.

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managed to remain in Kampuchea under a variety of disguises. Moreover, when territorial disputes between Kampuchea and South Vietnam flared up in the late 1950s as a result of recurrent incursions of Saigon forces into Kampuchea, Hanoi kept strict silence on these matters, whereas Beijing was openly in support of Phnom Penh.[21]

The contrast between Chinese and Vietnamese policies towards Kampuchea became even sharper in the 1960s when communist insurgency intensified in South Vietnam with inevitable spill-over effects into Kampuchea. As Phnom Penh deliberately drew close to China in a bid to secure its territorial integrity and political independence, Beijing also became increasingly aware of the Kampuchean obsession with the potential threat posed by the Vietnamese, communist or non-communist. Thus, starting with the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Kampuchea in December 1960, Beijing not only repeatedly reassured Phnom Penh of its respect for Kampuchea as a neutral nation, but also gave open and enthusiastic support to Sihanouk's proposal for an international conference to guarantee Kampuchea's neutrality and independence every time it was made, namely, in 1961, 1962 and 1963.[22] In late 1963, China even concluded a military aid agreement with Phnom Penh and pledged to aid Kampuchea in the event of armed invasion.[23] In late 1964 and again in late 1967, Beijing went as far as declaring openly that " an attack on Kampuchea is an attack on China."[24] Although in strengthening its ties with Kampuchea, Beijing was essentially responding to Sihanouk's initiatives and was still preoccupied with keeping American rather than Vietnamese influence out of Kampuchea, the degree of public support China displayed for Kampuchea could not but reveal its increasingly firm commitment to a Kampuchea free from foreign domination. As such, it might also well have been a veiled warning against Vietnamese ambitions in Kampuchea.

Indeed, Sihanouk's fears were not unfounded. By the early 1960s the North Vietnamese had already established effective control of large portions of Laotian and Kampuchean territories adjacent to South Vietnam.[25] And apparently because of the extent of its military presence in Kampuchea, not only was Hanoi reluctant to recognize openly or in writing the territorial integrity of Kampuchea, in spite of repeated urging by Sihanouk, but also it never endorsed Sihanouk's appeal for an international guarantee of Kampuchea's independence and neutrality. Instead, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL or Viet Cong) for three consecutive years after its establishment in 1960 demanded the formation of a confederated " peace zone " embracing Laos and Kampuchea as well as South Vietnam, to be followed by the

[21] Leifer, op. cit., pp. 96–97. Ambekar and Divekar, op. cit., p. 35.

[22] Harold Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Macmillan, New York, 1967), pp. 426–27; Leifer, op. cit., pp. 103, 124, 138, 145, 174–75.

[23] Hal Kosut (ed.), *Cambodia and the Vietnam War* (Facts on File, Inc., New York, 1971), p. 17; Leifer, op. cit., pp. 144–45; Gurtov, op. cit., p. 59.

[24] Kosut, op. cit., pp. 30–31; Leifer, op. cit., p. 157; Gurtov, op. cit., pp. 65–66.

[25] Leifer, op. cit., pp. 96–100, 122, 179. Also, Kosut, op. cit., pp. 13–14ff.

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" reunification of Vietnam through peaceful means."[26] Although the demand was directed against American influence in Indochina, the very nature and tone of such a proposal could not but reveal Vietnam's traditional paternalistic attitude towards her western neighbours.

It was not until June 1967, when Sihanouk made another earnest appeal to all foreign countries to recognize the existing Kampuchean borders, and when both Moscow and Beijing had once again responded positively, that Hanoi and the NLF finally agreed to give written promises to respect the borders of Kampuchea. But such pledges were made only in exchange for Kampuchea's full recognition of the Hanoi regime and the NLF, as well as her tacit permission to allow communist forces to operate in Kampuchea.[27] After all, by the time such pledges were made, the Vietnamese already had 40,000 troops in Kampuchea and were in firm control of half a dozen Kampuchean provinces bordering Vietnam.[28]

The rightist *coup d'état* of 18 March 1970 did not remove the differences between China and Vietnam over Kampuchea. Only four days after the *coup*, when the new Lon Nol regime was yet to clarify its foreign policy, and even before the deposed Prince Sihanouk made public his own reaction to the incident, Hanoi was already calling for an all-out resistance to Lon Nol and proceeded to expand its base areas in Kampuchea by launching a long series of attacks throughout the eastern part of the country.[29] By the end of April, these base areas were already becoming a solid band of self-sustaining territory stretching from Laos to the sea.[30] By contrast, China's attitude was more cautious. While extending to the deposed prince the warmest possible welcome and reassuring him of China's continuing recognition of him as head of state, Beijing did not announce its position until 5 April, nor did it lend any support to Vietnam's strategy of escalating the armed struggle in Kampuchea.[31] With the benefit of hindsight, the Vietnamese may well have been pleased to see the replacement of a professedly neutral but actually pro-China Kampuchean ruler whose anti-Vietnamese views had been too well known, with a rightist but anti-China government which could now be freely and openly attacked. And with more than 50,000 troops in Kampuchea now, clearly Hanoi could only benefit from a quick military victory. On the other hand, China's hesitancy to comment openly on the situation in Kampuchea probably reflected its reluctance to acquiesce in view of the already dominant position of the Vietnamese in Kampuchea. Given Sihanouk's long-standing and outspoken distrust of all Vietnamese, Beijing may well have felt constrained enough, even if it had not also actually been advised by the prince, not to lend encouragement to Hanoi's military posture before his hope of reversing the political

[26] Ibid., p. 181; Hinton, op. cit., pp. 356–60.
[27] Vietnam News Agency broadcast, 12 June 1967. Gurtov, op. cit., pp. 79–80, 207.
[28] Ibid., p. 80.
[29] Gurtov, op. cit., pp. 104–43.
[30] Kosut, op. cit., pp. 125–26.
[31] Norodom Sihanouk, *My War with the CIA* (Pantheon Books, New York, 1972), pp. 27–34. Xinhua News Agency (hereafter XHNA), 20 and 23 March 1970.

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tide in Kampuchea had dimmed.[32] Even if Beijing did contemplate any sort of political trade with Lon Nol, as charged later by Hanoi but flatly denied by Sihanouk, it could only indicate China's wishes to see the continuing existence of Kampuchea as a separate political entity.[33]

Perhaps nowhere was China's intention of elevating the status of Kampuchea vis-à-vis Vietnam more clearly shown than in the much publicized Summit Conference of the Three Indochinese Peoples sponsored by Beijing in April 1970. The conference was attended by top leaders from Vietnam, Laos, the Viet Cong and Royal Kampuchea, but to the surprise and annoyance of Hanoi, it was chaired by none other than the deposed Sihanouk, who was merely a junior partner in the proposed three-way alliance.[34] During the conference, Beijing in fact obtained Hanoi's pledge to cooperate with Sihanouk on an equal footing, and to help build up an indigenous Khmer resistance force around the Khmer Rouge.[35] Although Hanoi did dispatch " a couple of thousand " military cadres to Kampuchea upon Sihanouk's request, it also sent back hundreds of Kampuchean communists who had withdrawn to Vietnam in 1954, and proceeded to expand further its areas of control in Kampuchea and even to " liberate whole provinces " with its regular army.[36] In fact, the Vietnamese presence and influence in Kampuchea became so extensive that Hanoi, at least during 1971–72, seriously considered the idea of using the far superior Vietnamese forces on Kampuchean soil to seize control of the entire country.[37]

IN the light of the above, it was perhaps no accident that, by the juncture of 1972–73, when the Khmer Rouge forces had grown to become a credible fighting force and also taken over the brunt of fighting against Lon Nol, Vietnam somehow attempted to slow down military progress in Kampuchea. Thus, immediately after the Paris Cease-fire Agreement was signed in January 1973, Hanoi cut off all aid to the Khmer Rouge and in fact urged Sihanouk to negotiate with the Americans and the Lon Nol regime for a similar peace agreement.[38] Presumably, from the Vietnamese perspective, a final and complete communist victory in Kampuchea that preceded a similar victory in South Vietnam would severely diminish Hanoi's chances of regaining

[32] Sihanouk, op. cit., p. 31. Sihanouk was provided with broadcasting facilities immediately after his arrival in Beijing, and began to make broadcasts to Kampuchea on 20 March. Towards the end of March, there were violent demonstrations, if not a large-scale popular uprising, in eastern Kampuchea in support of Prince Sihanouk. As a result, South Vietnamese troops were invited into Kampuchea to restore order. Ibid., pp. 61–62. Kosut, op. cit., pp. 66–67; the *New York Times*, 28 and 29 March 1970.

[33] *The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations over the Last 30 Years*, p. 29. Sihanouk, op. cit., pp. 29, 142–43. Gurtov, op. cit., p. 141.

[34] Hanoi later on accused China of attempting to dominate Indochina through the 1970 summit conference. British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Pt. III, The Far East (hereafter *BBC/FE*), No. 5923 (22 Sept. 1978), p. A3/1. Also, *The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations over The Last 30 Years*, p. 30.

[35] Sihanouk, op. cit., pp. 172, 184, 232.

[36] Ibid. pp. 172–74; Hoang Nguyen, op. cit., pp. 8–10.

[37] See footnote no. 108 below.

[38] Sheldon W. Simon, " New Conflict in Indochina," in *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1978, p. 22. Gurtov, op. cit., p. 188.

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control over events in Kampuchea. In contrast, Beijing backed the Khmer Rouge's policy of no negotiation, no compromise and no coalition government, and also stepped up its military aid to Kampuchea.[39] Presumably, China sided with the Khmer Rouge and favoured a final drive towards military victory precisely because the indigenous Khmers, rather than the North Vietnamese, were now in effective control. An early victory independent of Hanoi's will or consent therefore could only bolster the image of an independent Kampuchea, if not also further restrain Vietnam's ambitions. China's postures appeared all the more significant against the background of a progressive reduction of Chinese aid to Vietnam beginning in 1973.[40] Moreover, while expressing repeatedly and consistently China's support for a military solution to the war in Kampuchea, Beijing as late as early 1975 reportedly contended that the struggle in Vietnam would take a long time to complete and counselled Hanoi to " take a low profile for at least a couple of years."[41] The apparently preferential treatment Beijing extended to Kampuchea and the higher priority it gave to Kampuchea's liberation could not but reveal China's intention to buttress the strength and enhance the role of Kampuchea in face of a pending communist takeover in South Vietnam.

The double victory the communists achieved in Kampuchea and Vietnam in April 1975 finally marked the end of the precarious triangular alliance between China, Vietnam and Kampuchea, by reviving the age-old fears of Phnom Penh and the traditional ambitions of Hanoi. From the Vietnamese point of view, the communist victory in Kampuchea would not have been a reality without Vietnamese assistance during the crucial war years. Hanoi therefore felt entitled to special status in Kampuchea and reportedly demanded " common diplomatic and economic policies " and even a " united army " with Kampuchea.[42] From the Kampuchean point of view, which China shared, precisely because of the prolonged dominating role of Vietnam in Kampuchea, Hanoi should withdraw all its troops from Kampuchea now that the war was over, for their continuing presence constituted a serious threat to Kampuchea's security and stability. The long-standing enmity between Vietnam and Kampuchea was further exacerbated by the emergence of a fanatically nationalistic regime in Phnom Penh which, once set up, proceeded to purge all Vietnam-trained cadres, disband all Hanoi-initiated organizations, and expel all Vietnamese civilians from Kampuchea.[43] Skirmishes between the Khmers and the Vietnamese forces along the Vietnam-Kampuchea border, which reportedly had started as early as 1973, thus quickly developed into major armed clashes as a result of Vietnamese

[39] Ibid., pp. 188–89. *Beijing Review* (hereafter *BR*), 22 Jan. 1973, p. 5; 11 Feb. 1973, p. 8. *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), 13 April 1973, p. 2.

[40] *Vietnam Courier*, July 1978, pp. 4–5. *BR*, 28 July 1978, p. 28.

[41] *Vietnam Courier*, June 1979, p. 10.

[42] *BR*, 19 Oct. 1981, p. 27. For charges made by the Khmer Rouge, see, for instance, *BBC/FE*, No. 5803 (3 May 1978), p. A3/1; No. 5845 (22 June 1978), p. A3/3.

[43] Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, " Passion of Kampuchea," in *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1979, pp. 34–37; *REVIEW*, 13 Jan. 1978, pp. 13–14; 21 April 1978, pp. 20–21. François Ponchaud, *Cambodia Year Zero* (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977), p. 157.

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insistence on holding on to their well-established sanctuaries in Kampuchea and the determination of the Khmers to regain control over them. Although negotiations on territorial issues were held as early as June 1975 and on a number of other occasions thereafter, none yielded any results because of the intransigence displayed by both sides.[44]

THE deterioration of Kampuchean-Vietnamese relations after 1975 would have remained more or less a localized issue had it not been accompanied by a further strengthening of ties between Beijing and Phnom Penh, as shown in the massive influx of Chinese aid and technicians into Kampuchea to help with the post-war reconstruction.[45] Although, due to the ultra-nationalistic and isolationist orientation of the new Khmer regime and the series of internal crises and natural disasters that shook the Chinese political scene in the year 1976, for nearly two years after April 1975 Beijing was unable to influence events in Kampuchea,[46] its continuing support for a vehemently anti-Vietnamese Kampuchea was sufficient proof to Hanoi of China's culpability in the strained relations between Hanoi and Phnom Penh. And from the Vietnamese point of view, the fanatical nature of the new Khmer regime only rendered Beijing's motivation in aligning itself with Phnom Penh all the more suspicious. As Hanoi could not tolerate—and yet Beijing appeared to be condoning—a Kampuchea openly hostile to Vietnam, the solution of the Kampuchean issue also assumed a new urgency for Hanoi. And it was only natural for Hanoi to solicit Moscow's backing in its confrontation with Kampuchea and inevitably China. Thus, the Fourth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, held in December 1976, not only resulted in the ascendence of the pro-Soviet faction of the Vietnamese leadership, but also adopted a resolution which only thinly veiled Vietnam's long-term goal in Kampuchea. The resolution proclaimed Hanoi's policy in Indochina as being " to preserve and develop the *special relationship* between the Vietnamese people and the people of Laos and Kampuchea . . . so that the three countries, which have been associated with one another in the struggle for national liberation, will be associated *forever* with one another."[47]

The year 1977 therefore witnessed a sudden and conspicuous escalation of Vietnam's tilt towards the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the exchange of numerous delegations and the conclusion of countless cooperation or aid agreements in all fields between Hanoi on the one hand, and Moscow and its East European allies on the other.[48] Hanoi also stepped up its military and political pressure on Kampuchea, as shown in

[44] See *The Monitoring Digest* (Singapore) (hereafter *MD*), 12 Jan. 1978, pp. 6–7; *Vietnam Courier*, February 1978, pp. 6–7 *BBC/FE*, No. 5803 (3 May 1978), p. A3/2.

[45] Ponchaud, op. cit., pp. 103–4; Norodom Sihanouk, *War and Hope* (Pantheon Books, New York, 1980), pp. 135–36.

[46] *REVIEW*, 7 Oct. 1977, p. 87; 14 April 1978, pp. 39–40. Zasloff and Brown, op. cit., pp. 33, 39. Sihanouk, *War and Hope*, p. 86; Ponchaud, op. cit., p. 160.

[47] *Vietnam Courier*, February 1977, p. 7.

[48] This is quite evident from a cursory examination of *MD*, February-December 1977.

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the outbreak of large-scale fighting in late April and May between the Khmer forces and some 20,000 Vietnamese troops still entrenched in their long-time enclaves in Kampuchea.[49] There were also recurrent reports of Vietnamese sabotage and attempts at *coups* throughout 1977.[50] On 18 July, Hanoi completed what appeared to be the first phase of its Indochina plan when it concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Laos, which not only justified the presence of 50,000 Vietnamese troops on Laotian soil, but also sanctioned all-round cooperation between the two countries. Once again, Hanoi made no pretence about its aims in Indochina, as the treaty obliged the two countries to pledge to " protect and develop the *special* Vietnamese-Laos relationship in order to make the two countries, inherently united in the national liberation cause, remain united *forever* in national construction and defence."[51]

Having more or less recovered from the political earthquake of 1976, Beijing must have watched all these developments with growing concern. And in the increasingly bold assertions of Vietnam's special rights over its two weaker neighbours, China saw the unmistakable hand of the Soviet Union. Although China continued to refrain from taking sides openly in the rapidly worsening Vietnamese-Kampuchean conflict, signs of its displeasure with Hanoi's Kampuchea policy, as well as its disconcertion with the looming shadow of Soviet presence in the region, did become increasingly clear in the course of 1977. In a number of statements made early in the year, Beijing not only repeatedly lent verbal support to Kampuchea's " independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity," and commended the Kampuchean people for having " succeeded in frustrating sabotage by foreign and domestic enemies," but also pointedly warned the Vietnamese of the danger of social imperialism.[52] That the signing of the Vietnam-Laos Treaty in July went almost completely unreported in Beijing also revealed China's misgivings about the treaty's implications.[53] In fact, as if to emphasize its concern, China made a four-point proposal sometime in July to bring about a negotiated settlement and even offered to mediate in the conflict.[54] In doing so, however, China made the hitherto thinly veiled warning to Vietnam, though still in private, that it would " not watch with indifference any intervention in Kampuchean sovereignty or coveting of Kampuchean territory by social imperialism " and would " support Kampuchea and her people in their struggle and in their actions to protect Kampuchea's territorial integrity and national sovereignty by giving *all possible* assistance."[55] The clouds were quickly gathering for a direct clash between Vietnam and China over Kampuchea.

[49] Simon, op. cit., p. 28.
[50] Sihanouk, *War and Hope*, p. 75; *REVIEW*, 14 April 1978, p. 39. Nguyen, op. cit., pp. 29–30.
[51] *BBC/FE*, No. 5567 (20 July 1977), pp. A3/4–9.
[52] *BR*, 14 Jan. 1977, pp. 7, 25; 22 April 1977, p. 40–41.
[53] It was only briefly noted in *Renmin Ribao* 21 July 1977, p. 5.
[54] See Huang Hua's confidential address to high-level Party cadres in July 1977. Reprinted in *Zhongguo dalu* (Mainland China), No. 126 (15 Feb. 1978), p. 57.
[55] Ibid.

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IT was not until the last quarter of 1977, when Hanoi launched a large-scale military operation across the border with more than 50,000 troops supported by hundreds of armoured cars and artillery pieces plus air cover, that the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Kampuchea burst into public view.[56] In face of the overwhelming military pressure, Kampuchea in late September rushed a high-powered delegation to China—the first in two years—obviously to seek diplomatic support and military assistance. The delegation received an unusually warm welcome in Beijing with much publicity and pomp. While the leaders of both countries delivered long speeches in each other's praise, abounding with heavy revolutionary rhetoric, Premier Hua Guofeng openly declared that China would " always stand with Kampuchea " in its " just struggle against imperialism and hegemonism."[57] In sharp contrast, when a Vietnamese delegation led by Le Duan visited Beijing on 20 November, apparently in a last attempt to dissuade China from open intervention and therefore to avert the final split, the reception it received was clearly just businesslike and colourless. Le Duan during the visit reportedly asked China to use its influence with the Kampuchean government in order to reach a settlement; but Beijing flatly rejected the request and instead asked Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea.[58] Whatever might have actually transpired in the meeting, it ended with no public mention whatsoever of the Kampuchean conflict, thereby suggesting differences between the two countries on the Indochina situation.

The point of no return was reached in late December when the four-month-long border war had resulted in the Vietnamese occupation of a 450-kilometre strip of Kampuchean territory stretching north to south, sometimes as much as twenty kilometres inside Kampuchea.[59] Although China still refrained from accusing Vietnam openly, when Phnom Penh finally broke diplomatic relations with Hanoi on 31 December, the Kampuchean Embassy in Beijing was provided with all the necessary facilities to bring out its full charges against Vietnam, while only excerpts from the official Vietnamese statement on the border conflict, issued on the same day, were released to the press, thereby showing clearly where Beijing's sympathy lay.[60] The official pronouncements made by Vietnam and Kampuchea on the border war also shed further light on the respective stands and goals of the two countries in the conflict, and therefore presumably on the cause of China's tilt towards Kampuchea. While the Kampuchean statement contained only vehement attacks upon Vietnam's " systematic and large-scale aggressive acts of invasion " and gave details of the territories encroached upon by Hanoi,[61] the Vietnamese statement went to great lengths to capitalize on the

[56] The Khmer regime's charges were detailed in *BR*, 6 Jan. 1978, p. 25. See also, *REVIEW*, 13 Jan. 1978, pp. 10–11; 27 Jan. 1978, pp. 10–11; 14 April 1978, p. 39.
[57] *BR*, 7 Oct. 1977, p. 21.
[58] *BR*, 19 Oct. 1981, p. 27.
[59] *The Straits Times* (Singapore) (hereafter *ST*), 5 Jan. 1978, p. 3; 17 Jan. 1978, p. 12.
[60] *BR*, 6 Jan. 1978, pp. 25–27. *ST*, 10 Jan. 1978, p. 1.
[61] *BR*, 6 Jan. 1978, pp. 25–26.

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" unbreakable militant solidarity and fraternal relationship " between Vietnam and Kampuchea fostered in " a long struggle against colonialism lasting almost a century."[62] Reminding Kampuchea of the support and assistance Vietnam had given during the war years, Hanoi contended that " both the immediate and long-term interests of the Vietnamese and Kampuchean peoples require that they continue to maintain such solidarity and friendship " which was meant to be " everlasting " and " unbreakable."[63] Similarly, on 6 January, when Phnom Penh in another statement accused Hanoi of forcing Kampuchea to participate in its " Indochina Federation " and demanded Hanoi withdraw all its troops from Kampuchea, Hanoi again countered by dwelling extensively on the " bonds of solidarity and friendship " and the " special relationship " between Kampuchea and Vietnam which the Vietnamese pledged " their utmost efforts to defend and develop."[64]

That Vietnam should have continued to speak of solidarity and unity with Kampuchea—a theme to be repeated again and again—at a time when it had only the faintest relationship to reality, clearly revealed its eagerness to see the emergence of a Kampuchea more accomodating to its wishes. Hanoi apparently calculated that its massive military thrust into Kampuchea had dealt sufficiently severe blows to Phnom Penh for it finally to come to a compromise with Vietnam. In fact, in January 1978 alone, Vietnam on more than three occasions urged Kampuchea to negotiate with Vietnam to end the border conflict, and even withdrew its troops from major advancing positions in Kampuchea in order to promote an atmosphere congenial to peace talks.[65] While the peace offer was repeated many times throughout the spring of 1978, to further dissipate Kampuchea's fears, on 7 April Hanoi issued a lengthy document entitled " On the Indochina Federation Question," in which it declared that the idea of an Indochina federation had " long passed into history " and that all that Hanoi desired was " to preserve and strengthen the militant solidarity and fraternal friendship " among the three Indochinese peoples.[66] Although Hanoi most probably did not expect much out of any peace talks that might be held, it apparently believed that if Kampuchea could be persuaded to return to the negotiating table, there would at least be a good chance of detaching it from China and therefore eventually attaining its own long-term goals in Kampuchea.

However, as it turned out, Hanoi's stick-and-carrot strategy by its very nature and scope only further alarmed Kampuchea and China, both of which now considered Vietnam to be bent on annexing Kampuchea. While Phnom Penh flatly rejected all Vietnamese initiatives as deceitful and Hanoi's concept of " special relationship " as a transparent guise for regional hegemony, China in mid-January sent a high-ranking govern-

[62] *MD*, 4 Jan. 1978, pp. 6–8.
[63] Ibid., pp. 9–10.
[64] *BR*, 13 Jan. 1978, p. 24. *MD*, 12 Jan. 1978, pp. 6–8.
[65] *MD*, 6 Jan. 1978, p. 13; 12 Jan. 1978, p. 7; 15 Jan. 1978, p. 18. *BBC/FE*, No. 5813 (15 May 1978), p. A3/1.
[66] *MD*, 8 April 1978, p. 14.

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ment delegation led by Deng Yingqiao, widow of the late Zhou Enlai, to Kampuchea, apparently in a gesture of solidarity with Phnom Penh.[67] In fact, Madam Deng's visit was accompanied by massive air and sea deliveries of arms and ammunition which were said to include long-range 130-mm and 150-mm artillery pieces and MiG-15 jet fighters.[68] A growing number of Chinese advisers were also sent to train Kampuchean soldiers to operate these weapons. On 26 February, Hua Guofeng in his report to the Fifth National People's Congress obliquely stated that " no country should seek hegemony in any region or impose its will on others." A few days later Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping hastened to point out that the country Hua had referred to was Vietnam.[69] These remarks were followed in early March by the dispatch of a Chinese technical mission of railway experts to Phnom Penh to repair and reconstruct Kampuchea's main railway line linking the capital with the country's only deep-water port at Kompong Som—the primary supply route for Chinese aid materials.[70] By early May, Kampuchean troops were reported for the first time since 1975 to have put tanks and other armoured vehicles, along with long-range guns, into war—an unmistakable sign of China's determination to help Kampuchea resist Vietnam.[71]

BEIJING' increasingly pro-Kampuchean stand, along with the escalation of Chinese military assistance to Kampuchea, at what Vietnam might have considered to be a delicate but crucial juncture of Vietnam-Kampuchea relations, was in turn seen by Hanoi clearly as an act of sabotage against Hanoi's peace initiatives. What followed, therefore, was a chain of events in the spring of 1978 which led to a rapid deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations. It is certainly no accident that in late March Hanoi launched a nationwide campaign against the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, resulting in the exodus of 70,000 Chinese from Vietnam to China during the two months of April and May alone.[72] Although the campaign had its own origins, its timing and the magnitude of the mass exodus could not but give the impression that the Chinese in Vietnam had been deliberately singled out as a target of retaliation, at least in part, against China's support for Kampuchea. By May thousands of Chinese stripped of their property had reportedly been sent either to the " new economic zones " set up in remote border provinces to reclaim farm land, or to the Kampuchean front to fight.[73] At about the same time, some 10,000 Chinese road builders in Laos were also asked to leave the country, apparently at the behest of Hanoi.[74] On 30 June, Vietnam took

[67] *REVIEW*, 21 April 1978, p. 17. *BR*, 27 Jan. 1978, p. 4.
[68] *ST*, 17 Jan. 1978, p. 12; *REVIEW*, 17 March 1978, p. 10; 21 April, p. 19.
[69] *REVIEW*, 17 March 1978, p. 11; *BR*, 10 March 1978, p. 37.
[70] *ST*, 7 March 1978, p. 3.
[71] *ST*, 19 May 1978, p. 3.
[72] *BR*, 18 Aug. 1978, p. 29. For a detailed analysis of the ethnic dispute, see Pao-min Chang, " The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute over the Ethnic Chinese," in *The China Quarterly*, June 1982, pp. 195–230.
[73] *ST*, 4 May 1978, p. 2; 22 May 1978, p. 3; 30 May 1978, p. 12.
[74] *ST*, 16 June 1978, p. 1.

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the formal step of closing ranks with the Soviet Union by announcing its admission to the Comecon.

Alarmed by the escalation of Vietnam's anti-China propaganda and activities and its swing to align with Moscow, and confronted with the continuing massive influx of refugees, Beijing also proceeded to exert pressure on Vietnam. On 12 May, China cancelled 21 complete factory aid projects to Vietnam and on 30 May scrapped another 51 similar projects.[75] Although the reason given for such measures was to divert urgently needed resources for the relief of refugees, they were clearly designed to put political pressure on Vietnam. In fact, on 5 June, only two days after receiving Ieng Sary, Deng Xiaoping declared that China would take harsher measures against Vietnam if Hanoi persisted in its anti-China policy.[76] On 16 June, Beijing shut down all three Vietnamese consulates in China; this was followed by the cancellation of all aid to Vietnam and the withdrawal of all Chinese technicians in Vietnam on 3 July.[77]

As retaliatory measures and counter-measures were adopted by Vietnam and China against one another, a war of words over the Kampuchean conflict also came into the open. Thus, on 25 May, the same day as Beijing first openly expressed its concern about the refugee crisis, Hanoi already alluded to " international reactionaries who have great ambitions in South-East Asia and are attempting to sow division among the Vietnamese and Kampuchean peoples."[78] On 5 June, Hanoi, in a thinly veiled attack on China, attributed more specifically the continuing conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam, and particularly Phnom Penh's stubborn refusal to negotiate, to " reactionary forces in this area . . . whose interests cannot be reconciled . . . with the existence of a unified, independent and sovereign socialist Vietnam."[79] On 17 June, Hanoi finally came into the open and accused Beijing of having " ceaselessly given all-round support to the Kampuchean authorities in launching their border war of aggression against the Vietnamese people . . . and in carrying out an anti-Vietnamese policy aimed at . . . sabotaging the tradition of solidarity and friendship between Vietnam and Kampuchea."[80] In a series of statements that followed in late June and in July, Hanoi went a step further to attack, for the first time, the " large-scale, systematic, ferocious and barbaric, genocide " in Kampuchea and linked it to China's ambition in South-East Asia.[81] Hanoi in fact claimed that relations between the three parties in Indochina had been " wonderfully pure until the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique usurped the leadership of the Kampuchean Communist Party and colluded with China " in the late

[75] *BBC/FE*, No. 5842 (19 June 1978), p. A3/1.
[76] *XHNA*, 5 June 1978.
[77] *XHNA*, 17 June 1978; 3 July 1978.
[78] *BBC/FE*, No. 5824 (27 May 1978), p. A3/5.
[79] *BBC/FE*, No. 5831 (6 June 1978), pp. A3/1–2.
[80] *BBC/FE*, No. 5842 (19 June 1978), p. A3/2.
[81] *BBC/FE*, No. 5845 (22 June 1978), p. A3/1; No. 5866 (17 July 1978), pp. A3/4–6; No. 5881 (3 Aug. 1978), p. A3/2.

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1960s. From then on, the Pol Pot group became a " cheap instrument " of Beijing's strategy of expansion in South-East Asia. And it was only on China's orders that the Pol Pot regime adopted a policy of genocide in Kampuchea and aggression against Vietnam, in order to destroy the Kampuchean race, thereby paving the way for China's conquest of other parts of Asia.[82] The Chinese were therefore held responsible for all the crimes committed against both the Kampuchean and Vietnamese peoples.

Beijing was quick to respond to Hanoi's charges. On 11 July, on the eve of China's closure of her land border with Vietnam, *The People's Daily* published a long commentary in which Beijing openly accused Hanoi of first making an about-face in its position on the Vietnam-Kampuchea boundary issue and then waging a " naked war of aggression against Kampuchea . . . in an attempt to subdue and gobble up Kampuchea by force."[83] Beijing charged that " victory in the war against US imperialism, coupled with possession of great amounts of arms, has made the Vietnamese authorities' heads swell and their hands itch. They behave in a way as if Vietnam were a ' big power ' . . . and dream of rigging up an Indochina federation with Vietnam at its head."[84] In a follow-up commentary, China described Vietnam's " line of independence and sovereignty " as merely " a cover to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of other countries "; Vietnam's concept of international solidarity also meant expecting others to " go along with them " and dance to their tune.[85] Beijing in fact claimed that only because Vietnam had failed in its " schemes of armed aggression and subversion against Kampuchea " did it " start venting its anger on China."[86] And the expulsion of ethnic Chinese and other anti-Chinese manoeuvres were closely linked to the border conflict, because all were parts of a plot in pursuit of " hegemonism," and " in this plot, the Soviet superpower with its own hegemonistic aims provides cover and support for the Vietnamese authorities' regional hegemonism, while the Vietnamese authorities serve as a junior partner for the Soviet Union."[87]

ALTHOUGH both the Vietnamese and Chinese charges must be viewed with some reservations, they did reveal the respective concerns of the two countries in Kampuchea. To the extent that China had all along been the principal and only ally of the Khmer regime, it could not have shirked the responsibility of strengthening a regime not only hostile to Vietnam but also ruthless towards its own people. Indeed, without the political and material support of China, the Kampuchean regime would have found it difficult to persist in or sustain its anti-

[82] *BBC/FE*, No. 5845, p. A3/2; No. 5866, pp. A3/4–6.
[83] *BR*, 21 July 1978, p. 6.
[84] Ibid., p. 8.
[85] *BR*, 28 July 1978, p. 28.
[86] *BR*, 21 July 1978, p. 6.
[87] Ibid.

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Vietnamese policy and activities.[88] And from the Vietnamese point of view, China's perennial interest in promoting an independent Kampuchea and thereby obstructing the renewal of the traditional solidarity and special relationship between Vietnam and Kampuchea could only reveal its own ulterior motives in the entire region. By capitalizing on the crimes of the Phnom Penh regime and by establishing a Chinese connection in both the internal and foreign policies of Kampuchea, Hanoi thus not only could shift the blame for the Kampuchean conflict squarely on to Beijing, but also could better justify any future and harsher actions it might be planning against Kampuchea.

On the other hand, China, like Kampuchea, was clearly convinced of Vietnam's ulterior motives in Indochina. Indeed, to the extent that Hanoi had openly sought lasting unity with its weaker neighbours and had already succeeded in dominating Laos, its grand designs for Indochina were all but fully unveiled. Although Vietnam probably had no intention yet of swallowing up Kampuchea in any overt fashion, at a time of escalating war between Vietnam and Kampuchea, Hanoi's persistent emphasis upon its traditional solidarity and friendship with Kampuchea was indeed odd and could not but reveal its determination at least to bring about a leadership change in Kampuchea as soon as possible. And from the Chinese point of view, Hanoi's persistent attempt to create a Kampuchea subservient to Vietnam, and the lengths to which it was prepared to go in order to attain its goal, not only revealed its aggressive character, but also suggested instigation by an external power. By accusing Vietnam of blatant aggression and associating Vietnam's " hegemonism " with world-wide Soviet designs, Beijing thus sought to alert the international community to Vietnam's long-term ambitions in the region and therefore also to defend its own intervention in the conflict.

Therefore, from July on, Sino-Vietnamese relations took a further turn for the worse, as both sides intensified their preparations for a possible showdown over Kampuchea. Convinced that trends in Kampuchea could not now be easily reversed with extensive Chinese involvement, Vietnam after July 1978 apparently decided to adopt a militant policy towards both China and Kampuchea. Thus, the fourth plenary session of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee, held in July, passed a resolution which not only pinpointed China as Vietnam's immediate enemy, but also expressed Hanoi's " determination rapidly to win victory both politically and militarily on the south-western border areas."[89] The immediate consequences were the renewal of intensive fighting in mid-June on the Kampuchean front, and the launching of a propaganda drive in late June to foment popular uprisings among both the civilian population and army units of Kampuchea.[90] From July onwards, Vietnam

[88] This was also Hanoi's major argument. *Vietnam Courier*, March 1979, p. 16.

[89] Hoang Van Hoang's statement, in *BR*, 7 Sept. 1979, p. 25. Also, *BR*, 19 Oct. 1981, p. 27; *BBC/FE*, No. 6172 (20 July 1979), p. A3/2.

[90] *REVIEW*, 14 July 1978, pp. 6–7; 28 July 1978, p. 27. *ST*, 1 Aug. 1978, p. 1.

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in fact not only dropped all its proposals for negotiations, but also began to move new divisions from the north to the Kampuchean front. In early August, Hanoi for the first time mounted sustained air attacks on Khmer positions, and by October it had already started to conduct battalion-sized sweeps into Kampuchea, leading to heavy fighting along the entire border.[91]

The steady escalation of Vietnamese pressure on Kampuchea was accompanied by the growing tension along the Sino-Vietnamese land border, as both sides were strengthening their military forces in preparation for possible wider armed conflict. Starting with the first bloody skirmish on 25 August, when dozens of Chinese and Vietnamese were killed or wounded, border incidents became increasingly numerous and violent.[92] By late September, accusations of territorial encroachments by army units had already been made by both sides, leading to clashes on a considerable scale. Although China had certainly policed the increasingly chaotic land border with greater vigour, the extent and pattern of such incidents, as well as the nature and volume of the continuing exodus of Chinese from Vietnam, appeared to suggest that Hanoi had somehow deliberately played up its dispute with Beijing, if only to draw Moscow closer to its side in a worsening conflict with China, and to obtain as many Soviet arms as possible for the impending invasion of Kampuchea.[93]

Indeed, it is no accident that in late August, Moscow began a massive airlift of military hardware to Hanoi which gave every sign of an emergency exercise, and it started to equip Vietnamese bases along the Sino-Vietnamese border with offensive missiles aimed at China.[94] An additional 500 to 1,000 Soviet technicians and advisers were also sent to Vietnam during the summer, raising the total number of Soviet personnel to about 4,000 by mid-September.[95] Apart from the Soviet offer of a $2.6 billion programme to reinforce Vietnamese armaments and military installations, the Comecon countries agreed in early September to complete the construction of all projects on which China had ceased technical assistance.[96] By mid-October, Moscow had already supplied Hanoi with the most advanced MiG-23 jet fighters which it had refused Vietnam during the height of the Vietnam war and still refused some of its Warsaw Pact allies. Practically all such aircraft were reportedly stationed in the Gia Lam Airport north of Hanoi.[97] As Soviet weapons and advisers poured into Vietnam, Hanoi also felt more confident and less restrained in confronting China. It is thus no coincidence that the border tension reached a new peak during the last quarter of 1978, and particularly

[91] *ST*, 3 Aug. 1978, p. 2; 29 Aug. 1978, p. 1; 19 Oct. 1978, p. 1, 3; 27 Oct. 1978, p. 36.
[92] *XHNA*, 25 Aug. 1978; *BBC/FE*, No. 5902 (29 Aug. 1978), p. A3/2.
[93] For a detailed analysis, see Pao-min Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute," in *Asia-Pacific Community*, Spring 1980, pp. 151–52.
[94] *ST*, 12 Sept. 1978, p. 2; 15 Dec. 1978, p. 1.
[95] *ST*, 27 Oct. 1978, p. 36.
[96] *ST*, 12 Sept. 1978, p. 2; 6 Oct. 1978, p. 3.
[97] *BR*, 24 Nov. 1978, p. 23.

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immediately before and after the conclusion of the Vietnamese-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 3 November.[98]

As Hanoi became increasingly militant and moved closer to Moscow in the second half of 1978, Beijing also dropped all pretence of being unconcerned about Kampuchea. A series of exchanges of high-level delegations between the two countries starting in late July were invariably accompanied by China's open condemnation of Vietnamese aggression and its explicit pledges of "resolute support" for Kampuchea's "just struggle to uphold national independence and state sovereignty."[99] To bolster Phnom Penh's defence capability, China by late July had also sizeably stepped up its supply of military hardware and ammunition to Kampuchea, as shown by the sharp increase in both the number of Chinese transport aircraft going into Kampuchea and in the size of the Chinese military advisory group in the country.[100] By September, China was already reported to be training Kampuchean pilots to fly MiG-19 fighters and allegedly had 5,000 to 6,000 military advisers in Kampuchea.[101] According to Chinese diplomats, on the eve of the fall of Phnom Penh, China had delivered at least 200 tanks, 300 artillery pieces, six jet fighters and two bombers, as well as some naval vessels, in addition to large quantities of smaller weapons; and there was a total of 15,000 Chinese civilian and military technicians working in all fields in Kampuchea.[102] The final stage had been set for a showdown between Vietnam and China over Kampuchea.

ALTHOUGH Vietnam was determined to step up pressure on Kampuchea in the second half of 1978, Hanoi apparently considered an all-out invasion of Kampuchea before October as militarily unnecessary in addition to being politically undesirable. In fact, the Vietnamese strategy from early 1978 had been to draw out the much smaller Kampuchean forces and pound them so as to destroy them piece by piece, rather than overrun the entire country or occupy as much Kampuchean territory as possible.[103] Such well-targeted military assaults were coupled with an intensified drive to organize a Khmer resistance force among the 150,000 Kampuchean refugees in Vietnam.[104] Hanoi apparently calculated that by a combination of internal mass uprising and external military pressure, the Kampuchean regime would collapse relatively rapidly.

However, by the end of the third quarter of 1978, the situation was rather different. Whatever fears Vietnam initially might have had of China's possible reaction to a more militant Vietnamese stance towards Kampuchea had largely dissipated. Beijing's apparent acquiescence to

[98] Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute," pp. 151–52.
[99] *BR*, 4 Aug. 1978, p. 3; 15 Sept. 1978, p. 6; 10 Nov. 1978, p. 4; 15 Dec. 1978, p. 3; 22 Dec. 1978, p. 15.
[100] *REVIEW*, 14 July 1978, p. 7.
[101] *REVIEW*, 3 Nov. 1978, p. 15; *ST*, 5 Sept. 1978, p. 28.
[102] *ST*, 2 May 1979, p. 2.
[103] *REVIEW*, 21 April 1978, p. 18; 28 July 1978, p. 27; 3 Nov. 1978, pp. 14–15.
[104] *REVIEW*, 28 July 1978, pp. 26–27; 3 Nov. 1978, p. 15.

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the influx of over 160,000 refugees and its failure to put an end to the continuing crisis had already exposed China's glaring vulnerability vis-à-vis Vietnam.[105] The absence of effective retaliation against Hanoi's repeated challenges along the increasingly tense land border further demonstrated China's timidity and powerlessness. If Vietnam still had doubts about China's impotence, she must have felt reassured by mid-October when Deng Xiaoping said openly that China would not send troops to Kampuchea.[106] On the other hand, the demand for greater military involvement on the part of Vietnam also steadily increased in the autumn of 1978 due to its repeated failure either to stage a *coup d'état* in Phnom Penh or to develop a more or less viable and self-sustaining rebel movement in spite of all the efforts made throughout the summer.[107] At the same time, the stubborn resistance put up by the Kampuchean forces in the third quarter of the year made the border war increasingly costly for Hanoi. The massive aid that China was pouring into Kampuchea at an escalating rate throughout the second half of 1978 further reduced the margin of Vietnam's military superiority in semi-guerrilla warfare. And in view of the pitiful domestic situation, no Vietnamese leader cherished the prospect of fighting another long war of attrition. By October, Vietnam had apparently come to believe that time was not on its side and a final massive offensive during the dry season was indispensable to an early and satisfactory conclusion of the Kampuchean war.

Perhaps a clear hint was dropped in early September of Vietnam's growing inclination to execute a *coup de grâce* against Kampuchea, when Hoang Tung, Editor-in-Chief of the *Nhan Dan* and a senior member of the Vietnamese Communist Party, was indiscreet enough, in an interview given to a French journalist, to regret openly that Vietnam had not intervened in Kampuchea in the early 1970s when large numbers of Vietnamese troops were stationed there. " If we had intervened, the situation would have evolved differently . . . Perhaps we are paying for that mistake."[108] At about the same time, foreign visitors to Hanoi were also reportedly told by Vietnamese officials that the Kampuchean regime " will not survive much longer " and that " it will be swept away before the end of the year."[109] It is perhaps also no accident that, beginning in September, the Vietnamese media suddenly intensified its propaganda war against Kampuchea by openly calling for the overthrow of the regime in Phnom Penh.[110] It was also during late September and early October that Hanoi began a massive military build-up along the entire Vietnam-Kampuchea border and reinforced its troop strength from 60,000–80,000 men to well over 100,000.[111] By mid-October, a com-

[105] Chang, " The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict over the Ethnic Chinese," op. cit., pp. 213–18.
[106] *ST*, 16 Oct. 1978, p. 3. Also, *REVIEW*, 24 Nov. 1978, p. 10; 12 Jan. 1979, p. 14; 19 Jan. 1979 p. 12.
[107] *REVIEW*, 24 Nov. 1978, p. 12.
[108] *BBC/FE*, No. 5198 (16 Sept. 1978), p. A3/4.
[109] *BR*, 6 Oct. 1978, p. 36.
[110] For examples, see *BBC/FE*, No. 5916 (14 Sept. 1978), p. A3/9; No. 5923 (22 Sept. 1978), p. A3/2.
[111] *ST*, 5 Oct. 1978, p. 30; 7 Oct. 1978, p. 3; 16 Oct. 1978, p. 3; 23 Oct. 1978, p. 32; 27 Oct. 1978, p. 36.

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bined general staff was already established in the province of Tay Ninh on the border, apparently in anticipation of the need to coordinate military activities on a large scale.[112]

However, it was clearly the conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 3 November that gave the final green light for Hanoi to go ahead by removing whatever hesitation Vietnam might still have had in executing its plans.[113] Article Six of the Treaty specifically provided that in case either party was attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties signatory to the treaty would " immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat," and would " take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries."[114] In view of the fact that no such treaty had existed when Vietnam was the object of attack by the United States and when its very survival was threatened, the document was clearly directed against China. That Vietnam should have needed such a symbol of alliance at a time when it had actually scored diplomatic victories in virtually all the disputes with China, and was also under no apparent military threat from Beijing, could only suggest that the treaty served the immediate, if not the only, purpose of removing all possibility of Chinese intervention following the anticipated Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.

Hanoi's intention in Kampuchea was made crystal clear by the announcement on 3 December of the establishment of the Kampuchean National Front for National Salvation (KNFNS), with a complete list of leading personalities and an elaborate set of programmes on both internal and external policies. With the explicit aim of overthrowing the Pol Pot regime, and professing support from " millions " of Kampucheans, it paved the way for a rapid escalation of the fighting without further constraints on the part of the Vietnamese.[115] By mid-December Vietnamese troops were already closing in on the Mekong cities lying as far as 50 miles inside Kampuchea.[116] Nevertheless, the Kampuchean forces apparently adopted a strategy of stubborn resistance as long as Vietnam held back its main units. In order to take advantage of the dry season and bring the war to an end as soon as possible, on 25 December Hanoi finally launched a high-profile and all-out invasion, when more than 100,000 Vietnamese troops backed by war planes, tanks and artillery, began to roll into Kampuchea along the main highways. From then on, there was little resistance from the Kampuchean forces, which simply melted away into the forests and mountains.[117] Twelve days later, on 6 January 1979, Phnom Penh fell almost without a fight.

It is perhaps significant that in reporting the large-scale offensive from early December onwards, Hanoi made no link between its own military

[112] *ST*, 23 Oct. 1978, p. 32.
[113] *Vietnam Courier*, December 1978, pp. 3–5; *REVIEW*, 22 Dec. 1978, p. 17.
[114] *Vietnam Courier*, December 1978, p. 5.
[115] *BBC/FE*, No. 5986 (5 Dec. 1978), pp. A3/5, 7. Also, No. 5999 (20 Dec. 1978), p. A3/3.
[116] *REVIEW*, 22 Dec. 1978, p. 17.
[117] *ST*, 4 May 1979, p. 16.

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drive and China's threat to Vietnam. The military operation was invariably described as a " war of liberation " or " people's struggle " waged by the newly established National Front in support of the uprisings of the Kampuchean people, and the immediate objective was " to eliminate the genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique and to bring to an end the Vietnam-Kampuchea border war."[118] In fact, throughout the final 12-day Vietnamese penetration into Kampuchea, Hanoi was conspicuously silent on the entire Kampuchean situation and did not mention a single word about either Vietnam's own role in the operation or China's threat by way of Kampuchea. Only after the capture of Phnom Penh did Hanoi admit that it had launched " counter-attacks " to repulse the Pol Pot regime's " territorial encroachments."[119] In greeting the victory, Radio Hanoi merely declared that the developments in Kampuchea had eliminated the cause of conflict between Kampuchea and her neighbours, thereby " paving the way for peace and stability " in the region.[120]

If Vietnam's reluctance to implicate China was due mainly to its presumed neutrality in the entire Kampuchean operation, it did not take long for Hanoi to reveal its real motivation. On 7 January, 1979, the Party newspaper *Nhan Dan* hailed the capture of Phnom Penh as " having ushered in a new era in Indochina " and hastened to place Kampuchea in its proper context by declaring that " from now on the three fraternal nations—Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos, will unite with one another to build a new life . . . This strong solidarity constitutes a strength which no force can destroy."[121] Such solidarity took concrete form on 16 February, merely one month after Hanoi had installed the Heng Samrin regime, when Hanoi's Prime Minister Pham Van Dong flew to Phnom Penh to conclude a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the new Kampuchean government, which turned out to be very similar to that signed between Vietnam and Laos in July 1977. While stressing the need for " all-round cooperation " between Vietnam and Kampuchea, the treaty mentioned repeatedly the " tradition of militant solidarity and fraternal friendship " between the two countries and put the two parties under obligation to " preserve the purity " of such solidarity and friendship.[122] On 23 February, the *Nhan Dan* already openly proposed the creation of an " Indochinese union " consisting of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, and claimed that the " militant solidarity and fraternal friendship " between the three nations constituted " a necessary objective and a *law* in the development of the revolution in each country."[123] A Vietnam-dominated Indochina finally saw the light of day.

[118] *BBC/FE*, No. 5986, pp. A3/2–11; No. 5999, p. A3/2.
[119] *BBC/FE*, No. 6010 (8 Jan. 1979), p. A3/6; No. 6016 (15 Jan. 1979), pp. A3/8–9.
[120] *BBC/FE*, No. 6013 (11 Jan. 1979), p. A3/7; No. 6016, pp. A3/10–11. Also, *REVIEW*, 26 Jan. 1979, p. 11.
[121] *BBC/FE*, No. 6011 (9 Jan. 1979), p. A3/12.
[122] *Vietnam Courier*, March 1979, pp. 5–6.
[123] *ST*, 24 Feb. 1979, p. 36.

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VIETNAM'S high-profile move into Kampuchea and the speed at which it formalized its special relationship with that country clearly astonished China.[124] Although China throughout the second half of 1978 never wavered in its diplomatic support of Kampuchea and also tried its best to boost Kampuchean defence capabilities, it was fully aware of the wide disparity in military strength between Kampuchea and Vietnam and the difficulties involved in supplying a non-contiguous country. In fact, the whole policy of China's military propping up of Kampuchea was based upon the assumption that Vietnam at least would not openly commit an act of massive aggression against Kampuchea in the purview of the international community. And as long as no large-scale invasion took place, it was entirely feasible for the Kampuchean forces to confine Hanoi's territorial ambitions within limited bounds. Beijing somehow calculated that the staunch verbal Chinese support plus a massive Chinese presence in Kampuchea would be sufficient to deter an all-out Vietnamese assault, for that could only mean direct confrontation between Vietnam and China.

In fact, throughout the last quarter of 1978 when the shadow of a Vietnamese invasion was actually growing, Beijing betrayed a clear anxiety to reduce the chances of an all-out war between Kampuchea and Vietnam. Apart from China's repeated declaration that it would not send troops to Kampuchea, a high-level Chinese delegation dispatched to Phnom Penh immediately after the announcement of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty did little more than advise Kampuchea to be prepared to surrender the capital if necessary and to fight a " protracted guerrilla war " in the countryside.[125] In mid-November, Deng Xiaoping even openly predicted the fall of Phnom Penh without, however, suggesting or threatening any measures of retaliation.[126] In fact, it was precisely China's reluctance, or rather inability, to commit itself fully to the defence of Kampuchea that had compelled Phnom Penh, in early October and again in early November, to propose, with Chinese encouragement and endorsement, the signing " immediately in Phnom Penh, Hanoi, or any other place, of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression " with Vietnam, if Hanoi would only stop its military actions against Kampuchea.[127] Having received no response from Hanoi, Kampuchea, in what appeared to be a desperate move to avert the unpleasant eventuality, actually had to make an open appeal in late November to " all friendly nations " for emergency assistance in order to keep Vietnam out.[128]

That Vietnam should have launched the invasion at all in such a blatant manner not only shattered all Beijing's hopes for containing the scope of the conflict, but also constituted a severe and humiliating blow to China

[124] That China did not expect Phnom Penh to fall so quickly, or at least was not prepared for it, was underlined by the haste and disorder in which Chinese diplomats and technicians were evacuated in early January, some of them even on foot. *REVIEW*, 19 Jan. 1979, p. 11. *ST*, 2 May 1979, p. 2.

[125] *REVIEW*, 24 Nov. 1978, p. 11. Also, 15 Dec. 1978, p. 34; 12 Jan. 1979, p. 14.

[126] *REVIEW*, 24 Nov. 1978, p. 10.

[127] *BR*, 13 Oct. 1978, p. 21; 10 Nov. 1978, p. 4.

[128] *BBC/FE*, No. 5988 (7 Dec. 1978), pp. A3/6–8.

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politically, since it made a big mockery of the resolute support for Kampuchea—both in words and in deeds—which Beijing had vehemently proclaimed and repeatedly demonstrated. In so far as Hanoi's decision to overrun Kampuchea militarily was made on the presumption of powerful Soviet backing and Chinese impotence and timidity, the invasion also posed a direct challenge to China's stature and credibility, to which Beijing now had no choice but to respond. After all the fruitless tussles and wrangles over other bilateral issues of dispute, to allow Vietnam to have its way in Kampuchea would in fact have been tantamount to a total surrender of China to Vietnam. Although by the end of 1978, some form of punitive action against Vietnam might well have already been planned and executed, if only to ensure minimum peace and order along the increasingly chaotic Sino-Vietnamese border, it became quite clear after the massive Vietnamese invasion that, unless a military operation of a similar scope was launched against Vietnam, China could not expect to demonstrate its determination to confront Vietnam and even Russia militarily, or to slow down the Vietnamese conquest.[129]

THAT China's decision to launch massive attacks upon Vietnam was made only after the Vietnamese invasion had occurred was amply shown by the sharp differences in its attitudes and actions between the two periods demarcated by 25 December. Chinese protests and warnings against Vietnam made before that date were either mild in tone or vague in implications, and did not go beyond Beijing's immediate concern about territorial encroachments and stability along the Sino-Vietnamese border. And as late as mid-December, when Vietnam was all set to move into Kampuchea, there was still no sign of a corresponding Chinese build-up in the border area, apart from increased reconnaissance flights.[130] All this apparently accounted for the lapse of 40 days between the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. It also explains, at least in part, the " supreme confidence " expressed by Hanoi in Beijing's non-intervention even up to the eve of the Chinese invasion, as well as the fact that Vietnamese forces stationed along the Sino-Vietnamese border were both limited in quantity and somewhat irregular in character.[131]

It was only in early January 1979 that Western intelligence sources began to monitor a " massive and hasty " build-up of enormous supplies of armour and artillery along China's border with Vietnam, signifying a possible large-scale Chinese invasion.[132] In addition, not until after

[129] Thus, China in launching the invasion proclaimed that the purpose of the military operation was to " destroy the myth that Vietnam is the third largest military power and therefore could do anything it wants." *XHNA*, 27 Feb., 7 March 1979.

[130] *REVIEW*, 22 Dec. 1978, p. 17.

[131] Ibid. Foreign analysts as late as mid-January doubted that China would launch a sustained offensive against Vietnam. The *New York Times*, 22 Jan. 1979, p. 3.

[132] *ST*, 7 Jan. 1979, p. 2; 4 May 1979, p. 16. *REVIEW*, 12 Jan. 1979, p. 14; 16 Feb. 1979, p. 10.

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Phnom Penh had fallen to the Vietnamese did China begin to make threatening remarks and relate them specifically to the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. The first clear hint that China might launch a large-scale military operation against Vietnam was made on 8 January by a high-ranking official at the People's Institute of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, when he told a group of visiting US senators accompanied by Ambassador Woodcock: " The Vietnamese are crazy. They believe they have defeated the French and the Americans and now the Kampucheans, and now they think they can defeat China. They must be taught a lesson. There will be war."[133] On 29 January, Deng Xiaoping while confirming unusual Chinese troop movements, told the US senate in Washington: " We cannot allow Vietnam to run wild everywhere . . . We may be forced to do what we do not like to do . . . Vietnam must be taught some necessary lessons."[134] The same warning was repeated by Deng in Tokyo on 7 February on his way back to Beijing, when he told the Japanese Prime Minister explicitly that " Vietnam must be punished for its action [inKampuchea]," for " if we remain inactive, the military action [in Kampuchea] might spread to ASEAN."[135] It was also no accident that only in early February, when China had concentrated 160,000 regular troops, 700 aircraft and hundreds of heavy artillery pieces along the Vietnamese border, did Hanoi hastily transfer a number of MiG-21 fighters from its overstretched southern command to the north and add a new missile-launching site to its border defence network.[136]

During the Chinese invasion that began on 16 February, Beijing also did not refrain from linking its military action to the Kampuchean situation. It was perhaps no coincidence that the all-out attack was launched on the same day when Pham Van Dong arrived in Phnom Penh to sign the Kampuchean-Vietnamese Treaty that laid the legal basis for a Hanoi-dominated Indochina. On 24 February, at a United Nations Security Council meeting on the Sino-Vietnamese border war, the Chinese delegate, after declaring that the objectives of China's military action were limited, urged the Security Council to take " immediate and effective measures to stop Vietnam's armed aggression against Kampuchea and to bring an end to Vietnam's military occupation of Kampuchea."[137] Two days later, Deng Xiaoping, responding to a query of a journalist, openly said that " one should first ask why Vietnamese troops entered Kampuchea " before asking when China's lesson would end. He also reiterated that " China could not tolerate the Cuba of the Orient [i.e., Vietnam] going swashbuckling in Laos, Kampuchea or even on the Chinese border."[138] Throughout the one-month operation the Chinese media also did not hesitate to describe the aim of Chinese

[133] *ST*, 4 May 1979, p. 16.
[134] The *New York Times*, 31 Jan. 1979.
[135] *XHNA*, 7–8 Feb. 1979. Also, *ST*, 8 Feb. 1979, p. 1.
[136] *REVIEW*, 16 Feb. 1979, p. 10.
[137] *Renmin Ribao*, 26 Feb. 1979, p. 5. Also, *BR*, 2 March 1979, p. 19.
[138] *XHNA*, 27 Feb. 1979.

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intervention as " nipping in the bud " any plan for a " greater Vietnam " or " Indochinese federation."[139]

As a move which was almost totally unexpected by Vietnam, the one-month-long Chinese operation did demonstrate China's capability for military action and the extent to which Beijing was prepared to go in order to contain Hanoi's regional ambitions. By opening up a second front of war for Vietnam and by inflicting substantial casualties and damages upon Vietnam, China also gave the retreating Khmer forces a breathing space and a boost to their morale, thereby slowing down the Vietnamese offensive in Kampuchea. Although Chinese troops were soon withdrawn to Chinese territory, their continuing presence along the Vietnamese border was sufficient to constitute a real threat to Vietnam, and one which now had to be reckoned with. It certainly began to tie down a considerable proportion of Vietnamese troops that would otherwise have been made available in Kampuchea. However, as far as the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Kampuchea was concerned, the Chinese invasion did not really contribute to its solution, as it added an emotional dimension to a protracted quarrel between China and Vietnam without actually altering the existing balance of forces in Kampuchea. In fact, precisely because of its explicitly " punitive " character, the Chinese invasion most probably made Hanoi more determined than ever to stay in Kampuchea, for to do otherwise could only imply Hanoi's submission to Beijing's demands under the sheer pressure of force. Indeed, by lending credence, hitherto most plausible, to Vietnam's claim that the Pol Pot regime was merely a puppet of China and a tool of Chinese expansionism, the Chinese military action in a way provided Vietnam with an ideal pretext for holding on to Kampuchea and proceeding with its conquest.

IN the light of the above, it is no wonder that the negotiations initiated by China after the war, from the very outset had little chance of success. In fact, no sooner had the negotiations started in April 1979 than a basic dispute emerged between the two sides regarding the purpose and scope of such peace talks. Being the apparent victim of Chinese invasion and still under threat of renewed attacks, Vietnam considered the problem of Chinese aggression as the only substantive issue to be discussed. Thus at the first meeting, Vietnam made a three-point proposal which called for, among others:

> 1) the cessation of all acts of hostility and provocation and the withdrawal of all armed forces on both sides to a distance of three to five kilometres from the border; 2) the establishment of a demilitarised zone to be supervised by a joint commission of the two countries; 3) the restoration of normal relations on the basis of respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,

[139] *Renmin Ribao*, 18 Feb. 1979, p. 1; 19 Feb. 1979, p. 6; 1 March 1979, p. 5. *ST*, 22 March 1979, p. 3.

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> non-aggression, non-use of force and non-interference in the other's internal affairs.[140]

Nowhere in the proposal or the accompanying remarks did Vietnam touch upon Kampuchea or other broader issues at all.

China apparently viewed the negotiations in quite a different light. Having run great risks in launching the military operation and also having sustained considerable losses, Beijing somehow expected Vietnam to have at least learned a lesson from the border war and therefore sought an overall solution to all the issues of conflict between the two countries. Thus, Beijing at the second meeting made an ambitious eight-point proposal covering Kampuchea as well as the ethnic Chinese and territorial disputes. However, the focus of China's attention was clearly on Kampuchea. In this respect, Beijing proposed three related courses of action for the restoration of normal relations between the two countries. They were:

> 1) neither side should seek hegemony in Indochina, South-East Asia or any other part of the world; 2) neither side should station troops in other countries, and those already stationed abroad must be withdrawn to their own country; 3) neither side should join any military blocs directed against the other, provide military bases to other countries or use the territories and bases of other countries to threaten, subvert or commit armed aggression against the other side or against any other countries.[141]

As it soon turned out, these two divergent views and starting points also constituted the two " key issues " to which each side adamantly insisted on giving priority in the agenda. Repeatedly dwelling on the " criminal nature of Chinese aggression," Hanoi contended that the Chinese invasion represented merely the climax of a long-standing campaign to " encircle, threaten, weaken . . . and subjugate " Vietnam and to " drag it into China's orbit."[142] In launching the invasion, therefore, the Chinese " only showed their true colours as hegemonists and imperialists " and deserved condemnation on these grounds alone.[143] Hanoi thus insisted that the negotiations had no other business than to discuss the prevention of another invasion, and their most immediate task was to " ease the dangerous situation which might lead to a new outbreak of the war,"[144] since only when the risk of war in the border area was eliminated could " adequate conditions for reaching a solution to other problems " be created.[145] In order to accomplish this objective, at the third session Hanoi even proposed a draft agreement, to be signed immediately by China and Vietnam, which would require both sides to "refrain from offensive activities, armed provocations, firing from one territory to the other on

[140] *BBC/FE*, No. 6095 (19 April 1979), pp. A3/4–5.
[141] *BR*, 4 May 1979, p. 16.
[142] *BBC/FE*, No. 6095, p. A3/2.
[143] *BBC/FE*, No. 6102 (27 April 1979), p. A3/10.
[144] *BBC/FE*, No. 6161 (7 July 1979), p. A3/6.
[145] *BBC/FE*, No. 6102, p. A3/10; No. 6155 (30 June 1979), p. A3/6.

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land, on the sea and in the air, and to refrain from any activity endangering the other's security."[146]

Indeed, from the Vietnamese perspective, without first being free from the threat of another invasion across the border, there was no point in discussing any other substantive issues, and a commitment by China to peace along the border was a necessary expression of its sincerity in improving relations with Vietnam. But that was not all. To allow the discussion to include Kampuchea or other larger issues would not only put Vietnam in a bad light and give greater credit than politically desirable to China's military action, but would also concede to China more than the existing balance of forces warranted. By underlining the aggressive character of the Chinese regime, and by concentrating on the specific issue of ensuring peace and tranquillity along the land border, Hanoi therefore expected to shift the blame for the tension in Indochina and the deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations to Beijing, and at the same time to avoid the responsibility of accounting for its own conduct in Kampuchea. By manoeuvring China into making a pledge to respect Vietnam's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and particularly not to use force or to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, Hanoi in fact not only sought to remove the danger of further armed intervention against Vietnam, but also to keep China safely out of Kampuchea. Such a strategy was certainly essential at a time when Vietnam was still in the process of mopping up remaining Khmer forces.

China, on the other hand, repeatedly stressed that the serious deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations was in the main the outcome of Vietnam's pursuance of regional " hegemonism " at Soviet instigation and with Soviet support, and the resulting hostility towards China. More specifically, it was Vietnam's ambition to set up an Indochinese federation and its willingness to serve as the " reliable outpost " of Soviet social imperialism in South-East Asia that had led to the confrontation between China and Vietnam.[147] The question of opposing " hegemonism " was therefore the " crux of the matter," the " root cause" and the " fundamental issue " in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict.[148] In order to normalize relations between the two countries, therefore, Vietnam must first commit itself to the principal of refraining from seeking verbal hegemony and then prove its sincerity in deeds by stopping its anti-China provocations and withdrawing its troops from Kampuchea. Without a fundamental change in Vietnam's policy and intention with regard to both China and Kampuchea, it would be futile to examine the specific, concrete issues.[149]

THUS, from the Chinese perspective, the border conflict was only a symptom and a result, rather than a cause, of the woeful state of

[146] *BBC/FE*, No. 6155, p. A3/5; No. 6172 (20 July 1979), p. A3/3.
[147] *BR*, 4 May 1979, pp. 14–15, 18. See also, *XHNA*, 5 and 18 July 1979.
[148] *BR*, 4 May 1979, p. 18; *XHNA*, 18 May, 23 May, and 18 July 1979.
[149] *XHNA*, 18 May 1979. Also, *BR*, 4 May 1979, p. 18.

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Sino-Vietnamese relations. And in view of the nature and scope of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, nothing short of a comprehensive review of all the major issues of dispute could be considered adequate or useful. However, since the large-scale Chinese invasion—described by China as " a counter-attack in self-defence "—could not be fully justified by either Vietnam's territorial encroachments or the refugee influx, or both, only by proceeding from the general principle to concrete issues could Beijing bring up the subject of Kampuchea in the peace talks and rationalize its intervention in the whole affair. By linking the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations to the general situation in Indochina, China also expected to draw the attention of the world community to Vietnam's ambitions, and to generate the badly needed political support for the Pol Pot regime which China could provide with only limited material aid. To allow itself to be bogged down in the discussion of trivial territorial or border matters would be to fall into the trap of Vietnam's delaying tactics, thereby allowing the latter to consolidate its control in Kampuchea. Without first being assured that Vietnam would indeed change its policy towards both China and Kampuchea, Beijing certainly did not want to have its own hands tied by promising not to use force again, particularly along the Sino-Vietnamese border which was the only area where China could exert effective pressure upon Vietnam.

Thus, in the continuing war of words, Beijing charged that the Vietnamese insistence that stabilizing the Sino-Vietnamese land border was the central issue, was only a trick and a " camouflage for their preparations for war against China, the tightening of their control on Laos and the strengthening of their war of aggression in Kampuchea."[150] To refuse to discuss Kampuchea and the principle of " anti-hegemonism " was in fact to admit the illegality of the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea and to trample underfoot the basic principles of peaceful coexistence between independent nations.[151] Moreover, Beijing contended that the Kampuchean situation was not an " isolated event " or " local issue," since it not only revealed Hanoi's ambitious designs for Indochina and for other South-East Asian countries, but also represented " an important component of the Soviet attempt to further its strategy of seeking world hegemony."[152] In fact, the Kampuchean problem, Beijing argued, was not so much a manifestation of the conflict between China and Vietnam, as of the Soviet and Vietnamese threat to the entire region. As such it was of " global significance " and could not afford to be overlooked.[153] Therefore, in lending a hand to Kampuchea, China was not merely containing the ambitions of a smaller neighbour, but also restraining the global hegemony of a superpower. And unless and until the Kampuchean question was discussed, " the Sino-Vietnamese negotiations can only serve to cover up Vietnamese hege-

[150] *XHNA*, 28 June 1979.
[151] Ibid.
[152] *BR*, 12 Oct. 1979, pp. 15–16.
[153] Ibid., pp. 16–17.

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monism and even meet its needs. Under no circumstances will the Chinese side agree to this."[154]

When Vietnam did eventually comment directly on the Kampuchean issue in late June, it countered the Chinese charges by arguing that the presence of Vietnamese troops in Laos and Kampuchea was a matter of " purely bilateral relations among three sovereign countries " and therefore had " absolutely nothing to do with other countries and was totally irrelevant to the Vietnam-China talks."[155] By raising issues not belonging to bilateral relations, China was in fact " claiming the right to discuss the affairs of a third, and even a fourth and fifth country."[156] In demanding the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, China was not only " creating a precondition for the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations," but was in fact demanding that Vietnam " give up its correct line of independence, sovereignty, and international solidarity."[157] Hanoi further contended that it was to cope with China's threat to the entire region in general and to Vietnam in particular that Vietnam had come to the aid of Kampuchea. Therefore, only " after the danger of aggression and intervention created by the Chinese rulers' expansionism and hegemonism had been removed " would the Vietnamese forces be brought home.[158] In any case, Vietnam declared that the " situation in Kampuchea cannot be reversed."[159]

As no agreement could be reached even on the procedure of conducting the negotiations, the peace talks were soon turned into a forum for trading charges and countercharges. By refusing to consider the Vietnamese proposal of adopting urgent measures to ensure peace along the border, China was accused of practising " big-nation hegemonism " and " evading the responsibility for its criminal war of aggression against the Vietnamese people."[160] By dodging the question of " hegemonism," Vietnam was also charged with " evading the crucial and substantive issues " in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict.[161]

That the negotiations had absolutely no effect upon Vietnam's policy in Kampuchea can be seen in the escalated efforts Hanoi made to consolidate its grip on Kampuchea throughout 1979. In fact, on 26 March, even before the peace talks started, a Lao-Kampuchean Treaty of Friendship similar to the Lao-Vietnamese and Kampuchean-Vietnamese treaties was hastily concluded under the auspices of Hanoi, thereby completing the final official step linking Indochina's three countries into an effective entity. The treaty not only ensured identical foreign and internal policies in the three countries, but also allowed free flow of manpower and resources across their borders, thereby giving a more

[154] *XHNA*, 18 July 1979.
[155] *BBC/FE*, No. 6161 (7 July 1979), p. A3/4. Also, No. 6170 (18 July 1979), p. A3/1.
[156] *BBC/FE*, No. 6155, p. A3/7. Also, No. 6172, p. A3/3.
[157] *BBC/FE*, No. 6155, p. A3/4.
[158] *BBC/FE*, No. 6161, p. A3/4.
[159] *BBC/FE*, No. 6107 (3 May 1979), p. A1/1; No. 6172, p. A3/5.
[160] *BBC/FE*, No. 6102, p. A3/10; No. 6121 (21 May 1979), p. A3/3.
[161] *XHNA*, 18 May 1979.

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definite shape to the *de facto* Indochinese federation.[162] In fact, Western military sources confirmed that by late March, Pathet Lao forces had already entered Kampuchea to participate in the war against the Khmer Rouge.[163] A massive programme of population resettlement was also launched at around the same time in a clear attempt to colonize more sparsely populated Kampuchea and Laos. By August, practically every province of Kampuchea had been placed under the charge of a Vietnamese province through a special " sister province " arrangement.[164] By November, Vietnam had reportedly already settled at least 250,000 Vietnamese in Kampuchea.[165]

In close coordination with the colonization project was a massive purge of Kampucheans of Chinese descent similar to the persecution of Chinese in Vietnam. The campaign was underway as early as April 1979, and the resulting exodus of ethnic Chinese reached a new peak in late May 1979, when more than 40,000 Kampucheans of Chinese extraction fled to Thailand in one single week.[166] In fact, according to Thai military sources, " most Kampucheans fleeing to Thailand are of Chinese descent, and many have been sent to the Thai border in Vietnamese trucks."[167] In the meantime, there were recurrent reports that the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea were systematically starving to death many Kampucheans by diverting large amounts of precious international aid supplies destined for the people into the hands of the Vietnamese troops, by preventing the Kampuchean peasants from harvesting their grain, and by even spraying poisonous gas from aircraft at civilians as well as at suspected guerrilla strongholds.[168] Kampuchea was being dismembered as a functioning society with dire consequences for the entire Khmer race.

ON the battlefield, Hanoi also went all out to intensify its offensive against the retreating Khmer Rouge forces, in an attempt to wipe out the Khmer resistance at one final stroke. This was evidenced not only in the continuing build-up of the Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea from an initial 100,000 to 150,000 by May 1979, and to 200,000 by October 1979,[169] but also in the large-scale military resupply operation that the Soviet Union launched in the spring of 1979 to aid Vietnam in its war efforts, with a total of 79 flights over Thai air space in the short span of two months from April to May alone.[170] In fact, by late April, only one week after the peace talks had started, the Vietnamese forces in a massive, two-pronged operation had already cornered an estimated 60,000 Khmer forces in western Kampuchea, and Vietnamese units were

[162] *Vietnam Courier* (Hanoi), April 1979, p. 11. *BBC/FE*, No. 6077 (27 March 1979), pp. A3/2–6.
[163] *ST*, 26 March 1979, p. 5.
[164] *REVIEW*, 13 Aug. 1979, pp. 17–20; *BR*, 9 Nov. 1979, p. 26.
[165] *ST*, 5 Nov. 1979, p. 32.
[166] *ST*, 23 May 1979, p. 1.
[167] *ST*, 6 June 1979, p. 2.
[168] The *New York Times*, 9 Aug. 1979, p. 3; 27 Sept. 1979, p. 19; 1 Oct. 1979, p. 10; 3 Dec. 1979, p. 11; 12 Dec. 1979, p. 11. *ST*, 30 Nov. 1979, p. 1; 22 Dec. 1979, p. 3.
[169] *ST*, 5 May 1979, p. 1; 8 Oct. 1979, p. 4.
[170] *ST*, 25 May 1979, p. 1.

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beginning to cross the Thai border in hot pursuit of the Kampuchean forces.[171] To intimidate Thailand into adopting a strictly neutral policy, the Hanoi-backed Heng Samrin regime even warned Thailand of " dangerous consequences " for allowing China to smuggle arms to the Khmers through Thai territory.[172] By November 1979, Hanoi had already amassed 40,000 troops along the Thai-Kampuchean border in preparation for a major dry-season offensive to wipe out the Khmer resistance.[173]

In the process of executing its anticipated final assault on the Khmer Rouge and consolidating its control over Kampuchea and Laos, Vietnam also did not take any chances along its northern frontier. In fact, immediately after the war, large units of crack regular troops, together with large amounts of war materials, including some of the most sophisticated weapons supplied by the Soviet Union, were transported to the Sino-Vietnamese border areas, and the northern provinces were quickly turned into a gigantic military base.[174] In the meantime, Hanoi drew even closer to Moscow. By May there were reportedly already 7,000 Soviet, Cuban and East German advisers in Indochina.[175] Advanced Soviet military aircraft and naval vessels, including the long-range TU-95 bombers and nuclear attack submarines, had also begun to make visits to Vietnam.[176] By August, Vietnam was confident enough of making more progress in Kampuchea and of support from the Soviet Union to proclaim once again the " unshakeable military solidarity and friendship " between the three Indochinese peoples and to reiterate the " irreversible " nature of the Kampuchean situation.[177] In particular, Hanoi warned Beijing that China should " think it over " before embarking upon another war against Vietnam, and declared that it " would not be taken by surprise this time."[178] To further buttress its position, Hanoi in fact went as far as to declare openly its reliance on " the military solidarity, friendship and cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union as a *firm guarantee* for its victory in the socialist construction and national defence."[179]

China, on the other hand, was also determined that the lesson it had intended to teach Vietnam had indeed been learned. In fact, the fall of Phnom Penh to Vietnamese forces did not lead to the slightest change in China's position on Kampuchea. In a series of official statements made after the fall of Phnom Penh, China pledged that it would support Kampuchea " in every way " and " through to the end " against

[171] *ST*, 23 April 1979, p. 1; 4 May 1979, p. 3.
[172] *BBC/FE*, No. 6055 (1 March 1979), p. A3/1; No. 6057 (3 March 1979), pp. A3/1–2. Also, *ST*, 5 March 1979, p. 1; *MD*, 14 Oct. 1979, p. 14.
[173] *ST*, 15 Nov. 1979, p. 40.
[174] *ST*, 4 May 1979, p. 1.
[175] *ST*, 3 May 1979, p. 1.
[176] *ST*, 3 May 1979, p. 1; 12 May 1979, p. 6.
[177] *Vietnam Courier*, September 1979, p. 2. Also, *BBC/FE*, No. 6201 (23 Aug. 1979), p. A3/2; No. 6205 (29 Aug. 1979), pp. A3/4–5.
[178] *ST*, 8 Aug. 1979, p. 3; 13 Aug. 1979, p. 5.
[179] *ST*, 2 Oct. 1979, p. 28.

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Vietnamese aggression.[180] By late January, Beijing was already busily resupplying the Khmer Rouge through Thai territory and using Chinese ships.[181] In early April, when the fighting had begun to spill over into Thai territory, the Chinese Ambassador to Thailand, Zhang Welih, told the *Bangkok Post* that China would help Thailand if it should be attacked.[182] In late June, apparently to counter Vietnam's warning to Thailand not to help the Khmers, Deng Xiaoping even declared: " Any threat to Thailand is a threat to China."[183] In view of the fact that the Khmer Rouge had recently used Thai territory as an escape route and had received their major supplies through Thai territory, the repeated Chinese warnings against Vietnamese encroachments of Thai territory were clearly aimed at deterring any massive Vietnamese incursions into Thailand which would jeopardize the very survival of the Khmer Rouge forces.

To make sure that the Khmer Rouge would withstand the Vietnamese onslaught, throughout 1979 China also kept alive its threat to use force against Vietnam again. Thus, in announcing the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam in early March, Beijing declared that China would counter-attack if Vietnam renewed armed provocations.[184] In early May, at a time when the Vietnamese forces were mopping up retreating Khmer forces in West Kampuchea, Deng Xiaoping told visiting UN Secretary General Dr Waldheim that China " reserves the right to act and will teach Vietnam another lesson."[185] In July, Li Xiannian repeated China's warning when he told *Newsweek* magazine in an interview: " China did not rule out the possibility of another strike against Vietnam."[186] The same warning was reiterated many times by other high-ranking Chinese officials, including Premier Hua Guofeng, in the second half of 1979.[187]

In order to demonstrate that China meant business, Beijing not only continued to station over 12 divisions of troops close to the Sino-Vietnamese border, with five army corps behind them, but also carried out a series of manoeuvres designed to tie down a substantial number of Vietnamese units along the border, so as to deter Vietnam from any further massive and sustained offensives against the Khmer Rouge forces. Thus, in late July 1979, Beijing declared four " danger " zones in the air space covering part of the Gulf of Tonkin and areas west of the Paracels Islands.[188] In the meantime, a large number of photographs showing Chinese missiles and troops in training manoeuvres were released amidst reports that China's 42nd army stationed near Hong Kong was being moved to the Vietnamese border.[189] In October, in

[180] *XHNA*, 9 Jan. 1979. Also, *BR*, 12 Jan. 1979, p. 2; 19 Jan. 1979, p. 3.
[181] *ST*, 1 Feb. 1979, p. 2; 8 Feb. 1979, p. 3; 11 Feb. 1979, p. 2.
[182] *ST*, 2 April 1979, p. 28.
[183] *ST*, 27 June 1979, p. 30.
[184] *XHNA*, 5 March 1979.
[185] *ST*, 3 May 1979, p. 1.
[186] *Newsweek*, 16 July 1979, p. 59.
[187] *ST*, 27 July 1979, p. 1; 8 Oct. 1979, p. 1; 26 Oct. 1979, p. 1. The *New York Times*, 8 Dec. 1979, p. 3.
[188] *XHNA*, 23 July 1979.
[189] See *Renmin Ribao*, 23 July, 28 July, 30 July, 1 Aug. 1979. *ST*, 13 Aug. 1979, p. 5.

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anticipation of a new Vietnamese dry-season offensive, Beijing went one step further to increase its aerial bombing practices on its side of the Sino-Vietnamese border, and Western sources once again reported abnormal movements and reinforcements of Chinese troops which were similar to those detected immediately prior to the 1979 war, thereby giving the impression that China might indeed soon teach Vietnam another lesson.[190] In fact, Beijing somewhat deliberately suggested to visiting American Vice President Mondale in early October that the second lesson might have to be administered to Vietnam around November when the drive against the Pol Pot would have gathered steam.[191]

IN addition to all this rattling of sabres, China also seemed to have made it a policy after the 1979 war to respond to every single Vietnamese armed provocation or incursion into Chinese territory with determined counter-attacks, if only to exert continuing pressure on Vietnam. As a result, the armed clashes along the border once again became a recurrent phenomenon, particularly from July onwards, with each side enumerating in great detail the nature and scope of such incidents. In late November, Hanoi in fact charged that China had committed over 1,000 armed provocations in violation of Vietnamese territory during the six-month period following the end of the border war, whereas Beijing also accused Vietnam of making more than 370 military incursions into China's border regions during the three months of August to October alone.[192] And the tense situation persisted into early 1980 with no signs of relaxation.[193] As a military solution to the Kampuchean conflict had remained Vietnam's chosen path, and as China was determined to meet the Vietnamese challenge on the battlefield, the futility of continuing the peace negotiations became increasingly clear. Thus, on 7 February 1980, Beijing refused to resume the interrupted peace talks, charging that the Vietnamese had used the talks as " a cover for their aggression against Kampuchea, threats to Thailand, and armed provocations against China," thereby virtually suspending the negotiations which had lasted for nearly a year.[194] The peace talks were formally called off by Beijing on 6 March 1980.[195] A new chapter in Sino-Vietnamese relations opened only with attempts at Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

[190] *ST*, 26 Oct. 1979, p. 1; 31 Oct. 1979, p. 2.
[191] *ST*, 8 Oct. 1979, p. 14.
[192] *XHNA*, 20 Nov. 1979; *BBC/FE*, No. 6280 (24 Nov. 1979), p. A3/1.
[193] China claimed that there were more than 200 armed incidents in January 1980 alone. *XHNA*, 7 Feb. 1980.
[194] Ibid.
[195] *XHNA*, 6 March 1980.

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The Soviet-Vietnamese Alliance and Kampuchea

Leif Rosenberger

MOSCOW and Hanoi gave every appearance of close political, economic and military cooperation against the United States during the Vietnam war. Soviet support and assistance to Hanoi helped it to win the war in 1975. Most observers saw the two allies working hand in hand to further the spread of communism in Asia. This image of intimate Soviet and Vietnamese cooperation was strengthened after the war, as the Soviet Union and Vietnam forged an alliance based on mutual hostility towards China. In fact, the common factor which today serves to keep the relationship stable and close is mutual hostility towards China.

Nevertheless, while joint interests and a history of cooperation might suggest a durable and close relationship, there is evidence of friction in the alliance today. The fact that Moscow and Hanoi cooperated during the war in Vietnam certainly does not fully describe the complexities of the relationship, nor does it hint at the strains which extend to the start of Soviet-Vietnamese relations.[1]

TO a certain extent, signs of strain in the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship are a natural consequence of an historical legacy which is troubled from the Vietnamese perspective. The historical record is one of frequent Soviet neglect, compromise or outright betrayal of Vietnamese interests:

- Soviet indifference to the founding of the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1930.
- Soviet failure to support, even verbally, the struggle of the Vietnamese communists against French colonial rule during the 1930s and early 1940s.[2]
- Soviet recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) five years after Ho Chi Minh's declaration of the DRV—only in 1950.[3]
- Soviet failure to support or lobby for the DRV application for membership in the UN either in 1948 or in 1951.[4]

[1] For the definitive work on early Soviet-Vietnamese relations, see Allan W. Cameron, "The Soviet Union and Vietnam: Origins of Involvement," in W. Raymond Duncan, ed., *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries* (Ginn-Blaisdell, Waltham, Mass., 1970), pp. 166–205.

[2] For an account of early Soviet indifference to Vietnam, see Ellen J. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1954); Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1966); Douglas Pike, *History of Vietnamese Communism 1925–1976* (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1981); William Juiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981).

[3] Moscow did not extend diplomatic recognition to Vietnam until 30 January 1950 (*Pravda*, 31 Jan., 1950). Furthermore, there was no Vietnamese ambassador in the Soviet Union until April 1952.

[4] Hanoi applied for UN membership on 22 Nov. 1948 and again on 29 Dec. 1951. See United Nations Security Council, *Document S/2780*, dated 17 Sept. 1952, and idem., *Document S/2466*, dated 5 Jan.

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— Soviet support at the Geneva Conference in 1954 for a cease-fire and partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel.[5]
— Soviet proposal for the admittance of both North and South Vietnam to the UN in 1956.

The Sino-Soviet split changed Moscow's attitude towards Vietnam.[6] By 1960, the Soviets had stepped up their political support and after 1965, their military support for North Vietnam. And certainly during the 10 years of direct and major US involvement in Vietnam (1965–75), Soviet military aid proved to be instrumental in bringing about the victory of the Vietnamese communists.

Despite the large amount of Soviet military assistance, the Vietnamese never felt that the Soviets helped their cause to the degree they deserved.[7] In their eyes, Soviet aid was offered only after repeated appeals and then it was insufficient and granted begrudgingly: the Vietnamese focus was always on what was *not* given.

Most of all, Hanoi suspected the motives behind Soviet military and economic aid. In the eyes of the Viet Minh, Soviet assistance and support was given not because of a genuine desire to help the Vietnamese communists achieve unification, but as part of Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence.

Indeed, Moscow apparently did not feel it could afford to offend the DRV or ignore its interests. The Kremlin evidently saw itself forced to cultivate Vietnamese support in order to maintain Soviet influence in the international communist movement against China. Only by extending increasing amounts of war materials to North Vietnam could Moscow offset China's more militant support for Hanoi's strategy of armed struggle in the south.

NEVERTHELESS, Soviet interest in improving relations with the United States became a point of tension in the Khrushchev era. To the dismay of Hanoi, Khrushchev avoided total Soviet commitment to Vietnam for fear that it could ruin his pursuit of *détente* with Washington. During Khrushchev's last two years in power, the Soviet Union almost disengaged itself from Vietnam.

The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership which replaced Khrushchev in 1964 stepped up Soviet support for Vietnam and initially lessened the issue of US-Soviet relations as a point of tension in Moscow's relations with Hanoi. But ultimately, the new Soviet leadership was also ready to sacrifice Vietnamese interests for the sake of its relations with Washington.

1952. For a further account of the Soviet lack of interest in Vietnam during the Korean war years—especially in comparison with China's interest—see McLane, op. cit., pp. 439–440.

[5] For more on the Geneva Conference, see King C. Chen, *Vietnam and China, 1938–1954* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1969); and Robert F. Randle, *Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1969).

[6] See Donald Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle* (Pegasus Books, New York, 1967).

[7] See Douglas Pike, " The USSR and Vietnam," in Robert H. Donaldson, ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981), pp. 251–265.

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Soviet-Vietnamese friction over the issue of Soviet-American relations reached a peak when the US mined Haiphong Harbour on the eve of the US-Soviet summit in May 1972. Brezhnev ignored the situation at Haiphong and warmly greeted President Nixon, making it clear that Moscow's relations with the United States enjoyed priority over the Vietnamese struggle. For the Vietnamese communists, the US-Soviet summit was unforgivable. It brought Soviet-Vietnamese relations to their lowest point since the Khrushchev disengagement of 1963–64.

Soviet shares in Hanoi went up as the eventual Vietnamese victory in 1975 drew near, but this did not alter Hanoi's feeling that it had received less than full Soviet support during the war. The Vietnamese felt that their obligation to the Soviet Union was limited.

FOLLOWING the war, Hanoi tried to pursue an independent foreign policy. For a while, it attempted to continue its wartime policy of gaining support from the Soviet Union and China while pledging allegiance to neither.

However, Vietnam's relations with China had deteriorated sharply by 1978. Hanoi saw the Sino-Cambodian alliance as a first step in a Chinese plan to contain Vietnam's ambitions in Indochina and felt threatened by PRC-backed Cambodian aggression. In early 1979, tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia, which had been steadily increasing since 1975, finally erupted into a military conflict. By February 1979, China and Vietnam were at war. Only Moscow was willing to offer support for Vietnam's military moves against Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime in Kampuchea.

Faced with increasing hostility from China, Chinese support for an anti-Vietnamese regime in Kampuchea, difficulties in its relations with ASEAN, and failure to improve relations with the US, Hanoi turned to the Soviet Union.

The approaching conflict with Kampuchea impelled Hanoi to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in November 1978. The key clause in the treaty is Article Six, which calls for consultation in case either party should be attacked or threatened. The Treaty was also meant to deter possible Chinese response to Hanoi's assault on the Khmer Rouge which followed in December 1978. It failed in this, however, as China attacked Vietnam in February 1979. The Chinese attack pushed Vietnam further in the direction of Moscow, by making it even more dependent on the Soviet Union for arms and military support.[8]

Nevertheless, Vietnam's decision to move away from its preferred independent course and become an increasingly close ally of the Soviet Union was prompted by force of circumstance rather than by any design to become a permanent member of the Soviet bloc. Thus, given its ambitions in Indochina, the situation facing Vietnam in late 1978 left Hanoi with few alternatives.

[8] See David W. P. Elliot, ed. *The Third Indochina War* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980).

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SOVIET and Vietnamese cooperation was strengthened following the war, as the Soviet Union and Vietnam forged an alliance based on mutual hostility towards China. The relationship served the interests of both parties.[9] The Soviet Union sees Vietnam as a key part of its strategy to encircle China.[10] In addition, Soviet access to Vietnamese military facilities supports Soviet military activities in the region. For their part, the Vietnamese need Soviet backing to maintain themselves against China and extend their domination and control over Laos and Kampuchea. Vietnam also depends on Soviet economic aid to keep its economy afloat.[11]

Soviet Military Advisers in Vietnam

There are some 2,000 military advisers in Vietnam. These advisers perform such tasks as helping to assemble new Soviet equipment, providing technical guidance in its operations, training pilots, repairing and servicing weapons, and maintaining and operating radar facilities.

Soviet Support in Kampuchea

Soviet support has been largely responsible for Vietnam's ability to extend its control over Kampuchea. Moscow has provided extensive logistic and military assistance for PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam) forces. Together with its aid to Laos, this military aid has been estimated at $100 million since 1979. Since the Sino-Vietnamese hostilities of 1979, Soviet piloted AN-12 transport aircraft have shuttled Vietnamese troops, ammunition and food from Vietnam to Kampuchea.

Soviet Military Aid[12]

During the 20 years (1955–75) of Hanoi's military struggle to unify the country under its control, the Soviet Union provided the Vietnamese with an estimated $300–500 million annually in military aid. Soviet military aid after the war dropped to $100 million by 1978, but after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979, it rose to more than $1 billion. Although this aid was subsequently reduced to an estimated $700 million in 1980 and $280 million in 1981, Moscow is still providing the Vietnamese with considerable military support. At the present time, the Soviets are supplying

[9] See Nayan Chanda, " An Alliance Based on Mutual Need," in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (*REVIEW*), 24 Aug. 1979, pp. 22–23.

[10] For a good overview of Soviet strategy in South-East Asia, see the article by Richard Armitage, US deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, entitled " Southeast Asia: Soviet Schemes Amid the Suffering," in the November 1981 issue of *Defense*. See also Lilitza Dzirklas, *Soviet Perceptions of Security in East Asia* (Praeger, New York, 1975); Leszek Buszynski, " The Soviet Union's Aims in Southeast Asia," in *Asian Wall Street Journal*, Hong Kong, 28 Oct. 1981, pp. 4–5; Strobe Talbott, " The Soviets Stir Up the Pacific," in *Time*, 23 Mar. 1981, pp. 53–55.

[11] See " Vietnam's Soviet Alliance: A Challenge to U.S. Policy," in *Indochina Issues*, no. 6, May 1980, pp. 2–3.

[12] See sub-section entitled " Soviet Military Aid to Vietnam " in *REVIEW, Asia 1982 Yearbook*, pp. 27–30. See ibid. for complete listing of the military hardware in the Vietnamese army, navy and airforce; and see The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook* (Taylor and Francis, London, 1982).

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almost all of Vietnam's arms. Vietnam's air, ground and naval forces have received approximately equal benefits.

Vietnam's Air Force

Soviet military aid has served to upgrade sharply and to modernize the Vietnamese air force. In addition to old MiG-21 fighters, the USSR has delivered the SU-22/FITTER, a modern ground attack aircraft, and the MI-24 assault helicopter. The MI-24 sharply enhances Vietnam's ability to respond to potential Chinese incursions across the border.

Vietnamese Ground Forces

The Soviets have also improved the effectiveness of the Vietnamese ground forces. Obsolete US, Chinese and Soviet systems have been replaced by more sophisticated Soviet weapons systems. These Soviet deliveries have helped to standardize Vietnamese military equipment, thus easing some of the chronic Vietnamese logistic problems.

Soviet weapons shipments to Vietnam's ground forces since 1979 include medium tanks and armoured personnel carriers, artillery, surface to air missile launchers, and anti-aircraft guns. Many of these new weapons systems represent a significant military technological advantage for the Vietnamese over the Chinese.

Vietnam's Navy

Vietnam's navy has increased its capability with the addition of many new Soviet units since 1979. These include submarine chasers, missile-patrol boats, and landing ships. The Soviets have also provided the Vietnamese navy with its first airborne anti-submarine warfare capability (in the form of KA-25 helicopters). In addition, STYX missiles and a number of OSA II patrol boats greatly improve Vietnam's stand-off capability against hostile ships.

Soviet Economic Aid[13]

Apart from the Vietnamese dependence on Soviet military aid, Soviet economic assistance continues to prop up the Vietnamese economy. During the 1976–80 Vietnamese five-year plan, Moscow provided $2·5 billion, mainly in low interest, soft loans for some 200 developmental projects. Vietnam also receives industrial and transport equipment from the USSR. Overall Soviet economic aid reached a peak in 1979 of perhaps $1·5 billion, about half of which was in commodity or trade subsidies.

The Soviet Union supplies major food and commodity aid to Vietnam. Most of the food and oil products supplied to Vietnam are on a grant aid or soft currency basis. From 1976 to 1980, the Soviet Union supplied up to 1·6 million tonnes of grain a year or about 20 per cent of the rice

[13] See the Staff Research Note, written by Lawrence H. Theriot and Jenelle Matheson, Office of East-West Policy and Planning, Department of Commerce, entitled *Soviet Economic Relations with Non-European CMEA: Cuba, Vietnam and Mongolia*, 1979.

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consumed in Vietnam. During this same period, Moscow sent Vietnam about 20,000 barrels of oil per day on highly concessionary terms.

At present, Moscow reportedly supplies 90 per cent of Vietnam's petroleum, iron and steel, fertilizer, and cotton imports and 70 per cent of its grain imports. In addition to commodity and industrial aid, Vietnam also benefits from the expertise of some 4,000–5,000 Soviet economic and technical advisers who help with planning, policy formulation, mineral exploration and project construction. Nevertheless, Soviet economic aid to Vietnam has been decreasing since 1980, from the 1979 peak of $1·5 billion to about $1 billion, and there has been no firm Soviet commitment to Vietnam's 1981–85 five-year plan.

THE Soviet Union receives sizeable benefits from this military relationship, in particular access to military facilities in Vietnam.[14] Soviet surface ships and submarines make regular visits at Cam Ranh Bay, which allow an improved, if still limited, naval capability in the South China Seas. In the past three years, the Soviet Union has deployed on average six to eight ships annually (principally naval auxiliaries) to the area.

The Soviets also conduct naval-air operations out of Vietnam. Flying first out of Da Nang airfield in 1979, and, since early 1980, continuously out of Cam Ranh airfield, Soviet reconnaissance aircraft conduct surveillance of US naval ships, while some attention is also given to Chinese ships and shore installations.

The Soviets have also expanded their command and control system at Cam Ranh. In early 1980, they established a shipboard command authority on shore with both satellite and high frequency communications.

Access to Cam Ranh has enabled the Soviet Union to improve its intelligence gathering and communications. In the past two years the Soviet Union has established FIX-24 high-frequency direction-finding antennae at Cam Ranh. The FIX-24s gather intelligence in the South-East Asia area, Southern China, and part of the Indian Ocean. It is the second largest Soviet intelligence communications network outside the Soviet Union. To accompany the FIX-24s, the Soviets built a Park Drive communications satellite terminal at Cam Ranh.

The Soviets at Cam Ranh have the capability to collect intelligence information and to communicate directly with Pacific Fleet Headquarters at Vladivostok as well as with the General Staff in Moscow. This bolsters their ability to conduct effective and coordinated naval operations and respond quickly to contingencies in the South China Seas.

The Soviets have also begun to improve some of the port facilities at Cam Ranh. The petroleum storage area is being enlarged in order to hold three million litres of fuel. In addition, a floating transporter dock has been moved into Cam Ranh Bay to service small ships and conventional

[14] See sub-section entitled " Soviet Military Facilities," in *REVIEW, Asia 1982 Yearbook*, p. 30.

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submarines. Ground control radar facilities have also been installed at Cam Ranh.

DESPITE the benefits that each side derives from the relationship, Soviet-Vietnamese relations are beset by underlying strains. Vietnam's intense nationalism, ethnocentrism and xenophobia frequently collide with Soviet assertiveness and insensitivity. Hanoi distrusts Soviet intentions and suspects that the Soviets are trying to control Vietnamese policy. Moscow, for its part, is irritated by Vietnamese uncooperativeness, obstinacy, and ingratitude.

The unpopularity of the Soviet advisers in Vietnam is one indication of these strains.[15] The Vietnamese resent the arrogance and heavy-handedness of the Soviet advisers who supervise them. At a more basic level, Soviet workers frequently do not hide their belief that the Vietnamese are lazy, unreliable and inferior.

The Vietnamese consider Russians to be racist, and have responded with verbal abuse and physical attacks on Soviet advisers. In Ho Chi Minh City, Russians are reportedly disliked so much that they will not venture out at night, even in groups, for fear of being attacked.

For their part, the Soviets feel that they have reason to be suspicious and distrustful of the Vietnamese, who seldom confide in them. Moscow has found itself in the dark regarding Vietnamese policies on a number of occasions. For instance, in late 1978, the Soviets were apparently caught off-guard by the deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The Soviets were apparently ignorant about the full extent of Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea. Moscow was also upset that Hanoi had not consulted them sufficiently prior to the June 1980 Vietnamese military incursion into Thailand, especially since the Soviets had recently given assurances to ASEAN leaders that this would not occur.

ECONOMIC relations have probably produced the greatest friction in the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship.[16] The Soviets are unhappy about their burden of economic aid to Vietnam ($3 million per day). They are further irritated by their conviction that much of their aid is wasted due to Vietnamese inefficiency. In an effort to ease their burden, the Soviets have cut back on their aid and have attempted to control its use and the purposes to which it is put. In the process, the Vietnamese have become resentful, increasingly suspicious of Soviet intentions, and determined to resist Soviet efforts which infringe upon their freedom of action.

The Soviet approach is motivated to a large degree by the increasing demands on their economic resources. With hard currency reserves in short supply and the Soviet need for Western goods and technology rising, Moscow is hard pushed to continue high levels of trade with the

[15] See William Shawcross, "In a Grim Country," in *The New York Review of Books* 24 Sept. 1981.

[16] For a recent description of Soviet-Vietnamese economic strains, see Paul Quinn-Judge, "Soviet Delay in Aid to Vietnam May Signal Strains," in *The Christian Science Monitor*, 15 Oct. 1982.

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West, economic support of Eastern Europe and aid to its Third World allies and clients. In this context, aid to Vietnam has become quite a burden for Moscow.

During most of the 1970s the mean annual rate of GNP growth in the USSR averaged close to 4 per cent. But during 1979–80, this GNP growth rate fell and has continued at 1–2 per cent ever since. The decline in the Soviet economy was apparent in agriculture and energy, both of particular relevance to Vietnam's growing needs.

While the Soviet Union has been feeling the economic pinch at home, its burden in Vietnam has increased dramatically. In 1976, the USSR was committed to only 45 per cent of Vietnam's total pledges of foreign aid. By 1978, the cessation of Chinese aid and the drying-up of Western aid left Moscow carrying almost the entire burden of Vietnam's 1976–80 five-year plan. This unanticipated burden included an estimated 1·6 million tonnes a year of grain and 1 million tonnes a year of heavily subsidized Soviet oil. This has been a drain on Moscow's scarce hard currency resources, which must be used to buy most of the food and oil supplied to Vietnam.

The slow-down in the Soviet economy, the increasing burden of aid to Vietnam, and other costly Soviet involvements in Afghanistan, Poland and Cuba presented Moscow's leaders with some increasingly difficult choices regarding resource allocation: something had to go.

IN 1980, Moscow made a choice. Despite evidence of severe economic hardship among the Vietnamese people, the Soviet Union instituted a policy of sharp cut-backs to Vietnam, beginning in early 1980. Soviet economic aid was reduced from about $1·3 billion in 1979 to an estimated $800 million in 1980, and it has continued at this reduced rate up to the present day, in spite of the fact that Vietnam's economic needs (aggravated by a population which is increasing at a rate of one million a year) have been mounting. According to United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) figures, Vietnam was two million tonnes short of rice in 1982. What is more, Dr Duong Quyen Hoa, a noted nutrition expert in Ho Chi Minh City, states that half the Vietnamese population is permanently under-nourished, and that 38 per cent of the children in Ho Chi Minh City are malnourished.[17]

Besides reduction in food supplies, Moscow has substantially increased the price of its refined oil exports to Vietnam. During 1979 and early 1980, the Soviets sold its petroleum product to Vietnam at about $4 a barrel, a highly concessionary price, well below world market price. But in 1980, the Soviets reportedly pressed Vietnam to buy its oil at $32 a barrel, in other words at approximately the world market price. After tough negotiations, the Vietnamese finally agreed to buy Soviet oil at about $16 a barrel. Still, this figure represents a 400 per cent increase in price and is thus a heavy burden on Vietnam's already shaky economy.[18]

[17] William Shawcross, op. cit.
[18] Ibid.

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The Soviet oil price increase (and Vietnam's subsequent inability to buy all the oil it needed) also had a crippling impact on the Vietnamese food situation. The decrease in Soviet oil shipments to Vietnam contributed to a disastrous rice shortage in the North and to rice rotting in the South, as many of the vehicles needed to transport the surplus rice in the South were without fuel. Vietnamese tractors were also idle because of lack of fuel.

Hanoi's impatience with Soviet inability or unwillingness to pay the price necessary for developing Vietnam's resources off the coast of Vietnam surfaced in April 1981. The Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quynh told a Japanese newspaper that Vietnam had no intention of relying solely on the Soviet Union for cooperation in developing its oil deposits. The Vietnamese official said that Vietnam was studying approaches from Britain, Australia and Norway to develop its oil resources, and also hoped that the Japanese would invest both money and technology.

As still another way of repaying some of its massive debt to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Hanoi is exporting Vietnamese labourers to the USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Bulgaria. More than 60–75 per cent of the workers' wages are believed to be taken by the Soviets as debt repayment.

Precise information about the scale of the labour programme, and thus the exact economic benefit Moscow derives from it, is not available. Most Western press reports, however, place the number of Vietnamese workers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe between 50,000 and 100,000; official statements coming from the USSR and East Germany play down the magnitude of the programme and cite only 7,000 to 11,000 Vietnamese labourers in the Soviet Union, 14,000 in Czechoslovakia, 7,500 in East Germany and 2,000 in Bulgaria.

Despite the uncertainty as to the exact economic benefit Moscow derives from this arrangement, the labour programme is, on the whole, mutually beneficial to both the Soviet Union and Vietnam. For the Soviet Union and the East European countries, Vietnamese workers relieve labour shortages and reduce the burden of aid. For Hanoi, the export of labour decreases its debt, alleviates high unemployment (and concomitant social problems) in Vietnam and eases the tight food situation in the country. In addition, since some of the Vietnamese workers may be trained, a number of them will develop skills which they can put to good use when they return to Vietnam.

On the negative side, the possibility that some form of coercion is involved in the " recruitment " of southern Vietnamese cannot be entirely ruled out. While specific destinations for the departing Vietnamese are difficult to determine, it is unlikely that the " guest workers " are all going to garden spots in the USSR. In fact, many of the Vietnamese " guest workers " do work in an extremely cold climate and since Moscow finds it difficult to attract many of its own people to the Siberian wasteland, one finds it hard to picture any tropical Vietnamese being

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enthusiastic about six to seven years there. Not surprisingly, rumours persist of Vietnamese workers in Siberia complaining of the cold, lack of adequate clothing and insufficient food. In any event, the longer Vietnamese workers remain in the Soviet Union, the more they are certain to experience difficulties—including Russian racism.

SOVIET inability or unwillingness to meet Vietnamese economic needs was demonstrated at a Comecon meeting in June 1980: the Soviet Union and its East European allies made no commitment to Vietnam's third five-year plan (1981–85), despite the pleas from the Vietnamese. *Pravda* bluntly indicated that Vietnam was not devoting sufficient efforts to its own internal development and noted that " resources for extensive growth and enlistment of additional manpower have not been exhausted."

The economic question resurfaced during the July 1980 Brezhnev-Le Duan summit. Hanoi publicly complained that Le Duan's request for more help with the Vietnamese five-year plan was rebuffed by Brezhnev.

Hanoi's increasing frustration led to a harsh public rebuke of Moscow, unprecedented since relations had taken a turn for the better in 1978: in an interview with the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in the winter of 1980–81, Nguyen Lam, Vietnam's chief economic planner, complained about the fact that the Soviet Union had still not made any firm commitment to Vietnam's current five-year plan. According to Lam, the Soviets told Hanoi that they would provide 40 per cent less aid during the third five-year plan than they had given during the previous one.[19]

Vietnamese unhappiness over their economic relations with the Soviet Union evidently became a political issue in Hanoi during 1981. The Fifth Vietnamese Party Congress, originally set for September 1981 (at the 9th Vietnamese Party Plenum in December 1980) was postponed. Instead, Le Duan, the foremost supporter of close ties with the Soviet Union, left for Moscow in September. The fact that Le Duan was seen off at the Hanoi airport by only two Politburo members indicates that some senior Party members were visibly dissociating themselves from close ties with Moscow.[20] Le Duan's return was just as cool as his send-off, since he had little success in securing commitments from Brezhnev for increased Soviet assistance. Le Duan's failure to loosen the purse strings in Moscow was followed by the worsening of Vietnam's financial difficulties in the autumn of 1981 (partly precipitated by the Soviet insistence that the Vietnamese dong be devalued fivefold against the rouble).

Following the summit, a debate apparently took place at the Communist Party of Vietnam's 11th Plenum in October about the alleged benefits which Vietnam may or may not be enjoying through membership of the Comecon. For instance, oblique references to the need for Vietnamese self-reliance began appearing in the Vietnamese media.

[19] Nayan Chanda, " Bickering Begins as Old Friends Fall Out," in *REVIEW*, 27 Feb. 1981, pp. 32–34.

[20] For Russian accounts of the September 1981 Le Duan-Brezhnev summit, see *FBIS USSR*, 8 Sept. 1981, p. E1; 14 Sept. 1981, pp. CC1–CC2; and 11 Sept. 1981, pp. E1–E4.

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Anti-Soviet sentiment in Hanoi apparently continued at the December 1981 CPVN plenary session in Hanoi, where criticism was reportedly expressed about the " qualitative " nature of Vietnam's relations with the Soviet Union.

Moscow was clearly concerned about the rising anti-Soviet sentiment in Vietnam. The Soviets reacted by seeking to influence the internal situation in Vietnam, initially by putting pressure on the Vietnamese to postpone their Party Congress scheduled to begin in December. In fact, Soviet unwillingness to make a definite commitment to Vietnam's 1981–85 five-year plan may well have delayed the start of the congress.

Anti-Soviet sentiment in Vietnam apparently increased as a result of Soviet pressure. This feeling was evidently strong even among some of the top Vietnamese leaders. Glimpses of this were later shown at the Vietnamese Party Congress when Vietnamese Politburo member Pham Van Dong chided Moscow for treating Hanoi in such a subservient manner. Truong Chinh, the second-ranking Vietnamese Politburo member, is another Vietnamese leader whose affection for the Soviet Union is not exactly overwhelming.[21]

Truong Chinh has long differed from Le Duan over economic policy, and policy and relations with the Soviet Union. These differences evidently surfaced during the debate prior to the adoption of the 1982 Vietnamese state plan on the eve of the Party Congress. Le Duan apparently argued for continued reliance on Soviet aid in return for increased exports to the Soviet Union. Truong Chinh evidently disagreed and stressed self-reliance and a more independent foreign policy posture.

In what may have been in part an effort to head off the growth of anti-Soviet sentiment prior to the Vietnamese Party Congress in March 1982, Soviet economic planning chief N. K. Baibakov made a trip to Vietnam in late February. Baibakov probably spoke in favour of a pragmatic approach to agricultural production, presumably to reduce the Soviet Union's burden of aid to Vietnam.

Moscow is annoyed by the Vietnamese handling of Soviet aid. The Soviets condemn the selfishness and stubbornness of the Vietnamese and question whether the Soviet Union is really getting a good return on its costly Vietnamese investment. A common feeling in Moscow is that much of the Soviet aid to Vietnam is going down " a rat's hole."

The Soviets cite instances where millions of dollars' worth of Soviet equipment, machinery and heavy construction vehicles have been misused by the Vietnamese.[22] Soviet heavy construction equipment, unloaded on to the docks of Haiphong Harbour in 1975, was still there in late 1980, rusty beyond use. This prompted a senior Soviet port official to go to Haiphong Harbour in March 1981. He found the chaos greater than expected, with some Soviet equipment lying abandoned there since 1968.

[21] As early as the 1950s, Philippe Devillers maintains that Truong Chinh was part of the " pro-Chinese " faction in Vietnam. See Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture, *End of a War: Indochina, 1954*, translated by Alexander Lieven and Adam Roberts (Praeger, New York, 1969).

[22] *REVIEW*, 12 June 1981.

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Soviet-Vietnamese tensions on this issue were further inflamed when, in the spring of 1981, the Soviets learned that some Vietnamese had started a fire at Haiphong on 11 April—which burned an estimated $28 million worth of Soviet goods—to hide evidence of widespread Vietnamese pilfering. Moscow was livid.

IN its efforts to tighten the administration of economic aid that began in the late 1970s, Moscow at first demanded more in-put into the planning and implementation of its aid. However, for the most part, the Vietnamese stubbornly resisted Soviet " policy recommendations." For example, Hanoi rejected Soviet " advice " to reorganize the government along Soviet lines and to reallocate Vietnamese manpower from the military to the agricultural sector.

By 1980, however, Moscow's own economic problems coupled with Soviet recognition that Hanoi was not responding to subtle Soviet suggestions led the Kremlin to apply more heavy-handed pressure tactics.[23] Moscow's sharp reductions in economic aid in 1980 coincided with Soviet demands that the Vietnamese:

a) accept large numbers of Soviet economic advisers and administrators at all levels of the Vietnamese ministries;
b) institute forced retirement at the Politburo level;
c) purge the pro-Chinese and incompetent deadwood from the Party;
d) replace economic hacks with Soviet-trained Vietnamese economists.

In the short term, this Soviet pressure was apparently successful. For instance, in December 1980 and early 1981, the Vietnamese begrudgingly made some changes in their leadership. They replaced about 50 per cent of the ministers and deputy ministers in the project sponsored by the Soviet Union. In addition, a number of Party hacks were purged and the number of Soviet advisers in Hanoi substantially increased.

Soviet pressure was also applied successfully following the fire at Haiphong Harbour in the spring of 1981. The Soviets confronted Hanoi with a draft document allegedly demanding one Soviet adviser for each Vietnamese official at the port. In June and July 1981, Hanoi succumbed to Soviet pressure and implemented the directives prepared by Moscow. On 9 July, for instance, as a result of heavy pressure from Moscow, Hanoi announced that the Vietnamese director of Haiphong Harbour had been fired.

Moscow apparently feels that the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance is stabilized by tightening its grip on the Vietnamese. In the long run, however, these heavy-handed efforts at dealing with economic problems in Vietnam may well prove counter-productive for Moscow. A large number of Vietnamese in high positions in the government and the Party are already bristling from these intrusive and overbearing Soviet actions.

[23] This discussion of Soviet demands draws in part from Douglas Pike, " A Voyage Into Uncharted Waters," *REVIEW*, 11 June 1982, pp. 42–43.

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The Soviets are undoubtedly aware that this same kind of pressure to control the economy of a client-state contributed to Egyptian President Sadat's decision to expel them from Cairo in the 1970s. As a result, Moscow deemed it essential to couple its economic pressure with concomitant moves to penetrate the Vietnamese police and security apparatus, lest a bristling client decide to imitate Sadat. Soviet efforts to avert such an eventuality were strengthened when Pham Hung, a Soviet favourite and previously Minister of the Interior (in control of the police and the internal security apparatus) was promoted to Deputy Prime Minister. In addition, Vo Van Kiet, another Soviet favourite and a protégé of Pham Hung, was elected to full membership of the Politburo and made Chairman of the State Planning Commission.

Despite the apparent short-run success of the Soviet hard sell, there were enough independent Vietnamese left to signal their disapproval of Soviet power politics. For instance, Vietnam was able to demonstrate that it was no puppet of the Soviet Union when it turned aside Soviet attempts to take full control of the joint-venture projects in Vietnam.

The jousting between Moscow and Hanoi which preceded (and contributed to) the delay of the Party Congress was apparent once the Congress finally took place in March 1982. The thrust of what the Soviets wanted—new Vietnamese emphasis on economic efficiency and economic professionalism—was reflected in the Vietnamese ministerial appointments and dismissals. On the other hand, the Vietnamese made it clear to the Soviets that they resented the way in which they had been treated by their Russian ally.

To be sure, the expected ritualistic Vietnamese obeisances to the Soviet Union were present at the Congress. For instance, Le Duan said that the USSR was the " cornerstone " of Vietnamese foreign policy and the " strongest and firmest ally." Nevertheless, no attempt was made to conceal the ill feeling which had developed between Soviet and Vietnamese officials on the eve of the conference. Pham Van Dong chided the Soviet Union for treating Vietnam " in a subservient way." And even Le Duan criticized the USSR for not meeting its obligations fully. Perhaps most interesting was Le Duan's admission that there were Party members who failed to understand (or support) the policy of close ties with the Soviet Union.

But if Hanoi was upset with Moscow, the Soviets were also disturbed by the Vietnamese. Soviet frustration and unhappiness with Vietnam were particularly apparent in the speech given by Soviet Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev at this Congress. The Soviet leader made a strong plea for more efficient use of Soviet aid. He called for " raising the effectiveness of cooperation . . . giving 100 per cent," implying that the current level falls well short of this.

Gorbachev also hinted that Soviet material assistance would be severely limited and possibly unavailable in some areas. He said that Vietnam would be assisted by the USSR in order to use " in a more rational way the production potential already built." Equally revealing

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was Gorbachev's statement that " further economic cooperation (would be) in line with the actual possibilities of the USSR and PRV." Gorbachev spoke about the " persistent struggle " for increasing efficiency of production in the USSR and stressed that " the economy must be economical, " implying that Vietnam's economy is not.

In turn, Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong complained that Vietnam would now be forced into " suspending construction work on projects . . . due to an inadequate supply of energy and raw materials (from the USSR)." In addition, since Moscow has still made no firm commitment to Vietnam's five-year plan (1981–85), the formulation of the plan had been delayed. In a statement he delivered to the Congress, the Vietnamese Premier could only describe the vague guide-lines of the plan, offering no tangible details about its composition.

The report is also striking for its statements regarding Soviet aid. Vietnamese praise for past Soviet assistance was perfunctory in comparison with the usual flowery praise. There is no mention at all of any future Soviet material aid for Vietnam. The report only mentions such " fluffy " items as Soviet cooperation and assistance in culture, science, technology and training.

The Soviet inability or unwillingness to provide much aid in the future has forced Hanoi to consider non-Soviet options.[24] The Party Congress resolved that Vietnamese diplomacy " must strive to secure . . . many-sided international aid for the building and defence " of Vietnam. In the economic field especially, Vietnam should " endeavour to establish relations . . . with countries outside the socialist community."

Besides the veiled verbal attacks which Moscow and Hanoi hurled at each other during the Congress, there are a few more concrete signs that strains persist. For instance, Hanoi politically demoted three senior Vietnamese officials generally associated with a policy aimed at fostering close ties with the Soviet Union. Nguyen Huu Mai, the current Vietnamese Ambassador to Moscow (since June 1980), Mai's predecessor, Nguyen Huu Khieu, and Zuan Thuy, chairman of the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Association, were all dropped from the Central Committee. When Vietnamese relations with China began to deteriorate at the time of the previous Vietnamese Party Congress in 1976, Vietnam's current Ambassador to China and other officials associated with cordial Sino-Vietnamese relations were removed from the Central Committee.

Notwithstanding a slightly better agricultural yield from 1982–83, Vietnam's economic problems continued into 1983. By the end of 1982, Vietnam's debt to the Soviet controlled Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was the rouble equivalent of $1·6 billion. In addition, Vietnam's economic plight took another turn for the worse when the International Monetary Fund rejected Vietnam's request for $150 million in special drawing rights. Without this loan, it seems likely

[24] See Nayan Chanda, " As Moscow's Ardour Cools, Hanoi Looks Elsewhere," *REVIEW*, 16 April 1982, pp. 17–18.

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that Vietnam will be hard pressed to come up with the $240 million necessary to avoid default on its $1·3 billion debt to Western lenders.

When the current Vietnamese five-year plan (1981–85) was almost two years old, Vietnamese Politburo member Truong Chinh went to Moscow in October 1982, hoping to elicit an economic aid commitment from the Kremlin. But once again, Hanoi returned empty-handed.[25]

Instead of easing Hanoi's economic problems with more aid, Moscow continues to tighten the screws and exploit Vietnamese economic vulnerabilities and isolation. In particular, the Soviets have successfully used the debt issue as leverage to seize Vietnamese products (such as coal and even scarce grain) which had previously been used to meet internal needs or to furnish precious hard currency.

MOSCOW and Hanoi share a parallel interest in keeping Chinese influence out of Laos and Kampuchea, and they are providing military assistance to these countries in order to counter Chinese military pressure. However, beyond the immediate goal of keeping the Chinese out of Indochina, the Soviets and Vietnamese are pursuing somewhat different objectives in Laos and Kampuchea, and this in turn has led to a certain amount of Soviet-Vietnamese friction.[26] Vietnam is pursuing its dream of a *de facto* Indochina federation under its control and expects Moscow to support this cause.

Moscow, however, does not share Hanoi's interest in a *de facto* Indochina federation under Vietnamese control. It does not refer to Hanoi's " special relationship " with Laos and Kampuchea, another way of expressing Vietnamese domination of Indochina. Instead, Moscow much prefers to deal bilaterally with its client-states, and is thus opposed to the creation of blocs not under its control.

Politically, the Soviets are trying to open the door to more Soviet influence throughout Indochina. But should there be a political about-turn in Vietnam, Moscow sees independent Soviet links with Laos and Kampuchea as prudent insurance.

Direct Soviet links with Laos and Kampuchea also make good economic sense to Moscow. In addition to Soviet efforts to tighten up the administration of aid to Vietnam, Moscow is trying to make sure that the aid it sends to Laos and Kampuchea is properly handled. Moscow feels that it must cultivate direct political links with Laos and Kampuchea in order to facilitate the shipment of aid and to prevent Soviet aid from being diverted by the Vietnamese. Hanoi, however, wants to be an exclusive channel for this Soviet aid, and is suspicious about Soviet efforts to improve its bilateral political links with Phnom Penh and Vientiane.

The Soviets have ignored Vietnam's demands that they act politically through Vietnamese channels and have stepped up their direct ties with

[25] *REVIEW*, 15 Oct. 1982, p. 15.

[26] For a somewhat overstated account of Soviet activities in Laos and Kampuchea, see the article by S. Rajaratnam, Singapore's Second Deputy Prime Minister, entitled " Now Vietnam Fights for a Soviet Indochina," in the 3 June 1981 edition of *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, Hong Kong.

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Party, army and government officials in Laos and Kampuchea. The Soviet attempt to cultivate ties with former Kampuchean Party chief Pen Sovan, and Pen Sovan's subsequent ouster (presumably orchestrated by Hanoi) suggest some Soviet-Vietnamese competition for influence in the Indochina region.

The evidence suggests that Hanoi did away with Pen Sovan because of his flirtation with Moscow.[27] In July 1980, he met Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov, and obtained promises of direct Soviet help to build up the Cambodian army. By the spring of 1981, there were signs that he was beginning to view Moscow as Kampuchea's main backer. In a speech to the fourth Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK) on 27 May 1981, Pen spoke of the Soviet Union as Kampuchea's most important supporter and as the guarantor of its security. Moscow also rolled out the red carpet at the Brezhnev-Le Duan summit in September 1981.[28]

In late November 1981, Pen Sovan publicly praised Soviet aid during the conflict with Khmer Rouge, but failed to mention Vietnamese assistance. He also repeatedly called for a widening of Kampuchea's contact with countries other than Vietnam, for instance with the USSR.

By December, Hanoi evidently concluded that Pen Sovan had gone too far. The Vietnamese ousted Pen Sovan as Kampuchean Party chief, and replaced him with Heng Samrin on 5 December 1981.

Moscow probably regarded his fall as a setback to its attempts to carve out an independent niche in Phnom Penh.[29] In any event, Moscow apparently had no idea that Pen Sovan would be removed so suddenly.

There are numerous other signs of Soviet unhappiness with Vietnam's actions.[30] While Le Duan promptly sent the traditional message of congratulations to Heng Samrin on 6 December 1981, Brezhnev's terse message of congratulations was not published in *Pravda* until 10 December. Even more telling was Moscow's extremely cool treatment of Heng Samrin during his trip to the USSR, the day after he became Party chief. Heng Samrin was met on his arrival by Babken Sarkisov, a lowly deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and only an alternative member of the Central Committee. According to Western press accounts, the only Soviet official that Samrin saw during his two-day stop-over in Moscow, was Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin.

Moscow's displeasure with the surprising ouster of Pen Sovan could

[27] The best accounts of Pen Sovan's sudden departure from the political scene are written by Nayan Chanda in the following articles in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*: " First Round Goes to Hanoi," 11 Dec. 1981; " Now a Non-Person," 18 Dec. 1981, pp. 16–17; " The Indochina Lynchpin," 1 Jan. 1982, pp. 20–21; and " Vietnam Back in Front," 8 Jan. 1982, pp. 13–14. For an alternative interpretation of Pen Sovan's ouster, see *The Economist*, 12 Dec. 1981, pp. 32–33.

[28] For a Russian account of the Brezhnev-Le Duan September 1981 summit meeting, see *FBIS USSR*, 9 Sept. 1981, p. B1.

[29] For the alternative interpretation that Pen Sovan's ouster represents a victory for Moscow and pro-Soviet factions in Phnom Penh, see *Asiaweek*, 16 Dec. 1981, pp. 2–3.

[30] See " Heng Samrin's Blitz Visit to Moscow," in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Zurich, 10 Dec. 1981; David Watts, " Grudging Welcome for Samrin," in *The Times*, London, 15 Dec. 1981; and *FBIS, Trends*, 16 Dec. 1981.

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also be deducted from the cool treatment it offered Samrin during his four-day stop-over in Moscow on the way back from Mongolia. Samrin's delegation received an exceptionally low-level welcome when they stopped in Moscow en route to Ulan Bator.

The *Pravda* report on Heng Samrin's visit simply noted that he had stayed in Moscow between 12–15 December and merely listed the low-level Soviet officials who saw him off. Particularly insulting was Moscow's decision to send to the airport Ivan Kovalenko, a member of the Party Central Committee's International Department, which deals with parties not in power. Most important of all is the fact that during his four days in Moscow, there was no indication that Samrin met any Soviet officials at all.

THE Vietnamese are obviously suspicious of the growth of overall Soviet involvement in Laos and Kampuchea, concerned as they are that the Soviets may be trying to stake out an independent role for themselves in Indochina.

Vietnamese suspicions have been heightened over the past few years by a trend towards a strengthening of the Soviet presence in Laos and Kampuchea. About a year ago, there were only about 50 Soviet advisers and technicians in Kampuchea; now there are 500, and there are signs that this upward trend will continue.[31] In Laos, there are now at least 2,000 Soviets and this number should grow as the Lao five-year plan (1981-85) is implemented under Soviet aegis.[32]

Furthermore, Moscow has bolstered its embassy in Laos over the past two years with experienced diplomats and an influx of lower-ranking personnel. In Kampuchea, the large Soviet diplomatic community is headed by Ambassador Oleg Bostorin, a strong man who has no difficulty in getting the Soviet view across in Phnom Penh.

The Soviets are also providing training and education in the USSR to ever increasing numbers of Kampucheans and Lao. According to Kampuchean Foreign Minister Hun Sen, " hundreds " of Kampucheans have received education and training in the USSR this past year and " thousands " are slated to go in the coming year. In Laos, it is estimated that about 5,000 Lao are presently receiving training and education in the Soviet Union. In addition, numerous Lao delegations, including journalists, agricultural and youth groups, visited the Soviet Union.

Moscow has an advantage in this competition. Lao students prefer to study in the Soviet Union rather than in Vietnam, where the standard of living and of education is inferior.

[31] For a discussion of how Moscow and Hanoi are apparently competing for influence in Kampuchea, see *REVIEW, Asia 1982 Yearbook*, pp. 21 and 129. For an account of how the Soviet role is increasing in Kampuchea, see the article by Denis Gray, " Soviet Role in Cambodia is Broadening," in the *New York Times*, 17 April 1981; and Barbara Wain's piece " Rebuilding Kampuchea: The Role of the Soviets," in *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, 11 June 1982.

[32] For a discussion of how the Soviets and the Vietnamese are apparently competing for influence in Laos, see " A Land Where Russia, Vietnam Vie for Power," in *US News & World Report*, 25 Oct. 1982, pp. 66–67, and *REVIEW, Asia 1982 Yearbook*, pp. 189–190.

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The Soviets are funnelling increasing amounts of military and economic aid directly to Laos and Kampuchea, despite Hanoi's attempts to establish itself as an exclusive channel.[33] In September 1981, Moscow signed a long-term economic aid agreement with Laos calling for not only more, but for direct economic assistance for the Lao five-year plan (1981-85). This will increase trade over the next five years two and a half times. More significantly, during this period the Soviets will give Laos about $600 million in economic aid, a sizeable jump from the $28 million figure for 1980. This includes the delivery of 500 trucks per year and large investment in the Lao road network and oil pipeline. Other Soviet-financed projects include a cement plant, power generators, gold and tin exploration, irrigation, and an agricultural machinery repair station.

In Kampuchea, the Soviet Union has begun a 10-year programme to reconstruct the war-ravaged infrastructure and public services. The Soviets are rebuilding the national bank, factories, hospitals, power plants, roads, grain silos, bridges and the port of Kompong Som. Schools and colleges have also been set up by the Soviets, including the first Russian-language polytechnic in Asia. The Soviets are running rubber plantations in Kompong Cham and the state farm in Battambang province near the Thai border. Finally, the first direct air link between Kampuchea and the Soviet Union was established in 1981.

The Soviet military role in Laos and Kampuchea has sharply increased in the past year or so and this trend is likely to continue.[34] In Laos, the Soviets are modernizing the Lao armed forces. Soviet pilots are training the Lao air force and many Lao military students are receiving long periods of training in the USSR. Hanoi may be concerned that when these students return, many will look to Soviet advisers rather than to Vietnamese guidance.

The Soviet Union provides military equipment and weapons for Laos. The Soviets have provided the Lao with over 20 MiG-21 aircraft, surface to air missiles, and infantry weapons. In addition, Moscow has promised 34 new MiG aircraft to Laos in the future. The USSR is also involved in the construction of radar bases and surface to air missile sites (along the Lao-Chinese border and near Vientiane). Some 1,000 Soviet advisers offer tactical support for the Lao army, which also uses Soviet combat plans.

Moscow has also been active cultivating its ties with the Kampuchean military. Kampuchean Defence Minister Chan Si visited the Soviet Union in July 1981 for high-level talks. Such meetings have apparently led to some increase in the Soviet role in Kampuchea. While Vietnamese military instructors continue to train Kampuchean recruits, Moscow is taking over the job of providing training for officers of the three branches of the Kampuchean armed forces—including Deputy Defence Minister

[33] An official Russian editorial reviewing Soviet aid to Indochina entitled " Fraternal Solidarity," can be found in *Pravda*, 3 Oct. 1981.

[34] For more details on the military forces and military hardware in Laos and Kampuchea, see *REVIEW, Asia 1982 Yearbook*, p. 39.

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Khen Sarin. In addition, about 2,000 Kampuchean army and air force personnel are receiving training in the Soviet Union.

Hanoi does not approve of all these Soviet actions and has begun to insist more and more strongly that Soviet dealings with Laos and Kampuchea should be routed through Vietnam. Otherwise, Hanoi is concerned that Soviet penetration in Vientiane and Phnom Penh could result in a reduction of its own influence in Indochina.

THE Vietnamese have actively contributed to Moscow's increased determination to deal directly with Laos and Kampuchea. Vietnam has been intercepting and siphoning off Soviet aid to Laos since the 1960s, and more recently Soviet assistance to Kampuchea. In order to prevent this diversion, the Soviets have begun to send supplies directly to the Kampuchean port of Kampong Som and to route economic assistance to Laos through Thailand rather than through Vietnam.

Besides competition for influence in Laos and Kampuchea, Moscow and Hanoi have different priorities regarding the war against the Khmer Rouge. The Soviets have argued that the Vietnamese must take Soviet interests with the ASEAN nations into account. The Soviets also probably want to reduce international tensions in South-East Asia in order to concentrate on their more serious preoccupations elsewhere (e.g. Poland and Afghanistan).

The Kremlin has long favoured a more conciliatory diplomatic approach and more cautious military tactics than Hanoi. The Soviets have felt that Vietnam's unyielding diplomacy and at times provocative military behaviour towards Thailand is counter-productive since it awakens fears of Vietnamese aggression and expansionism and serves to cement the US/ASEAN/Chinese consensus. Moscow seems to be quite willing to see a war of attrition continue, perhaps thinking that this maximizes Soviet influence.

Hanoi, on the other hand, is anxious to stamp out resistance in Kampuchea and is less concerned about alarming ASEAN. An early end to the fighting in Kampuchea would also allow Hanoi to decrease its dependence on Moscow. The Vietnamese are therefore willing to take actions which alarm ASEAN, even though they make Moscow irritated with Hanoi. A case in point was the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand in June 1980, which Moscow felt disrupted a trend towards ASEAN acceptance of Vietnamese domination of Kampuchea.[35]

Brezhnev apparently put pressure on Le Duan to be more accommodating and conciliatory towards ASEAN at a summit in September 1981. While promising to continue their military aid to Vietnam, the Soviets also evidently told Hanoi to keep a low military profile in Laos and Kampuchea and not to provoke any new flare-ups along the Thai border.

[35] For a discussion of the problems which Vietnam creates for Soviet relations with ASEAN countries, see Sheldon W. Simon, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia: Interests, Goals and Constraints," in *Orbis*, Spring 1981, pp. 75–82.

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Hanoi is undoubtedly uneasy about the Soviet commitment to Vietnamese military activities in Kampuchea. For instance, while it is probably safe to assume that the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia had at least some high-level *imprimatur* from the Kremlin, many Soviet diplomats in South-East Asia were apparently opposed to it.

In addition, during Truong Chinh's high-level meeting in Moscow in October 1982, the Soviets bluntly urged Vietnam to reach a settlement of the ASEAN-Indochina confrontation in Kampuchea. Furthermore, the Soviets gave no expressions of support for Vietnamese military operations in Kampuchea.

Some Soviet officials are apparently unhappy that Vietnam considers the achievement of dominance in Laos and Kampuchea a higher priority than building up its own economy. Privately, Soviet diplomats reportedly feel that Hanoi should concentrate on building a solid economic base at home, and thus not waste its energy trying to run everything in Laos and Kampuchea.

More recently, Hanoi's diplomatic posture on the Kampuchean issue has become rather more conciliatory and now more closely resembles Moscow's. The Vietnamese launched a peace offensive, at the Indochina Foreign Ministers' meeting in early July 1982, calling for a partial troop withdrawal, a safety zone along the Thai-Kampuchean border and a re-packaging of Hanoi's long-standing proposal for an international conference on South-East Asia. Moscow fully supports this more forthcoming approach. Thus, what was once a festering source of friction is now a minor irritant in Soviet-Vietnamese relations.

LOOKING ahead, it seems likely that the most potentially serious threat to the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance would be a Soviet rapprochement with China. Any move in this direction by Moscow would threaten the *raison d'être* of the alliance—mutual hostility towards China. The Vietnamese fear that Moscow might be willing to sacrifice their interests in a deal with China has recently been heightened.

Any sign of movement towards a Sino-Soviet rapprochement poses a potential threat to Soviet-Vietnamese relations. In a speech in Tashkent on 22 March 1982, proposing a normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, Brezhnev made no real attempt to allay Vietnamese fears[36] and avoided any statement about military support for Vietnam against China.

In a departure from its past practice of detailing and applauding every Soviet proposal for *détente* or disarmament in the recent past, the Vietnamese omitted any specific mention of Brezhnev's Tashkent speech in the political report at the Vietnamese Party Congress.

OF course, what worried Hanoi more than anything else were the Sino-Soviet normalization talks, which began in Beijing in October 1982. During the first round of talks, China stated that three precondi-

[36] See Nayan Chanda, "A Studious Silence From a Worried Vietnam," *REVIEW*, 2 April 1982, pp. 14–15.

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tions must be met by the Soviet Union before any marked improvement in Sino-Soviet relations (i.e. better party-to-party relations) could take place: a reduction of Soviet troops along the Chinese border with the Soviet Union and Mongolia; a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and a halt to Soviet support of the Vietnamese military occupation of Kampuchea.

Of the three preconditions, China has publicly stated that the last one cited is the most important and therefore the key element for any normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. In this regard, China presented a five-point plan for a Kampuchean settlement. As part of the plan, the Soviet Union must use its influence (by ceasing military aid to Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea) to persuade Hanoi to announce a timetable for the withdrawal of its troops. Whatever the Soviet reaction to this Chinese proposal, the inclusion of Kampuchea in the agenda of the first round of Sino-Soviet talks was deeply disturbing for Hanoi, awakening Vietnamese fears of another historical Soviet betrayal of their interests. While Soviet President Brezhnev in his Tashkent speech tried to assure them that continued improvement in Sino-Soviet relations would not be to the " detriment of third countries," the Vietnamese were concerned that Soviet support for Vietnam may be an acceptable price for Moscow to pay for the bigger prize—Sino-Soviet *détente*.[37]

THE spectre of such *détente* prompted Hanoi to begin its own low-level contacts with the Chinese in 1982. And while the major differences between Vietnam and China remain outstanding, each side seemed willing to decrease the level of hostility.

Of course, Beijing and Hanoi may only be trying to pique Moscow and thus improve their respective bargaining positions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. There are, however, some indications that relations between Vietnam and China began improving, albeit cautiously, at this point.[38]

Sino-Vietnamese border tensions, for instance, began to ease in early 1982. In May 1982, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach publicly complimented China on its good behaviour and noted that border incidents in 1982 were down to only 30 incidents per month (compared to an average of 100 incidents per month in 1981).

While a Vietnamese proposal for a truce period—from late August to 6 October 1982—was formally rejected by Beijing, China and Vietnam observed a *de facto* truce period, thus allowing the Chinese and Vietnamese to celebrate their national days without belligerance from the other side. Then, in November 1982, the Vietnamese and the Chinese pulled back some army units from the Sino-Vietnamese border.

This relative calm along the border helped to improve the atmosphere for three low-level Sino-Vietnamese meetings in Bucharest in mid-1982. The success of these discreet meetings apparently encouraged Hanoi to upgrade its diplomatic staff in Beijing. Ho Han, a respected Vietnamese

[37] See " Why Vietnam Fears Closer Soviet-Chinese Ties," in *BusinessWeek*, 2 May 1983, p. 51.
[38] See Nayan Chanda, " Romanian Rendez-Vous," in *REVIEW*, 17 March 1983, pp. 22–23.

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China specialist was sent to the PRC in late 1982 to further the dialogue and to identify areas of negotiation.

The possibility of Sino-Soviet *détente* was probably a key issue discussed among Vietnamese Communist Party leaders at their December 1982 Plenum.[39] Evidently Hanoi decided to meet China part of the way on the demand for a timetable for Vietnamese troop withdrawals in Kampuchea.[40]

Hanoi timed its conciliatory signal to Beijing to coincide with the conclusion of the Indochina summit and the beginning of the second round of Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow. On 23 February 1983, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach announced a second partial Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Kampuchea, to be followed, if considerations of security permit, by regular partial withdrawals each year.

Then, in February 1983, Han was invited to a private dinner given by Zhang Dewei, a prominent Chinese diplomat in Beijing. Han's acceptance marked the first time a Vietnamese had accepted such an invitation since the breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1980.

A decrease in Chinese hostility towards Vietnam and Chinese flexibility on the differences which divide Beijing and Hanoi can be detected through analysis of the Chinese press and media. Instead of the usual portrayal of Vietnam as a puppet of the Soviet Union, Chinese propaganda began to reflect the thaw in Sino-Vietnamese hostility. The Chinese press started to point out the strains in Soviet-Vietnamese relations, and suggested that better relations with China would help Vietnam assert its independence of the Soviet Union.

In late February 1983, Hanoi signalled its interest in furthering the dialogue with Beijing by announcing its intention to make annual troop withdrawals from Kampuchea. The Chinese probably saw this as a positive step towards providing a timetable for a phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops—something China sees as a precondition for resuming formal Sino-Vietnamese normalization talks.

Next, China signalled its good faith by dropping its long-standing (since 1979) demand that a total Vietnamese troop withdrawal was necessary before any formal Sino-Vietnamese negotiations could take place. With the publication of a five-point proposal for solving the Kampuchean issue, China showed that it was ready for formal talks with Vietnam so long as some of its previous preconditions were met.

Later, in March 1983, Hanoi softened its position on the Chinese threat to Indochina. Instead of its usual position that it would withdraw Vietnamese troops only when the Chinese threat to Indochina was over, Hanoi now called only for a Chinese "pledge" not to threaten Kampuchea.

But while Hanoi and Beijing are lessening their hostility, there are still no major concessions by either power. So far, at least, Vietnamese troop withdrawals from Kampuchea are minor. Moreover, the withdrawals are

[39] *REVIEW*, 20 Jan. 1983, pp. 23–24.
[40] *REVIEW*, 10 March 1983, p. 10.

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designed not so much as an indication of Vietnamese commitment to an ultimate troop withdrawal, as Vietnamese effort to divide ASEAN and to probe for any flexibility from China.

China has made it clear, however, that while it is ready to reduce the level of Sino-Vietnamese hostility, it does not intend to cut off aid or deny sanctuaries to the anti-Vietnamese resistance forces in Kampuchea in the near future.

IF China expected Moscow to take a softer line than Hanoi at the Sino-Soviet talks (which began in March 1983), it was rudely mistaken. If anything, Soviet concern that Vietnam might somehow be making a deal behind Moscow's back apparently induced the Soviet Union to take a hard line on Kampuchea, in order to reassure Hanoi of its support, to keep the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance close, and to keep the pressure on China. The Soviet Union refused even to discuss the Kampuchean issue with China. And for the first time since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet talks in October 1982, Hanoi publicly thanked the Soviets in late March 1983 for this " resolute " position.

Moreover, Moscow went one step further to reassure Vietnam. In December 1983, the new Soviet leadership (now headed by Andropov) signed a protocol on goods exchange and payments for 1983, one month before it was due to take effect. This contrasts with the difficulties Hanoi encountered in negotiating economic agreements with Moscow in the previous two years, when relations with Moscow were strained and Hanoi had no talks taking place with China. While this economic protocol may well be a tactical sop to Vietnam, it does suggest Soviet concern over Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic manoeuvring.

The resumption of the Sino-Soviet talks in Beijing from 9–16 September 1983 indicated, however, the continuing Chinese interest in better relations with the Soviet Union. About one week earlier, on 1 September, the Soviet Union shot down a South Korean airliner, killing 169 passengers and the crew.

While most of the world expressed outrage at this unconscionable act and condemned the Soviet Union for the atrocity, China abstained from voting at the UN Security Council meeting on 12 September on a resolution deploring the incident, reportedly viewing it as a " political move " by the United States to condemn Moscow.[41]

Hanoi was nervous that Moscow, in the wake of China's soft line on the Korean airliner incident, may be more willing to make a deal with China on Kampuchea.

To reassure the Vietnamese, the Soviet delegation (headed by Geidar Aliev) signed, on 31 October 1983, a new agreement with Hanoi, confirming and updating the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 3 November 1978. The new Declaration (signed in Hanoi on 4 November 1983 and published in *Pravda* on the following day)

[41] The *Washington Post*, 17 Sept. 1983, p. A11.

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restated Soviet support for the Vietnamese communists. It stressed " the unchanged principled line of the USSR to provide support and assistance to fraternal Vietnam." It also announced that the Communist Party of Vietnam " completely supports the principled line of the Soviet Union to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China." However, this was accompanied by a telling statement that the present government in Kampuchea is the only legal one, and that " the basic cause of the still existing tensions in the region is the hostile policy of the forces of hegemonism and imperialism which threaten the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea." " Hegomonism " is of course a code word for the Chinese policy, so that when the Declaration announces the necessity " first of all to stop foreign intervention into the internal affairs of the states of the region," it is clear at whom the remark is aimed. Although the gradual withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea was envisaged (" over a period of years "), " the unity of the Vietnamese, Laotion and Kampuchean nations " was strongly emphasized in the Declaration, thus implicitly bolstering Hanoi's position on Kampuchea.

THE Soviet-Vietnamese relationship in 1983 is uneasy; contradictions and strains trouble it now. Questions about the direction of the alliance have risen to the surface.

Despite growing friction, however, there is no sign that the Soviets or the Vietnamese intend to loosen their ties soon. Hanoi will probably continue to believe that the alliance will provide necessary support for its military campaign in Indochina, as well as assistance in dealing with persistent economic problems and Chinese hostility. For their part, the Soviets presumably reap too many strategic benefits from the alliance to withdraw unilaterally from their commitment, in spite of the economic burden it creates.

It is clear that the economic and geopolitical circumstances which prompted Vietnam to ally with the Soviet Union will not continue should Moscow be " flexible " towards China. A Kampuchean settlement, in particular, would certainly have an impact on the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance.

Only in such a political setting may Beijing decrease its hostility towards Hanoi, whose resentment of Soviet policy would then increase existing friction in the relationship between Moscow and Hanoi. If combined with a lessening of Sino-Vietnamese tensions this could reduce Vietnam's heavy dependence on Soviet military and economic aid and allow Hanoi to enlist the support of other economic patrons, such a diversification of aid could then strengthen Vietnam's ability to pursue a more independent foreign policy. At present, however, this is not a likely possibility, though it cannot be excluded in the future.

Also, one cannot rule out the impact that a change in the aging Vietnamese leadership could have on the durability or the nature of the

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alliance.[42] Before long, a younger group of Vietnamese will inherit the reins of power from Le Duan and his pro-Soviet supporters. This younger group may well reassess the Soviet connection. In a struggle over the succession an up-and-coming leader may revive Ho Chi Minh's arguments for a balanced policy between Moscow and Beijing.

[42] See Douglas Pike, op. cit.

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Will the Soviets Pull Out of Afghanistan?*

Thomas T. Hammond

IS there a chance that the Kremlin can be persuaded to withdraw its more than 100,000 troops from Afghanistan, abandon the communist regime of Babrak Karmal, and permit the formation of a neutral coalition government? Evidently some officials of the United Nations and the US government think so.

UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, after talks with Andropov and Gromyko in March, said that the Soviet leaders showed " real interest " in achieving a political solution to the Afghan problem and gave him " renewed encouragement " for the UN's peace efforts.[1] Soon thereafter, Under Secretary General Diego Cordovez, who is conducting the peace negotiations, claimed that an agreement was " 95 per cent in the bag."[2]

The United States has supported the UN talks and has publicly taken an optimistic view regarding their prospects. Earlier this year the Afghan desk officer at the State Department commented: " The Reagan Administration is convinced that a dialogue with the Soviet Union over Afghanistan is possible. Unlike Poland, where Soviet intentions are unbreakable, the United States does detect a Soviet willingness to eventually leave Afghanistan to its traditional neutrality."[3]

Some non-government specialists on Afghanistan are also optimistic that the UN negotiations will lead to a Soviet withdrawal. Selig S. Harrison, an expert on South Asia, has published a series of articles in the *New York Times* and *Foreign Policy* in which he speaks enthusiastically about the success of the UN's efforts and the prospects for an agreement. He writes: " Some Soviet leaders [whom he does not name] show interest in finding a graceful way out " of Afghanistan. He adds, without citing his source, " Moscow says that it would seek to broaden the base of the Kabul regime, possibly replacing Mr Karmal."[4]

Similarly, Lewis M. Simons, who covered South Asia for the *Washington Post* for several years, sees " an emerging Soviet inclination toward a face-saving resolution " of the Afghan occupation. He also quotes an anonymous " senior US government official " as saying that many people in Washington feel the chances for a peaceful settlement of the Afghan question are growing.[5]

* This article is based on the book *Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences*, to be published by Westview Press.

[1] The *Washington Post*, 30 March 1983, p. A18.

[2] *Time*, 23 May, 1983, p. 30.

[3] Peter Arnet, " Report from a War Zone," in *Parade Magazine*, 20 Feb. 1983, p. 19. The State Department officer quoted is Mrs Ernestine Heck.

[4] " Rough Plan Emerging for Afghan Peace," in the *New York Times*, 12 July 1982, p. A15.

[5] Lewis M. Simons, " Standoff in Afghanistan," in the *New Republic*, 16 & 23 Aug. 1982, pp. 23–24.

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It is easy to see why friends of Afghanistan are eager for a Soviet withdrawal. It would presumably end the suffering of the Afghan people, permit the almost 4 million Afghan refugees to return to their homes, and reduce the Soviet threat to Pakistan, India, Iran and the Persian Gulf.

It is also easy to see why the Soviets would like to solve their Afghan problem, since their invasion has hardly been an overwhelming success. The generals who planned the invasion probably thought they would have an easy time routing the illiterate Afghan " rag-heads," with their backward ways and First World War rifles, but the rebels have fought the Russians to a stalemate. Although the Soviets have used ruthless, almost genocidal, tactics, they have managed to get control of only about 20 per cent of Afghanistan.

In addition, the Kremlin's puppet, Babrak Karmal, has been unable to rally any popular support, the ruling People's Democratic (Communist) Party is rent by factional feuds, the government is neither respected nor effective, and the Afghan army is plagued by poor morale and numerous desertions.

The Politburo is probably also unhappy over the damage that Afghanistan has done to the USSR on the international front. The invasion killed what was left of *détente* with Washington, eliminated any chance for Senate approval of Salt II, speeded up American rearmament, produced votes of condemnation in the UN, and damaged the Soviet Union's reputation, especially in Muslim and Third World countries.

But in spite of the difficulties Moscow is having both inside Afghanistan and abroad, and in spite of the efforts of the UN, it is extremely doubtful that the Soviets will pull their troops out of Afghanistan or permit the formation of a neutral government. The UN negotiations will probably accomplish nothing. The Soviets went into Afghanistan to establish their domination of that country, and they will not withdraw until that domination is ensured in one way or another

A peaceful political solution could come about only through an agreement between the USSR and the Babrak regime on the one hand, and Pakistan, Iran, the rebels and the US on the other hand, but such an agreement is most unlikely. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan will not talk to the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan since Pakistan does not recognize the Babrak government. Consequently, the UN negotiator, Under Secretary General Diego Cordovez, has to act as a courier between the two diplomats. Iran refuses to participate in the negotiations even in this indirect fashion. Likewise absent from the UN's negotiations in Geneva were the two states that probably will have the deciding voice in any settlement—the USSR and the United States. And the millions of Afghan rebels and refugees have not been consulted at all.

IF the Soviets are not going to agree to give up their domination of Afghanistan, why have they endorsed the UN negotiations? There are probably several reasons: to lessen the condemnation of the Soviet Union by encouraging hopes that it will withdraw; to gain international

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legitimacy for the Babrak regime; to improve the USSR's world image by appearing to be reasonable and conciliatory; to discourage the sending of further aid to the rebels, and to undermine the morale of the mujaheddin, who fear that a deal will be made behind their backs. Perhaps the Kremlin also hopes that through patient negotiations it can eventually get a settlement that leaves Russia in control in Kabul.

It is up to the United States to see to it that Moscow achieves none of these objectives. This does not mean that it should oppose the UN initiative. But it does mean that it should not permit the negotiations to serve as a means of taking pressure off the Soviets or as an excuse to reduce aid to the Afghan insurgents and the Afghan refugees. The UN-sponsored negotiations should be viewed realistically, sceptically, bearing in mind Afghan national character and tradition, as well as the record of Soviet foreign policy. Let us do that by examining each of the main options faced by the USSR in Afghanistan.

These Soviet options are:

1) form a coalition government;
2) restore the king;
3) let Afghanistan become neutral and non-aligned;
4) follow a policy of Finlandization;
5) withdraw Soviet troops;
6) send more troops;
7) annex all or part of Afghanistan;
8) continue present policies.

Before examining each of these alternatives, the best way to anticipate Soviet behaviour in the future is to examine its behaviour in the past. To understand what the USSR is likely to do in Afghanistan, one should recall what it did after it invaded other small states on its borders and installed communist regimes—in Outer Mongolia and Eastern Europe. In those countries the USSR followed a rather consistent pattern of policies, and it seems reasonable to suppose that their policies in Afghanistan will be similar.

1. Form a Coalition Government

Some commentators have suggested that the Soviets might tire of the struggle in Afghanistan and accept a coalition government. It is difficult, however, to imagine which groups would make up such a coalition. Judging from past actions in Eastern Europe, Moscow will not accept a coalition unless it is dominated by communists, that is, unless it is a sham coalition. As for the rebel leaders, most of them hate the communists so passionately that they probably would not join a cabinet containing even one communist, and they surely would not accept a cabinet controlled by communists. Edward Girardet, a journalist who has spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan with the freedom fighters, says that the ones he talked with insisted they would never compromise with the Soviets or the Afghan communists:

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> They were adamant that the only way they would accept a solution would be for the Russians to leave. And they're also adamant that there would be no Communists left. . . . I asked them, " What would you do with these people." And they said, " Well, obviously they cannot live here; otherwise, we'd kill them."[6]

Rebel opposition to the idea of a coalition government is matched by the equally vehement opposition of Babrak. When asked what he thought of the proposal for a coalition with the rebels, he rejected it emphatically. " Afghanistan has no tradition of compromising with gangsters," he said.[7]

Undoubtedly the Soviets could put together some kind of bogus coalition consisting of communists and non-communists, but it is doubtful that it would attract a following. In the present atmosphere of mutual hatred, any Afghan who cooperated with the Soviets or Babrak would be looked upon with contempt by most of his fellow countrymen. The Soviets might remove Babrak and form a new cabinet under a new prime minister, but it is most unlikely that any leader installed under Soviet sponsorship will be accepted by the rebels.

One Soviet citizen put his finger on the key point when he said:

> In terms of a political settlement, there's nothing we can offer that the other side—that is, Pakistan, Iran or the West—will accept. There's nothing that they're going to offer which will allow Babrak Karmal's regime to be established which we can accept. And therefore, here we sit.[8]

2. Restore the King

Various people have suggested that the best man to head a coalition regime would be the former king, Mohammad Zahir, who was overthrown in 1973 and has been living in exile ever since. Nicholas Gage in the *New York Times* reported from Pakistan as follows:

> In diplomatic circles here discussion frequently turns to personalities who might be suitable to head such a [coalition] government and gain enough support to make it work. One of the names mentioned is former King Zahir, now living in Rome.[9]

Selig Harrison asserted in the *New York Times* that " King Mohammad Zahir may yet have a role to play " in a transition to a new regime.[10] And Lewis Simons wrote in the *New Republic*:

> Zahir Shah . . . has emerged as a possible central player in unifying the disparate factions within the country. . . . He could provide a centrifugal force needed to pull into reasonable proximity the

[6] Transcript of Public Broadcasting System, " McNeil-Lehrer Report " programme, *Afghanistan: War Continues*, 16 Oct. 1981, p. 7.

[7] The *New York Times*, 21 Dec. 1982, p. 3.

[8] Transcript of " McNeil-Lehrer Report," pp. 7–8. The quotation was reported by Professor Robert Legvold of Columbia University.

[9] The *New York Times*, 20 July 1980, p. 12.

[10] The *New York Times*, 12 July 1982, p. A15.

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> diverse essential elements in Afghanistan—the Communists and the Moslem fundamentalists.[11]

At first glance there is some plausibility in these statements. Zahir is certainly the best known Afghan exile because he was the nominal king of Afghanistan for 40 years, and no other ex-ruler is still alive. Zahir got on well with the Soviets; it was during his reign that Moscow began giving Afghanistan large amounts of military and economic aid. The Soviets know that he is not a strong leader, and they may look upon him as someone they could control easily.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Zahir will be moving back to Kabul. Many Afghans oppose him precisely because he did have good relations with Moscow; they despise him as the man who opened the gates to Soviet influence.[12] He was never very popular; when he was ousted in 1973, almost no one came to his defence. And since he is not an able person, he would have a difficult time—anybody would—uniting the many contentious *émigré* factions. Zahir, moreover, is lazy. Throughout his reign he let relatives run the country for him, and he has continued his indolent ways in exile, making no effort to regain power.

More important, however, the Soviets are unlikely to restore the monarchy for ideological reasons. Moscow has at times left monarchs on their thrones as a temporary measure to camouflage communist domination. They did this with the Bogdo Gegen of Outer Mongolia in the 1920s and with King Michael of Rumania in the 1940s.[13] But there has never been a case where the Soviets allowed a communist regime to be replaced by a monarchical one. This would be too much of an ideological retreat, almost like restoring the Tsar in Russia. It is conceivable that Zahir or some other member of the royal family might be used as a figurehead president or in some other position, but not as king.

3. Let Afghanistan Become Neutral and Non-Aligned

Some writers, including Jagat S. Mehta, former Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, suggest that Afghanistan be restored to the status it enjoyed from the nineteenth century to the communist *coup* of 1978—neutral, non-aligned, and independent. As Mehta puts it:

> Since 1880 the rulers of Afghanistan have maintained a sagacious policy of not becoming involved in the European political game or serving as the strategic instrument of any power. In its strategic location, Afghanistan recognized that to preserve its independence the country must remain neutral in great power conflicts but with special care not to provoke the security sensitivities of its powerful neighbour to the north.[14]

[11] The *New Republic*, 16 & 23 Aug. 1982, pp. 23–25.

[12] Professor Louis Dupree says that neither Zahir nor his son-in-law, Abdul Wali, is popular with the Afghan people. Conversation with Dupree, 16 Dec. 1981.

[13] Thomas T. Hammond, "The Communist Takeover of Outer Mongolia: Model for Eastern Europe?" in *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, T. T. Hammond (ed.) (Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut 1975), pp. 122–24 and 133.

[14] Jagat S. Mehta, "A Neutral Solution," in *Foreign Policy*, no. 47 (summer 1982), p. 141.

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According to Mehta, the Soviets now regret their invasion of Afghanistan and want to restore the pre-1978 status quo. " In retrospect," he says, " the USSR probably recognizes that a genuinely non-aligned Afghanistan pursuing non-radical policies was a better guardian of Soviet interests."[15]

With the Soviets coming around to this point of view, says Mehta, a " broad consensus exists among contending and interested powers." He continues:

> A surprising measure of common ground on the broad ingredients of an ultimate solution has emerged among the various interested parties. Many have implicitly recognized that stability cannot be restored unless Afghanistan is neutralized against great-power competition. . . .
>
> All these proposals in effect call for the restoration of Afghanistan to its prerevolutionary status—non-aligned although sensitive to Soviet interests, free to develop according to its own religious and social ethos.[16]

Most Afghans undoubtedly would be delighted to see their country restored to its pre-1978 status, but it is impossible to turn the clock back, and it is doubtful that the USSR would permit it. Moscow has spent millions of roubles and sacrificed thousands of casualties to make sure that the Afghan government remains pro-Soviet, and it is unlikely to settle for less. Allowing the formation of a neutral, non-aligned government, like the restoration of the monarchy, would be an impossible ideological retreat.

The Kremlin has not permitted the neutralization of any of its client states in Eastern Europe, so what reason is there to believe that it would allow this in Afghanistan? Hungary tried to become neutral in 1956, but was prevented from doing so by Soviet tanks. Austria, true enough, was allowed to adopt a policy of neutrality in 1955 when Soviet troops were withdrawn, but Austria's situation was quite different from that of Afghanistan. Austria was not communist, and, in return for Soviet withdrawal, the US, Britain and France also withdrew their occupation forces from Austria.

Creating a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan would also be difficult because of the hatred that has grown up during the past few years—hatred between communist and non-communist Afghans and hatred of Afghans for Russians. Judging from the resistance movement, the great majority of Afghans are anything but neutral in their feelings about the Soviet Union, and their anti-Soviet passions presumably are growing stronger as the fighting continues. There is also the matter of *badal* (blood for blood), the Afghan tradition that if a member of one's family is killed, that death must be avenged. Since hundreds of thousands of Afghans have been killed since 1978, either by the Afghan communists or by the Soviets, there are probably no neutrals left. Added to that is Muslim fanati-

[15] Ibid., p. 144.
[16] Ibid., p. 145.

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cism—the rebels' belief that they are fighting a *jihad*, a holy war of true believers against communist infidels.

4. Follow a Policy of Finlandization

Selig Harrison suggests that the Afghan problem be solved by making Afghanistan into another Finland. He proposes a regional security agreement containing these elements:

a) " A precise timetable " for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan " over a period of several years."
b) " Acceptance by Moscow that its residual forces in Afghanistan would keep out of Afghan internal affairs."
c) " In return for agreeing not to give help or sanctuary to Afghan resistance groups, Islamabad and Teheran could seek reciprocal Soviet and Afghan pledges barring their help to Baluch and Pushtun separatist movements."
d) " Pakistani and Iranian inspection of Soviet bases " and " Soviet inspection of Pakistani and Iranian border areas."
e) " A companion accord stabilizing the disputed Afghan-Pakistan boundary."
f) " Parallel understandings between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China designed to neutralize Pakistan and Iran as arenas of great-power conflict."[17]

After proposing this rather comprehensive series of agreements, Harrison says: " The real question is not whether Finlandization would be desirable but whether it is possible." Precisely. In my opinion it is clearly *not* possible. Even a whole team of Talleyrands could not negotiate all these diplomatic miracles.

What incentive would the Soviet Union have for agreeing to these proposals? It would get nothing in return but promises from Pakistan and Iran to cease aiding the rebels. Such promises would have little value to Moscow if it withdraws its forces from Afghanistan and abandons the struggle against the rebels.

Even if all Harrison's proposed agreements could be negotiated, it is doubtful that Finlandization could work in the case of Afghanistan since Finns and Afghans are so different. The Finns are united, disciplined and have a strong central government, whereas the Afghans are a heterogeneous collection of independent, unruly tribes who have never fully recognized the jurisdiction of any government in Kabul.

At the end of the Second World War, when Finlandization as we know it began, the Finns were in a helpless state. They had been beaten twice by the Russians, first in the Winter war of 1939–40, and then again, with their Nazi allies, in the great battles of the German-Soviet war. Seeing the Red Army impose communist regimes on the Baltic States, Poland and other countries, the Finns were willing to give Moscow the right of veto

[17] Selig Harrison, " Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland? " in *Foreign Policy*, no. 41 (winter 1980–81), pp. 163–87.

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over Finnish foreign policy in exchange for independence in domestic affairs.

The Afghans, by contrast, have never been conquered by the Russians or anyone else. They are not accustomed to foreign domination. They are fiercely independent and love to fight. Since they have not been defeated by the Soviets, they are in no mood to compromise, and their traditional hatred of the Russians has doubtless been intensified by the bloody conflicts of the past few years.

It is also unlikely that Moscow would be willing to give Afghanistan the kind of freedom that Finland enjoys. The Finnish case is exceptional, quite unlike Russia's usual policies towards its small neighbours. None of the other states along Russia's European borders were allowed the independence granted to Finland. All of them were subjected to communist seizures of power, carried out with the aid of Soviet intervention in one form or another. Afghanistan will probably follow this pattern, not the Finnish one.

Jagat Mehta also favours the Finlandization of Afghanistan, but with an added twist—" Swedenization " of the whole area, particularly Pakistan, India, and Iran. The Soviets allowed Finland to be independent, he says, because Sweden remained neutral and refused to join NATO. Afghanistan cannot become another Finland, he says, unless its neighbours follow the path of Sweden and dissociate themselves from any of the power blocs. " The Kremlin's attitude towards withdrawal from Afghanistan," he adds, " will depend on whether Pakistan becomes a heavily armed, pro-Western ally or a neutral state between the superpowers."[18]

It is easy to understand why an Indian diplomat would like to see Pakistan weaken its ties with the US and cancel its military build-up. But Pakistan is unlikely to curtail its arms programme unless India does the same and unless Russia withdraws its armies from Afghanistan. The Finlandization of Afghanistan will have to precede any Swedenization of its neighbours: neither is very likely.

5. Withdraw Its Troops

There has been much talk about the Soviet Union withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan, under one condition or another. The UN General Assembly, the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference, the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference, the European Community, and various other groups have called for Soviet withdrawal. Soviet leaders have encouraged talk of withdrawal by saying over and over again that their troops in Afghanistan are only " limited military contingents," who are there " temporarily," and will be pulled out as soon as " outside interference " comes to an end.

But there is little likelihood that Soviet military forces will leave Afghanistan this year, next year, or in 10 years. Soviet troops occupied

[18] Jagat S. Mehta, " A Neutral Solution," pp. 146–47.

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Poland in 1945, and they are still there today, as they are in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Outer Mongolia. In those cases where the Soviets did pull their soldiers out of nearby communist countries (such as China, North Korea, Yugoslavia and Rumania), these countries later adopted anti-Soviet policies of one kind or another. If Moscow in the past has stationed troops in neighbouring countries to ensure their loyalty, provide military security for the USSR, and prevent their communist regimes from being overthrown, what reason is there to suppose that Afghanistan would be an exception? Indeed, there is so little support for communism in Afghanistan that the presence of Soviet military force is essential for the survival of the communist government.

Withdrawal would also involve a loss in Soviet prestige. Through its invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has acquired a reputation for being tough, determined and ruthless. Withdrawing from Afghanistan would create an image of weakness; it might even encourage other client states to rebel from Moscow's control. One Soviet citizen expressed Soviet determination to remain in Afghanistan as follows: " It's a mess, [but] we're not going back. It's a test for the Red Army."[19]

Pulling Soviet troops out of Afghanistan might also lead to trouble in Soviet Central Asia. Uzbeks and other Central Asians who are unhappy under Russian rule might be encouraged to think that if the Russians could be forced to leave Afghanistan, perhaps they could be made to leave Central Asia too.

Withdrawal from Afghanistan would likewise mean sacrificing the political and strategic advantages that Moscow has gained from its occupation—its closer proximity to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and its increased ability to exert pressure on Pakistan and Iran.[20]

Despite vague promises to withdraw at some unspecified date in the future, the Soviets give every indication that they plan to stay a long time. For example, the airstrips, barracks, warehouses, and other constructions they have built for their armed forces are permanent installations. In addition, it must be remembered that, unlike the US in the case of Vietnam, there is no chance that public opinion in the Soviet Union will force the government to pull out.

Of course there may be, some day, a *partial* withdrawal of Soviet military units. If the Soviets are able to increase the size and reliability of the Afghan army, there could be a commensurate reduction in Soviet forces.

The Soviets have agreed, in principle, to the idea of withdrawing their troops, but have imposed impossible conditions. While the Pakistanis have suggested that Soviet forces pull out rapidly, in three to six months, the Soviets insist that there be no fixed schedule and that they be allowed

[19] Transcript of " McNeil-Lehrer Report," p. 7.

[20] On this point see Francis Fukuyama, *The Future of the Soviet Role in Afghanistan: A Trip Report* (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, September 1980).

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to adjust their withdrawal to the level of rebel resistance.[21] More than that, the Soviets demand that the government in Kabul be a " friendly " one, which they define as a government that would keep Soviet military advisers and would invite Soviet troops to return in case of an emergency in Afghanistan *or in Iran*![22] In other words, Moscow is asking the UN, the US, China and Pakistan to give advance approval for the Soviet Union to launch another invasion of Afghanistan in the future.

6. Send More Troops

There seems little doubt that the mighty Soviet Union could defeat the Afghan rebels and pacify most of the country if it decided to commit enough men to the job. But it would take many more than the 105,000 troops that have been sent so far. Some have estimated that as many as 400,000 men would be required to eliminate resistance entirely, while others think 400,000 would not be enough.

Why have the Soviets been unwilling to send more troops? There are probably several reasons. First, a dramatic increase in Soviet forces would get Afghanistan into the headlines again, whereas at present it gets scant attention from the news media. The invasion did great damage to the Soviet image around the world, and the Politburo may feel that it has enough public relations problems elsewhere, as in Poland.

Secondly, the Soviet leaders perhaps think that they cannot spare many more men in Afghanistan. Those of us on the outside, looking at the huge Soviet army, are inclined to think that they could easily send a few hundred thousand more to Afghanistan, but the Soviet army has enormous tasks, such as guarding the vast stretches of frontier with Europe and China. Troops also have to be held in readiness for possible use in Poland.[23] If all the troops on duty are needed at their present posts, this means that no more could be sent to Afghanistan without calling up reservists, and that would disrupt the Soviet economy, which is already plagued by labour shortages.

Thirdly, the Soviets may be trying to avoid duplicating the American experience in Vietnam, where half a million foreign soldiers were not enough to win a guerrilla war against determined natives. Perhaps the Soviets decided from the beginning that they were going to limit their investment in Afghanistan and be satisfied for the time being with controlling the principal towns and highways.

With these considerations in mind, the Soviets so far have not made any large increases in their occupation forces since the initial invasion. Of

[21] The *New York Times*, 25 June 1983, p. 3.

[22] Selig Harrison, " Nearing a Pullout From Afghanistan," in the *New York Times*, 7 June 1983, p. A23. See also the letter by Paul H. Kreisberg criticizing Harrison's article: the *New York Times*, 12 June 1983, p. 18E.

[23] Professor Robert Legvold, after talking with Soviet policy-makers and foreign policy analysts in Moscow in October 1981, reported: " They [the Soviets] feel there is an interconnection between Afghanistan and Poland. People . . . said to me that one of the constraints on their action in Poland is Afghanistan, and one of the constraints on the degree to which they escalate in Afghanistan is Poland." Transcript of " McNeil-Lehrer Report," p. 8.

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course they could do so at any time. They did send about 15,000 more at the end of 1981, and they may send additional troops in the future. They may decide that in order to take advantage of their strategic position vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf, Pakistan and Iran, they will have to bring Afghanistan under much firmer control. But so far there are no signs that they are planning to double or triple their forces in Afghanistan.

7. Annex All or Part of Afghanistan

Some have suggested that Moscow may annex all of Afghanistan, making it the sixteenth republic of the USSR.[24] Such suggestions are probably erroneous since they are contrary to past Soviet performance. So far the Soviet government has never annexed all of an independent country unless (like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) that country had previously been a part of the tsarist empire. The Red Army invaded Outer Mongolia in 1921 and established Soviet domination, so that Mongolia today has little more independence than, say, the Uzbek Soviet Republic. But Moscow has never formally annexed Mongolia because nothing would be gained and world opinion would be offended. It looks much better for Moscow to pretend that Outer Mongolia is a free and independent state, while annexing it would be evidence of Soviet expansion. In addition, having an " independent " Mongolia gives the Soviet Union one more vote in the UN and other international organizations. These considerations also explain in part why Stalin did not annex Eastern Europe or North Korea at the end of the Second World War.

Thus it is unlikely that Moscow will annex all of Afghanistan. It is not necessary. Afghanistan is a relatively small, backward country, with no powerful neighbour other than the USSR, so there is no danger of it breaking away from the grasp of the Russian bear. Annexation would not strengthen Moscow's control, but would simply tarnish its image.

It has also been suggested that the USSR might annex *part* of Afghanistan. Annexation of the northern portion of Afghanistan would be somewhat logical from the point of view of geography since the towering ranges of the Hindu Kush divide Afghanistan roughly into two halves—north and south. These mountains, some of which are over 18,000 feet high, offer much more of a natural barrier than the Amu Darya, the river that marks much of the present boundary between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

Partial annexation makes some sense also from an ethnic point of view because in northern Afghanistan there are large numbers of Tadzhiks (about 3·5 million), Uzbeks (about 1 million) and Turkmen (about 125,000) who could logically be annexed to the Tadzhik, Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet republics.[25] For this type of annexation—based on an ethnic claim—there are several precedents in Soviet history.

[24] Alexandre Bennigsen, " Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam," in *Problems of Communism*, vol. 29, No. 2 (March–April 1980), p. 49; Zalmay Kalilzad, " Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan," in *Problems of Communism*, vol. 29, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec.), p. 40.

[25] The population figures are taken from Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1980), pp. 59–61.

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Soviet Muslims would probably be delighted to see all or part of Afghanistan added to their Central Asian republics. According to Alexandre Bennigsen, a leading authority on Islam in the USSR:

> it is likely that the present-day elites [in Soviet Central Asia] favour Soviet annexation of, if not the whole of Afghanistan, then at least Afghan Turkestan north of the Hindu Kush. Such an annexation would considerably strengthen the Soviet Muslims' demographic and political position vis-à-vis the Russians.[26]

It is precisely because it would strengthen the Soviet Muslims' " demographic and political position vis-à-vis the Russians " that the Kremlin probably will *not* annex northern Afghanistan. The Politburo, which is dominated by Russians, is already worried by the high birth rate among the 43 million Muslims of the USSR, as compared with the low birth rate among Russians. This threat of growing Islamic population and power would be aggravated by the addition of more Muslims, especially Muslims who are fanatical in their religion and in their hatred of Russians. Many of the Muslims in northern Afghanistan are former *Basmachi* or descendants of *Basmachi*—the anti-communists who fought against the Soviet regime in Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s before fleeing to Afghanistan. Since Soviet leaders presumably are already worried that the virus of Islamic nationalism will spread from Iran and Afghanistan to Soviet Central Asia, it is unlikely that they will increase the danger of infection by annexing northern Afghanistan.

8. Continue Present Policies

The Soviets have been occupying Afghanistan ever since December 1979 and have had plenty of time to consider changing their policies, but have not done so. This must mean that they think the present course of action is basically correct, or at least preferable to any alternative. Apparently they assume that over a period of time they can strengthen their position and gradually wear down the resistance—as they did in Outer Mongolia, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and, indeed, in the whole Russian Empire after the Bolshevik *coup* in Petrograd.

The Soviets seem to be willing, at least for the time being, to accept the present stalemate. They cannot suppress the rebels, but the rebels cannot drive them out of Afghanistan. The war is costing the USSR men and resources, but the costs are bearable. As far as world opinion is concerned, they probably think that the worst is over, that if many countries do not like what Moscow is doing in Afghanistan, they have resigned themselves to it and are not going to do much about it. Thus the Politburo sees its intervention in Afghanistan continuing at a relatively low level, and foreign opposition continuing at the same level.

This is not the first time that the Soviets have been faced with the task of establishing communist rule in a country where the majority of the people are anti-communist; in fact, nowhere has it been otherwise. Nor is

[26] Bennigsen, " Soviet Muslims," p. 42.

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it the first time that the Russians have fought against Muslims; indeed, they have been fighting Muslims for centuries. Under the tsars they subdued the Muslims of Kazan, Astrakhan and the Crimea, drove the Turks out of the Ukraine and defeated the Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia. After 1917 the Bolsheviks conquered the Caucasus and Central Asia again, not finishing the fight against the *Basmachi* until the 1930s. The Soviets can be expected to show their usual patience and persistence in Afghanistan, anticipating a slow, gradual triumph.

While the Soviets apparently intend to pursue more or less the same policies as before in Afghanistan, they undoubtedly want to suppress the rebels more effectively. They may do this in part by greater use of chemical warfare and other ruthless measures such as destroying villages and cities, burning crops, and driving Afghans out of the country. That is, they could adopt a systematic " scorched earth " policy of " migratory genocide," especially in areas near Kabul and along the Pakistani border. Recent Soviet actions seem to indicate that they have indeed decided on such a policy.

In the long run, however, the most effective means for establishing Soviet control in Afghanistan (as earlier in Central Asia and Outer Mongolia) is education and indoctrination. The crippling weakness of the USSR in Afghanistan is that so few Afghans favour communism. Most Afghan adults probably cannot be converted to communism, but it may be possible to win over a significant portion of the youth. To accomplish this goal, several thousand Afghan young people are now being educated in the USSR, and there are plans to send many more.[27] Some observers maintain that this will not work, that the Afghan students will come home hating the Russians more than ever. Against this one can argue that the communist *coup* of 1978 was carried out largely by officers who had been trained in the USSR and were eager to make Afghanistan communist. If they learned to hate the Russians, they were nonetheless impressed by the factories, hospitals and other manifestations of modernization in Soviet Central Asia, and were convinced that communism was the solution for Afghanistan.

Although it is more difficult to make communists out of Afghan adults, the Kabul regime is making an effort here also. The population is subjected to a barrage of communist propaganda on the radio, television and in the newspapers. Unfortunately for the government, about 90 per cent of the people cannot read, which makes them safe from the poisonous influences of the printed word, so it would not be surprising if the regime institutes a crash programme to eliminate illiteracy. It probably will also expand the national television network so as to make thought control easier.

The training of new cadres is the key to the future of communism in Afghanistan; if this succeeds, everything else has a chance to succeed. Young people trained and indoctrinated in the USSR or at home can

[27] Eliza Van Hollen, *Afghanistan: A Year of Occupation* (US Department of State, Washington, D.C., Feb. 1981), Special Report No. 79, p. 4.

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provide officers and soldiers for the army, bureaucrats for the ministries, administrators for the provinces, spies to infiltrate the rebels, and so on. This is not to say that it will be easy for the Soviets to subdue the people of Afghanistan. They are tough, independent, loyal to their kin and accustomed to fighting. But it is hard to see how they can long continue to withstand the overwhelming military, economic and political power of their mighty neighbour. The people of Eastern Europe, like the people of Afghanistan, are anti-communist and anti-Soviet, but this has not prevented the communist regimes of those countries, with Soviet support, from maintaining themselves in power ever since the Second World War. The Afghans may well suffer the same fate.

Andropov's Policies Towards Afghanistan

There have been reports (perhaps spread by Soviet disinformation agents) that Andropov opposed the invasion and is eager to reach a settlement that would lead to a Soviet withdrawal. Some observers expected Andropov to come forward with a new and promising proposal, but their hopes were diminished by an editorial in *Pravda* in December 1982 which reaffirmed the Brezhnev line and showed no signs of Andropov's hoped-for " flexibility." The revolution in Afghanistan, said *Pravda* (quoting Brezhnev), " is irreversible." The editorial also noted that the Afghan regime so far had not availed itself of its " legitimate right " to pursue the rebels " when they are returning to their foreign operational bases "—a threat that the Soviets might increase their armed attacks across Pakistan's border.[28]

In March 1983, however, Andropov and Gromyko met with Perez de Cuellar, and the UN leader declared afterwards that he had " reasons for hope " that the UN's efforts will succeed.[29] These UN efforts have focused mainly on a draft agreement containing four points:

1) the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan;
2) the cutting off of all outside aid to the Afghan insurgents;
3) the repatriation of the three to four million Afghan refugees;
4) international guarantees that the agreement will be carried out.[30]

Even if agreement could be reached on these four points (which is more than doubtful), other difficult issues would remain. First, there is the problem of what kind of government Afghanistan will have. As noticed earlier, it is difficult to imagine the Soviets accepting a government that is not communist-dominated, while the rebels declare that they will not submit to a government that contains any communists at all.[31] Closely related to this is the fact that the rebels and the refugees so far have not been allowed to participate in the negotiations. Surely it is unrealistic for the UN to assume that millions of fiercely independent Afghans will submit meekly to some deal arranged behind their backs in Geneva.

[28] *Pravda*, 16 Dec. 1982, p. 4.
[29] The *Washington Post*, 30 March 1983, p. A18.
[30] The *New York Times*, 16 June 1983, p. A6, and 25 June 1983, p. 3.
[31] The *Washington Post*, 21 May 1983, p. 18.

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Then there is the problem of timing, the question of which would begin first—the withdrawal of Soviet troops or the international guarantees that all foreign aid to the rebels will end. The Soviets naturally want the foreign aid to stop first, but the other side fears Moscow would then find excuses to delay its withdrawal indefinitely. And who would supervise the implementation of an agreement? Some of the insurgents have suggested a peace-keeping force from Islamic nations, but the Soviets have rejected this idea and that of a UN-sponsored multi-national force.[32]

As of this writing the UN has held three sets of negotiating sessions with Pakistan and the Babrak regime in Geneva—in June 1982, April 1983 and June 1983. But despite optimistic statements by Diego Cordovez, Selig Harrison and others, agreement seems far, far away. After the last talks, the *New York Times* reported that there was " no sign of major progress on any of the significant issues."[33] " The Soviets," said one diplomat, " haven't given ground on anything."[34]

THE Soviet leadership has changed, but its policies towards Afghanistan have not changed. Under Andropov, as under Brezhnev, Soviet troops will not withdraw, and the attempts to set up a neutral, non-aligned and independent Afghanistan will come to naught. The UN can negotiate till doomsday, but Andropov is not going to abandon the sacred Soviet principle that once a country becomes communist it must remain communist, especially if it borders on the USSR.

[32] Ibid.

[33] The *New York Times*, 25 June 1983, p. 3.

[34] The *Washington Post*, 21 May 1983, p. 18. For Selig Harrison's most recent optimistic article about the UN negotiations see " A Breakthrough in Afghanistan? " in *Foreign Policy*, no. 51 (summer 1983), pp. 3–26.

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Moscow's Disenchantment with Iran

Muriel Atkin

DURING 1982 and the first half of 1983, the Soviet assessment of Iran's Islamic Republic became increasingly negative, in sharp contrast to the positive tone which had typified the Soviet line since the collapse of the Pahlavi monarchy. Soviet policy towards Iran was largely reactive. The more certain elements of the Islamic Republican Party consolidated their hold on power from mid-1981 onwards, the more ready they were to demonstrate their independence of any foreign power and to eliminate other domestic political groups, including the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party. The Soviet Union reacted by repeatedly insisting on its benevolence towards Iran, protesting (to no discernible effect) the criticisms levelled by Iran's leaders, and changing its assessment of a revolution which had seemed so favourable to Soviet interests.

Before the unwelcome turn of events, the Soviet line had emphasized approval of the revolution's anti-Americanism, the relaxation of political controls, proposals for economic reforms directed against big business and large landowners, and the prospects for increased Soviet-Iranian contacts. The main features of this approach persisted into early 1982, notably in the third-year assessments of the revolution published in *Pravda*, *Izvestia* and the Russian-language dailies of the Soviet Muslim republics.[1] Although these articles devoted unprecedented attention to negative developments, particularly the growth of anti-Sovietism among some of the politically active mullahs and the shortcomings of the new regime's economic policies, these were balanced by the established interpretation of the positive aspects of the revolution. There were even some efforts to shift part of the blame for the problems from the Islamic Republicans to the United States, which, according to the Soviets, has relentlessly plotted the overthrow of the new Iranian regime by such means as economic pressure, subversion and military force.

The *Pravda* article, by Pavel Demchenko, author of a number of that newspaper's appraisals of the Iranian revolution, was the last and most negative of the assessments. Yet here, too, there was a positive side, as in the observation that the three years since the Shah's fall saw " the elimination of many negative factors in the domestic politics of that country."[2] Demchenko contrasted the improved economic relations between the Soviet Union and Iran with the latter's increasing diplomatic coolness towards its northern neighbour. The closing comments reflect wariness rather than strong optimism or pessimism, as Demchenko noted that relations between the two countries over the past three years had both ups and downs and were not yet as good as they could be. The tenor

[1] *Bakinskii rabochii*, 8 Jan. 1982, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 11 Feb. 1982, p. 4; *Pravda*, 9 Mar. 1982, p. 4.
[2] *Pravda*, 9 Mar. 1982, p. 4.

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of these remarks reflects the spirit in which the Soviets have dealt with Iran since 1979: when an obstacle to closer relations was encountered on one point, the Soviets would make overtures on another (especially economic).

However, Soviet dissatisfaction with the Tehran leadership continued to grow to the point that the negative view of the Islamic Republic received far more emphasis than the positive. Signs of this change have appeared in several kinds of sources, including political, journalistic and scholarly. The most striking example of the new interpretation appeared in an article published in July 1982 in *Kommunist*, the political and theoretical journal of the Party's Central Committee. The author, R. A. Ul'yanovskii, is a particularly important person to make such a pronouncement since he is a deputy chief of the International Department of the Central Committee and a leading Soviet expert on relations with the developing countries. His article is unprecedented not only for the scope and directness of its criticism but also for the absence of any balancing positive statements about the course of Iranian politics, especially since 1981. This contrasts sharply with Ul'yanovskii's own earlier writings on the subject, including an article published only a few months before the one in *Kommunist*. Similarly, academic and journalistic commentary on Iranian affairs is changing to reflect the new interpretation. Significant by its absence was a journalistic retrospective on the fourth anniversary of the Iranian revolution. The 1983 anniversary coincided with the arrest of the Tudeh Party leadership by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. There is no sign as yet of a difference of opinion, for example between policy and academic camps, over the nature of events in Iran. Rather, the pattern which emerges is a general shift of line.

The new interpretation of Iranian affairs applies to that country's leadership, its foreign and domestic policy, and the prognosis for its revolution. There is a certain sense that the Iranian revolution was a missed opportunity, that, had the leadership been of a different sort, the revolution could have taken a far more radical turn. Dramatic language aside, one might almost apply to the Soviets the attitude Ul'yanovskii ascribed to the Iranian masses, who, amidst the violent power struggles of the Islamic Republic, " are more and more showing disillusionment with their recent idols."[3]

Two elements have remained constant in the Soviet view of the Iranian revolution: the general principle that Islam can play a positive role, from the Soviet point of view, in mobilizing broad support for " anti-imperialist " revolutions; and that Iran achieved a notable victory in carrying out such a revolution under the aegis of Islam. Quotations from Lenin and from Brezhnev's report to the 26th Party Congress (March 1981) are frequently cited to demonstrate the truth of the first point.[4] The

[3] R. A. Ul'yanovskii, " Iranskaya revolyutsiya i ee osobennosti," in *Kommunist*, 1982, No. 10, pp. 113, 110.

[4] Ibid. p. 106; see also I. Timofeev, " Rol' islama v obshchestvenno-politicheskoi zhizni stran zarubezhnogo Vostoka," in *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1982, No. 5, pp. 53–54.

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core of the argument is that in countries which are still at a more or less medieval or early modern stage of their evolution, where, consequently, the proletariat and proletarian parties are weak, religious rhetoric is a prime vehicle for voicing social protest and the best way to appeal to the masses in terms they can understand.

Yet even here the Soviets have shown increased doubts. E. M. Primakov, head of the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences (which, among its other functions, provides information to the Kremlin on current affairs) has modified his interpretation of Islam as a political force. A book of his published in 1982 includes an almost verbatim restatement of his 1980 analysis of the Islamic resurgence. However there is a significant change. He has provided a new introduction to this section in which he states that, in Asia, traditions, of which Islam is the prime example, distort the class struggle and lead it along lines which are " distinctive, unfamiliar, and in isolated cases deformed . . ."[5]

The Soviets do not deny that the Shii clergy provided the leadership for the Iranian revolution of 1978–79. If anything, emphasis on this has increased since the revolution, as Moscow lost interest in many of the secular nationalists. The basic argument is that the Shah's economic development and close ties with the West did great economic harm to the urban and rural lower classes and offended their traditionalist, Islamic values. The only people to whom they could turn to direct their opposition and who could offer an alternative vision of society was the Shii clergy. The mullahs had the advantage of being allowed to function by a state too afraid of their power to attempt to crush them as it had the secular opposition.

It is on the question of the clergy's motives for leading the opposition that the new interpretation is more negative. Before the triumph of the revolution, several Soviet authors had pointed out that a contributing factor to the mullahs' opposition to the Shah was the way his economic and secularizing policies had undercut clerical wealth and influence. However, from 1980 to the spring of 1982, the trend was for Soviet authors to stress the clergy's altruistic, principled motives. The Soviet Union's leading expert on Iranian Shiism, E. A. Doroshenko, in this period changed her explanation of Ayatollah Khomeini's political activism. In her 1975 monograph on the Shii clergy, she had explained Khomeini's objections to the Shah's reforms in terms of the threat posed by land reform to the upper clergy, who had long standing ties with the large landowners, and Khomeini's rejection of the mild improvement in women's status made possible by reform legislation. In an essay published in 1981, she gave a different explanation, which dwelt on Khomeini's opposition to the Shah as a tyrant. She also noted the upper clergy's responsiveness to the concerns of people of varying social levels and its disapproval of foreign domination of Iran.[6] Even Ul'yanovskii, in an

[5] E. M. Primakov, *Vostok posle krakha kolonial'noi sistemy* (Moscow, 1982), p. 68.

[6] E. A. Doroshenko, *Shiitskoe dukhovenstvo v sovremennom Irane* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 22, 46; idem, " Puti i formy vozdeistviya shiitskogo dukhovenstva na obshchestvenno-politicheskuyu zhizn' Irana."

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article published in the spring of 1982, emphasized the clergy's strong ties with the masses. In his later *Kommunist* article, he reverted to the argument about the clergy's self-serving motives.[7]

ALTHOUGH the Soviets have never wavered in their approval of revolutionary Iran's anti-Americanism, the more time passes since Iran embarked on that course at the birth of the republic, the greater the Soviet dissatisfaction that it has not led to a friendlier attitude towards the Soviet Union. Khomeini as well as various other prominent mullahs and government officials have been openly critical of the Soviet Union for invading Afghanistan, mistreating its own Muslims, aiding Iraq against Iran, and failing to give the Palestinians and the Arab states adequate support against Israel. The standard Iranian rhetoric lumps the Soviet Union and the United States together as the "two superpowers." According to this argument, both superpowers think in terms of their own selfish interests in contrast to Iran, which has made itself independent of both and acts on behalf of all Muslims.[8] These charges became part of the standard repertoire of Iranian diplomacy which was not modified in substance but by the addition of greater detail as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated further.

This variety of neutralism was denounced in a number of Soviet sources during 1982 and 1983. The argument, as stated by Ul'yanovskii and Primakov, is that if one ignores the fact that the Soviet Union and associated socialist states are the true friends of anti-imperialist countries one plays into the hands of imperialism. Similar arguments were made in the Soviet press and in Radio Moscow's broadcasts to Iran.[9] One of the most frequently cited examples of Soviet benevolence is the economic help given to post-revolutionary Iran, which, according to the Soviets, enabled it to develop its economy and compensate for the drastic reduction in trade with the West.[10] However, in the Ul'yanovskii article in

Islam v istorii narodov Vostoka (Moscow, 1981), pp. 73, 78–79; for other negative explanations of the mullahs' political activism see L. Polonskaya and A. Vafa, "Tipologiya nemarksitskikh ideinykh techenii v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh," in *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, 1977, p. 32; A. I. Demin, "Obshchestvennye preobrazovaniya i osnovye tendentsii sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo i vnutri-politicheskogo razvitiya Irana," ed. A. Z. Arabadzhan, *Iran. ocherki noveishei istorii* (Moscow, 1976), pp. 320–21, 324; for another positive explanation see Primakov, "Islam i protsessy obshchestvennogo razvitiya stran zarubezhnogo Vostoka," in *Voprosy filosofii*, 1980, No. 8, pp. 61–62, 63, 70.

[7] Ul'yanovskii, "Iranskaya revolyutsiya," p. 108, idem, "Teoriya voploshchennaya v zhizn'. V. I. Lenin i voprosy natsional'nogo osvobozhdeniya i otnosheniya k natsionalizmu," in *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya*, 1982, No. 2, pp. 14, 15–16.

[8] Tehran domestic radio, 25 Feb. 1983, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*, South Asia (hereafter referred to as FBIS, South Asia), 28 Feb. 1983, p. 14; M. Atkin, "The Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union," in N. R. Keddie and E. Hooglund, eds., *The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic* (Washington, D.C., 1982), pp. 141–43.

[9] Ul'yanovskii, "Iranskaya revolyutsiya," p. 113; Primakov, "Strany Vostoka v sovremennom mire," *Pravda*, 11 Aug. 1982, p. 5; *Izvestia*, 11 Feb. 1982, p. 4; Moscow radio in Persian to Iran, 2 and 4 Sept. 1982, 26 Feb. 1983, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union (hereafter referred to as FBIS, Soviet Union), 7 Sept. 1982, pp. H18–19, 8 Sept. 1982, pp. H13–15, 2 Mar. 1983, p. H12; Baku international radio in Azerbaijani, 23 Mar. 1983, FBIS, Soviet Union, 25 Mar. 1983, p. H12.

[10] *Pravda*, 9 Mar. 1982, p. 4 and 12 Feb. 1983, p. 4; *Izvestia*, 11 Feb. 1982, p. 4; Baku international radio in Azerbaijani, 11 Aug. 1982, FBIS, Soviet Union, 16 Aug. 1982, pp. H15–16, 19 Aug. 1982; Moscow radio in Persian to Iran, 16 Aug. 1982, 23 and 28 Feb. 1983, 1, 11 and 18 Mar. 1983, 28 Apr.

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Kommunist, trade between the two countries was not held up as a particularly positive side of relations between them, as it had been in the third-year retrospectives on the revolution. For Ul'yanovskii, there were no longer any particularly bright spots in relations between the Soviet Union and Iran.

The current leaders of the Islamic Republic have not been impressed by the Soviets' protestations of virtue. The established criticisms of the Soviet Union were still voiced. Symbolically, the delegation to Brezhnev's funeral in November 1982, a special envoy and some foreign ministry personnel, was decidedly lower-ranking than protocol dictated. In contrast, the Presidents of Pakistan and Syria and the Vice President of Iraq all attended. In December 1982, Iranian authorities permitted a demonstration by Afghan refugees at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. The crackdown on the Tudeh Party which had been underway for well over a year culminated in February 1983 with the arrest of the Party's general secretary, Nureddin Kianuri, and other prominent Party members on the charge of spying for the Soviet Union. The move was intended both as another stage in the continuing process of eliminating all political competitors and as a sign of displeasure with the Soviet Union. Khomeini's comment on the anti-Tudeh measures praised the pious Muslim soldiers who were fighting a war (i.e. against Soviet-backed Iraq) as well as those who had destroyed dissent within Iran by crushing the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the Fedayan-e Khalq, the Tudeh, democrats, Kurdish nationalists, and others.[11]

At the end of April and beginning of May, Kianuri and other Party members publicly confessed and the Tudeh was banned; at the same time 18 Soviet diplomats were expelled from Iran on the grounds of espionage. Whatever the means by which the confessions were obtained or the accuracy of the particulars, those statements at least tell us something about the attitudes of the people who extracted and broadcast them. The main themes of the confessions are: the Tudeh betrayed Iran by putting loyalty to the USSR first, even when Soviet-armed Iraqis attacked Iran; the Party spied for the Soviets, including by infiltration of the government and armed forces; it collaborated with Kurdish rebels; and it was preparing to seize power. The most important lesson of all was that Marxism and the Soviet example were irrelevant to Iran, which found a complete guide in the teachings of Islam.[12] Kianuri drove home the message that " no leftist trend should infiltrate into Iran as it means affiliation to foreigners, to aliens. It is the mother of all treason . . ."[13]

Under the circumstances, the Soviets' short-term reaction has been conspicuously weak, a reflection of the limited options available to it. Naturally the Kremlin denied the charges in domestic publications and

1983, FBIS, Soviet Union, 19 Aug. 1982, p. H7, 24 Feb. 1983, pp. H4–5, 2 Mar. 1983, pp. H11–12, 9 Mar. 1983, pp. H6–7, 16 Mar. 1983, pp. H3–4, 22 Mar. 1983, pp. H6–7, 3 May 1983, p. H5.

[11] Tehran domestic radio, 4 May 1983, FBIS, South Asia, 5 May 1983, pp. I2–3.

[12] Tehran domestic television, 30 Apr. 1983 and 2 May 1983, FBIS, South Asia, 3 May 1983, pp. I3–5, 4 May 1983, p. I3.

[13] Tehran domestic television, 30 Apr. 1983, FBIS, South Asia, 3 May 1983, p. I3.

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Persian-language broadcasts to Iran. The standard, but not particularly effective, arguments about the importance of Soviet support for revolutionary Iran and the dangers posed by American counter-revolutionary designs were repeated. Some additional detail was introduced about the likelihood that there would be a *coup* like the one backed by the CIA which toppled Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953. As before, the Soviets blamed domestic reactionaries and foreign imperialists for the anti-leftist, anti-Soviet actions in Iran.[14] At least in the short run, the Soviets chose not to rely on such readily available counter-measures as restrictions on trade or transit trade, the curtailment of Soviet-backed economic development projects in Iran, or the withdrawal of Soviet technical personnel (perhaps 2,000 strong).

APART from the general discontent over Iran's coolness towards the Soviet Union, the aspect of Iran's foreign policy which Moscow currently finds most objectionable is the continuation of the war against Iraq. To judge from Moscow's public interpretation of the war, it sees itself as in danger of losing regardless of who wins the actual fighting. Ever since the signing of the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty in 1972, Moscow has sought to maintain good relations with both Iraq and Iran regardless of regime and has shown a lack of enthusiasm for actions which might spark a war between the two. With the outbreak of fighting in September 1980, Moscow's cultivation of both sides compounded Tehran's anti-Sovietism. At the same time, the war has distracted both combatants from earlier enmities which suited Soviet foreign policy, particularly those directed against the United States and Israel.[15] The conflict between Iran and Iraq has also caused friction within the Non-Aligned Movement, to which both belong and which in the past frequently agreed with the Soviet Union on international issues. The March 1983 Non-Aligned summit treated the Iran-Iraq dispute gingerly and was unable to mediate an accommodation between them.

Soviet sources have been inconsistent as to whether other Arab states of the Gulf really feel threatened by Iran or whether the United States is trying to stimulate such fears. In any case, the Soviets seem displeased that the United States may capitalize on the threat in order to draw these oil-rich Arab states closer to it and also build up its military strength in the region.[16] Since the revolution, Moscow has argued that the United States intended to use military force to topple the new regime in Tehran. The point of this argument is that Iran should seek good relations with its northern neighbour to ensure its continued protection against such

[14] Moscow radio in Persian to Iran, 7, 10 and 13 May 1983, FBIS, Soviet Union, 11 May 1983, p. H6, 17 May 1983, pp. H1–2, 3, 20 May 1983, pp. H6–7; Tashkent radio in Persian to Iran, 6 May 1983, ibid. 11 May 1983, p. H7; *Pravda*, 19 Feb. 1983, p. 4, 23 Mar. 1983, p. 5, 6 May 1983, p. 4, 15 May 1983, p. 4.

[15] *Pravda*, 31 May 1982, p. 6, 12 Mar. 1983, p. 5; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 21 July 1982, p. 9; *Krasnaya zvezda*, 8 June 1983, p. 3; Moscow domestic radio, 18 July 1982, Moscow radio in Persian to Iran, 17 Aug. 1982, FBIS, 19 July 1982, pp. CC4–5, 19 Aug. 1982, pp. H5–6.

[16] In addition to the items cited in note 15, see, *Pravda*, 11 Jan. 1983, p. 4, 19 Feb. 1983, p. 4; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 25 July 1982, p. 5; Moscow radio in Persian to Iran, 4 and 7 May 1983, FBIS, Soviet Union, 5 May 1983, pp. H1–2, 11 May 1983, p. H6.

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intervention. The Soviets particularly emphasized charges of an American military build-up in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean aimed against Iran to counter Iranian accusations of espionage in 1983.[17]

Once Iran launched its counter-invasion of Iraq in July 1982, Soviet coverage of the war tilted in favour of Baghdad. Press reports were usually terse and often composed primarily of summaries of the exaggerated and mutually contradictory claims by official sources in Tehran and Baghdad. In symbolic terms, during the first two weeks following the Iranian invasion, *Pravda*'s articles about it were evenly divided between those which put Tehran's version first and those which began with the Baghdad version. Since then, precedence has been given overwhelmingly to the Iraqi side of the story, even when it was Iran that was taking the initiative, as in the offensive of early October 1982. Whenever *Pravda* departed from the strict summary of official releases it added comments which were critical of Iran, as did other Soviet sources. Iran's battle claims were deflated. The Soviets contrasted Iraq's willingness to end the war, as demonstrated by the withdrawal of its troops from most of occupied Iranian territory and its cessation of hostilities, with Iran's determination to continue fighting and refusal to heed the Security Council's appeal for a cease-fire.[18] The Soviets also publicly observed Iraq's national holiday soon after the launching of the Iranian offensive. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declared in September 1982 that the Soviets had resumed arms deliveries to Iraq.[19] (Direct transfers of military hardware had been halted soon after the war began.)

After the crackdown on the Tudeh and the expulsion of the 18 Soviet diplomats, the Soviet military newspaper, *Krasnaya zvezda*, alleged that Iran has been receiving military supplies (originally ordered by the Shah) from the United States.[20] Whether this is in fact the case remains questionable. However, it is significant that the Soviets have made such an allegation, given their repeated emphasis on the significance of the Iranian revolution as marking a break with American " imperialism."

THE revised Soviet interpretation of Iran's domestic politics parallels the interpretation of its foreign policy in the sense that the initial change brought by the revolution, in this case the end of the monarchy, is still praised unambiguously but there is growing criticism of the scarcity of positive developments since then. Moscow had welcomed the defeat of secular politicians like Bazargan and Ghotbzadeh at the hands of the Islamic Republicans and reconciled itself to the ouster of Bani-Sadr, eventually categorizing him as an American agent along with the other

[17] *Pravda*, 19 Feb. 1983, p. 4; *Krasnaya zvezda*, 8 June 1983, p. 3; Moscow radio in Persian to Iran, 15 Feb. 1983, 4 and 7 May 1983, FBIS, Soviet Union, 17 Feb. 1983, pp. H1–2, 11 May 1983, p. H6.

[18] *Pravda*, 15 July 1982, pp. 5, 6, 18 July 1982, p. 5, 30 July 1982, p. 5, 27 Aug. 1982, p. 5, 28 Sept. 1982, p. 1, 6 Oct. 1982, p. 5, 7 Oct. 1982, p. 5; Moscow domestic television, 31 July 1982, FBIS, Soviet Union, 2 Aug. 1982, pp. CC9–10.

[19] Moscow domestic television, 17 July 1982, FBIS, Soviet Union, 19 July 1982, pp. H4–5; *Iran Times*, 1 Oct. 1982, p. 16.

[20] *Krasnaya zvezda*, 8 June 1983, p. 3.

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defeated lay politicians.[21] However, its attitude towards the victorious Islamic Republicans has cooled as they solidified their hold on power, backed away from certain previously contemplated economic reforms, and turned against the Tudeh Party.

Even though Khomeini has not yet been criticized directly, he was referred to much less positively as the new Soviet line emerged. While his importance in leading the revolution has not been disputed, his role in post-revolutionary Iran has been de-emphasized of late. At first, the argument was that Khomeini advocated policies which the Soviets considered appropriate to the revolutionary transformation of Iran, but that various people in the government and clergy were not following his intentions.[22] During 1982, Khomeini received decreasing attention in Soviet sources. References to him were made mostly in the context of his leadership of the revolution to its initial victory. In the earlier of Ul'yanovskii's 1982 articles on Iran, the portrait of Khomeini as resolute leader was replaced by one depicting him as the object of a power struggle between reformist and conservative elements within the clergy.[23]

The existence of such clerical factions has received increased Soviet attention. The critical, and from the Soviet perspective disquieting, issue is the growing power of the opponents of reform. These conservatives have been described as proponents of the interests of the bourgeoisie and large landowners and as active enemies of the secular Left.[24] One barometer of the extent of the Soviet change of opinion is the way an earlier, more positive interpretation was misrepresented in a 1982 book review. Doroshenko stated in a 1981 essay that since the start of the Iran-Iraq war Khomeini and the mullahs close to him had sought to make reforms to benefit the masses, although not all mullahs agreed with that policy. An approving review in the prestigious journal *Narody Azii i Afriki*, while appearing to cite Doroshenko's views, ignored her point about the advocacy of reform in high circles and inaccurately attributed to her the judgment that the traditionalists among the clergy were currently in control.[25] Ul'yanovskii came to a particularly gloomy view of the situation. He argued that even the clerics who favour reform had been unable to convert those general principles into effective programmes and that, in any case, it is not they who prevail but, rather, those who would betray the revolution:

> The more the new organization of power, with its specifically Islamic features, was strengthened (to which the ruling clergy gave paramount attention), the more quickly the foundations of the revolution as a truly popular, anti-imperialist, and democratic revolution were eroded, the less hope remained for the realization of its social goals,

[21] Moscow domestic radio, 13 June 1981, FBIS, Soviet Union, 15 June 1981, p. H1; *Bakinskii rabochii*, 8 Jan. 1982, p. 4; Ul'yanovskii, " Iranskaya revolyutsiya," p. 112.

[22] *Pravda*, 9 Mar. 1982, p. 4.

[23] Ul'yanovskii, " Teoriya," pp. 17–18.

[24] Ibid. p. 17; idem, " Iranskaya revolyutsiya," pp. 113–14, 116; Primakov, " Islam," pp. 67, 68.

[25] Doroshenko, " Puti," p. 82; V. Malashenko, review of *Islam v istorii narodov Vostoka*, in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1982, No. 3, p. 169.

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for the satisfaction of the fundamental interests of the millions of the Iranian popular masses.[26]

This line of thought was carried further in response to the anti-Soviet measures of the first half of 1983. Instead of talking of a power struggle between the Right and Left in the Iranian government, Moscow declared that the reactionaries were in control. *Pravda*'s Pavel Demchenko, in his editorial on the arrest of the Tudeh leadership, came close to direct criticism of Khomeini when he wrote that since 1979 the Tudeh had consistently supported the " revolutionary wing of the leadership " of the new regime because the Party *believed* that Khomeini shared those views. Demchenko seems to be implying that that belief was wrong. The same message was conveyed in *Pravda*'s initial lengthy response to the Tudeh arrests.[27]

ONE aspect of clerical rule which was subjected to the most sweeping reassessment was its economic policy. Until the Ul'yanovskii *Kommunist* article, this had received fairly positive treatment in Soviet sources. For example, two prominent Soviet scholars, one specializing in Iran and the other in Islam in South-East Asia, published an article early in 1981 analysing the significance of contemporary Islamic economic policies. They noted that Islam could be invoked to support the economic interests of various classes inside and outside the elite. Reformers could use it to justify the redistribution of wealth and the curtailment (though not elimination) of private property rights for the good of society as a whole. The particular variety of Islamic economics which predominates in a given country depends on domestic political and class influences. The authors then cited Pakistan and Iran as sharply contrasting examples of elitist and reformist applications of Islam.[28] A year later, a Soviet Ottomanist published a remarkable paean to traditional Islamic economics. While the author's focus was on the policies of the Ottoman Empire in its heyday, he directly linked Khomeini with those values. The thesis of the article was that traditional Islam is deeply collectivist and anti-capitalist in spirit, as demonstrated by such factors as insecurity of personal property, lack of entrepreneurial spirit, and hostility towards the pursuit of individual wealth. The author attacked the idea that these traits are manifestations of backwardness and attributed them instead to deep-rooted anti-capitalism.[29]

[26] Ul'yanovskii, " Iranskaya revolyutsiya," pp. 112, 113–14, 115; Moscow radio in Persian to Iran, 6 July 1982, FBIS, Soviet Union, 9 July 1982, pp. H11–12.

[27] *Pravda*, 23 Mar. 1983, see also ibid. 19 Feb. 1983, p. 4, 6 May 1983, p. 4, 15 May 1983, p. 4; Moscow radio in Persian to Iran, 26 Feb. 1983, 7, 10, 13 and 27 May 1983, 1 June 1983, FBIS, Soviet Union, 2 Mar. 1983, p. H12, 17 May 1983, pp. H1, H3, 20 May 1983, pp. H6–7, 2 June 1983, p. H3, 3 June 1983, p. H3; Tashkent radio in Persian to Iran, 6 May 1983, FBIS, Soviet Union, 11 May 1983, p. H7.

[28] L. Polonskaya and A. I. Ionova, " Kontseptsii ' Islamskoi ekonomiki ': sotsial'naya sushchnost' i politicheskaya napravlennost'," in *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1981, No. 3, pp. 113, 114, 116, 117.

[29] I. Ivanov, " Sotsial'nye aspekty traditsionogo islama," in *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, 1982, No. 3, pp. 6–8.

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The most positive and substantial treatment of Iran's Islamic economics can be found in Primakov's writings. He has argued that despite the utopian shortcomings of the Islamic Republic's economic policy, it nonetheless represents an improvement over the exploitative system which preceded it and has merits in its own right:

> The concept of " Islamic economics " is an attempt at modernizing Islam, taking into account some real problems of Iran's contemporary socio-economic development.[30]

While this approach to economics is fundamentally petty bourgeois, according to Primakov, that is not, in context, a major flaw, since it links the interests of the petty bourgeoisie with those of the peasants and the urban workers. That is similar, Primakov argues, to the policy of Mahatma Gandhi (who is treated favourably in Soviet sources). Moreover, this petty bourgeois approach has " definite revolutionary-democratic potential."[31] Primakov noted with approval specific steps that the Islamic Republic has taken to implement its economic theories, including nationalizations, measures aimed against foreign investment, and the establishment of a fund to aid small and middle peasants.[32]

Ul'yanovskii, in his *Kommunist* article, went to considerable lengths to refute such assertions. An Islamic approach to economics, he argued, cannot work under any circumstances and has failed miserably in Iran. Islamic economic theory is doomed in advance by two basic flaws: Koranic teachings are irrelevant to the economic, social, and ethical concerns of late twentieth-century Iran; the attempt to propound an Islamic theory of economics as an alternative to socialism or capitalism is based on an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. According to Ul'yanovskii, the politically active mullahs drew their support before the revolution from two social strata with very different interests. On the one hand, there were smallholders who favoured capitalism, but one modified to favour themselves, and not the elite. On the other hand were those who owned no means of production and sought a fundamental restructuring of the economic system. Islamic economics is a doctrine designed to hold the support of these two constituencies. All that this doctrine really does, according to Ul'yanovskii, is attempt to mask with egalitarian talk the continuation of policies which favour the big capitalists and landowners. The mullahs' promised reforms have had no significant practical effect, largely because the upper bourgeoisie and other opponents of the revolution have thwarted reforms, which might have benefited the masses. Some reforms were discussed but never implemented; others failed to produce adequate results. Ul'yanovskii saw the regime's most grievous shortcoming in its failure to institute sweeping agricultural reform. He characterized this as a betrayal of the hopes of Iran's peasant majority. The unstated corollary is that the

[30] Primakov, " Islam," p. 64; idem, *Vostok*, p. 76; a similar view was expressed by Timofeev, " Rol' islama," p. 54.

[31] Primakov, " Islam," pp. 66, 68; idem, *Vostok*, pp. 76–77.

[32] Idem, " Islam," pp. 64–65; idem, *Vostok*, pp. 75–76, 78; see also Timofeev, " Rol' islama," p. 55.

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transformation of village life might set the stage for the political mobilization and radicalization of peasants, who, heretofore, have shown scant interest in the Tudeh Party. Ul'yanovskii also faulted the Islamic Republicans for their failure to deal with industrial problems, especially their inability to develop " effective economic planning."[33]

IF the Soviets' enthusiasm for the Iranian regime is on the wane, they are not very optimistic about the short-term prospects for the leftist opposition. Various Soviet sources have noted the Islamic Republicans' firm grip on power and the way they have strengthened their position since the summer of 1981 by the use of intimidation and force against the Left.[34] According to Ul'yanovskii, the Left has also weakened itself by internal disputes over proper strategy and tactics.[35] This is a veiled reference to the unwillingness of various leftists to join a coalition with the Tudeh Party, as well as the existence of several mutually hostile political factions on the Left.

Within this context, there has been an interesting shift in Soviet pronouncements about the Mojahedin-e Khalq. The Soviets' attempt to reach an accommodation with the Mojahedin in 1979 foundered on these guerrillas' hostility towards the new leadership in Tehran, with whom Moscow had hopes of good relations, and coolness towards the Soviet Union. There followed a period of Soviet criticism of the Mojahedin which lasted into early 1982. Thus, the TASS retrospective on the Iranian revolution which was printed in the dailies of the Soviet Muslim republics in January 1982 referred in general terms to the *counter-revolutionary* violence directed against members of the Iranian government, to which the government responded with force. Given the way this was phrased, with its emphasis on the assassination of government officials (as opposed to the Kurds' battle against the Republic's armed forces) this passage must be directed against those most active in conducting assassinations, the Mojahedin. There was no hint, as there would be in later statements, that the Mojahedin's violence had been provoked by the government's repressiveness.[36]

Signs of the changing Soviet attitude have been appearing since the spring of 1982, with favourable references to the Mojahedin as active participants in the revolution of 1978–79 and as representatives of the masses.[37] The philosophy of Ali Shariati, the ideological inspiration of the Mojahedin, has been treated positively as a non-theocratic application of Islamic ideas to current problems and an enormously influential stimulus to revolution in Iran.[38] There are also hints as to the reason for the

[33] Ul'yanovskii, " Iranskaya revolyutsiya," pp. 108–109, 112–14, 115, 116; idem. " Teoriya," p. 17.
[34] Primakov, " Islam," pp. 67–68; idem, *Vostok*, p. 81; Ul'yanovskii, " Iranskaya revolyutsiya," pp. 111, 112; Timofeev, " Rol' islama," p. 55; *Bakinskii rabochii*, 8 Jan. 1982, p. 4.
[35] Ul'yanovskii, " Iranskaya revolyutsiya," p. 113, 116.
[36] *Bakinskii rabochii*, 8 Jan. 1982, p. 4.
[37] Ul'yanovskii, " Iranskaya revolyutsiya," p. 116; Timofeev, " Rol' islama," p. 56; TASS in English, 2 Aug. 1982, FBIS, Soviet Union, 3 Aug. 1982, p. H16.
[38] Timofeev, " Rol' islama," pp. 55–56.

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Soviets' change of line on the Mojahedin. One factor is the perceived influence of the Mojahedin on radicals elsewhere in the Muslim world. For Ul'yanovskii, the key issue seems to be their resolute opposition to the efforts of conservative mullahs to block further reforms.[39]

Moscow's attitude towards the Tudeh Party became more negative the more time passed since the fall of the monarchy, although in 1983 this was tempered by the need to uphold Soviet interests by protesting Tehran's accusations that the Party was engaged in subversive activity on the Soviets' behalf. Various Soviet writers have observed that in Iran, as in most of Asia, communist parties are small and weak because of the relatively backward stage of socio-economic development there. In such countries, it would be premature to expect or seek to foment a Marxian socialist revolution.[40] The Tudeh's limited contribution to making the revolution has received decreasing attention, although it is not ignored, especially in broadcasts to Iran. Ul'yanovskii has even taken an indirect swipe at the current Party leadership by saying that the Shah's government killed or imprisoned for many years the Party's " best representatives."[41] The Party's current leadership spent most of the Shah's reign in exile in Eastern Europe. Following the arrest of the Tudeh's leaders, Pavel Demchenko assessed the Party's strength gloomily when he wrote that it had been decapitated.[42]

As for Soviet judgments on the achievements of the revolution, here too there has been a noticeable shift to the negative over time. Primakov used to cite Iran as an example of a country where an anti-imperialist revolution also displayed heightened awareness of social issues.[43] However in August 1982, Primakov published an article in *Pravda* summarizing his views on Third World revolutions expressed in his earlier writings. This time there was no positive reference to Iran. He could not, in a newspaper article, have repeated all the arguments he had made in lengthier works. Still, he chose to mention Iran—but only in the context of the Shah's close ties with the United States.[44] An article published a few months earlier in a major foreign policy journal by a Middle East specialist was more explicit about the shortcomings of revolutionary Iran, stating that " The Islamic revolution in Iran has not realized in a consistent and complete form the programmes of any of the participants who were prominent in it. . . ."[45] Once again, Ul'yanovskii was the most negative. He contended that the new rulers of Iran wanted to go no further than the bourgeois-democratic stage. As a result, the masses' hopes for the betterment of their lot were not fulfilled. Three

[39] Ibid. p. 55; Ul'yanovskii, " Iranskaya revolyutsiya," p. 116.

[40] Ul'yanovskii, " Teoriya," p. 20; Primakov, " Zakon neravnomernosti razvitiya i istoricheskie sud'by osvobodivshikhsya stran," in *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* 1980, No. 12, p. 45; idem, *Vostok*, p. 73.

[41] Ul'yanovskii, " Iranskaya revolyutsiya," p. 110; see also his negative comment in " Teoriya," p. 16.

[42] *Pravda*, 23 Mar. 1983, p. 5 and 19 Feb. 1983, p. 4.

[43] Primakov, " Islam," p. 64; idem, *Vostok*, p. 75.

[44] Idem, " Strany Vostoka," pp. 4–5.

[45] Timofeev, " Rol' islama," p. 56.

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years after the revolution's victory, they remained no better off than they had been under the monarchy.[46]

Despite the problems, the desire for good relations with Iran remains a part of the Soviet public discussion of foreign policy. However, the way it was mentioned in one Soviet foreign affairs journal in the summer of 1982 reflected the current chill. The author stated that Moscow was "ready to develop good relations" with Iran, implying that such relations did not currently exist. Moreover, the statement was made with regard to Turkey as well as Iran.[47] Thus Iran was put in the same category as a country on poor terms with the Soviet Union. When Leonid Brezhnev visited Soviet Azerbaijan in late September 1982, he did not use the occasion of being on Iran's doorstep to make any public overtures to that country. Instead, he declared Soviet support for the Arab League, a gesture which could hardly bring comfort to Iran during its war with Iraq.[48] The Soviets also demonstrated their displeasure with Iran by denying visas to its wrestling team which had planned to attend an international competition in the USSR in September 1982.[49] Since the setbacks of 1983, the Soviets have wavered between urging Iran's leaders to retreat from current policies before counter-revolution triumphs, and implying that there was no likely alternative to such a development.[50]

DESPITE the chill in Soviet-Iranian political relations, both countries remain interested in economic contacts. The Soviets continue to work on many construction and technical projects in Iran (most of them initiated before the revolution). The shipment of commercial goods to Iran from the Soviet Union, and from non-Soviet bloc countries via the Soviet Union, remains an important part of Iran's international trade, even though the Persian Gulf ports still carry a greater volume of goods. Even as political relations deteriorated during 1983, Soviet and Iranian officials continued to meet to devise ways to expedite that trade.[51] Soviet Persian-language broadcasts to Iran frequently cite economic relations between the two countries as proof of Soviet friendship and help.[52]

Other Soviet options for pursuing its interests in Iran are limited. There are few responses the Soviets can make to the deterioration of relations without incurring high costs, perhaps disproportionately high. The situation in Iran is still quite different from the one which existed in Afghanistan on the eve of Soviet intervention, when a pro-Moscow communist regime was on the verge of collapse. In addition, the Soviets

[46] Ul'yanovskii, "Iranskaya revolyutsiya," pp. 110, 113–16.
[47] M. Isaev, "Azii—mir, bezopasnost'," in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, 1982, No. 7, p. 18.
[48] *Pravda*, 21 Sept. 1982, pp. 1–2.
[49] *Iran Times*, 10 Sept. 1982, pp. 1, 16.
[50] *Pravda*, 23 Mar. 1983, p. 5 and 15 May 1983, p. 4.
[51] Moscow radio in Persian to Iran, 23 May 1983, FBIS, Soviet Union, 24 May 1983, p. H8; IRNA (Tehran) in English, 8 Apr. 1983, ibid. 11 Apr. 1983, p. H1; *Middle East Economic Digest*, 4 Feb. 1983, pp. 16–17.
[52] Moscow radio in Persian to Iran, 23 and 26 Feb. 1983, 1, 11 and 18 Mar. 1983, 28 Apr. 1983, FBIS, Soviet Union, 24 Feb. 1983, pp. H4–5, 2 Mar. 1983, pp. H11–12, 9 Mar. 1983, pp. H6–7, 16 Mar. 1983, pp. H3–4, 22 Mar. 1983, pp. H6–7, 3 May 1983, p. H5.

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have been wooing the Saudis for several years. Any heavy-handed interference in Iranian affairs would most likely undermine the Soviets' overtures to Riyadh. The US response to such a move would also have to be taken into consideration. In any case, Moscow is well aware of the weakness of elements in Iran which might cooperate with an obvious power play. Economic reprisals would cost the Soviets a vital medium of contact and influence in Iran. Conditions in Poland and Afghanistan remain far more pressing concerns. There are a host of other international and domestic issues which compete with Iran for the Kremlin's attention. All these dilemmas are compounded by the transition of the Soviet leadership from the Brezhnev to the Andropov era and beyond.

The Soviets have noted that further upheaval in Iran is possible. However predictions are vague about the circumstances under which this might occur or the form such an upheaval might take. Once again it is Ul'yanovskii who is especially outspoken. In his most recent pronouncement on the subject, he judged Iran to have reached a crucial and hazardous turning point. The only possibilities were for the revolution to go forwards or backwards. The outcome would be determined by whether all genuine advocates of change, especially on the Left, could cooperate to save the revolution. He seemed guarded about the prospects for such cooperation. It is precisely the lack of cooperation on the Left which he has decried in post-revolutionary Iran. He has also noted the retreat from revolution under similar circumstances in other countries, notably Egypt.[53] Ul'yanovskii limited himself to the conclusion that Iran remains volatile and that many things may happen:

> Full of contradictory potential, [the revolution] contains within itself the possibility of sharp turns in the future.[54]

In the light of the developments of 1983, the Soviet judgment seems to be that the sharp turn has occurred but that it is in the wrong direction.

[53] Ul'yanovskii, "Iranskaya revolyutsiya," p. 116; idem, "Teoriya," p. 11; idem, "O stranakh sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii," in *Kommunist*, 1979, No. 11, p. 118.

[54] Idem, "Iranskaya revolyutsiya," p. 116.

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The USSR and Africa: Challenge and Prospects

Thomas H. Henriksen

FOR many American observers, Soviet policy towards Africa since the Second World War has been difficult to comprehend for extended periods of time. Until recently, some commentators have assessed Soviet actions as being motivated merely by the expected concern of a great power for diplomatic status on a world stage, for secure trade relations or to have ports of call for the Soviet navy to show the flag. The USSR's large size, industrial maturity, and technological sophistication made the Soviet system appear somewhat irrelevant to African conditions. The Soviet Union was regarded by African radicals and responsible Western analysts alike as cautious and centrist in its posture towards Africa. China's activism, on the other hand, was initially seen as an attempt to promote revolution and to foster hostile reactions to the United States. Such a posture struck a responsive chord in African revolutionary circles. Soviet intervention into the continent in the mid-1970s and its massive arms transfers to African rulers have invalidated most earlier perceptions of Moscow's aims.

Soviet Policy Since the Second World War

Three decades ago the Soviet Union's African policy seemed centred on the problems of how to mesh Marxist-Leninist ideology and self-interest with the rise of nationalism in the continent. When Nikita Khrushchev assumed power, he reversed previous Soviet policy to align Moscow with the emerging political elites of the Third World. Abandoning Stalin's doctrine about the unreliability of the " national bourgeoisie," Khrushchev embraced Sékou Touré of Guinea, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, as well as other leaders in the non-Western world. The revised theory held that " socialist revolutions " could be fostered—wittingly and unwittingly—by the " national democrats." Indigenous communists received instructions to cooperate with Khrushchev's national democrats.[1] Having misunderstood the realities of African politics, events did not turn out as Soviet planners had hoped. African leaders deviated from Soviet theories, suppressed local communists and pursued foreign policies independent of Moscow's line. But on the ideological plane the USSR proved much more successful.

The USSR strove effectively to give widespread currency to the notion of neo-colonialism. This concept explained that chronic economic backwardness and persistent political instability resulted from neo-

[1] Dan C. Heldman, *The USSR and Africa: Foreign Policy Under Khrushchev* (Praeger, New York 1981), pp. 8–10.

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colonial interference by the West in the African continent. Sensitive to their new-found independence and suspicious of their former colonial overlords, many African politicians and intellectuals incorporated neo-colonialism into their world-view and used it simplistically to blame US and Western "exploitation" for African misery and under-development. These same opinion-makers scorned democratic capitalism for socialist economic development and an African way of life.[2] Being historically free of colonial involvement in Africa, the Soviet Union was better able to capitalize on the nationalist feelings arising in the 1950s and 1960s. The African leadership in fact declined to view Russian conquest of the Asian sections of the USSR as examples of colonialism; it also refused to acknowledge the satellite status of Eastern Europe as meaningful to the tropics. Moscow promoted this anti-Western campaign as a means to counter its fear of markets and resources accruing to American businesses and Common Market countries, and to gain an economic place in the newly independent African continent. The Soviet Union strove—and continues to strive—to place itself in the ranks of a self-fabricated anti-imperialist struggle alongside the African states in order to allay their suspicions of Soviet influence and to diminish Western commercial contacts.

Less successful than its ideological offensive was the Soviet Union's interventionist gamble two decades ago in the former Belgian Congo (now Zaïre). As the newly independent state's central authority crumbled and the provinces drifted apart, the Kremlin resolved to ally itself with the erratic Premier Patrice Lumumba. Held in check by Western counter-measures and the complexities of Congolese politics, Moscow lost out temporarily in projecting its military influence into sub-Saharan Africa.[3] Rebuffed in the Congo, Moscow appeared to be sobered by its own lack of naval and airlift capabilities to intervene and by the perplexities of ethnic politics in Africa.

Western apprehension subsided with the passing of the initial wave of radical elites or policies through *coups* or disillusionment in Ghana, Mali, Egypt and the Sudan. Soviet policy towards Africa during the 1960s and early 1970s centred on diplomatic activity and arms transfers to liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. From the Soviet perspective, gifts of small arms and guerrilla training served as long-term investments in a Marxist future, for, once in power, the guerrillas would more likely look to the East than to the West. The investment failed in Guinea-Bissau but turned out to be sound for Angola and Mozambique: both have decidedly Marxist-orientated regimes with strong political, military and economic ties with Moscow. From Washington's viewpoint, which was coloured by a rosy interpretation of *détente*, Soviet arms and guerrilla instruction conducted both in Africa and Russia

[2] For a differing view on the European contribution to Africa, see Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, "Economic Achievements of Colonizers: An Assessment," in *Colonialism in Africa*, 1870–1960, Vol. 4; *The Economics of Colonialism*, eds. Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann (Cambridge University Press, London, 1975), pp. 673–90.

[3] Waldemar A. Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa* (Praeger, New York, 1969), pp. 194–96.

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posed little real threat to American interests. In the view of the Nixon Administration, there was little chance that white rule in Angola, Mozambique or Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) would collapse. This proved to be a totally false prognosis. Moreover, many academics, journalists and State Department officials argued that Soviet arms shipments supported genuine nationalists who strove to liberate their countries from colonial rule and to bring racial freedom to the inhabitants. Western analysts, furthermore, interpreted Moscow's economic dealings in Africa as " businesslike," because of the reportedly tough terms demanded by Soviet negotiators for trade, aid and scientific-technological cooperation.[4]

Soviet-Cuban Military Intervention

The massive Soviet-Cuban intervention into the Angolan civil war in 1975 opened a new chapter in the Soviet Union's relations with African states, as well as heralding a bold and aggressive foreign policy on the world stage.[5] Soviet armaments and some 20,000 Cuban regular troops retrieved the almost certain defeat of the Marxist-led MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). This alien intrusion installed the MPLA in Luanda but contributed to the continued opposition of its rivals, who turned to guerrilla warfare in the countryside. Currently, the chief opposition arises from UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) which continues to tie down sizeable numbers of Cuban and MPLA troops in Angola's south-eastern region. The Soviet Union's actions also pushed aside the Chinese-backed nationalist movement and eclipsed the People's Republic of China from active involvement in the Angolan civil war. In attempting to counter Soviet ambitions, China found itself on the same side as the South Africans, who also opposed the MPLA. This temporary alignment tarnished Beijing's standing in Africa, for it placed China shoulder-to-shoulder with the continent's white racists. Gradually and quietly the Chinese have begun to return to the African political scene.[6]

Reacting to an aroused Congress which feared another Vietnam, the Ford Administration wavered in its support for South African attacks on the MPLA before its own foreign policy options were restrained by the Clark Amendment. Named after Iowa's former Senator Dick Clark, the Amendment curtailed American intervention in Angola. This cut off American support for the anti-MPLA forces and guaranteed victory for the Soviet-Cuban backed Marxist movement.[5] This episode gives credence to the power vacuum concept of politics in that the Soviet Union filled the vacuum created by the American and Portuguese withdrawal from Angola.

Soviet actions, however, went unrestrained. In 1977, Moscow shifted

[4] Christopher Stevens, *The Soviet Union and Black Africa* (Holmes & Meyer, New York, 1976), p. 26.
[5] A brief but reliable study of foreign intervention in the Angolan civil war is Colin Legum's *After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa* (Africana, New York, 1976).
[6] " Fearing Soviet, China is asserting itself in Africa," *The Sun*, Baltimore, 7 June 1978.

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support from Somalia to Ethiopia and then backed the new Ethiopian regime of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam against a Somali invasion force. Moscow's reversal demonstrated a firm grasp of strategic advantage and a well-seasoned understanding of *realpolitik*. Somalia's General Siad Barre had come to power in a *coup* which had resulted in the termination of American aid and expanded base rights at Berbera for the Soviet Union in return for Russian support to replace support from Washington. Despite Somalia's expressed commitment to " scientific socialism," the country posed a certain liability for the Kremlin through its revanchist claims on Ethiopian and Kenyan territory. Just prior to the Soviet switch, Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia was overthrown and the Barre government showed signs of growing restiveness in its relationship with Moscow. But the Soviet reversal of alliances revealed long-range geopolitical goals rather than strained relations. Moscow's calculations included a bigger client state in Ethiopia, in the throes of a revolution, with its larger endowment in human and physical resources and with more than adequate ports on the Red Sea, as well as a better strategically located territory to influence regional politics. Not only did the USSR gain another client state dependent on Soviet arms, but also the United States lost its Ethiopian base at Asmara in the Soviet exchange of Somalia for Ethiopia. This changeover was accompanied by another large military intrusion into the continent.

Once again the Soviet Union displayed a modern and effective capability to project heavy military equipment and about 15,000 Cuban soldiers to influence political developments in Africa. It coordinated an airlift from Libyan, East European and Soviet airfields to rescue the beleaguered revolutionary Ethiopian regime from its war with Somalia over the Ogaden province.[7] In so doing, it sent approximately 1,500 Soviet military advisers and over one billion US dollars in weaponry.[8] Soviet large-scale assistance entailed not only tank landing ships to supplement non-functioning or crowded Ethiopian seaports but also high-ranking generals to direct the military campaign against Somalia. As in the case of Angola, Soviet, Cuban and East German advisers, troops and security experts still give support to the pro-Moscow, Marxist regime.

SOVIET (with Cuban and East German) politico-military intervention into Africa in the mid-1970s must modify many of the past explanations for Soviet goals in that continent. Moscow's current policy is no longer simply opportunist in its pursuit of diplomatic influence; for during the crisis in the Horn of Africa, the USSR chose Ethiopia over Somalia. The choice itself points to the calculation of strategy and not simply influence. The pattern emerging over the past several years is one of shifting emphasis in the allocation of the Soviet Union's capabilities, personnel and resources. The change in Soviet policy has been the

[7] Richard E. Bissell, " Soviet Policies in Africa," *Current History*, October 1979, p. 126.
[8] *New York Times*, 10 Mar. 1978.

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development of the capacity to build an empire of client-states beyond its adjoining borders in Eastern Europe.

The 1950s and 1960s witnessed Soviet ideological concern for African politics when such radical leaders as Touré of Guinea, Nkrumah of Ghana and Keita of Mali enjoyed special favour. More recently, the Soviet leadership began to deal with African power centres as they exist. This past year, for example, saw a step-up in the Soviet Union's relations with the corrupt and inefficient rule of Mobutu Sese Seko. In fact, Zaïre's relations with all of Eastern Europe have improved. Trade with Comecon countries increased. Exports to Rumania accounted for two per cent of Zaïre's total exports. Yugoslavia invested in Zaïre's rural industries and promised food projects.[9] Moscow and Kinshasa planned air connections between the two capitals.

Another change in the pattern of Soviet diplomatic conduct involves its increased ability to use raw power as an instrument of diplomacy in the Third World. Like China and India, Russia initially fought against what it perceived as the reliance of the West on military power to back up its policy in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In their expansionist drive, the Soviets devoted considerable efforts to developing their own military and industrial resources to join the ranks of Western states in their ability to bring military pressure to bear on international situations around the world. Over the same period the West's military position slipped. In both Angola and Ethiopia, the USSR surprised Western analysts with its ability to transport large numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers over thousands of miles in order to rescue embattled allies.

The most obvious and traditional tool for world influence or a seaborne empire is a large navy. Since the late 1960s the Soviet navy has extended itself from the Mediterranean Sea first into the Indian Ocean and then into the South Atlantic. During the 1968–72 period, the Soviet navy conducted regular operations along the West African coast and in the north-west region of the Indian Ocean. Soviet maritime manoeuvres in this latter area were sometimes explained away as simply defensive measures to counter the presence of Polaris-equipped American submarines which had the capacity to strike Russian territory. But Soviet naval ventures into the southern zone of the Indian Ocean in about 1975 undercut the defensive argument.[10] This past year has marked the stationing of warships in Mozambique's Maputo Harbour. This positioning of Soviet combat ships was justified by Moscow as a means of assisting Mozambique's grant of staging bases to South African guerrillas and of protecting Mozambique against retaliatory raids on these bases by

[9] For more about Eastern Europe's role in Africa, see Roger E. Kanet, "East European States," *Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Thomas H. Henriksen (Hoover Press, Stanford, California, 1981), pp. 23–56, and George A. Glass, "East Germany in Black Africa: a new special role?," *The World Today*, Vol. 36, No. 8, Aug. 1980, pp. 305–12.

[10] Paul B. Ryan, *First Line of Defense: The US Navy Since 1945* (Hoover Press, Stanford, California, 1981), pp. 167–74.

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Pretoria. Yet the projection of Soviet naval power on a permanent basis into the southern Indian Ocean—an area not essential to Soviet interests—served to emphasize the view of Moscow's successive advances into the vital seaway between Africa and India, as well as across the West's oil route from the Persian Gulf. The Soviet's actions cannot but lead to an intensification of the race for naval facilities and anchorages in the Indian Ocean.[11] Less disturbing but indicative of Soviet ambitions is the use of Mozambican facilities evident in the refuelling at Maputo's airport of Soviet aircraft bound for Antarctica.[12]

The appearance of the Soviet fleet in the South Atlantic raised Western concerns at the time of the Angolan civil war. But a more threatening presence resulted from the Moscow-backed MPLA victory and the use of Angolan ports by the Soviet navy. At the time of the Falkland Islands crisis, Angola allowed its harbours to be used by Soviet ships to track and monitor the progress of Britain's Royal Navy across the South Atlantic.[13]

The use of the Soviet navy as a tool of expansion is instructive, for it illustrates not only the uses of naval power but also the minimum risk options it affords. Fleets can manoeuvre in and out of dangerous circumstances with the winds of political change much more easily than ground forces. To give maximum flexibility to the projection of seapower, the Soviet Union prefers above all naval bases under Moscow's direct control. If these are unattainable, Moscow generally favours anchorages over naval bases and floating dry-docks over fixed installations. In the Somali situation, for instance, the Soviets merely towed their dry-dock across the Gulf of Aden when relations with the Barre government soured.[14]

Afro-Communist States

Present-day Soviet policy towards the Marxist-Leninist regimes in Angola and Ethiopia differs from previous reactions. Since the ascendancy of Soviet arms over the West's conventional and nuclear armaments in the mid-1970s, Moscow has demonstrated a greater emphasis on military assistance rather than on economic aid, as was typified in such projects as the Aswan Dam. Moscow has also shown a greater willingness to become involved abroad directly or through the use of Cuban and East German proxies. In the past, the USSR relied more on the covert actions of the KGB than on overt intervention. This propensity to use military might has given rise to the argument that the Soviet presence will be transient and that the West has little to fear in the long run. A subsidiary to this

[11] Michael T. Kaufman, " Ports & Oil Spur Naval Build-Ups by US and Soviet," in the *New York Times*, 20 Apr. 1981.

[12] " Mozambique: Gearing up for Action in Southern Africa," *To the Point*, South Africa, 11 Apr. 1981, p. 10 and Vernon V. Aspaturian, " Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," *Problems of Communism*, 29, May–June 1980, pp. 1–18.

[13] Broadcast from the British Broadcasting Corporation, 6.00 a.m. GMT, 14 Apr. 1982.

[14] Richard E. Bissell, " Soviet Interests in Africa," *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations*, eds. Warren Weinstein and Thomas H. Henriksen (Praeger, New York, 1980), pp. 6–9.

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main explanation is that African nationalists, fresh from the European colonial experience, will not bow to the Soviet yoke.

This view has three main weaknesses. First, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique rely on Soviet bloc support against stubborn internal and external enemies. The MPLA government in Angola faces a resilient adversary in UNITA which roams almost at will over much of the south-eastern corner of the country, sabotaging the vital Benguela railway which carries Zaïre's copper shipments to the Angolan port of Benguela on the Atlantic coast. In Ethiopia the regime of strong-man Mengistu is fighting simmering wars with partisans in the Tigre region, with Somali guerrillas in the south-east, and with Eritrean insurgents in the north-east region. The rural insurgency in Mozambique has become more serious for the FRELIMO government since the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. Disaffected Mozambicans and disbanded Portuguese soldiers coalesced into the RNM (National Resistance Movement) to wage a guerrilla war in the mid-section of Mozambique. Both UNITA and the RNM receive support from South Africa which is locked in a type of cold war with Angola and Mozambique, but both movements also enjoy local support. Without grass-roots assistance and popularity the two movements, as is the case with many guerrilla organizations, could not carry on a clandestine struggle in the African bush. Angolan territory is also frequently overrun by regular South African forces because the MPLA allows its soil to be used by SWAPO (South West African People's Organization) in its campaign to wrest South African control of Namibia. South Africans have also staged incursions into Mozambique, which has given shelter to units of the African National Congress. These problems necessitate reliance on Warsaw Pact (and Cuban) support for the foreseeable future.

A second flaw in the argument that Soviet bloc influence is likely to be of only short duration involves the issue of economic aid for the three revolutionary regimes as well as what might be termed the façade Marxism of such states as Benin (formerly Dahomey), the People's Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Guinea. The West has increasingly relied on the powerhouse of its financial and industrial resources to outbid the East for influence in developing nations. This had been the strongest card in the West's hand, but the Soviet Union's application of power can do much to negate it. Moreover, Eastern Europe has become more active in trade and aid to Africa during the 1970s. An adequate discussion of East European economic and diplomatic efforts in Africa is impossible within the confines of this article. Briefly, however, their endeavours, even when pursued for individual goals of greater autonomy from the Soviet orbit, contribute to providing an alternative to the West's economic cooperation (see Table 1). More than 75 per cent of the aid (for which the recipient countries could be determined) went to six states—Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and the Sudan. At the time of the aid all these countries were considered " progressive," except Nigeria, and Ghana has not received

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TABLE 1

Credits and Grants to African Countries, 1954–78

	1954–78				1977				1978			
	USSR*	%	Eastern Europe*	%	USSR*	%	Eastern Europe*	%	USSR*	%	Eastern Europe*	%
Total to all developing countries	17,088	100·0	9,086	100·0	402	100·0	397	100·0	3,707	100·0	1,502	100·0
Africa	5,429	31·8	3,240	35·7	31	7·7	249	62·7	2,010	54·2	627	41·7
N. Africa	4,358	25·5	1,824	20·1	—	—	130	32·7	2,000	54·0	110	7·3
Algeria	716		524		—		—		—		—	
Egypt	1,440		890		—		95		—		—	
Mauritania	8		10		—		—		—		—	
Morocco	2,098		170		—		—		2,000		89	
Tunisia	96		210		—		35		—		—	
Other	—		20		—		—		—		20	
Sub-Saharan Africa	1,071	6·3	1,416	15·6	31	7·7	119	30·0	11	0·3	517	34·4
Angola	17		88		6		—		1		76	
Benin	5		—		—		—		—		—	
Cameroon	8		—		—		—		—		—	
Cape Verde	3		1		—		—		3		—	
Central African Empire	3		—		—		—		—		—	
Chad	5		—		—		—		—		—	
Congo	28		60		—		3		—		—	

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Equatorial Guinea	1	—	—	—	—	—
Ethiopia	105	95	—	23	negl.	45
Gabon	—	2	—	—	—	2
Ghana	94	105	1	—	—	—
Guinea	212	110	1	—	—	—
Guinea-Bissau	11	—	—	—	—	—
Kenya	48	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar	20	negl.	—	—	6	negl.
Mali	90	23	—	—	1	—
Mauritius	5	—	—	—	—	—
Mozambique	5	17	5	12	—	2
Niger	2	—	—	—	—	—
Nigeria	7	80	—	—	—	—
Rwanda	1	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal	8	35	negl.	—	—	—
Sierre Leone	28	—	—	—	—	—
Somalia	164	6	—	negl.	—	—
Sudan	65	240	—	62	—	24
Tanzania	38	23	18	—	—	3
Uganda	16	—	—	—	—	—
Upper Volta	6	—	—	—	negl.	—
Zambia	9	62	—	—	—	12
Other	67	469	—	19	—	352

SOURCE: *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1978* (Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., September 1979), pp. 7–10.
NOTE: Components may not equal totals because of rounding.
* In millions of US dollars.

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assistance since the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966. Mozambique, which is not shown as receiving substantial aid, has benefited greatly from East European support.[15]

Terms for East European economic assistance are generally quite favourable, and the East Europeans furnish thousands of economic advisers and technicians to Africa as well as education for 8,000 African students in 1978.[16] Additionally, the East Europeans, as well as the Soviets, have entered into joint ventures and other forms of cooperation in sub-Saharan African states; capital, equipment and technical expertise are provided in return for African labour and raw materials. Some jointly-operated industries permit the East Europeans to export goods disguised as African goods into the European Economic Community thereby gaining hard currency. Despite the fact that the East European motives are often for economic self-interest, their economic presence provides an alternative to the easy access that the West once enjoyed.

Finally, the explanation of transient Soviet influence overlooks the total commitment of the governments in Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique to social reorganization along Marxist lines. Their propaganda organs bear an anti-Western message; these regimes are opposed to capitalism and to democratic institutions. The political and social orientation of whole peoples is being shaped into an anti-Western viewpoint. The outlook and make-up of the new Afro-Communist governments stand in sharp contrast to the African socialist states of an earlier period. Their espousal of Marxism-Leninism has gone beyond the militant critique of European colonialism and Western capitalism of the nationalist politicians of the decade of independence. Instead, it serves as a blueprint for restructuring society and gaining power against entrenched opposition. The ruling Afro-Communist parties envisage a socialist development and centralized control over the political life of the nation. In their view, Western policy is bankrupt because it not only helps their opponents, but it also lacks a radical prescription to colonial rule and underdevelopment. In short, they could become African "Cubas."

The Soviet Union's influence is even apparent in the foreign policies of the revolutionary regimes—a preserve where past and present African socialists have managed to exercise their own independent views. For example, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique endorsed the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in the unbalanced UN vote against it. Moscow has also committed itself to the three Marxist regimes in an uncommon way: it signed a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with each of the states in the late 1970s.

These ruling parties would risk their political legitimacy by turning

[15] For more on the People's Republic of Mozambique, see Thomas H. Henriksen, "Mozambique: The Enemy Within," *Current History*, Vol. 81, No. 473, March 1982, pp. 111–14, 135–36, and Thomas H. Henriksen, "Mozambique," *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Hoover Institution Press, 1982).

[16] Kanet, "East European States," p. 56.

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away from their Marxist-Leninist foundations. Nor can the West count on a repetition of the expulsion of Soviet advisers and technicians as happened in Somalia, Egypt and the Sudan. Sub-Saharan states lack the powerful counterweight to Soviet influence, a firm basis that Islam and Arab culture provided in North Africa. Sub-Saharan African countries instead remain ethnically fractured and in some cases are divided by religion and even cultural affinities. Moreover, the Soviet Union's collaboration with Cuba may spare it friction with African governments since black Cuban proxies lessen racial tensions between external forces and the recipients of assistance.

The Future for Soviet Prospects

Due to commitments in Afghanistan and crisis-plagued Poland, it seems that the Kremlin's immediate priorities lie beyond Africa. The USSR has also had some more recent problems. The anti-regime guerrilla wars in Angola, Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, Ethiopia have drained the resources and tested the capacities of Moscow's allies in each of these three territories. Likewise, the weakness of party cadres in these states have belied hopes for rapid political transformations. The poor showing of SWAPO guerrillas in Namibia and the ineffectual raids of the ANC saboteurs have not lived up to expectations. Moscow also backed the wrong horse in the struggle for black rule in Rhodesia by supporting the Zimbabwe African People's Union rather than Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union, which emerged to rule an independent Zimbabwe. In spite of temporary preoccupations elsewhere, however, the Kremlin's prospects in Africa appear bright. It is impossible, of course, to predict the policies of a post-Brezhnev era, the continued cooperation between Russia and Cuba or the Chinese role in Africa. But the USSR learned valuable lessons from its unhampered incursions into non-Arab Africa. These injections of arms into Angola and Ethiopia revealed that Soviet hardware and Cuban regulars can make up for the sloth, indifference, ethnic rivalries and sheer incompetence of local forces. Other areas afford equal opportunities. And there remains the much lower risk option of aid to liberation movements.

South Africa is likely to remain a target for Soviet-equipped guerrillas. Its strategic location and rich storehouse of minerals make South Africa a worthy prize for disruption and Pretoria's racial policies make it a candidate for insurgency, just as they render Western responses ambivalent. Caught in a dilemma, Western nations find their strategic and material self-interest in conflict with their beliefs and practices of racial democracy which are absent from South Africa's apartheid structure. It can be expected that the Soviet Union will continue to take advantage of the West's predicament. Here, as elsewhere, the danger stems not only from a possible loss of minerals to the United States and Western Europe but also from African tolerance for Soviet intervention that could upset precarious regional balances. Regional instability will in turn offer the

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Soviet Union further opportunities and make peaceful settlement more difficult.

Other targets are ripe in Africa, for regimes viewed as neo-colonialist are fair game for national liberation movements.[17] The most likely candidate for such an eventuality is Zaïre, where the venal and crumbling Mobutu regime wavers precariously. The FLNC and other groups inside and outside Zaïre are organizing to topple the regime. Across the borders waits the old Katanga gendarmerie, trained and armed by Moscow, Havana and Berlin. It could launch a third invasion into Zaïre's southern province of Shaba. The Mitterand government in France is unlikely to follow its predecessor's policy of intervention in 1977 and 1978 to save the Mobutu government again. Colonel Mu'ammar Qaddafy's government in Libya engenders much instability in northern Africa, especially Chad and the Sudan, and his 1981 tripartite alliance with Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen raises concern in the Horn of Africa. The tremendous Soviet-supplied military resources at his command enable Qaddafy to create great mischief on his own or with Moscow's blessing.[18]

No external power operates in Africa without some restraints, and the Soviet Union is no exception. The Reagan Administration is not likely to follow the same policies as the Ford and Carter governments but the course of events outside Africa are as difficult to predict as those within the continent. This much can be said, however: the Soviet Union's intervention did much to dispel the notion that it was reluctant to extend itself in a meaningful way outside the European heartland. Its actions are likely to encourage aspiring African politicians to look to Moscow and away from Washington for help. But it needs to be borne in mind that the USSR has behaved in a counter-revolutionary manner in aiding in the suppression of Africans in Biafra, Eritrea, Ogaden and the southern Sudan, where it appeared to advance Soviet interests. Aspirants for Soviet arms, therefore, should ensure that their goals and Moscow's ambitions coincide. Revolutionary commitment alone is not enough. Even parallel goals provide no guarantee of permanent Soviet loyalty, for when the Soviet Union switched support from Somalia to Ethiopia, it turned against the Eritrean guerrillas, who had received Warsaw Pact arms and Cuban instruction.

What seems certain from Soviet actions in recent years is that Africa stands high in the Kremlin's priorities.

[17] For more on future prospects for the Soviet Union, see Morris Rothberg, *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power* (Advanced International Studies Institute, Miami, Florida, 1980), pp. 264–73 and Thomas H. Henriksen, " Communism, Communist States, and Africa: Opportunities and Challenges," *Communist Powers in Sub-Saharan Africa*, pp. 123–26.

[18] Raymond W. Copson, " African Flashpoints: Prospects for Armed International Conflict," *Orbis*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter 1982, p. 911.

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Central America and the Lessons of Vietnam

Sol Sanders

THE inadequacy of the analogy of the American intervention in Indochina with Washington's growing policy dilemma in Central America is rather obvious in spite of the constant din which daily parades such comparisons in the media. Vietnam was a war against the Vietnamese communists, with a long and partially successful struggle against the French behind them; it was a war of confrontation 6,000 miles away in a totally alien theatre; it was a debatable call to war in a region in which Washington had never been a major power-broker. The elements of a final tragedy were thus introduced. The guerrillas of Central America waged a token campaign against the Somoza regime which was successful only with help from Washington; the locus of a confrontation in what has always been considered America's backyard; a political dispute involving confirmed Soviet surrogates geographically closer to Washington than San Francisco—all these factors make the Central American imbroglio a different contest from the one which took place in South-East Asia.

Fundamental to the present argument, of course, is the concern, in a period of increasingly dramatic domestic problems that require enormous intellectual and financial resources for their solution, that the United States restrict its commitments in a troubled world. For a world power such as the United States, the problem of assigning a priority to its foreign interests on a geographic basis and limiting its commitments on the basis of those priorities, however logical in the abstract, becomes exceedingly difficult to implement.

Although the argument over priorities was central to the Vietnam issue, the rationale for why Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico, are essential to American interests is so apparent and so much stronger, and has been expounded in so many places, that it hardly needs repeating here. Suffice it to say that the strategic value for Moscow of more Soviet satellite regimes like Cuba in the region, the threat that these would pose to American security, the world-wide psychological and hence political repercussions of America's failure " to handle the issue," the torrent of refugees which would be pushed northwards in the wake of the creation of a band of Soviet-style states in the area, are but few of the elements in such a disaster. Few who argue against the Reagan Administration's commitment to stabilize the area deny that it is a matter of immediate and continuing concern to the United States. Nor do they argue that it is a waste of American resources and prestige to have a role in deciding what will be the nature of governments in Central America and their relationships with other powers within and without the region. Few even argue that the Administration's accusations against the already established Cuban models in the region are only a case of our misunderstand-

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ing the nature of these regimes (*pace*, Mary McCarthy, Jane Fonda, Susan Sontag, and other apologists for the North Vietnamese regime during hostilities). What they do contend is that the Reagan Administration's approach is faulty, that Washington does not recognize the real problems of the area, and that its " militarization " of the conflict is turning it into " another Vietnam."

Whether the analogy comes from those who opposed the US commitment in South-East Asia or from those who supported it but do not want a debilitating repetition of the sacrifices there, it is often based on a misinterpretation of the basic elements in the Vietnam conflict. A great number of those who write or talk about the lessons of Vietnam ignore the minutiae which were as important as, if not more important than, the sophisticated intellectual struggle that revolved around the tragedy in Washington and which still bedevils us. A combination of factors is, indeed, prompting the US to repeat the major mistakes of the South-East Asia intervention. However, these mistakes do not arise from the faults attributed to policy by critics in Congress or the young media representatives reporting from the area, so fascinated by what they deem sincere and altruistic revolutionary movements. Rather, Washington is willy-nilly falling into the pattern of events that led to the protracted struggle in Vietnam and, eventually, to the defeat of American power and the friendly forces allied to it in the area. What is happening is a failure of officialdom to recognize the nature of the threat, the bureaucratic and military structure necessary to contain it, and the necessity to proceed with such a programme before the descending spiral of defeats and flagging morale engulfs the area—and Washington. This lack of comprehension has less to do with the peculiarities of the Reagan Administration than with the general failings of US institutions and the general attitudes of the American political elite, whatever their superficial political differences. Just as most American institutions—the military, the civilian bureaucracy, the academy, the social welfare agencies—failed in Vietnam, failed to cope with new and varied problems, so these same agencies of government and society today show the same inability to adapt to the particular problems created for policy-makers in Latin America.

The United States is inevitably being drawn into a morass, a conflict without limits and with goals so ill-defined that it does not know how to achieve them, and with the inevitable frustrations and embitterment that are likely to come from such a task.

Of course, no two historical episodes are identical and therefore analogies are misleading. Still, the pattern of repetition of past mistakes in South-East Asia in what is presently transpiring in Latin America is so striking to those who experienced the former that it warrants comment.

AMERICA'S pursuit of a policy of gradualism, of responding only to Havana-Moscow initiatives in the region, is bound to lead to defeat—in Central America as it did in Vietnam.

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Even today, after all that has been written about the conflict in South-East Asia, it is still not understood by the general public—nor by a large part of American officialdom, including the military—that it was the communists who dictated the terms on which the war in Vietnam was fought. The escalation throughout the conflict came from the communists, not from Saigon and Washington. Whether it was in weaponry or in strategy, Hanoi set the pace of the battle. The Viet Cong, for example, had automatic weapons (the Soviet/Chinese AK47) in quantities in the early 1960s, whereas the American-supplied Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) had to make do with an inferior weapon. It was long after the introduction of US forces in large numbers in 1965 that the ARVN received the M16. On larger issues, too, the communists always took the initiative. Their territory remained immune from attack while, first the South Vietnamese, and then the Americans, fought a defensive war. In the summer of 1964, for example, when regular North Vietnamese units entered the war in the south as units (repatriated individuals and " infiltration packets " had been used as early as 1959 to swell the ranks of the southern guerrillas), Washington chose to deny Vietnamese insistence that it had taken place. (The then Vietnamese Chief of State Nguyen Khanh told me at the time: " I know Washington has an election to win, but I have a war to win.") When I reported the new-style invasion for *US News & World Report* (11 Jan. 1965), the US military command in Saigon held a press conference to deny the evidence accumulated by three Saigon correspondents who bothered to visit the battlefield area. Later, US officers quietly told other reporters that I had been a victim of Vietnamese counter-intelligence for accepting the testimony of prisoners interviewed in Hue and inspecting Soviet weaponry that had been captured. Years later, an American general, in conversation with a newly arrived fellow officer in Vietnam, said: " Sanders was telling me that the North Vietnamese had invaded in regular units. The White House said it wasn't true. What would you have done? " What he meant was that President Lyndon Johnson did not want the public spectre of a bigger war to loom before the Congressional elections of that year, so the reality was simply denied until the following spring. Whatever else it did, it led to a growing demoralization of the Vietnamese leadership and a realization by Saigon's officer corps that the war would not be fought on equal terms.

Today that pattern is being repeated in Central America. A few months before the end of the Carter Administration, the US Ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezzulo, in a procedure demanded by Congress, sent a public document to Congress attesting that the US had no evidence that the government of Nicaragua was shipping arms to the communist-led guerrillas in El Salvador. However, in a classified version of that testimony, he said that there was no evidence that the *Comandantes* in the Nicaraguan junta were shipping arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas as a government, but that they might be engaged in so doing as individuals. This kind of sophistry has led to the inevitable miscalculations of military strength. For two years, there has been evidence that the Sandinistas are

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building up an impressive military presence in Nicaragua with help from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Eastern bloc countries and allies, including the Palestine Liberation Organization. An example of this is the military jet airfields which are now being completed in Nicaragua. American intelligence knows that Nicaraguans have been taken to Bulgaria to be trained as MiG pilots. There have been reports of crated MiGs arriving in the country, and Libyan pilots have been seen on one of the bases. However, because these reports come from sources who oppose the Sandinistas, because of the incredible bureaucratic methodology that has crept into our intelligence community, the reliance on " non-human intelligence," i.e. electronic and photographic devices, the shibboleth of "no confirmation," seem to be repeatedly invoked. The small but prestigious Honduran air force, fitted out with reconditioned French jet aircraft and trained by the Israelis and the US, is the only local military barrier that stands between a growing Nicaraguan military establishment and its threat to other countries in the area. What now appears to be the inevitable introduction of MiGs into Nicaragua (at a time of Havana's and Moscow's own choosing) will substantially modify the balance of power in the area.

IN Vietnam, from the moment in the conflict at which the US took a direct hand in it—that is, from the division of the country in 1954 into the two regimes and the subsequent American support of the Republic of (South) Vietnam after the installation of President Ngo Dinh Diem—one fact was never recognized in Washington: the basic goal of the communist regime in the north was the unification of the former French territories in Indochina under its control. Hanoi was dedicated to doing whatever, in the short term, or in the long run, would accomplish that end, even to the point of risking its own suicide. Talk of compromise, which constantly came from the West, and was from time to time echoed in Hanoi when naïve or fellow-travelling journalists interviewed the North Vietnamese leaders, was never more than an eyewash tactic. The withdrawal of at least 30,000 military and political cadres from the south to the north after the French settlement in 1954, their clandestine repatriation as leaders of the revolt against the Diem regime, the use of Laos and Cambodia as transit routes and sanctuaries for forces dedicated to overthrowing the Saigon republic, the mobilization, first of support within the communist bloc, and later outside it among well-meaning if naïve Frenchmen, and then Americans—all these were stratagems of the communists in Hanoi in pursuit of that one goal which Washington had over two decades either failed to perceive, had rationalized, or, finally, accepted. Eventually, Henry Kissinger settled for an unverifiable Paris treaty that did not compel North Vietnamese cadres to withdraw from South Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos. Washington acceded to the original North Vietnamese intentions by refusing to continue, in 1973 and 1974, to maintain the level of assistance and support that, even after all the mistakes of the American conduct of the war and the flawed peace settlement in Paris,

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might have permitted a Saigon regime to survive. The flight of the boat-people and the tens of thousands who have died in the Vietnam Gulag since the communists took over are testimony to the deficiencies of American strategy.

In Central America, the Sandinista revolutionary regime has been a movement inspired, managed, and supplied by Castro's regime. One of its first acts on taking power was to send a delegation to Moscow to sign a party-to-party agreement with the Communist Party of the USSR, even though the Sandinistas did not, at least publicly, constitute a party in the strict sense. The initial disparate dissident elements who opposed Somoza were unified by the personal intercession of Fidel Castro, who saw them as the continuation of his permanent revolution. And in this he has been consistently supported by the Soviet Union with the help of the other members of the communist bloc. Their aim is the creation of a Union of Socialist Republics of Central America.

That the Sandinista regime still contains non-communist elements is a re-working of the takeover of regimes in Central Europe during the 1940s, or even of the Cuban experience itself. That the Sandinistas, or other revolutionary and anti-American elements in their own country or other countries of the area, have had the support of non-communists, even those who bear no extreme animosity to the US, is no different than the support for the communist Viet Minh coalition of 1943-54 in Vietnam from other South-East Asians motivated by their nationalist and anti-colonialist sentiments.[1]

ANY American strategy, then, that hopes to defeat efforts to establish new communist regimes in the Central American-Caribbean region through armed insurrection, must take into account the regional aspects of the conflict, which has its headquarters in Cuba and leads directly to Moscow. The Soviet-Cuban strategy encompasses the entire area and seeks to use every facet of the political spectrum in accomplishing its ends. The Cubans and the Russians know the history of the Central American region, that an anti-American government in any one of the republics has not been tolerated for long by Washington. Their strategy has, therefore, from the outset been an effort to weave the fates of the various pro-Havana movements into one web not only with Havana and Moscow, but also with other members of the communist world. East Germans have supplied transport and intelligence training to the Sandinistas. North Koreans have supplied heavy weapons. Bulgarians are training aviators and police. The North Vietnamese have supplied American weapons captured after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and other

[1] I, myself, was one of the organizers of a very successful pro-Viet Minh public meeting at the McAlpine Hotel in New York in the autumn of 1947 which included large numbers of non-communist Asian, African, and other international leaders attending the United Nations General Assembly at Lake Success, and a blue-ribbon list of Americans knowledgeable about Asia. As far as I know, none of those who attended in good faith to support Vietnamese independence from the French, nor even most of the organizers, knew at that time that we were being manipulated by communists within our own organization who were directly connected with the communist leadership in Indochina.

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specialities—propaganda advice on dealing with the US press and on guerrilla tactics, i.e. the marvellous tunnelling that was helpful in resisting the impact of B52 bombing in South Vietnam. The coordination of the Caribbean movements, however small, is incredible for an area of the world which has rarely in the past seen sophisticated political behaviour. Already surrogates are serving surrogates. There were Cuban cadres involved in the creation of the pro-Havana state on the island of Grenada. The installation of a pro-Havana dictator in Surinam, former Dutch Guyana on the north-west coast of South America, had been achieved with the collaboration of the Cubans—and the Grenadians. One of the first announcements of the new dictator, Daiyse Bouterse, was that he would send " volunteers to help defend the Nicaraguan revolution." It was only after the killing of Maurice Bishop and the impending US action in Grenada that Bouterse changed his tune.

Indeed, it is true that the Sandinistas would never have gained power had they not used the anti-Somoza sentiments of non-communists in Costa Rica and Panama who helped supply them with arms and gave them sanctuary. Nor would they have been successful in ousting Somoza had they not managed to use friendly American diplomats, who saw the Sandinistas as an option for a more progressive regime in their efforts to rid Nicaragua of the Somoza dictatorship. (" I did not know the Cubans would be there," said one American diplomat, referring to a secret meeting of US diplomats and Sandinista leaders in Costa Rica to arrange a transfer of power from Somoza to an interim regime. That naïve US official has now become an adviser to one of the Democratic presidential candidates. Another prominent US diplomat involved in the events leading up to the installation of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua told a Guatemala audience during the conflict that the Central American states would inevitably be taken over by Marxist-Leninists and the only effective American policy was to try to modify their policies, rather than to block them.)

To talk of "winning" in El Salvador, where the Sandinistas have set out to destroy a regime inimicable to them and replace it with another pro-Cuban government, without first developing an overall military and political strategy for the region, is to repeat the mistakes of South-East Asia. Even assuming that the US can supply and train a military force in El Salvador sufficiently strong to overcome the communist insurrection there—and there is no sign that it can as yet—Havana would simply transfer its emphasis to one of the other regimes in the region, all weak due to the classic reasons of underdevelopment of their economies and political institutions. Meanwhile, Havana will continue to lend whatever aid and support it can, with Moscow's help, to keep an insurgency going in El Salvador. And given the ability of a small group of armed men to disrupt any traditional pre-industrial society (or, for that matter, much more sophisticated and stable societies such as pre-Tupamaro Uruguay), and the enormous armed force necessary to secure the economic as well as the political structure of even a small country like El Salvador, Havana

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can hope to heap an impossible burden on the local population and on the United States.

No military strategy which does not proceed on a regional basis will be effective in containing the rebellion in El Salvador. An embargo on Nicaragua, much talked of in the press, would not effectively cut off supplies from the Salvadoran guerrillas. It would be no more effective than the US naval attempt to halt the smuggling of arms to the Viet Cong along the Vietnamese coast, US bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, or diplomatic protestations to Prince Norodom Sihanouk. If anything, the problem is more difficult in Central America—a narrow isthmus with huge bodies of water on either side, and at least eight different national frontiers to police. Arms and material flow to El Salvador, not only from Nicaragua, but through the other states in the region which have neither the physical means nor the political ability to control these supply routes. The initiation of a new insurgency against the Diem regime after the 1954 settlement would not have been possible without the repatriation of the southern Vietnamese cadres down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos (cf. the French television film broadcast 16 Feb. 1983 with a full explanation by Hanoi Generals Vo Nguyen Giap and Vo Bam of the use of the route); the Têt Offensive in 1968 could not take place without the use of Cambodian ports and transit routes and supplies from Singapore and the communist bloc. Similarly, the communist insurrection in El Salvador depends not only on the use of routes through Nicaragua, but also on those through Honduras and Guatemala and on the transit of war materials through Mexican and Panamanian ports.

Any successful strategy in pursuit of the war against the pro-communist guerrillas in the area on a regional basis must deal effectively with Washington's friends, as well as with its enemies. The Soviet Embassy in Costa Rica is a central direction point for subversive activities in the whole region. With some 150 above-ground personnel, its presence there is blatant. Streets near the embassy are often lined with cars bearing Nicaraguan licence plates and the embassy broadcasts without codes on sideband radio to its agents in the region. The Costa Ricans are now in extreme economic difficulties because of their runaway welfare costs and bankrupt government-owned enterprises, and as a result of the fall in coffee and other commodity prices; they are looking to the US to bale them out. Eliminating official Soviet representation in San José might well be a condition for such aid if Washington were pursuing a comprehensive plan to subdue the insurgencies in the region. Similarly, unofficial negotiations aimed at persuading London not to withdraw its forces from Belize, the former colony of British Honduras, look as though they have failed. It is well known that the British military presence in the region is only a token force. While British soldiers display anti-aircraft weapons around the airport at Belize City, streams in northern Belize are used for smuggling arms to Yucatan in Mexico, Peten in Guatemala and on to elements of the anti-government Guatemalan insurgency operating from refugee camps on Mexican territory. London has again threatened

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recently to withdraw all its troops and leave the US with another problem child on its doorstep—something that has happened repeatedly in the Caribbean in recent years. Might it not be within the legitimate rights of an American government which supported the British effort to stand on principle in defending the Falkland Islands against Argentine aggression—and thereby sacrificing goodwill and possibilities for leadership among the Latin Americans—to ask Whitehall to reverse the decision? It would also be appropriate at every opportunity to remind America's Mexican friends that the insurgency facilities which have been implanted by anti-regime Guatemalan guerrillas in the border areas of the Mexican state of Chiapas will one day be used against the regime in Mexico City.

To do less than this is to repeat the mistakes of Vietnam: in 1963, the US supplied Singapore with Armorlite automatic rifles, a version of the M16, in order to help Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yu to build up a military force under " Mexican " (Israeli) instructors at a time when he believed he might be threatened by Kuala Lumpur for his unilateral withdrawal from the union with Malaysia. It was during a period of such shortages of this weapon that there were not enough M16s for US forces, much less for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). But the United States got no *quid pro quo* from Lee to halt the enormous traffic in essential commodities to Cambodia which passed on clandestinely to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese in the war against Saigon. " Enough penicillin has gone to the Vietnamese communists to cure venereal disease in Cambodia for the next millenium," a British Chamber of Commerce official told me in Singapore in 1965. Not only did these drugs and hospital supplies pass on to the Vietnamese communists, but batteries, copper wiring, chemicals, food, and a thousand items that were needed by the guerrillas—all the peripheral but necessary logistic supplies of war. Cambodian imports skyrocketed, Singapore profits snowballed, and the war became increasingly difficult for the Saigon regime to handle.

IN guerrilla wars, perhaps even more than in conventional conflicts, the elements of economic warfare are critical. It is the aim of the guerrillas not only to destroy the economic infrastructure of the regimes they fight, but to force those regimes to bear the economic costs of waging the war. Havana (and her Soviet and other allies) is today using American markets to help pay the cost of her subversive activities on behalf of the guerrillas in Central America and the Caribbean. For example, the US continues to permit the purchase of shrimps in Panama hauled from Cuban trawlers, even though those same ships are used for inserting clandestine cadres and weapons, and communications, up and down the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Central America and northern South America. Washington only cancelled the US sugar quota for the Sandinistas in June 1983, ignoring the fact, generally known in commercial circles, that the sugar was, indeed, Cuban and not Nicaraguan. Indeed, a Cuban-controlled merchant marine firm operates throughout the region, directed by a

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member of the DGI, the Cuban secret police twin of the KGB, smuggling arms for the guerrillas.

Despite such activities, Washington has nowhere in the elaborate State Department or Pentagon bureaucracy made an integrated effort to wage economic warfare against the guerrillas and their friends in the region. The Sandinistas have, for example, been able to buy critical parts for American planes and weapons, despite American embargos. Furthermore, the talk in high places about " a Marshall Plan for Central America " tends to obscure the real issues in the conflict. To compare the problems of post-Second World War Europe with those of the 400-year-old inheritors of Spanish feudalism is, on the face of it, ridiculous. It was the American obsession with fighting inflation and building up the non-war infrastructure of South Vietnam that helped defeat the United States in Vietnam. The massive imports programme, financed by the American taxpayer, sapped the Vietnamese spirit with a " Honda mentality."

THERE is little hope that young Americans, sheltered from the political disasters which have overtaken populations in most major countries of the world in this century can realistically identify with the daily fight for survival which exists in much of the non-industrial world. Just as it was seldom possible to instil in the average American who came to Indochina as a soldier or administrator even a modicum of knowledge and respect for the Confucian values which dictate Vietnamese behaviour, so the formulators and critics of American policy in Central America seem blissfully unaware that the deep social problems of the region date from at least the time of the *conquistadores* and the *reconquista* in fifteenth-century Spain, and will not be healed by any magic formulas.

When I asked for information about a former Sandinista *Comandante* who had defected to the anti-Sandinistas, I was told that his father was a mulatto from the Mesquite coast and his mother was a Morisco, i.e. her ancestors were Muslim converts to Catholicism during the Spanish Inquisition. That a fifteenth-century conversion of a forebear sets the social and political framework in which one lives in the 1980s, establishes the environment in which the blood-feuds in the region thrive. It explains, more than mere ideology, the phenomenon of the death squads and the carnage of civilian deaths that naturally has so horrified American and European opinion during the current conflict.

The credulity and capacity for self-delusion among the law-makers and their staffs on Capitol Hill dealing with the Reagan Administration's policy in Central America are boundless. The Report on Bill H.R. 2760, which would direct the Administration to end its clandestine support of anti-Sandinista rebels in Central America and give those funds to friendly governments in the area, in order to continue the attempt to prevent the spreading of revolutionary influence, contains this remarkable statement:

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> . . . The United States has a substantial stake in Central America, which the President has set forth to the nation. For the price of a somewhat larger security assistance program, US foreign policy can regain the high, firm ground it must maintain to bring the scrutiny of world opinion upon Nicaragua and Cuban adventurism in Central America. Such scrutiny—and its self-interest in strong economic relations with a prosperous Central America—are what will bring Nicaragua to the bargaining table.

To believe that the strictures of world opinion would deter Fidel Castro, his supporters in the Kremlin, or his followers in Managua from continuing a programme of world revolution and conquest is to lapse back into the same frame of mind which believed that only the US intervention stood between the Vietnamese people and a peaceful solution to the conflict. Even today there is no widespread understanding that, indeed, there was a holocaust in Indochina after the communist victory in Saigon in 1975. The evidence from so many communist regimes around the world is surely sufficient to believe the thesis that economic deprivation, in itself, would force a modification of communist politics. It has not happened in Cuba and there is no indication that the Sandinistas, who have modelled their regime at every turn on Cuba's—and follow advice from large numbers of Cuban " technicians "—would abandon their goals of overturning other governments in the region because of promises of economic betterment.

This incredible *naïveté* among those outside the government is matched by those within it, a *naïveté* which reminds one of the pseudo-sophistication of an arrogant US officialdom in Washington and Saigon which had a " father knows best " attitude towards the problems of the South Vietnamese regime.

THE effort to win a war in South Vietnam against a force with inferior resources was lost in no small part because of the application of an allegedly scientific methodology to problems better solved in more traditional or commonsense ways, rather than by the application of the " quantification lunacy " methodology of the behavioural sciences.

There was the famous case of a Rand Corporation study which reported that the frequency of Viet Cong night attacks was greater during those periods of the month when the moon was in eclipse. The tendency to substitute, for what are considered more tedious traditional methods of accomplishing ends, new gimmicks which fail in their purpose has become the hallmark of American operations abroad. Nowhere is it a greater barrier to success than in dealing with a guerrilla insurgency which, in the nature of things, is based on the most specific characteristics of the geography of an area, of its peoples and their individual traditions. Since the effort of the guerrillas is to blast the established order apart and from the chaos dictate a new order with minority support for a new regime, every fissure in the society is exploited. In Nicaragua, the former guerrilla leadership exploited the traditional antagonism between the mulatto-

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Indian people of the Caribbean coast and their Spanish-Indian Mestizo cousins on the plateau. In Vietnam, the traditional complaints of the aboriginal peoples of the high plateau against the ethnic Vietnamese were used in the early days of fighting to gain control of the spine of the Annamite range in order to establish the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail for transmission of cadres and supplies from North Vietnam to the south.

In Central America, weapons smuggled into El Salvador to aid the guerrillas are sometimes photographed through American satellite photo reconnaissance facilities—one of the wonders of the space age. But the satellite cameras cannot see through the roofs of banana loading sheds in Caribbean ports. And the hundred-year-old port watching system of US Naval Intelligence that once gave the United States information about every ship and every cargo that moved around the world, was abandoned by CIA Director Stansfield Turner as part of his war against " human intelligence " advocates in the intelligence community. Apparently so far the effort has not even been made to re-establish it.

All this recalls to mind the Pentagon task force appointed by Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara before the massive entry of North Vietnamese troops into the conflict. According to Daniel Elsberg in his " hawkish " days in Vietnam, McNamara objected that the task force behavioural science analysts had hypothesized a very low figure for the tonnage needed to be brought down the Ho Chi Minh Trail or through Cambodia to keep a North Vietnamese division in provisions. I asked Elsberg what happened then. His reply was: " What did one do when a boss said a figure was too low? I simply went back and increased it." Yet had McNamara relied on the common knowledge of those who had seen the Chinese Nationalists build airfields in Western China in the late 1930s and early 1940s, of those who had seen the Chinese invasion of Korea during the Korean war, or the Chinese entering India during the 1963 war in the Himalayas, he would have known that Asian armies have repeatedly been able to carry enormous amounts of material—beyond the expectation of their Western adversaries—by the most primitive and traditional methods. The North Vietnamese did it by porter and bicycle on the Ho Chi Minh Trail when they did, indeed, enter the war in massive numbers after 1964. Unfortunately, this was an exceptional incident. As a rule, McNamara tended to rely on the numerological methods (" body count " etc.) of the " behavioural " analysts in evaluating the war situation in Vietnam.

NOT only have wars always been the most inefficient of human activities by their very nature, but they are fought as much on the psychological front as with weapons on the battlefield.

The Reagan Administration, in an effort to stop the pattern of subversion, infiltration, guerrilla warfare, and the establishment of a pro-Cuban, communist-oriented regime in El Salvador—a process which now threatens half a dozen other small states in the Central American-Caribbean region—has launched a counter-offensive against the

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Nicaraguans. The force includes former professional members of Somoza's National Guard army and large numbers of other adherents, some of them former Sandinistas who have broken with the junta over the increasing evidence of communist control. Yet, because of the strictures of domestic American politics, the spokesmen for the Administration have repeatedly had to announce on Capitol Hill that the aim of this support is not to bring down the oppressive regime in Managua, but simply to force it to suspend its aid to the rebellion in El Salvador. Whether this is the real intent of the Administration or not, it has apparently eluded the authors of this policy that modern communications have delivered their message to the jungle fighters whose morale is constantly sapped by this line of propaganda; i.e. that they are fighting and dying just to inhibit the flow of weapons from Nicaragua to El Salvador. (The effort has also been dogged by incredible bureaucratic bungling: there are three levels of CIA decision-making in the field. The guerrillas are held on such a short leash that field actions sometimes take weeks for approval in Washington. On more than one occasion the anti-Sandinistas have not had adequate weapons to supply *campesinos* who have joined them in their incursions into northern Nicaragua.)

There has been no mobilization of United States government propaganda for either other Latin American countries or friendly areas in Western Europe which would tell the true story of events in Central America. A dispirited and divided United States Information Service has hardly scratched the surface of the problem. The pro-Havana groups, on the other hand, have set up an elaborate propaganda operation in Mexico City, reportedly with advice from the Vietnamese communists as well as their European communist partners. All American media are scrutinized for their reporting of the Central American struggle and all American reporters and editors are identified and ranked according to their political attitudes towards the conflicts in the area. A network of contacts operates not only among the media directed from Cuban friendship committees in New York and Washington, and the Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington, but from " agents of influence " in the American universities who have long been favourable to Cuban policies. That network reaches right into the halls of government where it is common knowledge in the intelligence community that Nicaraguan agents are bed-fellows of some members of Congress. The extensive nature of the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan propaganda network in the United States puts to shame the Prague conference in the early 1960s which initiated the famous anti-Vietnam " teach-ins " in American universities.

Washington appears to believe that fair elections in El Salvador will answer charges that the United States is propping up dictatorial or reactionary regimes. The long series of elections in South Vietnam—as fair if not fairer than any held in Asia—have long since been forgotten. Ironically, it is only defectors from the Viet Cong who now attempt from time to time to remind Americans how they were able to infiltrate and operate in South Vietnam, to agitate for greater freedom, at the very

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moment that its rudimentary institutions of representative government and a free press were suffering defeat at the hands of the communists.

The relatively large-scale effort that has been devoted to trying to persuade the Socialist International that US efforts in Central America are well intentioned and will provide for greater freedom and prosperity in the area when the communist insurrection is defeated, displays the misplaced targets for propaganda. The SI has not hesitated to continue to condemn American " imperialist rule " in Puerto Rico, to admit parties in the area with Cuban ties, and to give aid and comfort to many anti-democratic elements throughout Latin America, so long as they are anti-American. To believe that the US, first, can get an SI *imprimatur* for any programme it pursues in Central America, and, secondly, that that would have any appreciable effect on the outcome of the present struggle, is another example of the irrelevancy of much that is being done under the guise of policy and strategy.

Last year, the United States failed to respond to the public call by the former President of Colombia that the Rio Treaty, the pact under which the US signed with its Latin American neighbours to defend the hemisphere against foreign attack, be invoked to halt Cuban penetration of Central America. Is it any wonder, then, that his successor has taken a completely different line on American " intervention "?

Only recently was a more decisive attitude displayed. The Reagan Administration's action in Grenada in late October 1983 was a forthright attempt to deal with a potentially major problem for the region and for American security. For more than three years strategists have warned that the build-up of a major Cuban-Soviet base at the principal sea entrance to the Caribbean would be catastrophic. The arms caches, the military airfield, the presence of a four-star GRU Soviet general as ambassador, the growing East German, North Korean, and Libyan surrogate presence, the surveying of the eastern approaches to the island for a new harbour—all lent credence to this warning. The training of guerrillas recruited from nearby islands, which was reported in late 1982 by the other members of the Organization of the East Caribbean States, the former British colonies in the Lesser Antilles, and the participation of Grenadian cadres in the bloody establishment of the Bouterse regime in neighbouring Surinam in 1982, all pointed to the geopolitical importance of this tiny island. The intervention in Grenada confirmed all these suspicions by revealing secret treaties with the Soviet Union, Cuba and North Korea—treaties which provided for military aid and aimed at the creation of a communist base there. Indeed, the role of the Cuban " civilian " workers in the fighting was in itself sufficient indication of the Cuban plans.

But the manner in which the Reagan Administration took the action was bound to present new and pressing problems. It was hardly a diplomatic triumph. The Caribbean allies in the joint action were not given sufficient prominence. The President's initial statement put almost total stress on the safety of the American citizens on the island; while

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calculated to win domestic support, it would have been far better to have emphasized the geopolitical nature of the action for America's European allies—particularly the British, for whom Washington had pulled the chestnuts out of the fire of the Falklands imbroglio in 1982. The case against the Grenadian regime had not been made in the long months preceding the military action even though the President had gone on television in the spring of 1983 with an ill-prepared presentation.

Searching for a South-East Asian analogy, one is reminded of Cambodia. A State Department officer covering Cambodian affairs from Bangkok in the late 1960s told me: "I am against our invading Cambodia, but we might have to do it some day to protect out interests in Vietnam—and by not publicizing Sihanouk's traffic with the communists, we are undermining the case we will have to make at that time." One might well have said the same about Grenada and Maurice Bishop in the summer of 1983. Why should the explanations not be given to the public earlier? Perhaps because until now the US was offering a Hobson's choice to its friends and allies in Central America—the same alternatives that it presented in South-East Asia. On the one hand there was the threat of communist conquest through subversion, infiltration, and finally guerrilla warfare; on the other, in the conflict that took place, the US was seen as an unreliable partner in the struggle that must of necessity be protracted if the communist threat was to be met in the long run. Is Grenada going to change this?

It is indeed surprising that the United States still commands such enormous prestige and faith among the believers in freedom all over the world; that despite all this, small countries like Jamaica are still prepared to stand behind the US. If America will not stop eroding that resolve among the Latin Americans, its efforts to bolster the security of the region will appear painfully inadequate in the light of the tragedy of Vietnam.

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Soviet Policy in Central America*

Jiri Valenta

SINCE 1979 there has been continuous upheaval in some countries of the United States' southern periphery—the Caribbean basin. The term Caribbean basin is a rather broadly defined geostrategic concept which is very appropriate for analyzing Soviet objectives in the region. The basin encompasses the Central American countries, the Caribbean island nations (Cuba and Grenada most importantly), and such littoral nations as Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia.

Political unrest in the Caribbean basin stems from many complex internal conditions which have set the stage for the current problems. The most evident are widespread poverty, economic disparity, industrial underdevelopment, unstable political institutions, and most significant, authoritarian regimes whose antiquated structures are far too inflexible to deal effectively with social and economic change. However, these conditions alone are not responsible for the violence that has torn apart the region. An understanding of the causes of upheaval on the US periphery has been frequently observed by the perception of conflicts in the area as strictly " national " in nature. As a result, greater regional and international trends have been either confused with national issues or ignored. The sources of instability in the Caribbean basin are not always contained within each country. The conflicts tend to assume a regional dimension, thereby threatening to pit one grouping of countries against another. The factor which has helped radicalize and internationalize these conflicts is Soviet-backed Cuban activity in the region. It is the Soviet presence in otherwise local or regional disturbances which creates the potential military threat and elicits a US response.

THE turning point in Soviet relations with the Caribbean basin nations came in 1959–60 after the Cuban revolution. When US-Cuban differences became unbridgeable, the Soviets tried to fill the political, economic and, ultimately, security vacuums. Since that time a few major historical shifts in Soviet policies vis-à-vis the Caribbean basin have occurred. These policy shifts were influenced by a number of interacting factors. The most crucial were: (1) Soviet-perceived opportunities in countries of the region; (2) the status of the Soviet-Cuban alliance in general and in the Caribbean in particular; (3) the dynamics of Soviet internal and East European politics; and (4) changing Soviet perceptions of the " correlation of forces " with the United States.

(1) As suggested by actual events, Soviet activities in the Caribbean

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basin often reflect optimism or pessimism, depending on and corresponding to observable trends in the region—that is, the presence or absence of local revolutionary activities, deteriorating socio-economic conditions, and anti-American nationalism. Soviet optimism in response to new and promising revolutionary situations peaked following the revolution in Cuba (1959–62) and in Nicaragua (1979–82). Their exemplary success led to a certain euphoria on the part of the Soviets, who then became hopeful about the revolutionary potential of other countries in the region.

Soviet perceptions regarding the revolutionary climate in the Caribbean basin changed again dramatically in 1979. The revolution in Nicaragua, the *coup* in Grenada, the growth of the insurgency movement in El Salvador, and the considerable worsening of socio-economic conditions, particularly in Central America, encouraged this last shift. The new Soviet policy was characterized by more active support of revolutionary forces in the basin.

(2) The dynamics of Soviet-Cuban relations is yet another important variable conditioning shifts in Soviet policy. Since the 1962 missile crisis, when the Cubans were dissatisfied with the USSR's management of the crisis, the Soviets and Cubans disagreed profoundly about which strategy to pursue in Latin America. However, as recent Soviet-Cuban policies in Africa and Central America attest, most of these differences have been overcome. In spite of past disagreements and existing differences, the Soviets and Cubans now have a unified Third World strategy which reflects the overall coordination of their foreign policies. The Soviets' continued economic and security support of the island is contingent upon this understanding. Cuban economic dependency on the Soviet Union grew substantially during the late 1960s and 1970s and was one of the factors influencing Castro's decision to compromise with the Soviets on foreign policy matters. Cuba became a Soviet ally, " the first socialist country in the Western hemisphere." Although the Soviets are newcomers to the Caribbean basin, with Cuba's help they have been able to exploit the socio-economic malaise and characteristic anti-US sentiment in the region. In doing so, their tactics have been either violent or peaceful, sometimes a combination of both.

Cuba is not entirely subservient to the Soviet Union in Africa and the Caribbean and at times appears even more assertive. Castro undoubtedly exercises some autonomy in formulating policy towards other countries and influences Soviet policy-making.[1] Despite Castro's relative auton-

[1] Cf. J. Valenta, " The USSR, Cuba and the Crisis in Central America," in *Orbis*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Fall 1981, pp. 715–746; J. Valenta, " Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Ethiopia, 1978," in *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall-Winter, 1980/81, pp. 353–367; J. Valenta, " The Soviet-Cuban Alliance in Africa and Future Prospects in the Third World," in *Cuban Studies* (*Studios Cubanos*), Vol. 10, No. 2, July 1980, pp. 36–43; J. Valenta, " Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1975," in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. XI, Nos. 1 & 2, Spring-Summer 1978, pp. 1–33; J. Valenta, " Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1980, pp. 52–57; J. Valenta " Soviet Policy and the Crisis in the Caribbean," in H. M. Erisman and John Martz (eds.) *Colossus Challenged, the Struggle for Caribbean Influence* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1982), pp. 47–82; J. Valenta, " Soviet and Cuban Responses to New Opportunities in Central America," in Richard Feinberg (ed.) *The International Aspects of the Crisis in Central America* (Holmes & Meyer, New

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omy, the decisive factor is that Cuban economic and military dependency on the Soviet Union prohibits the Cubans from initiating any major overt or covert support operations for guerrilla forces in Africa and the Caribbean basin without Soviet approval and assistance. Furthermore, such operations are impossible without Soviet strategic cover and commitment to protect Cuba in the event of an attack.

(3) In addition, Soviet strategy and tactics have been conditioned by the dynamics of Soviet and East European internal affairs. One could fairly accurately argue that the Soviets showed relative constraint abroad when they experienced severe internal problems such as succession and power struggles in the Kremlin and crises in Eastern Europe (1953–56 and 1964–68). The USSR usually embarked on a more assertive course after the general secretaries consolidated their positions (1958–62 and 1969–74). However, one of the primary motives for the modification in Soviet strategy in the early 1980s (support for revolutionaries in democratic countries of the Caribbean basin) was to preoccupy the United States in its strategic rear and to divert US attention from Europe and Asia, where the Soviet Union's western and southern guard (Poland and Afghanistan) are embroiled in unresolved conflict.

(4) Within the framework of Soviet-American relations, what appears to matter most is the Soviet perception of the correlation of forces between the Soviet Union and the United States. During Stalin's time, the Caribbean basin's geographic remoteness and limited Soviet sea- and airlift capabilities made the region of only marginal importance. Gradually, the Soviet Union evolved from a basically regional and immature global power under Khrushchev in the 1960s to a fully developed, globally oriented superpower under Brezhnev. The acquisition of strategic parity with the United States in the early 1970s and improved conventional capabilities made possible the Soviet-Cuban ventures in Angola and Ethiopia and support for Nicaragua and other clients. In the late 1970s the Soviets demonstrated time and again a more assertive strategy in Third World countries by means of direct or indirect military intervention and increasing military aid.

Since the mid-1970s, the most significant shifting Soviet perceptions concerning the balance of forces has been the image of declining US ability to counter Soviet activity in the Third World and the Caribbean basin in particular. The perception contrasts sharply with the image held by the Soviets in previous decades when US policy-makers were believed to have not only the power to obstruct Soviet plans but also the will to use force.[2] In 1975–80 the Soviets observed a weakness on the part of US

York, 1982), pp. 127–159; J. Valenta, "The USSR and Cuba in Africa," in Carmelo Mesa Lago (ed.) *Cuba in Africa* (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1982), pp. 141–48; J. Valenta, "Soviet Decision-Making on the Intervention in Angola, 1975," in David Albright (ed.) *Communism in Africa* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, April 1980), pp. 93–117.

[2] This image was shaken only briefly during the short period marking the transition from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy Administration and the unsuccessful 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Khrushchev's appraisal of Kennedy as "weak" and "inexperienced" led the Soviets to conclude prematurely that the Kennedy Administration was unable to curtail revolutionary activity in the

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policy-makers which they attributed to the defeat in Vietnam and the subsequent fear on the part of the American public and Congress of slipping into a new Vietnam quagmire, the damaging political and economic effects of the 1973 oil embargo, and the weakening of the US presidency during the Watergate scandal. US setbacks in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, and radical anti-US sentiment in Central America were perceived as further shifts in the correlation of forces favouring the Soviets. Numerous Soviet writings point to these phenomena as having undermined the US determination and propensity to resist " anti-imperialist " trends in the Caribbean basin. Thus US support for proxies (Guatemala in 1954) as well as the direct use of military force (the Dominican Republic in 1965) were viewed as more difficult to stage in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, and certainly before the US-led invasion of Grenada in 1983.

BY the 1970s, the Soviet Union and Cuba had formulated a coherent strategic vision with regard to the Third World in general and the Caribbean basin in particular. After the discord of the 1960s there was an integrated, flexible and long-term plan of action designed to achieve specific ideological, political, security and economic objectives.

Ideology

As discussed, the assumption that the Soviets support revolutionary movements in the Caribbean basin solely to create Leninist regimes is misleading. Still, ideology cannot be discounted among Soviet motives and objectives. The Cuban trajectory in the 1970s, resulting in conformism to true Leninist development and Soviet recognition of Cuba as a matter of the " socialist commonwealth,"[3] is a path the Soviets would like to see emulated by some radical regimes in the region. However, because of numerous bad experiences in the 1960s and 1970s—when many radical regimes in the Third World were overthrown and others substantially reduced the Soviet's presence and influence—the Soviets feel compelled to exercise caution in making commitments to would-be Leninist regimes.[4]

Caribbean. The humiliating defeat suffered by the Soviet Union a year later during the Cuban missile crisis dampened for a long time Soviet enthusiasm for the revolutionary aspects of their strategy in the basin.

[3] Cuba's formal status outside the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) is unimportant. The country's military alliance and cooperation with the USSR is even closer and more perfectly integrated than that of some WTO members like Rumania. In the Soviet's view Cuba is more reliable than, for example, Czechoslovakia or Poland.

[4] Here I deliberately use the term Leninist, not Marxist-Leninist. The Cuban and Nicaraguan regimes are certainly not Marxist–Leninist; rather, given their specific political cultures, they are Machistas-Leninistas. These regimes have little to do with Marx's notions of humanism and revolution. To call these regimes Marxist neglects not only this point but also the fact that Marx actually favoured the United States in the war against Mexico in 1848 (an issue which causes Cuban officials to tremble in public debate). Cuba did not copy the Marxist model of communism (for Marx had none), but rather the Leninist political system. Lenin was the one who developed the concepts of the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism. Although Leninist forces call themselves Marxist, Westerners need not make the same error.

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With the probable exception of Cuba, the Soviets in the early 1980s hardly view the new radical regimes in the developing world as truly Leninist, in the Soviet sense of the term. At present, they refer to these regimes as " progressive," " anti-imperialist," and, at most (in the case of Nicaragua and Grenada), as on " the path towards socialist orientation " (neither truly " Leninist " nor " socialist "). This cautious terminology reflects the Soviets' guarded expectations, conditioned by Cuba's long and arduous evolution towards real Leninist development, and the desire that there be no confusion as to which regime embodies the most advanced and mature form of socialism—i.e., the Soviet model. In addition, some Soviet analysts label Nicaragua and Grenada as " popular-democratic "—a term the Soviets used in the late 1940s to refer to East European countries which are today definitely Leninist.[5] Undoubtedly, the Leninist inclination of Nicaragua and Grenada is appreciated and applauded by the Soviets who can better justify the aid extended to these regimes to their domestic constituencies and allied communist countries.

The Soviets recognize the potential in revolutionary events to promote Soviet ideological interests, both abroad and at home. The Soviets view the revolutionary processes in the Caribbean basin and elsewhere in the Third World in the context of the world-wide struggle between capitalism and communism. These conflicts, Soviet officials maintain, are " tipping " the global balance of power " in favour of the socialist camp."

Politics

The Soviet Union's most important political objective in the basin is to foment and encourage forces and regimes which it considers anti-imperialist. Because the Soviets view the region as the strategic rear or internal security zone of the United States, their policy has been cautious, and until not long ago, it respected in action if not in word the Monroe Doctrine. This attitude changed in 1960 when Khrushchev stated that " the Monroe Doctrine has outlived its times " and that the US acceptance of the Cuban revolution was proof that it had died a " natural death." Soviet officials have repeatedly restated this position. Still, owing to a number of constraints, Soviet strategy in the Caribbean continues to be cautious and subtle. The choice of means is dictated by internal, national conditions, which vary from country to country in the region, and by a number of external factors, the most important of which is the state of Soviet-American relations.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s the Soviets have further conceptualized and perfected their anti-imperialist strategy in the Caribbean basin. Soviet sources suggest that the Soviets have categorized four distinct kinds of regimes in the Caribbean: (a) " revolutionary," pro-Soviet, Leninist regimes or revolutionary regimes following a Leninist

[5] A. I. Stroganov described the political regimes in Nicaragua and (pre-invasion) Grenada as " the new popular-democratic statehood " (" *novaya narodno-demokraticheskaya gosudarstvennost'* "), *Latinskaya Amerika*, No. 5, May 1983, p. 134.

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course—i.e., Soviet clients; (b) capitalist, yet " progressive," " anti-imperialist " regimes that are basically friendly towards the Soviet Union and willing to stand up to US " imperialism "; (c) capitalist, " liberal-bourgeois " regimes that depend on the United States; and (d) " reactionary," " right-wing " regimes, generally not liked yet supported by the United States.

(a) Revolutionary regimes

This first class of regimes consists of Soviet clients such as Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada (before October 1983). These regimes are either developing along Leninist lines or, in the case of Cuba, have already achieved a Leninist identity. The Soviets support these regimes by giving political, economic, and military aid, and advisory assistance. The Soviet Union's political and economic support and arms transfers to Nicaragua and Grenada (before October 1983) are patterned after its relationship with Cuba and indicate the Soviets' faith in the eventual Leninist transformation of these countries.

(b) Progressive regimes

These non-Leninist regimes in the Caribbean basin, such as Mexico and Panama (particularly under General Omar Torrijos), for a variety of reasons have conducted policies independent of and sometimes contrary to those of the United States. Because of their size, large population, plentiful resources, or strategic location, they are seen as important nations worthy of being courted. The Soviet Union and Cuba do not support armed insurgency in these countries but rely exclusively on political and, to a lesser degree, economic instruments to maintain cordial relations and gain additional influence. (In both Mexico and Panama, however, the Soviets and Cubans coordinate the activities of communist parties and insurgents from other Caribbean basin nations.)

(c) Liberal-bourgeois regimes

In dealing with the democratic regimes of larger countries which have plentiful natural resources and policies independent of those of the United States (Venezuela), revolutionary means, including armed insurgency, are not entirely excluded by the Soviets and Cubans, though legal means of gaining influence are preferred. Yet, in such less significant countries as Costa Rica, Colombia (before 1982) and Jamaica, and perhaps the Dominican Republic, the Soviets feel they have little to lose by supporting or at least not opposing Cuban aid to the revolutionary groups in these countries. This difference represents an important readjustment in Soviet thinking from the late 1960s and 1970s when the Soviets seemed to prey only on " right-wing " regimes. Now " liberal-bourgeois " regimes—those with strong ties to the United States and those which do not have important economic resources—are also potential targets for revolutionary tactics. The fact that Cuba, and not the Soviet Union, *appears* to be the main coordinator of insurgent activities in these

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countries has enabled the Soviets to continue, though in a more limited fashion, diplomatic and economic relations with Costa Rica and Colombia.

(d) Reactionary regimes

Soviet policy towards what the Soviets call reactionary regimes—those which are traditionally anti-communist—is to promote violent revolutionary tactics, including, since the early 1980s, acts of terrorism. The regimes of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, which are hostile towards the Soviet Union and Cuba, should be overthrown, if possible. Backed by the Soviets, the Cubans have played a pivotal role by uniting splinter movements and have provided a minimum of arms and training to insurgents in these countries. A case in point is El Salvador, a country which is viewed by the Soviets as strategically important and potentially revolutionary. In El Salvador in May 1980 the pro-Soviet Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) endorsed—with Soviet backing—violent revolution. Such a shift was extremely significant since the Soviets and the PCES had broken in the past with those party leaders who advocated such a policy. The PCES chief Shafik Handal's search for arms in the USSR and in allied countries corresponded to this policy change.

The continuation, scope, and intensity of Soviet support aimed at overthrowing reactionary regimes depends on available opportunities and the perceived costs and risks of such a strategy in terms of domestic conditions in these countries and the overall state of Soviet-American relations. Although Cuba is apparently an autonomous actor in the coordination and support of armed insurgency, such activity is not possible without continuous Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba and its new clients in Nicaragua and Grenada, as well as Soviet strategic coordination through local communist parties.

Security

Another important component of Soviet policy-making regarding Central America and the Caribbean is the security issue. One Soviet security objective is gradually and cautiously to secure access to and maintain naval facilities in the Caribbean basin so as to project Soviet power while undermining that of the United States and its allies. Thus far, however, Soviet military presence in the region is limited by the lack of facilities and logistical support necessary for the permanent deployment of a fleet. To date, the only significant Soviet military presence is in Cuba. It includes modern docks and repair facilities; airport facilities for reconnaissance aircraft; satellite stations and the most sophisticated intelligence facilities (outside the Soviet Union) for monitoring US satellite and microwave conversations, US ship and air movements, and advanced NATO weapons testing in the Atlantic. Soviet naval activities in the area, including regular visits by warships, until now have seemed rather scaled down in comparison with US naval visits to areas in Western Europe close to the Soviet Union. These visits are mainly designed to legitimize the

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Soviet naval presence. The Soviets deploy not only warships but also intelligence, merchant, oceanographic, space supporting, salvage and rescue, and fishing vessels.

Undoubtedly, the Soviets would like to upgrade and expand their naval presence in the Caribbean. This desire is indicated by Soviet plans to make permanent use of the facilities at Cienfuegos—plans which were partly shelved in 1970 because of vociferous US protests. Unfettered, the Soviet Union is likely to establish additional naval facilities in the region in order to create a stronger and more permanent military presence than it now has. This trend is suggested by recent Soviet tactics in Nicaragua and Grenada (before October 1983), which have the most anti-imperialist credentials in the region.

The second Soviet security objective is to develop close military ties with new client regimes through arms transfers and other forms of military cooperation. The Soviet arms transfers to Cuba serve as a model for this kind of activity. Soviet modernization of Cuba's armed forces with sophisticated weapons has made them, both in terms of size and equipment, the most formidable force in the Caribbean basin, with the exception of the United States. Although the Cubans do not have sufficient air- and sealift or amphibious assault capabilities to conduct their own invasion of any Central American country or large island nation such as Jamaica, they could offer " fraternal " aid to such small islands as Grenada.

Obviously, the essentially defensive Cuban navy cannot challenge US naval power in the Caribbean basin. Yet, in case of US confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf or Europe, Cuba, which the Soviets view as their " aircraft carrier,"[6] could constrain US mobility and capacity to respond, causing delays in US deployment.

The third Soviet security objective is to become a major military supplier to the " anti-imperialist forces " in the basin; in this regard the Soviet arms transfer to Cuba serves as a precedent for the arms transfers to Nicaragua and Grenada. In Central America the arms race began with the Sandinistas' planned military build-up from 1979 to 1980.[7] This issue is important, since it deflates the argument that the Nicaraguan military build-up was merely a response to the Reagan Administration's tough policies. More than any other factor, the Soviet-Cuban arms transfer to Nicaragua has destabilized the region. The supply of heavy tanks, in particular, which are not included in the inventory of Nicaragua's neighbours Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, has fuelled this race. While by the end of 1982, the Nicaraguan armed forces could count at least several dozen T-54 and T-55 tanks in their arsenal, the Central American nations combined possessed approximately 20 small Sherman and Scorpion tanks. Seventy Soviet MiGs are reportedly waiting in Cuba

[6] Victor Belenko, in John Barron, *MiG Pilot: Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko* (Reader's Digest Press, New York, 1980), p. 65.

[7] *Washington Post* transcript of the interview with Miguel Balanos Hunter at the Heritage Foundation, 16–17 June 1983.

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for the return of Nicaraguan pilots who are receiving flight instruction in Bulgaria. The large-scale deliveries of sophisticated weapons to Nicaragua from the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as from France and Algeria, is accompanied by the Sandinistas' efforts to build with Cuban and Soviet advisers one of the largest standing armies in Central America. The Nicaraguan armed forces have already grown from 8,000 under Somoza to 25,000 (not including 4,000 security forces and 50,000 militia reserves). This latter number already exceeds the level needed for Nicaraguan self-defence. If realized, the goal of 50,000 will exceed the combined strength of the armed forces of Nicaragua's neighbours. The USSR and Cuba have also unsuccessfully tried to establish a foothold on the minuscule, yet strategically located island of Grenada. Their arms transfer to Grenada similarly followed the Cuban arms transfer model, though, at this early stage, on a much smaller scale.

Finally Nicaragua, like Cuba, may soon serve as an important transit centre for guerrilla warfare experts. In Nicaragua dozens of Soviet and several thousand Cuban military and advisers are building an intelligence service and running advanced training programmes for guerrillas destined for El Salvador and other countries in the region. These operations are more significant than they initially appeared, since the guerrilla movement in Central America can be sustained and exported more easily from Nicaragua than from Cuba. Indeed, between October 1980 and February 1981, Nicaragua became the staging centre for a large Cuban effort to coordinate and support a major offensive in El Salvador.

Economics

Economic objectives play a more minor role in Soviet strategy in Central America. In 1983 Soviet trade, investment and credits are confined to Cuba, Mexico, Costa Rica, and the new clients, Nicaragua and Grenada. Since they generally must pay for imports in hard currency, the Soviets do not view the Caribbean as economically attractive. Most Soviet exports are bound for South American countries, especially Brazil and Argentina, which accounted for 60 per cent of total Soviet exports to South America in 1979. In Central America Soviet trade is minimal.

However, the presence of vital natural resources, particularly in Mexico and Venezuela, has doubtless spurred interest in the basin. The Soviets are presently working with the Mexicans on long-term cooperation in oil matters and may be interested in similar agreements with other oil producers in the region. Mexico has also agreed to supply crude oil to Cuba and, in the future, to assist Cuba's oil exploration efforts. Meanwhile, Venezuela supplies some oil to Cuba. Eastern bloc trade and economic aid to Soviet client regimes—Cuba and Nicaragua—certainly reinforce the Soviets' strategy in the area.

IN attempting to divine future trends in Soviet and Cuban relations towards the Caribbean basin one must consider the following factors.

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Opportunities for Exerting Influence

Soviet and Cuban policies towards the Caribbean basin were unobstructed before October 1983. Until then the Nicaraguan and Grenadian revolutionary regimes had marshalled significant economic aid from the Soviet Union and its allies. In stark contrast to the slow economic recovery in the industrial world, the Caribbean basin faces seriously deteriorating socio-economic conditions. As in the past, this situation could precipitate radicalization, thereby encouraging Soviet and Cuban activity. Such an eventuality cannot be excluded even in a country with democratic traditions such as Jamaica or the Dominican Republic. With the possible exception of Haiti, where poverty is accompanied by severe political repression, the likelihood of revolutionary upheaval is smaller in the Caribbean islands than in Central America. This is certainly the Soviet belief. The Soviets view Central America as the " weakest link " in the chain of " imperialist domination."

Perhaps the success in Nicaragua has led the Soviets and Cubans to overestimate the revolutionary potential in El Salvador. Certainly up until the autumn of 1983, the periodic guerrilla offensives in El Salvador failed to spark a popular insurrection of the kind seen in Nicaragua, in part because of some rather significant differences in the respective political development of the two countries. Nicaragua's revolution was genuine in that it expressed the will of a popular majority by overthrowing the hated Somoza dictatorship. El Salvador's revolution is less legitimate. Until recently, both the Soviets and the Cubans committed their resources to the rebel cause regardless of the returns that warranted such an investment. In other countries like Costa Rica and Columbia, Cuban support for the unpopular guerrillas has damaged diplomatic relations.

In countries located in the northern tier of Central America—El Salvador, Guatemala, and, to a lesser degree, Honduras—the deep socio-economic decay is especially pronounced. Even those countries in the southern tier face severe economic difficulties (particularly Costa Rica), making them candidates for future social upheaval. Other littoral countries in the basin, like Mexico, where there has been little or no violence thus far, are also worrisome. The recent Mexican economic crisis, which has imposed additional hardships on the already impoverished masses, could lead to great unrest, radical shifts in Mexican policy, and new waves of immigration to the United States. New revolutionary upheaval in Surinam on the South American coast may yet be exploited by the Soviets and Cubans. The most immediate and critical problem in 1983 is the almost warlike situation on Nicaragua's border with Honduras and the dangerous arms race in the region.

Relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba

During the remainder of the 1980s any differences probably will not create serious fissures in the Soviet-Cuban alliance, as happened in

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1962–68. The Soviet-Cuban alliance precludes any meaningful rapprochement between Cuba and the United States. In response to two different overtures from US policy-makers, Cuban leaders indicated clearly the impossibility of breaking their alliance with the Soviets. In the past, US moderation—as manifested by America's conciliatory approach towards Cuba in 1975 and again in 1977 and America's acceptance of the violent overthrow of Somoza's regime—in 1979—did not lead to appreciable changes in Soviet and Cuban policies. The 1975 overture preceded the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola; the one in 1977 was followed by intervention in Ethiopia; and US moderation in Nicaragua in 1979 was followed by a more assertive Cuban stance in El Salvador.

The Soviet-Cuban alliance has produced tangible benefits for both countries. Moscow has an indispensable ally willing to deploy troops or coordinate insurgency activities in strategic areas of the Third World. Moscow has made enormous ideological, political, security, and economic investments in Cuba. To turn its back on Castro's regime now would seriously undermine Soviet strategy in Africa and Central America. Likewise, Soviet security, economic and political support is essential to Cuba. Cuba is too dependent on the Soviet Union to alter the relationship and still too committed to revolutionary change. Castro can ill afford to abandon the revolution; to forgo alliance with the Soviet Union and to move closer to the United States would undermine the very rationale of Castro's regime. Short of an improbable anti-Castro *coup*, there is little opportunity to weaken Soviet-Cuban relations in the 1980s. Even Castro's death would not induce profound changes in Cuban policy. His replacement by the second in command, Raul Castro, would only result in Cuba's increased subservience to the Soviet Union.

Soviet and East European Internal Politics

As in the past, Soviet strategy in the Caribbean basin in the 1980s will be influenced by Soviet and East European domestic politics and economic conditions. Overall economic and political conditions in the Soviet Union and Cuba are not propitious for large aid commitments or new revolutionary undertakings. So far, however, the Soviets and East Europeans have reinforced Cuba's pivotal role[8] and have given significant economic support to Nicaragua and Grenada (prior to October 1983).

Unlike Cuba, the Soviet Union is a superpower with global responsibilities and obligations not only to its clients in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, but also, and primarily, to its "allies" in Eastern Europe, where economic conditions are deteriorating. Bankruptcy and unrest in Poland, as well as the continuing war in Afghanistan, have already forced the Soviets to focus more of their attention on their own strategic backyard.

In addition, these problems of instability were enhanced by the death

[8] Economic and military cooperation is also accomplished by new methods such as the recent exchange of tens of thousands of Cuban workers for Czechoslovak military equipment and economic aid.

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of Brezhnev in November 1982 and the attendant period of political succession in the USSR. Although Yurii Andropov has swiftly consolidated power in the Politburo, his position is still challenged and his health is as poor as Brezhnev's was in the late 1970s.

The cumulative effect of all these conditions may restrain the Soviets in the Caribbean basin for a few years. To be sure, it would be overly optimistic to conclude that the Soviets will terminate the arms transfers and economic support necessary for the survival of existing revolutionary regimes in the region. The Soviet Union's support for Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada, in fact, has intensified in the early 1980s. Soviet economic support for Cuba alone is estimated at $8 million per day, and this figure is believed to be low. Annually this amounts to $3 billion, approximately 25 per cent of Cuba's gross domestic product or roughly five times the total US aid to Latin America. In years to come, the Soviets are likely to be cautious about supporting struggling guerrillas (in El Salvador and Guatemala) because of a preoccupation with their own domestic and East European problems. The Soviets, who determine the limits of Cuban assertiveness, may moderate future Cuban activities while waiting for new, low-risk opportunities.

The Correlation of Forces between the Superpowers

The final and most crucial consideration in Soviet strategic planning in the 1980s will be the overall balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States and, within this framework, US willingness and ability to respond to Soviet ventures in the Caribbean and elsewhere.

The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980 was indicative of a shift in the American public's mood. As privately acknowledged by some Soviet analysts, the series of Soviet military interventions between 1975 and 1980 contributed to his election. Rightly or wrongly, both the Soviets and Cubans view President Reagan as an unpredictable hard-liner. President Carter, though also perceived as unpredictable, was considered less dangerous than his successor, whose stance in the Caribbean basin was displayed early in the 1980 presidential campaign when he threatened to retaliate against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by blockading Cuba. The Cuban effort to coordinate and time the guerrilla offensive in 1980–81 in El Salvador, Colombia and Costa Rica during the transition from Carter to Reagan was probably no coincidence. The three-pronged offensive was a means of " beating Reagan to the draw," i.e., preempting his proclaimed tough response to Cuban activities in the Caribbean basin and placing him in what might have been an embarassing position during and shortly after the delicate transitional period.

Although President Reagan has yet to weave his Caribbean policies into a coherent strategy, his policies thus far have made the basin a major issue in East-West relations, causing some moderation of Soviet and Cuban revolutionary tactics in the region. The Reagan Administration wisely did not rule out the use of a blockade or other kinds of military

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force against Nicaragua. However, in 1981–82 the Administration engaged in some unnecessary talk which, because it was confrontational and at the same time unaccompanied by action, lost some of its effectiveness. The swift invasion of Grenada, however, by the United States and East Caribbean nations in October 1983 may signal to the Soviets and Cubans the limits of US tolerance of their encouragement of the Leninist forces in the Caribbean basin.

Since 1980 the Soviets have increased their military and economic aid to existing revolutionary regimes and have continued to cultivate " anti-imperialist " trends in Mexico and Panama. US support for Great Britain in the Falkland Islands war of 1982 enabled the Soviets and the Cubans to exploit the heightened anti-Americanism in Latin America. As a result of this war, US efforts to work with the Argentines to cope with the situation in Central America were spoiled.

The Soviets will proceed cautiously in the Caribbean so as not to provoke the United States in the next few years. They realize that they are unable to intervene militarily on a large scale in the Caribbean basin. At present their only military option is diversionary activity close to their periphery (in West Berlin or the Persian Gulf)—options which could lead to nuclear confrontation with the United States. The Soviets have already shown restraint in allowing US navy ships to check the cargo of Soviet ships destined for Nicaragua in August 1983. By the same token, Soviet high officials have repeatedly stressed that they support Nicaragua and other Leninist forces in the Caribbean "*politically in every way.*"[9] The same is true about El Salvador where the Soviets are even more reluctant to provide direct military aid to the guerrillas, and in Grenada where the Soviets were unable to oppose the US military invasion. This behaviour contrasts sharply with the Soviet pattern of behaviour on their own periphery which was highlighted by the recent Soviet shooting down of a South Korean airliner.

Overall, any bold changes in Soviet strategy can be expected to wait until the results of the 1984 presidential election. Should a candidate less decisive or less committed to curbing Soviet expansionism be elected, one can expect the Soviets and Cubans to take advantage by instigating another round of well-planned offensives.

DUE to the Caribbean basin's geographic proximity, the United States has vital security interests in the area. The basin constitutes a key passage zone for oil and other vital raw materials from Guatemala, Venezuela and the Caribbean islands to the United States, as well as for all seagoing vessels using the Panama Canal. About 1.1 billion tons of cargo pass through the Caribbean annually, of which almost half originates in ports of the US Gulf Coast. Doubtless the region would assume crucial strategic importance if the United States were engaged in

[9] As Yurii Fokin, a high official in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in an interview on Radio Havana on 13 Aug. 1983 (*FBIS*, Latin America, 5 Aug. 1983).

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an overseas conventional war. A growing Soviet-Cuban military presence in the basin could endanger logistical support for US allies in Europe and the delivery of oil and other strategic materials to the United States. The United States does have a military option in the Caribbean basin; however, its military involvement in the basin has already placed a burden on US resources and strained both US domestic policies and international connections.

The task of US policy-makers in the 1980s is to develop a counter-strategy which would multiply and intensify the constraints on Soviet and Cuban activities in the Caribbean basin. First, the United States should establish unambiguous "red lines" beyond which it will not tolerate Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Caribbean and on the Pacific side of the ithsmus. These guide-lines should provide for measures against the deployment of offensive weapons, such as medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, or the construction of permanent facilities for Soviet submarines. The Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement worked out after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the 1970 Nixon-Brezhnev understanding reached after the Cienfuegos incident provide some precedents for establishing such boundaries. The Soviets should be made to realize that disregard for these limits in Cuba, Nicaragua, or elsewhere in the region is unacceptable.

Obviously, the Soviet and East European arms transfer to the Nicaraguan army does not pose the same direct national security threat as did the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba. However, a permanent and growing Soviet military presence, even of a conventional type, or naval facilities in the basin cannot be ignored. US toleration of a significant Soviet military presence in Grenada or Nicaragua could facilitate a similar build-up elsewhere in the area. If the phenomenon is accepted in one locale, it will become difficult to oppose in the others. The spread of Soviet military facilities in geographic proximity to the United States could make a significant difference in wartime by tying up US forces needed in other theatres. US security depends on the ability to prevent the military involvement of extra-hemispheric powers in countries on its southern flank. The United States cannot condone such involvement and must be prepared to use force to prevent hostile military alliances at its periphery. New Leninist regimes like Cuba, with strong military ties with the USSR, must be considered a security threat to the United States.

The United States, however, should distinguish Soviet-Cuban fomented strife in the region and revolutionary situations that are indigenous to the countries. Carter's decision not to rescue Somoza's dictatorship was correct in that the opposition to Somoza was internal, vehement, and widespread. To regret this decision for its possible linkage to recent developments in Nicaragua is to ignore the unpredictable consequences of revolutions. Each revolution must be judged independently. At times, US policy-makers feel compelled to give military and economic aid to right-wing authoritarian military regimes when such governments are undermined by Soviet and Cuban support for opposing

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revolutionary forces. In deciding whether to lend US military support, the red lines or limits of tolerance may not always apply.

Should the United States consider a military response if the influx of Soviet and Cuban military advisers and the conventional arms transfers to Leninist forces in the Caribbean basin continue, reaching critical proportions? Doubtless such a response must be considered. In doing so, US policy-makers need to weigh carefully the potential benefits and adverse effects of military action on the American public, which remains opposed to the use of US combat troops. The public's attitude was reflected in late 1982 when both houses of the US Congress voted in favour of an amendment to the Department of Defence budget barring the use of government funding for groups seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Any protracted deployment of combat forces in the Caribbean basin, specifically Grenada, may still be opposed by Congress. More important, deployment may cause domestic polarization that, in turn, could undermine US efforts to counterbalance the Soviet strategic and conventional build-up elsewhere in the world.

There are other possible military measures that can strengthen long-term US policies in the Caribbean basin. The United States should continue to expand its naval presence in the Caribbean. For example, the United States could construct new naval and air facilities to monitor movements in the Caribbean basin; provide continuous surveillance of the Pacific coast of Nicaragua and El Salvador as long as civil war in the latter country continues; assign permanent forces to the US military command in the Caribbean; and schedule regular deployments of a US aircraft carrier battle group in the basin. The navy should increase air surveillance operations and conduct more calls to Caribbean countries to demonstrate the American presence. Finally, if possible, the US navy could hold more regular surface combatant task group exercises.

In short, the United States should heed the writings of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov and Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, both of whom stress the use of naval power in peacetime to further political objectives. The United States has successfully conducted regular deployments in the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean for quite some time. A regular schedule of bilateral and multilateral exercises with its Latin American allies could be initiated along similar lines. Naval exercises with amphibious landings should be made periodically to show foe and friend alike the viability of US power. Indeed, the large US naval exercises which are being conducted off Nicaragua's shores appear to have some initial impact on the perceptions of Soviet and Cuban leaders who are now pressing for peace talks in Central America. In light of advanced Soviet weapons transfers to Cuba and lately to Nicaragua, the United States has little choice but to arm friendly regimes in the Caribbean basin.

As long as Soviet support for revolutionary forces does not cross the limits of US tolerance, political and economic means should be used to counter Soviet and Cuban strategy in the Caribbean. In the political sphere, the United States can play upon future tactical differences

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between the Soviet Union and Cuba, the Soviet Union and Nicaragua, and Nicaragua and Cuba. In this regard, the establishment of Radio Marti would be a step forward, since Nicaragua and Cuba are vulnerable to criticism via US broadcasts regarding treatment of their dissidents and lack of respect for human rights. A wide-ranging cultural and scholarly exchange programme could be initiated to demonstrate the failures of the Cuban political and economic systems and Cuba's dependency on the Soviet Union.

US policy-makers could provide military and economic aid and support to opposition forces which seek to overthrow or destabilize regimes that have developed or intend to develop military ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba. Military and economic aid should be further upgraded to countries such as El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.

WHAT is most essential for a successful and sensitive US policy towards the Caribbean basin is an understanding and appreciation of the region's historical, political, economic, and social diversity. The United States can no longer ignore the complex nature of the various conflicts in the basin. As argued earlier, the present crisis in the Caribbean cannot be attributed solely to Cuban and Soviet interference. Socio-economic polarization and the decay of specific political and economic structures have triggered the rise of internal and intra-regional conflict as have the oppressive policies of right-wing regimes in the region. A resolution of these conflicts calls for a major political and economic programme which discourages the excesses of both the Right and the Left and supports beleaguered and often weak democratic forces.

Like Poland, Cuba and Nicaragua are among the world's most indebted nations. Both (particularly Cuba with a $3.5 billion debt to the West) are presently bankrupt in spite of Soviet economic aid. In a dramatic policy shift, reflecting the seriousness of its economic situation, Cuba launched a plan in 1981 to attract foreign investors. This development provides the United States with an opportunity to use positive and negative economic incentives to further peaceful change. Similar to credits to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the US government should do its utmost to coordinate Western credit policies towards Cuba and Nicaragua. The United States should try to ease Castro's and the Nicaraguan junta's financial difficulties only if Cuba and Nicaragua agree to curb significantly their support for revolutionary activities in the Caribbean. The United States should indicate to the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua, as well as East European countries, that moderate policies will be rewarded.

An important instrument of US policy aiming in the long run at constraining Soviet and Cuban strategy, is economic leverage. The Reagan Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which included emergency aid for El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic totalling $350 million, as well as preferential, duty-free treatment of exports and significant tax incentives to attract

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American investors, was an important step, but only a moderate one, towards a much needed massive economic programme. The CBI is a small package in comparison with the Soviet aid programme to Cuba and Soviet-Cuban aid to Nicaragua, which includes not only funding but also great numbers of personnel. Unfortunately, even obtaining approval for the CBI was a major undertaking in terms of US domestic politics.

The US domestic opposition to the CBI clearly suggests that the development of a successful US counter-strategy in the Caribbean basin presupposes: (1) overcoming the protectionist mentality of any Americans regarding foreign aid, which is a vital national interest; and (2) the continued and unhampered recovery of the US economy.

As argued above, the main problems of the Caribbean basin are miserable living conditions, hunger and unemployment which, in turn, invite violence and revolution. If unresolvd, the socio-economic problems in the Central American isthmus, exacerbated by current US economic difficulties, might engulf the United States in a conflict of overwhelming dimensions. For the Soviets and Cubans the continuation of these socio-economic problems will provide additional opportuities for their own self-serving roles in the Caribbean basin. It would be a tragedy and a failure for Western democracies to allow the Soviets to champion the cause of political and economic justice, while, in the long run, furthering the political, military and social objectives of totalitarianism. Successful containment of Soviet initiatives in the Caribbean basin depends on the more equitable distribution of wealth and burdens among the nations of the region. What is required is a balanced approach to the problems which can prevent the widening of the conflict in the basin and its exploitation by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

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Obituaries

We regret the deaths of these contributors to and friends of SURVEY:

Raymond Aron (1905–1983)
David Footman (1895–1983)
Henry ("Scoop") Jackson (1912–1983)
Arthur Koestler (1905–1983)
Jiri Lederer (1920–1983)
Leonard Schapiro (1908–1983)

Raymond Aron
The Sage of a Generation

THE Aron that we knew was unknown. He was a very imposing man. His body was gnarled, his gestures vigorous, his features noble and well defined. His face was illuminated by the bluest of eyes which set into motion the heavy eyelids and quivering eyebrows, so as to veil them or make them twinkle. His chin was strong, his mouth like the thrust of a sabre, his cheeks sunken. But an enchanting smile would often set ablaze his energy and express (his gaze now becoming endearing) the most charming gentleness and, to his friends, the most irresistible goodness.

I do not know how France saw him on the occasion of his last appearances on television. Ourselves, we were touched by his intelligent face, with its transparent spirituality, a face the like of which has not been seen since the Age of Enlightenment. We found it very beautiful.

By " we," I mean those who closed ranks around him at the end of the 1960s. Raymond Aron conducted an open seminar then. The wounded souls of intellectual France flocked to it: the survivors of the questionable battles of those years, battles which were fought under the banner of various " isms "—not just of Marxism. We came for the performance. You had missed a truly great performance if you had not seen Raymond Aron take the floor, after someone had delivered a confused and obscure speech, full of the currently fashionable jargon. He would express in a few words what the speaker had vainly been trying to say for a whole hour, then he would analyse the question again, propose the right answer, only to criticise his own reply as inadequate, and, finally, put the question in genuinely philosophical terms, as it should have been formulated in the first place. I doubt whether in the present generation there will be anyone who could be compared with him.

It was not, however, for this that we loved him best. One can pass a man by, yet if one sees right inside him, he is infinitely greater than his works, important or useful as they might be. What attracted us to Raymond Aron was the ethic of his thought. The first commandment of the intellectual is to love the truth. He followed this point scrupulously: he never tired of seeking, thinking and speaking the truth. At the age of 70

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he could be seen frequenting the libraries, comparing various editions of Clausewitz in order to shed more light on him, behaving just like a student feverishly preparing a learned thesis. He expressed this truth in a style that was simple, or, better still, in that superb voice of his, full of copper tones and, when necessary, of bronze. He preferred the truth to honours, to career, if need be to public acceptance, and indeed to friendships. It was this that offered us a cure, even more than his ideas and his books.

He loved the truth and truth loved him in return. It spoke through him, sometimes through him alone. As we know, it was his talent, or rather the essence of his charisma, not to be wrong. In the long run the French recognized this and quite recently even consented to be thankful to him. Our nation has often been led astray and into error; in politics it takes lightly decisions which it later regrets. Aron has held a sort of court of truth for over 50 years. He did not cease informing, predicting, warning, alerting, and, while advising, he never lost courage. He will be compared with the orators of Greece and Rome. He was magnanimous in his lucidity. Yet, he who understood so much, could not understand why he was hardly understood at all. He always avoided hatred and contempt.

Recently, after committing a political misjudgment the consequences of which, by no means fully played out yet, are distressing, our nation turned to him in great numbers as to the last moral authority, and as though they foresaw that he would not be in their possession for much longer. *Le Spectateur Engagé* was the first book that influenced a wider audience. Aron's *Mémoires*, in which he took stock of his life and drew up the balance-sheet of his performance as an intellectual court of justice when he was at his zenith, were for Paris the occasion to honour him, like a Voltaire, as someone who had done it a lot of good. This was long overdue and it made him very happy. Providence was kinder to him still. It let him die on his feet, as he wished to die and as he had lived; he died leaving the Palais de Justice where, always faithful to the incorruptible truth, he had just testified to it in a court of law.

Alain Besançon

Leonard Schapiro Sovietologist Extraordinary

SOON after the shock of the death of an old friend and contributor to *Survey*, Raymond Aron, came the sudden death of Leonard Schapiro who collaborated with the magazine almost from its inception.

Leonard Schapiro was a very special friend. He was generally regarded as the foremost specialist on Soviet affairs not only in Britain, but all over the world. He was always ready to help, to advise and to write the articles I so often requested, even when he was very busy with his research, his teaching and the preparation of his books.

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Leonard was my teacher and a personal friend for over 30 years. It is difficult to convey his qualities of mind and character in a short note in which, inevitably, the real person may appear as just an abstract enumeration of his virtues and achievements.

Leonard was quite exceptional both as an individual and as a scholar. He was gentle and yet had very firm opinions. When, for instance, he reviewed books of which he was critical, the criticism as a rule took a rather mild form, while unmistakable in its pointed accuracy.

All who remember him would concur that he was a true gentleman. His role in developing Soviet studies in this country and abroad is generally acknowledged. His books and his students all over the world testify to this. For *Survey* he was not just a member of its Editorial Board, but a very active patron throughout practically the entire period of its existence. I often consulted him and sought his help and he was generous to a fault with his time, his intellect and his assistance. I collaborated with him on the LSE seminar on Soviet and East European affairs which he established three decades ago. The discussions there were among some of the best sources of enlightenment on the subject, and the speakers—a steady reservoire of contributors to *Survey*.

Leonard took part in innumerable symposia and conferences where his remarkable knowledge of Russian literature and Soviet history and politics was always a special asset and, unlike so many academics, he never indulged in " diplomatic scholarship "; he was always direct in expressing his beliefs, he did not fudge the issues.

He took his intellectual position seriously. Like Aron, he was concerned with unvarnished truth. He would not compromise with changing fashions in Sovietology, he was steadfast in his convictions which were based on a profound understanding of the phenomenon of totalitarianism in this century. His studies of it were among the best to have appeared in our time, foremost among them of course his classical *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*.

He was originally a lawyer, but his view of international affairs was not tinged by the usual *déformation professionelle* of looking at them just from the perspective of legalistic formalism, so common among lawyers. At the same time, nobody could be more emphatic than he was about the importance of law, or more regretful about the lack of genuine legal institutions in the Soviet system. He regarded the absence of a *Rechtstsaat* and of the " due process of law " as incompatible with the very notion of civilization. Not for him a *tentation totalitaire*: he was always liberal, in the old-fashioned sense of the word, in his views.

His sense of history prevented him from accepting any of the modish methods of analysis of Soviet and communist affairs: positivistic behaviourism or abstract system-analysis. He was too knowledgeable for that. He was an important obstacle to the deterioration of Soviet studies through political and/or methodological confusion. His influence in this respect was, I believe, greater than that of any other person in this field, indeed his was one of the most important voices of realism and sanity.

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For many years Leonard's failing health worried his friends, but he had looked fragile for a long time and one had hoped that he would always go on as before. After his retirement, he continued to work at the LSE and was as active as ever. His characteristic profile, his sallow complexion, his sense of the ridiculous were there as they had always been. Although his silhouette had become even more bent with time, his spirit was still lucid, his judgment unimpaired and his productivity undiminished.

He had just finished a new book and he was writing an article on the Andropov period for *Survey* when I spoke to him recently. We had met at a dinner a few days before his death. On Tuesday came the news of his stroke. Mercifully he did not suffer long.

We have lost a fine man and a Soviet analyst extraordinary.

Leopold Labedz

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

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